area handbook series 

Uganda 

a country study 



Uganda 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Rita M. Byrnes 
Research Completed 
December 1990 



On the cover: A crested crane, the national symbol 



Second Edition, First Printing, 1992. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Uganda : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Rita M. Byrnes. — 2nd ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-74) 

"Supersedes the 1969 edition of Area handbook for Uganda 
coauthored by Allison Butler Herrick, et al." — T.p. verso. 
"Research completed December 1990." 
Includes bibliographical references (pp. 245-270) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0749-6 

1. Uganda. I. Byrnes, Rita M., 1943- . II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Area handbook for 
Uganda. IV. Series. V. Series: DA pam ; 550-74. 
DT433.222.U35 1992 92-513 
967.61— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-74 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/ Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of Al- 
lison Butler Herrick, Saone Baron Crocker, Sidney A. Harrison, 
Howard J. John, Susan R. MacKnight, and Richard F. Nyrop, 
who wrote the 1969 first edition of Uganda: A Country Study. The 
present volume incorporates portions of their work. 

The authors are grateful to numerous individuals in various 
government agencies and private institutions who generously shared 
their time, expertise, and knowledge about Uganda. These peo- 
ple include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country 
Studies/ Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army. 
None of these individuals is in any way responsible for the work 
of the authors, however. 

The authors also wish to thank those who contributed directly 
to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Sandra W. 
Meditz, who reviewed all textual and graphic materials and served 
as liaison with the sponsoring agency; Richard F. Nyrop, who re- 
viewed several of the chapters; Marilyn Majeska, who managed 
editing and production; Reed Isbel, who edited the chapters; 
Laverle Berry, who updated chapters and helped prepare the 
manuscript for prepublication review; Tim Merrill, who helped 
select illustrations and draft maps; and Barbara Edgerton, Janie L. 
Gilchrist, and Izella Watson, who did the word processing. Beverly 
Wolpert performed the final prepublication editorial review, and 
Joan C. Cook compiled the index. Linda Peterson and Malinda B. 
Neale of the Library of Congress Printing and Processing Section 
performed phototypesetting, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

David P. Cabitto provided invaluable graphics support. Har- 
riett R. Blood prepared the topography map, and Greenhorne and 
O'Mara prepared the other maps, all of which were reviewed by 
David P. Cabitto. The charts were prepared by David P. Cabitto, 
who also deserves special thanks for designing the illustrations for 
the book's cover and chapter title pages. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the individuals 
and public and private agencies who allowed their photographs to 
be used in this study. They are indebted especially to those who 
contributed work not previously published. John A. Rowe also is 
due special thanks for providing several historical photographs. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xi 

Country Profile xiii 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

John A. Rowe 

HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND SOCIAL DIVISIONS 4 

UGANDA BEFORE 1900 5 

Early Political Systems 6 

Long-Distance Trade and Foreign Contact 9 

THE COLONIAL ERA 13 

The Issue of Independence 16 

Power Politics in Buganda 18 

INDEPENDENCE: THE EARLY YEARS 20 

MILITARY RULE UNDER AMIN 25 

UGANDA AFTER AMIN 31 

The Interim Period, 1979-80 31 

The Second Obote Regime, 1981-85 33 

The Return of Military Rule, 1985 35 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 39 

Rita M. Byrnes 

PHYSICAL SETTING 42 

Location and Size 42 

Land Use 42 

Mountains 42 

Lakes and Rivers 45 

Climate 46 

POPULATION 47 

Size 47 

Composition and Distribution 47 

ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND LANGUAGE 49 

Eastern Lacustrine Bantu 51 

Western Lacustrine Bantu 55 

Eastern Nilotic Language Groups 60 



vii 



Western Nilotic Language Groups 66 

Central Sudanic Language Groups 68 

Foreigners 69 

RELIGION 70 

World Religions 72 

Local Religions 74 

Millenarian Religions 76 

SOCIAL CHANGE 77 

WOMEN IN SOCIETY 81 

EDUCATION 83 

The School System 84 

Teachers 87 

Educational Finance 88 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 88 

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 89 

Health Care 90 

Social Welfare 92 

Chapter 3. The Economy 95 

Nancy Clark 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 98 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 100 

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 101 

Direct Economic Involvement 103 

Budgets 104 

Rehabilitation and Development Plan 106 

LABOR FORCE 107 

AGRICULTURE 108 

Crops 110 

Livestock 117 

Fishing 120 

Forestry 122 

INDUSTRY 123 

Energy 123 

Manufacturing 125 

Mining 128 

TOURISM 128 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 130 

Rail and Road Systems 130 

Air Transport 131 

Communications 133 

BANKING AND CURRENCY 134 

Banking 134 

Domestic Credit 134 



vm 



Currency and Inflation 136 

FOREIGN TRADE AND ASSISTANCE 137 

Foreign Trade 137 

Balance of Payments 140 

External Debt 141 

Aid 142 

Regional Cooperation 143 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 145 

Nelson Kasfir 

THE TEN-POINT PROGRAM 149 

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 152 

SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 155 

The Executive 156 

The National Resistance Council 158 

Local Administration 161 

Judicial System 165 

Elections 167 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 170 

Fears of Regional Domination 171 

Buganda and the Kingship 172 

Political Parties 175 

Surprise Political Tactics 177 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 178 

Regional Organizations 180 

Kenya and Tanzania 181 

Uganda's Other Neighbors — Sudan, Rwanda, 

and Zaire 184 

Britain 187 

The United States 188 

Israel 189 

The Soviet Union 190 

Chapter 5. National Security 193 

Thomas P. Ofcansky 

NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 195 

MILITARY HISTORY 196 

Early Development 196 

World War I 198 

World War II 199 

NATIONAL SECURITY SINCE INDEPENDENCE 200 

The First Obote Regime: The Growth of 

the Military 200 

Idi Amin and Military Rule 202 



ix 



The Second Obote Regime: Repression Continues . . . 204 

The Rise of the National Resistance Army 206 

THE ARMED FORCES IN SOCIETY 210 

Constitutional Authority 211 

Defense Spending 211 

Military Strength 212 

Military Service 212 

Veterans 214 

Kadogos 214 

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE 216 

Foreign Assistance in the 1960s and 1970s 216 

Foreign Assistance in the 1980s 218 

EXTERNAL SECURITY CONCERNS 220 

Zaire 220 

Sudan 222 

Kenya 223 

Rwanda 224 

INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES 226 

Early Development 226 

Postindependence Security Services 227 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 230 

Prison System 232 

Patterns of Crime and the Government's 

Response 233 

HUMAN RIGHTS 233 

Appendix. Tables 237 

Bibliography 245 

Glossary 271 

Index 275 

List of Figures 

1 Internationally Recognized Administrative Divisions, 1990 . . xx 

2 Locally Recognized Administrative Divisions, 1990 xx 

3 Topography and Drainage 44 

4 Population by Age and Sex, 1989 48 

5 Major Ethnic Groups 50 

6 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Fiscal Year 1989 . 102 

7 Major Transportation Routes, 1990 132 

8 Structure of Resistance Councils and Executive Committees, 

1990 164 



x 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a con- 
cise and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic, 
and military aspects of contemporary Uganda. Sources of infor- 
mation included scholarly books, journals, and monographs; offi- 
cial reports of governments and international organizations; foreign 
and domestic newspapers; and numerous periodicals. Chapter bib- 
liographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some 
of the more valuable sources suggested as possible further reading 
appear at the end of each chapter. Place-names follow the system 
adopted by the United States Board on Geographic Names. Mea- 
surements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is 
provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric 
measurements (see table 1, Appendix). A glossary is also included. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Decem- 
ber 1990. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated: the Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- 
curred since the information cutoff date; the Country Profile in- 
cludes updated information as available; and the Bibliography lists 
recently published sources thought to be particularly helpful to the 
reader. 



xi 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Uganda. 
Short Form: Uganda. 
Term for Citizens: Ugandan(s). 
Capital: Kampala. 

Date of Independence: October 9, 1962, from Britain. 

Geography 

Size: 241,139 square kilometers, including 44,000 square kilometers 
of open water or swampland. 

Topography: Mostiy plateau that slopes gendy toward north, with 
central downwarp occupied by Lake Kyoga. Mountains on east 



xiii 



and west. Highest peak of Mount Stanley is Margherita (5,113 
meters). Approximately one-half of Lake Victoria (10,200 square 
kilometers) lies within Uganda and is source of Nile River. 

Climate: Equatorial climate, moderated by altitude. Annual rainfall 
varies from more than 2,100 millimeters around Lake Victoria to 
about 500 millimeters in northeast. Vegetation heaviest in south; 
thins to savanna and dry plains in northeast. 

Society 

Population: In 1990, 16.9 million (government estimate); annual 
growth rate more than 3.2 percent, increasingly tempered by im- 
pact of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Nearly one- 
half population under age fifteen. Nearly 10 percent urban, almost 
half in Kampala. Density varies from more than 120 inhabitants 
per square kilometer in far southeast and southwest to fewer than 
30 inhabitants per square kilometer in north-central region. 

Languages: Three major language families found in Uganda — 
Bantu, Central Sudanic, and Nilotic. Lake Kyoga rough bound- 
ary between Bantu-speakers in south and Nilotic- and Central 
Sudanic-speakers of north. Official language: English. Swahili and 
Arabic also widely spoken. 

Religion: 66 percent Christian, equally divided between Roman 
Catholics and Protestants; largest Christian denomination Angli- 
can (Episcopal). About 15 percent Muslim. Remainder tradition- 
al or no religion. 

Education: Education not compulsory but highly regarded. Four 
levels: primary of seven years; lower secondary of three or four 
years; upper secondary of two years; and postsecondary consist- 
ing of university, teachers' colleges, or commercial training. Pupils 
share expenses with central government on primary and lower 
secondary levels; thereafter, education free. 1989 primary enroll- 
ment more than 2.5 million; secondary, 265,000. Adult literacy 
rate 50 percent or more. 

Health: Large number of infectious diseases, including measles, 
pertussis, respiratory tract infections, anemia, tetanus, malaria, 
and tuberculosis. Incidence of AIDS quite high, reaching epidemic 
proportions in southern areas. Uganda had 20,000 hospital beds, 
more than 600 health centers, and about 700 doctors in late 1980s. 
Low expenditures on health care and facilities. Life expectancy in 
1989 about fifty- three years. 



xiv 



Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): USh995.6 billion, or about 
US$4.9 billion in FY 1989; per capita income USh60,7112, or about 
US$304. About 44 percent of GDP originates outside monetary 
economy. 

Currency: Uganda shilling (USh). USh510 = US$l, official ex- 
change rate, late 1990; parallel market rate USh700 = US$l. 

Government Budget: UShl69.26 billion in FY 1990, including 
deficit of USh57.91 billion. 

Fiscal Year (FY): July 1 to June 30. 

Agriculture: Agricultural activity in monetary sector constituted 
about 26 percent of GDP and 95 percent of export revenues; in 
addition, agriculture accounted for over 90 percent of nonmone- 
tary economic activity. Cash crops: coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco. 
Food crops: plantains, cassava, sweet potatoes, millet, sorghum, 
corn, beans, peanuts. Fishing important for domestic consump- 
tion. Forest areas cover 7.5 million hectares; being rapidly depleted 
despite attempts at regulation. 

Energy: Electric generating plants at Owen Falls and Murchison 
(Kabalega) Falls; some oil in western Uganda. 

Industry: Mostly processing of agricultural produce and produc- 
tion of textiles, wood and paper products, cement, chemicals. Small 
part of GDP in late 1980s, with much unused capacity. 

Mining: Formerly 9 percent of exports; output nil in late 1980s, 
except for construction materials such as sand and gravel. 

Tourism: Third largest source of foreign exchange until destroyed 
by civil war and unrest during 1970s; slowly reviving in late 1980s. 

Exports: Coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco. Coffee chief export crop and 
foreign exchange earner. 

Imports: Machinery, military equipment and supplies, construc- 
tion materials, oil, vehicles, medical supplies. 

Major Trading Partners: Exports to United States and Western 
Europe; imports from Kenya, Britain, Germany, Italy. 

Transport and Telecommunications 

Roads: Total of 27,000 kilometers, 6,000 all-weather, 1,800 paved. 
All areas of country accessible by road; condition of roads poor. 
Road repair government priority. 



xv 



Railroads: Total of 1,240 kilometers, in state of severe disrepair. 
Chief transport link with Indian Ocean ports. Rehabilitation under- 
way in late 1980s. 

Civil Aviation: Five airports with paved runways, major one at 
Entebbe. Litde domestic or international service by Uganda Airlines 
in late 1980s. Complete reorganization and rebuilding in process. 

Ports: Two inland ports, Jinja and Port Bell, both on Lake Victoria. 

Telecommunications: 61,600 telephones, 9 television stations, 10 
AM radio stations; radio-relay systems for long-distance surface 
communications; international service via Atlantic Ocean and In- 
dian Ocean International Telecommunications Satellite Corpora- 
tion (Intelsat) links. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Legal basis of government 1967 constitution modi- 
fied by decrees of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) after 
1986. The National Resistance Council (NRC) wields supreme 
authority and power as interim government expected to last until 
January 1995. Resistance councils (RCs) exist on district, county, 
subcounty, parish, and village levels, each elected by council mem- 
bers of next lower level and by universal suffrage at village level. 

Administrative Divisions: Uganda divided into 34 districts, 150 
counties, and 129 municipal governing units. 

Courts: Legal and court systems heavily influenced by British com- 
mon law and practice, supplemented by Islamic law and customary 
institutions and laws. Supreme Court of Uganda highest court, 
below which are series of appeals courts; civil disputes in hands 
of local resistance committees. 

Politics: Two main parties, Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and 
Democratic Party (DP) . Organized political activity suspended in 
1986. In February 1989, elections held for all resistance councils, 
including some seats on NRC. 

Foreign Relations: Nonaligned foreign policy; enthusiastic sup- 
porter of African and regional economic and political cooperation. 
President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni elected chair of Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) in July 1990. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: No official figures available, but strength of Na- 
tional Resistance Army (NRA) estimated at 70,000. Recruitment 
voluntary; no fixed term of service, both men and women serve. 



xvi 



Defense Spending: About USh6.9 billion, or US$40.68 million, 
in FY 1989. Consumes 35 percent or more of national budget. 

Military Organization: Information on organization and com- 
position not officially available. Combat units: six brigades, several 
battalions, and Police Air Wing. 

Major Military Suppliers: Britain (training), Tanzania (train- 
ing), Libya (training and equipment), Soviet Union (equipment), 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) (training 
and equipment), United States (training). 

Security Forces: In 1986 NRA assumed responsibility for inter- 
nal security. Police force reorganized and together with other in- 
ternal security organs began to enforce law and order in all districts 
except those experiencing rebel activity in late 1989. Controlled 
by Ministry of Internal Affairs. In late 1980s, receiving training 
from Britain, France, and North Korea. Numbered 20,000 by early 
1991. 



xvii 




Figure 2. Locally Recognized Administrative Divisions, 1990 



xx 



Uganda had been brought into the world economic system gradu- 
ally over the centuries, first through trade in ivory, and later through 
trade in slaves and agricultural products. In the early twentieth 
century, colonial officials, with the help of Baganda (people of 
Buganda; sing., Muganda) agents, established cash crops, espe- 
cially cotton, and later coffee, to help finance economic develop- 
ment according to world market demands. Buganda prospered and 
drew farm workers from other areas of the protectorate. Buganda' s 
schools also developed ahead of those in other regions, helping fuel 
existing rivalries between the Baganda and their neighbors. 

Agricultural production increased dramatically during World 
War I, and during the 1920s and 1930s, farmers were able to 
weather the fluctuations in world market prices by cutting cash- 
crop production and reverting to subsistence agriculture. Protec- 
torate laws carefully regulated the use of land and other resources, 
often allocating economic rights according to racial categories. Pro- 
tests against such restrictions increased after World War II, but, 
unlike much of Africa, Uganda was preparing peacefully for in- 
dependence well before it arrived. 

At independence in October 1962, ethnic and regional rivalries 
were crystallized in several newly formed political parties and in 
the federal system that gave substantial autonomy to the four large 
kingdoms in the south, plus the highly centralized society of Busoga. 
The central government maintained control over the northern 
region. The army flourished under the first independent govern- 
ment led by Milton Obote and pressed its demands for higher pay 
and improved conditions of service. A military coup in 1971, 
however, plunged Uganda into eight years of terror and disintegra- 
tion under the government of Idi Amin. Uganda's once-developing 
economy disintegrated, and its once- thriving education system 
suffered lasting damage. Government- sanctioned brutality became 
commonplace. Many of Uganda's intellectuals and entrepreneurs 
were forced to flee. A brief but tumultuous political transition fol- 
lowed the nightmare of the Amin years, and the early 1980s be- 
came a time of revenge- seeking and despair under the second 
government led by Milton Obote. Growing rebellions finally forced 
Obote from office in 1985, but Ugandans had little cause for con- 
fidence in their political future. 

The government led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni that seized 
power in January 1986 had not inspired overwhelming public 
confidence in its ability to rule. Museveni's National Resistance 
Army (NRA), however, had shown greater military discipline than 
other armed forces in recent years, and Museveni declared that 



xxn 



establishing a peaceful and secure environment was his highest pri- 
ority as president. For this goal, Museveni had strong popular 
backing. 

The NRA's hastily formed political arm, the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM), set out its political program in the Ten-Point 
Program, which advocated a broad-based democracy and a hier- 
archy of popular assemblies, or resistance councils (RCs), from the 
village through district levels to mediate between the national 
government and the village. After initial doubts about embracing 
Western economic reforms, the NRM also embarked on ambitious 
structural adjustment and export diversification programs. Mu- 
seveni took seriously the notion of accountability in government 
service and set about improving standards of behavior among 
public-sector employees. 

But the NRM had few politically educated people in its ranks, 
and Museveni's policy of appointing members of previous govern- 
ments to high office cost him political support. In addition, the 
NRM's political ideas were new and lacked support in the north- 
ern and eastern regions, where popular insurgencies continued to 
plague his rule even after six years in power. And the army, with 
its intense recruitment drives and policy of incorporating former 
rebel opponents into its ranks, was unable to eliminate the human 
rights abuses for which it had become infamous. Campaigns to 
pacify and stabilize rebel-occupied areas turned into army assaults 
on peaceful residents of the north and east, and the judicial sys- 
tem was slow to deal with those accused of serious atrocities. At 
the same time, the cost of maintaining the military escalated rapidly, 
and pressures to reduce the size of the army posed the dilemma 
of escalating unemployment among former members of the military. 

Since research on this volume was completed in 1990, the govern- 
ment has continued its program of political reform in an effort to 
meet its own deadline for returning to civilian rule by 1995. 
Progress, however, has been slow. The central institutions of grass- 
roots democracy, the RCs, improved their ability to function as 
part of the government, but in some areas the RCs' exact respon- 
sibilities were not well understood. In a few cases, their efforts to 
maintain order degenerated into vigilantism. 

A twenty-one-member constitutional commission appointed in 
1988 completed its nationwide consultations in late 1991, but it 
postponed submitting a draft constitution to the government until 
November 1992. The government also planned a nationwide 
referendum on the draft constitution in mid- 1993. 

Nationwide RC elections, held from February 29 to March 9, 
1992, were generally considered a success. Voters in more than 



xxin 



30,000 villages elected RCs for their villages, and indirect elections 
were held for RC members at the parish, subcounty, county, and 
district levels. Partisan campaigning and explicitly soliciting votes 
were legally prohibited; candidates who violated this prohibition 
were disqualified, although candidates were able to use other 
avenues to make their views known. In several areas, staunch critics 
of the government were elected to the RCs, confirming the 
widespread belief that the elections were generally free and fair. 
About half of the incumbent RC members were removed from 
office, and several members of the national legislature lost in elec- 
tions for village RCs. 

In a few areas, such as Bushenyi, elections were delayed because 
of conditions caused by religious feuding, political violence, or the 
spreading drought. In a few localities, election irregularities led 
to the annulment and rescheduling of the balloting. But when the 
votes were counted, more than 400,000 Ugandans had been elected 
to various levels of political office, and the new office-holders 
represented nearly every ethnic, religious, and political identity in 
the country. The next elections were planned for late 1994, when 
the government pledged it would provide secret ballots and the 
direct election of legislators at all levels. 

Despite well-publicized human rights abuses by the military that 
continued through early 1991, President Museveni's New Year's 
message for 1992 emphasized his commitment to improving this 
record. By mid- 1992, the courts had begun to hear the cases of 
eighteen prominent northern politicians who had been accused of 
treason in April 1991, and charges against several of the accused 
had been dropped. The government had disciplined soldiers for 
human rights abuses in unsettled areas of the north and east, and 
the army response to the unrest was more restrained in 1992. An 
inspector general of government (IGG) was appointed to serve as 
a "watchdog" on government, but the incumbent's effectiveness 
was undermined by the IGG's large caseload and the fact that the 
inspector general served at the president's pleasure. 

The government declared northern Uganda "pacified" in late 
1991 , following a three-month-long army sweep that included house- 
to-house searches in Gulu, Lira, Kitgum, and Apac districts. Resi- 
dents were asked to produce poll tax receipts and other documents 
to prove their identity. In some cases, civilians were assaulted, and 
a few were executed for failing to comply. 

Museveni also attempted to bring order to Uganda's foreign re- 
lations. He met in Nairobi with Kenyan president Daniel T. arap 
Moi and Tanzanian president Ali Hassan Mwinyi in late 1991, 
and they agreed to develop closer ties among the three countries. 



xxiv 



Relations with Kenya had been strained, primarily because of con- 
tinuing clashes along their common border. Most of the attacks 
were provoked by banditry and cross-border skirmishes among iso- 
lated groups of soldiers or herders, but the two leaders harbored 
mutual suspicions of one another. Moi feared Museveni's close ties 
with Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi could contribute to destabili- 
zation in Kenya, where ethnic and political tensions were already 
high. (This fear probably diminished, however, following Libya's 
reported June 1992 termination of its military relationship with 
Uganda.) The three leaders agreed to coordinate policies in secu- 
rity, trade, transportation, agriculture, and industry, and to pur- 
sue other avenues for regional cooperation. 

Relations with Rwanda remained strained as of mid- 1992. Fight- 
ing continued along the Uganda-Rwanda border following the Oc- 
tober 1990 invasion of Rwanda by Rwandan exiles in Uganda. 
Many members of the invading rebel army, the Rwandan Patri- 
otic Front (RPF), had been members of the Ugandan army. Rwan- 
dan president Juvenal Habyarimana continued to accuse Museveni 
of allowing, and even supporting, RPF operations from Ugandan 
territory, and Rwandan forces struck back across the border several 
times in 1991 and early 1992. Ugandan officials estimated that 
several thousand Ugandans had been killed, and more than 30,000 
displaced, by the conflict. Representatives of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), along with officials from Rwanda, Burundi, 
Tanzania, and Zaire, met several times in 1991 and 1992 and urged 
the warring parties to observe the ceasefire agreed to in March 1991 , 
but fighting continued as of mid- 1992. 

Unrest in Zaire arising out of economic deterioration and a stale- 
mate over political reform also contributed to the security crisis 
in southwestern Uganda in 1992. Ugandan officials claimed more 
than 20,000 Zairian refugees had entered Uganda, seeking refuge 
from marauding Zairian troops and antigovernment rebel banditry. 

In northern Uganda, similar problems arose out of civil war and 
drought conditions in Sudan. In 1991 and 1992, Sudanese army 
assaults on antigovernment rebel units near the Ugandan border 
were forcing southern Sudanese to seek refuge in the increasingly 
drought- stricken area of northern Uganda, and in a few cases 
Sudanese attacks extended into Ugandan territory. 

The influx of refugees strained an already struggling Ugandan 
economy. Uganda's overall economic growth continued in 1992, 
but fell from the impressive rate of nearly 6 percent in 1990 and 
almost 5 percent in 1991 to a projected 4.5 percent in 1992. The 
government attributed the positive performance to the nation's 
returning political stability and an increasingly favorable investment 



xxv 



environment. Foreign assistance also continued to play a signifi- 
cant role in economic growth. Inflation fell from triple-digit levels 
to about 25 percent in 1990 but rose to 38 percent in 1991. Tar- 
geted inflation for 1992 was 15 percent. 

The fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1992 budget included total 
government spending of 674.35 billion Uganda shillings (USh; for 
value of the Uganda shilling — see Glossary), or about US$911.3 
million, of which the government claimed defense spending would 
constitute about 20 percent. Educational expenditures would con- 
stitute 12 percent; health care, 6.5 percent; 3 percent was earmarked 
for providing safe drinking water. Roughly one- third of expendi- 
tures were to be financed by government revenues; one- third by 
foreign grants; and one-third by borrowing, debt rescheduling, and 
the sale of treasury bills. 

Agricultural growth reached 2.8 percent in 1991 and was ex- 
pected to exceed that in 1992. Cotton production doubled in 1991 
over 1990 levels; production of tea and tobacco also increased. 
Coffee earnings fell to about US$140 million in 1991 — largely the 
result of the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement, which 
had regulated world market prices — but coffee still accounted for 
about 70 percent of merchandise export earnings. Nontraditional 
export earnings, although small in comparison with traditional ex- 
ports, doubled between 1990 and 1992 to more than US$50 mil- 
lion, largely because of government support programs that included 
low-interest loans and expanded credit opportunities to encourage 
the production of a wider variety of agricultural products. 

Nevertheless, Uganda's trade deficit remained high in 1991, with 
imports roughly three times the value of exports. Combined with 
high interest payments, the unfavorable trade deficit produced a 
current account deficit of almost US$500 million. Debt service re- 
quirements reached roughly 75 percent of export earnings, with 
arrears mounting steadily. Most of Uganda's external debt was 
owed to multilateral creditors and therefore could not be re- 
scheduled. 

The government continued to implement features of the 1987-91 
economic rehabilitation program, such as liberalizing the market- 
ing of agricultural produce. In 1992 a few coffee producers' groups 
were handling coffee marketing, although the government's Coffee 
Marketing Board remained active. In early 1992, the government 
introduced an auction system for allocating foreign exchange on 
the basis of market dictates rather than government selection among 
importers. To help improve Uganda's investment climate, the 
government also began restoring to its original owners the property 



xxvi 



that had been expropriated during the 1970s, and negotiating com- 
pensation in a few other cases. 

The government announced that it would privatize, at least in 
part, 100 of the country's 116 public enterprises and eliminate 16 
parastatals. It would retain majority shares in commercial bank- 
ing; copper mining; housing; airlines; breweries; grain milling; 
pharmaceutical distribution; steel and cement production; textile 
and sugar manufacturing; and the marketing of coffee, cotton, and 
most agricultural produce. Private investors, including foreigners, 
would be able to purchase shares in companies in which the govern- 
ment was a major shareholder. The government planned to retain 
full ownership of electric utilities, railroads, air cargo services, de- 
velopment finance banking, posts and telecommunications, insur- 
ance agencies, tourist agencies, and newspaper publishing. To 
improve accountability among these enterprises, it intended to 
reduce the number of political appointments and increase its over- 
sight of recordkeeping practices. 

Civil service reform was also an important goal for the early 
1990s. With the elimination of "ghost" employees from govern- 
ment rolls in mid- 1991, the number of public employees outside 
the education sector was reduced from 90,000 to roughly 64,000, 
and teachers' rolls were reduced to roughly 80,000. The salaries 
of remaining government employees were increased, some by as 
much as 40 percent, after these payroll cuts were announced. 

Uganda continued to experience a devastating epidemic of in- 
fection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), despite government and 
private-sector initiatives to reduce the rate of transmission and the 
impact of the disease. In 1991 the internationally funded AIDS 
Information Center (AIC) in Kampala began the first free, anony- 
mous HIV testing and counseling program in sub- Saharan Africa. 
The AIC planned to test 280,000 Ugandans by mid-1993. After 
it had conducted 30,000 tests, the center recorded seropositive rates 
of approximately 26 percent, but the total number of AIDS cases 
nationwide could not be estimated with certainty. The government 
established the AIDS Commission Secretariat to coordinate AIDS 
prevention strategies nationwide. Government officials and medi- 
cal and social workers met in Kampala in mid- 1992 to address the 
needs of the several hundred thousand children who had been or- 
phaned by the AIDS epidemic. 

Despite significant progress and ambitious planning, Uganda 
faced serious economic and political problems in 1992. Lingering 
insurgency campaigns in the north and east, increased defense 
spending, and serious military abuses reinforced one another to 



xxvn 



erode public confidence. The government's commitment to eco- 
nomic development provided hope of improved living standards, 
but the combined economic and security problems, along with the 
effects of two decades of neglect of education and social services, 
led many people to question whether Museveni could deliver on 
his pledge to restore broad-based democracy to Uganda. 

June 15, 1992 Rita M. Byrnes 



xxviii 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



The baobab tree, ancient symbol of the African plains 



UGANDA WAS ONE of the lesser-known African countries un- 
til the 1970s when Idi Amin Dada rose to the presidency. His bi- 
zarre public pronouncements — ranging from gratuitous advice for 
Richard Nixon to his proclaimed intent to raise a monument to 
Adolf Hitler — fascinated the popular news media. Beneath the fa- 
cade of buffoonery, however, the darker reality of massacres and 
disappearances was considered equally newsworthy. Uganda be- 
came known as an African horror story, fully identified with its 
field marshal president. Even a decade after Amin's flight from 
Uganda in 1979, popular imagination still insisted on linking the 
country and its exiled former ruler. 

But Amin's well-publicized excesses at the expense of Uganda 
and its citizens were not unique, nor were they the earliest assaults 
on the rule of law. They were foreshadowed by Amin's predeces- 
sor, Milton Obote, who suspended the 1962 constitution and ruled 
part of Uganda by martial law for five years before a military coup 
in 1971 brought Amin into power. Amin's bloody regime was fol- 
lowed by an even bloodier one — Obote 's second term as president 
during the civil war from 1981 to 1985, when government troops 
carried out genocidal sweeps of the rural populace in a region that 
became known as the Luwero Triangle. The dramatic collapse of 
coherent government under Amin and his plunder of his nation's 
economy, followed by the even greater failure of the second Obote 
government in the 1980s, raised the essential question — "what went 
wrong? ' ' 

At Uganda's independence in October 1962 there was little in- 
dication that the country was headed for disaster. On the contrary, 
it appeared a model of stability and potential progress. Unlike neigh- 
boring Kenya, Uganda had no European settler class attempting 
to monopolize the rewards of the cash-crop economy. Nor was there 
any recent legacy of bitter and violent conflict in Uganda to com- 
pare with the 1950s Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. In Uganda it 
was African producers who grew the cotton and coffee that brought 
a higher standard of living, financed the education of their chil- 
dren, and led to increased expectations for the future. 

Unlike neighboring Tanzania, Uganda enjoyed rich natural 
resources, a flourishing economy, and an impressive number of 
educated and prosperous middle-class African professionals, includ- 
ing business people, doctors, lawyers, and scientists. And unlike 
neighboring Zaire (the former Belgian Congo), which descended 



3 



Uganda: A Country Study 

into chaos and misrule immediately after independence, Uganda's 
first few years of self-rule saw a series of successful development 
projects. The new government built many new schools, modern- 
ized the transportation network, and increased manufacturing output 
as well as national income. With its prestigious national Makerere 
University, its gleaming new teaching hospital at Mulago, its Owen 
Falls hydroelectric project at Jinja — all gifts of the departing Brit- 
ish — Uganda at independence looked optimistically to the future. 

Independence came without a struggle and was caused by Brit- 
ish actions as much as it was a response to an indigenous in- 
dependence movement. The British determined a timetable for 
withdrawal before local groups had organized an effective nation- 
alist movement. Uganda's political parties emerged in response to 
impending independence rather than as a means of winning it. 

In part the result of its fairly smooth transition to independence, 
the near absence of nationalism among Uganda's diverse ethnic 
groups led to a series of political compromises. The first was a 
government made up of coalitions of local and regional interest 
groups loosely organized into political parties. The national govern- 
ment was presided over by a prime minister whose principal role 
appeared to be that of a broker, trading patronage and develop- 
ment projects — such as roads, schools, and dispensaries — to local 
or regional interest groups in return for political support. It was 
not the strong, directive, ideologically clothed central government 
desired by most African political leaders, but it worked. And it 
might reasonably have been expected to continue to work, because 
there were exchanges and payoffs at all levels and to all regions. 

Historical Legacies and Social Divisions 

As Uganda's first prime minister, Obote displayed a talent for 
acting as a broker for groups divided from each other by distance, 
language, cultural tradition, historical enmities, and rivalries in 
the form of competing religions — Islam, Roman Catholicism, and 
Protestantism. 

Observers with a powerfully developed sense of hindsight could 
point to a series of divisions within Ugandan society that contributed 
to its eventual national disintegration. First, the language gulf 
between the Nilotic-speaking people of the north and the Bantu- 
speaking peoples of the south was as wide as that between speak- 
ers of Slavic and of Romance languages in Europe. Second, there 
was an economic divide between the pastoralists, who occupied the 
drier rangelands of the west and north, and the agriculturalists, who 
cultivated the better- watered highland or lakeside regions. Third, 
there was a long-standing division between the centralized and 



4 



Historical Setting 



sometimes despotic rule of the ancient African kingdoms and the 
kinship-based politics of recent times, which were characterized by 
a greater sense of equality and participation. Furthermore, there 
was a historical political division among the kingdoms themselves. 
They were often at odds — as in the case of Buganda and Bunyoro 
and other precolonial polities that disputed among themselves over 
control of particular lands. There also were the historical complaints 
of particular religious groups that had lost ground to rivals in the 
past; for example, the eclipse of the Muslims at the end of the 
nineteenth century by Christians allied to British colonialism created 
an enduring grievance. In addition, Bunyoro 's nineteenth-century 
losses of territory to an expanding Buganda kingdom, allied to Brit- 
ish imperialism, gave rise to a problem that would emerge after 
independence as the "lost counties" issue. Another divisive fac- 
tor was the uneven development in the colonial period, whereby 
the south secured railroad transport, cash crops, mission educa- 
tion, and the seat of government, seemingly at the expense of other 
regions, which were still trying to catch up after independence. Con- 
flicting local nationalism (often misleadingly termed "tribalism") 
also contributed to social divisions. The most conspicuous exam- 
ple was Buganda, whose population of over one million, extensive 
territory in the favored south of Uganda, and self-proclaimed su- 
periority created a serious backlash among other peoples. The 
presence of Nubians, an alien community of professional military 
people clustered around military encampments, added to the dis- 
harmony. Nubians had been brought in from Sudan to serve as 
a colonial coercive force to suppress local tax revolts. This com- 
munity shared little sense of identification with Uganda. Another 
alien community that dominated commercial life in the cities and 
towns was composed of Asians, who had arrived with British coloni- 
al rule. Finally, the closely related peoples of nearby Belgian Con- 
go and Sudan soon became embroiled in their own civil wars during 
the colonial period, drawing in ethnically related Ugandans. 

This formidable list of obstacles to national integration, coupled 
with the absence of nationalist sentiment, left the newly indepen- 
dent Uganda vulnerable to political instability in the 1960s. It was 
by no means inevitable that the government by consensus and com- 
promise that characterized the early 1960s would devolve into the 
military near- anarchy of the 1970s. The conditions contributing 
to such a debacle, however, were already present at independence. 

Uganda Before 1900 

Uganda's strategic position along the Great Rift Valley, its fa- 
vorable climate at an altitude of 1,200 meters and above, and the 



5 



Uganda: A Country Study 

reliable rainfall in the Lake Victoria Basin made it attractive to 
African cultivators and herders as early as the fourth century B.C. 
Core samples from the bottom of Lake Victoria have revealed that 
dense rainforest once covered the land around the lake. Centuries 
of cultivation removed almost all the original tree cover. 

The cultivators who gradually cleared the forest were probably 
Bantu-speaking people, who, with their slow but inexorable ex- 
pansion, gradually populated most of Africa south of the Sahara 
Desert. Their knowledge of agriculture and use of iron technology 
permitted them to clear the land and feed ever larger numbers of 
setders. They displaced small bands of indigenous hunter-gatherers, 
who relocated to the less accessible mountains. Meanwhile, by the 
fourth century B.C., the Bantu-speaking metallurgists were per- 
fecting iron smelting to produce medium- grade carbon steel in 
preheated forced draft furnaces. Although most of these develop- 
ments were taking place southwest of modern Ugandan bound- 
aries, iron was mined and smelted in many parts of the country 
not long afterward. 

Early Political Systems 

As the Bantu-speaking agriculturalists multiplied over the cen- 
turies, they evolved a form of government by clan (see Glossary) 
chiefs. This kinship-organized system was useful for coordinating 
work projects, settling internal disputes, and carrying out religious 
observances to clan deities, but it could effectively govern only a 
limited number of people. Larger polities began to form states by 
the end of the first millennium A.D., some of which would ulti- 
mately govern over a million subjects each. 

The stimulus to the formation of states may have been the meet- 
ing of people of differing cultures. The lake shores became dense- 
ly settled by Bantu-speakers, particularly after the introduction of 
the banana, or plantain, as a basic food crop around A.D. 1000; 
farther north in the short grass uplands, where rainfall was inter- 
mittent, pastoralists were moving south from the area of the Nile 
River in search of better pastures. Indeed, a short grass "corridor" 
existed north and west of Lake Victoria through which successive 
waves of herders may have passed on the way to central and 
southern Africa. The meeting of these peoples resulted in trade 
across various ecological zones and evolved into more permanent 
relationships. 

Nilotic- speaking pastoralists were mobile and ready to resort to 
arms in defense of their own cattle or raids to appropriate the cat- 
tle of others. But their political organization was minimal, based 
on kinship and decision making by kin- group elders. In the meeting 



6 



Historical Setting 



of cultures, they may have acquired the ideas and symbols of po- 
litical chiefship from the Bantu- speakers, to whom they could offer 
military protection. A system of patron-client relationships devel- 
oped, whereby a pastoral elite emerged, entrusting the care of cat- 
tle to subjects who used the manure to improve the fertility of their 
increasingly overworked gardens and fields. The earliest of these 
states may have been established in the fifteenth century by a group 
of pastoral rulers called the Chwezi. Although legends depicted the 
Chwezi as supernatural beings, their material remains at the ar- 
chaeological sites of Bigo and Mubende have shown that they were 
human and the probable ancestors of the modern Hima or Tutsi 
(Watutsi) pastoralists of Rwanda and Burundi. During the fifteenth 
century, the Chwezi were displaced by a new Nilotic- speaking 
pastoral group called the Bito. The Chwezi appear to have moved 
south of present-day Uganda to establish kingdoms in northwest 
Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi. 

From this process of cultural contact and state formation, three 
different types of states emerged. The Hima type was later to be 
seen in Rwanda and Burundi. It preserved a caste system where- 
by the rulers and their pastoral relatives attempted to maintain strict 
separation from the agricultural subjects, called Hutu. The Hima 
rulers lost their Nilotic language and became Bantu-speakers, but 
they preserved an ideology of superiority in political and social life 
and attempted to monopolize high status and wealth. In the twen- 
tieth century, the Hutu revolt after independence led to the expul- 
sion from Rwanda of the Hima elite, who became refugees in 
Uganda. A counterrevolution in Burundi secured power for the 
Hima through periodic massacres of the Hutu majority. 

The Bito type of state, in contrast with that of the Hima, was 
established in Bunyoro, which for several centuries was the 
dominant political power in the region. Bito immigrants displaced 
the influential Hima and secured power for themselves as a royal 
clan, ruling over Hima pastoralists and Hutu agriculturalists alike. 
No rigid caste lines divided Bito society. The weakness of the Bito 
ideology was that, in theory, it granted every Bito clan member 
royal status and with it the eligibility to rule. Although some of 
these ambitions might be fulfilled by the Bunyoro king's (omuka- 
md) granting his kin offices as governors of districts, there was al- 
ways the danger of a coup d'etat or secession by overambitious 
relatives. Thus, in Bunyoro periods of political stability and ex- 
pansion were interrupted by civil wars and secessions. 

The third type of state to emerge in Uganda was that of Bugan- 
da, on the northern shores of Lake Victoria. This area of swamp 
and hillside was not attractive to the rulers of pastoral states farther 



7 



Uganda: A Country Study 

north and west. It became a refuge area, however, for those who 
wished to escape rule by Bunyoro or for factions within Bunyoro 
who were defeated in contests for power. One such group from 
Bunyoro, headed by Prince Kimera, arrived in Buganda early in 
the fifteenth century. Assimilation of refugee elements had already 
strained the ruling abilities of Buganda' s various clan chiefs, and 
a supraclan political organization was already emerging. Kimera 
seized the initiative in this trend and became the first effective king 
(kabaka) of the fledgling state. Ganda (root word and adjective for 
Buganda) oral traditions later sought to disguise this intrusion from 
Bunyoro by claiming earlier, shadowy, quasi- supernatural kabakas. 

Unlike the Hima caste system or the Bunyoro royal clan politi- 
cal monopoly, Buganda' s kingship was made a kind of state lot- 
tery in which all clans could participate. Each new king was 
identified with the clan of his mother, rather than that of his father. 
All clans readily provided wives to the ruling kabaka, who had eligible 
sons by most of them. When the ruler died, his successor was chosen 
by clan elders from among the eligible princes, each of whom be- 
longed to the clan of his mother. In this way, the throne was never 
the property of a single clan for more than one reign. 

Consolidating their efforts behind a centralized kingship, the 
Baganda (people of Buganda; sing. , Muganda) shifted away from 
defensive strategies and toward expansion. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, Buganda had doubled and redoubled its territory. Newly 
conquered lands were placed under chiefs nominated by the king. 
Buganda' s armies and the royal tax collectors traveled swiftly to 
all parts of the kingdom along specially constructed roads which 
crossed streams and swamps by bridges and viaducts. On Lake 
Victoria (which the Baganda called Nnalubale), a royal navy of 
outrigger canoes, commanded by an admiral who was chief of the 
Lungfish clan, could transport Baganda commandos to raid any 
shore of the lake. The journalist Henry M. Stanley visited Bugan- 
da in 1875 and provided an estimate of Buganda' s troop strength. 
Stanley counted 125,000 troops marching off on a single campaign 
to the east, where a fleet of 230 war canoes waited to act as aux- 
iliary naval support. 

At Buganda' s capital, Stanley found a well-ordered town of about 
40,000 surrounding the king's palace, which was situated atop a 
commanding hill. A wall more than four kilometers in circumfer- 
ence surrounded the palace compound, which was filled with grass- 
roofed houses, meeting halls, and storage buildings. At the entrance 
to the court burned the royal fire (gombolola), which would be ex- 
tinguished only when the kabaka died. Thronging the grounds were 
foreign ambassadors seeking audiences, chiefs going to the royal 



8 



Drawing of the royal capital of Buganda 
at the time of journalist Henry M. 

Stanley's visit in 1875 

advisory council, messengers running errands, and a corps of young 
pages, who served the kabaka while training to become future chiefs. 
For communication across the kingdom, the messengers were sup- 
plemented by drum signals. 

Most communities in Uganda, however, were not organized on 
such a vast political scale. To the north, the Nilotic-speaking Acholi 
people adopted some of the ideas and regalia of kingship from 
Bunyoro in the eighteenth century. Chiefs (rwots) acquired royal 
drums, collected tribute from followers, and redistributed it to those 
who were most loyal. The mobilization of larger numbers of sub- 
jects permitted successful hunts for meat. Extensive areas of bush- 
land were surrounded by beaters, who forced the game to a central 
killing point in a hunting technique that was still practiced in areas 
of central Africa in 1990. But these Acholi chieftaincies remained 
relatively small in size, and within them the power of the clans re- 
mained strong enough to challenge that of the rwot. 

Long-Distance Trade and Foreign Contact 

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Uganda remained 
relatively isolated from the outside world. The central African lake 
region was, after all, a world in miniature, with an internal trade 



9 



Uganda: A Country Study 

system, a great power rivalry between Buganda and Bunyoro, and 
its own inland seas. When intrusion from the outside world finally 
came, it was in the form of long-distance trade for ivory. 

Ivory had been a staple trade item from the East Africa coast 
since before the Christian era. But growing world demand in the 
nineteenth century, together with the provision of increasingly ef- 
ficient firearms to hunters, created a moving "ivory frontier" as 
elephant herds near the coast were nearly exterminated. Leading 
large caravans financed by Indian moneylenders, coastal Arab 
traders based on Zanzibar (united with Tanganyika in 1964 to form 
Tanzania) had reached Lake Victoria by 1844. One trader, Ah- 
mad bin Ibrahim, introduced Buganda' s kabaka to the advantages 
of foreign trade: the acquisition of imported cloth and, more im- 
portant, guns and gunpowder. Ibrahim also introduced the religion 
of Islam, but the kabaka was more interested in guns. By the 1860s, 
Buganda was the destination of ever more caravans, and the kaba- 
ka and his chiefs began to dress in cloth called mericani, which was 
woven in Massachusetts and carried to Zanzibar by American 
traders. It was judged finer in quality than European or Indian 
cloth, and increasing numbers of ivory tusks were collected to pay 
for it. Bunyoro sought to attract foreign trade as well, in an effort 
to keep up with Buganda in the burgeoning arms race. 

Bunyoro also found itself threatened from the north by Egyptian- 
sponsored agents who sought ivory and slaves but who, unlike the 
Arab traders from Zanzibar, were also promoting foreign conquest. 
Khedive Ismail of Egypt aspired to build an empire on the Upper 
Nile; by the 1870s, his motley band of ivory traders and slave raiders 
had reached the frontiers of Bunyoro. The khedive sent a British 
explorer, Samuel Baker, to raise the Egyptian flag over Bunyoro. 
The Banyoro (people of Bunyoro) resisted this attempt, and Baker 
had to fight a desperate battle to secure his retreat. Baker regarded 
the resistance as an act of treachery, and he denounced the Banyoro 
in a book that was widely read in Britain. Later British empire 
builders arrived in Uganda with a predisposition against Bunyoro, 
which eventually would cost the kingdom half its territory until the 
"lost counties" were restored to Bunyoro after independence. 

Farther north the Acholi responded more favorably to the Egyp- 
tian demand for ivory. They were already famous hunters and 
quickly acquired guns in return for tusks. The guns permitted the 
Acholi to retain their independence but altered the balance of power 
within Acholi territory, which for the first time experienced un- 
equal distribution of wealth based on control of firearms. 

Meanwhile, Buganda was receiving not only trade goods and 
guns, but also a stream of foreign visitors. The explorer J. H. Speke 



10 



Kabaka Mutesa I, 
who reigned from 1856 to 1884 




passed through Buganda in 1862 and claimed he had discovered 
the source of the Nile. Both Speke and Stanley (based on his 1875 
stay in Uganda) wrote books that praised the Baganda for their 
organizational skills and willingness to modernize. Stanley went 
further and attempted to convert the king to Christianity. Finding 
Kabaka Mutesa I apparendy receptive, Stanley wrote to the Church 
Missionary Society (CMS) in London and persuaded it to send 
missionaries to Buganda in 1877. Two years after the CMS estab- 
lished a mission, French Catholic White Fathers also arrived at 
the king's court, and the stage was set for a fierce religious and 
nationalist rivalry in which Zanzibar-based Muslim traders also 
participated. By the mid- 1880s, all three parties had been success- 
ful in converting substantial numbers of Baganda, some of whom 
attained important positions at court. When a new young kabaka, 
Mwanga, attempted to halt the dangerous foreign ideologies that 
he saw threatening the state, he was deposed by the armed con- 
verts in 1888. A four-year civil war ensued in which the Muslims 
were initially successful and proclaimed an Islamic state. They were 
soon defeated, however, and were not able to renew their effort. 

The victorious Protestant and Roman Catholic converts then 
divided the Buganda kingdom, which they ruled through a figure- 
head kabaka dependent on their guns and goodwill. Thus, outside 
religion had disrupted and transformed the traditional state. Soon 
afterwards, the arrival of competing European imperialists — the 



11 



Uganda: A Country Study 

German Doctor Karl Peters (an erstwhile philosophy professor) and 
the British Captain Frederick Lugard — broke the Christian alli- 
ance; the British Protestant missionaries urged acceptance of the 
British flag, while the French Catholic mission either supported 
the Germans (in the absence of French imperialists) or called for 
Buganda to retain its independence. In January 1892, fighting broke 
out between the Protestant and Catholic Baganda converts. The 
Catholics quickly gained the upper hand, until Lugard intervened 
with a prototype machine gun, the Maxim (named after its Ameri- 
can inventor, Hiram Maxim). The Maxim decided the issue in 
favor of the pro-British Protestants; the French Catholic mission 
was burned to the ground, and the French bishop fled. The resul- 
tant scandal was settled in Europe when the British government 
paid compensation to the French mission and persuaded the Ger- 
mans to relinquish their claim to Uganda. 

With Buganda secured by Lugard and the Germans no longer 
contending for control, the British began to enlarge their claim to 
the ' 'headwaters of the Nile, ' ' as they called the land north of Lake 
Victoria. Allying with the Protestant Baganda chiefs, the British 
set about conquering the rest of the country, aided by Nubian 
mercenary troops who had formerly served the khedive of Egypt. 
Bunyoro had been spared the religious civil wars of Buganda and 
was firmly united by its king, Kabarega, who had several regiments 
of troops armed with guns. After five years of bloody conflict, the 
British occupied Bunyoro and conquered Acholi and the northern 
region, and the rough outlines of the Uganda Protectorate came 
into being. Other African polities, such as the Ankole kingdom to 
the southwest, signed treaties with the British, as did the chiefdoms 
of Busoga, but the kinship-based peoples of eastern and northeastern 
Uganda had to be overcome by military force. 

A mutiny by Nubian mercenary troops in 1897 was only barely 
suppressed after two years of fighting, during which Baganda Chris- 
tian allies of the British once again demonstrated their support for 
the colonial power. As a reward for this support, and in recogni- 
tion of Buganda' s formidable military presence, the British negotiat- 
ed a separate treaty with Buganda, granting it a large measure of 
autonomy and self-government within the larger protectorate. One- 
half of Bunyoro 's conquered territory was awarded to Buganda as 
well, including the historical heartland of the kingdom containing 
several Nyoro (root word and adjective for Bunyoro) royal tombs. 
Buganda doubled in size from ten to twenty counties (sazas), but 
the "lost counties" of Bunyoro remained a continuing grievance 
that would return to haunt Buganda in the 1960s. 



12 



Historical Setting 

The Colonial Era 

Although momentous change occurred during the colonial era 
in Uganda, some characteristics of late-nineteenth century Afri- 
can society survived to reemerge at the time of independence. 
Colonial rule affected local economic systems dramatically, in part 
because the first concern of the British was financial. Quelling the 
1897 mutiny had been costly — units of the Indian army had been 
transported to Uganda at considerable expense. The new commis- 
sioner of Uganda in 1900, Sir Harry H. Johnston, had orders to 
establish an efficient administration and to levy taxes as quickly 
as possible. Johnston approached the chiefs in Buganda with offers 
of jobs in the colonial administration in return for their collabora- 
tion. The chiefs, whom Johnston characterized in demeaning terms, 
were more interested in preserving Buganda as a self-governing 
entity, continuing the royal line of kabakas, and securing private 
land tenure for themselves and their supporters. Hard bargaining 
ensued, but the chiefs ended up with everything they wanted, in- 
cluding one-half of all the land in Buganda. The half left to the 
British as "Crown Land" was later found to be largely swamp and 
scrub. 

Johnston's Buganda Agreement of 1900 imposed a tax on huts 
and guns, designated the chiefs as tax collectors, and testified to 
the continued alliance of British and Baganda interests. The Brit- 
ish signed much less generous treaties with the other kingdoms 
(Toro in 1900, Ankole in 1901, and Bunyoro in 1933) without the 
provision of large-scale private land tenure. The smaller chiefdoms 
of Busoga were ignored. 

The Baganda immediately offered their services to the British 
as administrators over their recentiy conquered neighbors, an offer 
that was attractive to the economy-minded colonial administration. 
Baganda agents fanned out as local tax collectors and labor organiz- 
ers in areas such as Kigezi, Mbale, and, significantly, Bunyoro. 
This subimperialism and Ganda cultural chauvinism were resent- 
ed by the people being administered. Wherever they went, Baganda 
insisted on the exclusive use of their language, Luganda, and they 
planted bananas as the only proper food worth eating. They regard- 
ed their traditional dress — long cotton gowns called kanzus — as civi- 
lized; all else was barbarian. They also encouraged and engaged 
in mission work, attempting to convert locals to their form of Chris- 
tianity or Islam. In some areas, the resulting backlash aided the 
efforts of religious rivals — for example, Catholics won converts in 
areas where oppressive rule was identified with a Protestant Mu gan- 
da chief. 



13 



Uganda: A Country Study 

The people of Bunyoro were particularly aggrieved, having 
fought the Baganda and the British; having a substantial section 
of their heartland annexed to Buganda as the "lost counties"; and 
finally having "arrogant" Baganda administrators issuing orders, 
collecting taxes, and forcing unpaid labor. In 1907 the Banyoro 
rose in a rebellion called nyangire, or "refusing," and succeeded 
in having the Baganda subimperial agents withdrawn. 

Meanwhile, in 1901 the completion of the Uganda railroad from 
the coast at Mombasa to the Lake Victoria port of Kisumu moved 
colonial authorities to encourage the growth of cash crops to help 
pay the railroad's operating costs. Another result of the railroad 
construction was the 1902 decision to transfer the eastern section 
of the Uganda Protectorate to the Kenya Colony, then called the 
East Africa Protectorate, to keep the entire railroad line under one 
local colonial administration. Because the railroad experienced cost 
overruns in Kenya, the British decided to justify its exceptional 
expense and pay its operating costs by introducing large-scale Eu- 
ropean settlement in a vast tract of land that became a center of 
cash-crop agriculture known as the "white highlands." 

In many areas of Uganda, by contrast, agricultural production 
was placed in the hands of Africans, if they responded to the oppor- 
tunity. Cotton was the crop of choice, largely because of pressure 
by the British Cotton Growing Association, textile manufacturers 
who urged the colonies to provide raw materials for British mills. 
Even the CMS joined the effort by launching the Uganda Com- 
pany (managed by a former missionary) to promote cotton plant- 
ing and to buy and transport the produce. 

Buganda, with its strategic location on the lakeside, reaped the 
benefits of cotton growing. The advantages of this crop were quickly 
recognized by the Baganda chiefs who had newly acquired free- 
hold estates, which came to be known as mailo land because they 
were measured in square miles. In 1905 the initial baled cotton 
export was valued at £2,200; in 1906, £21,000; in 1907; £211,000; 
and in 1908, £252,000. By 1915 the value of cotton exports had 
climbed to £2,369,000, and Britain was able to end its subsidy of 
colonial administration in Uganda. In Kenya, by contrast, the white 
settlers required continuing subsidies by the home government. 

The income generated by cotton sales made Buganda relatively 
prosperous, compared with the rest of colonial Uganda, although 
before World War I cotton was also being grown in the eastern 
regions of Busoga, Lango, and Teso. Many Baganda spent their 
new earnings on imported clothing, bicycles, metal roofing, and 
even automobiles. They also invested in their children's educa- 
tions. The Christian missions emphasized literacy skills, and 



14 



Historical Setting 



African converts quickly learned to read and write. By 1911 two 
popular journals, Ebifa (News) and Munno (Your Friend), were pub- 
lished monthly in Luganda. Heavily supported by African funds, 
new schools were soon turning out graduating classes at Mengo 
High School, St. Mary's Kisubi, Namilyango, Gayaza, and King's 
College Budo — all in Buganda. The chief minister of the kingdom, 
Sir Apolo Kagwa, personally awarded a bicycle to the top gradu- 
ate at King's College Budo, together with the promise of a govern- 
ment job. The schools, in fact, had inherited the educational 
function formerly performed in the kabaka' s palace, where genera- 
tions of young pages had been trained to become chiefs. Now the 
qualifications sought were literacy and skills, including typing and 
English translation. 

Two important principles of precolonial political life carried over 
into the colonial era: clientage, whereby ambitious younger office- 
holders attached themselves to older high-ranking chiefs, and gener- 
ational conflict, which resulted when the younger generation sought 
to expel their elders from office in order to replace them. After 
World War I, the younger aspirants to high office in Buganda be- 
came impatient with the seemingly perpetual tenure of Sir Apolo 
and his contemporaries, who lacked many of the skills that mem- 
bers of the younger generation had acquired through schooling. 
Calling themselves the Young Baganda Association, members of 
the new generation attached themselves to the young kabaka, Dau- 
di Chwa, who was the figurehead ruler of Buganda under indirect 
rule. But Kabaka Daudi never gained real political power, and af- 
ter a short and frustrating reign, he died at the relatively young 
age of forty- three. 

Far more promising as a source of political support were the Brit- 
ish colonial officers, who welcomed the typing and translation skills 
of school graduates and advanced the careers of their favorites. The 
contest was decided after World War I, when an influx of British 
ex-military officers, now serving as district commissioners, began 
to feel that self-government was an obstacle to good government. 
Specifically, they accused Sir Apolo and his generation of ineffi- 
ciency, abuse of power, and failure to keep adequate financial 
accounts — charges that were not hard to document. Sir Apolo 
resigned in 1926, at about the same time that a host of elderly 
Baganda chiefs were replaced by a new generation of officeholders. 
The Buganda treasury was also audited that year for the first time. 
Although it was not a nationalist organization, the Young Bagan- 
da Association claimed to represent popular African dissatisfaction 
with the old order. As soon as the younger Baganda had replaced 
the older generation in office, however, their objections to privilege 



15 



Uganda: A Country Study 

accompanying power ceased. The pattern persisted in Ugandan 
politics up to and after independence. 

The commoners, who had been laboring on the cotton estates 
of the chiefs before World War I, did not remain servile. As time 
passed, they bought small parcels of land from their erstwhile land- 
lords. This land fragmentation was aided by the British, who in 
1927 forced the chiefs to limit severely the rents and obligatory labor 
they could demand from their tenants. Thus the oligarchy of landed 
chiefs who had emerged with the Buganda Agreement of 1900 
declined in importance, and agricultural production shifted to in- 
dependent smallholders, who grew cotton, and later coffee, for the 
export market. 

Unlike Tanganyika, which was devastated during the prolonged 
fighting between Britain and Germany in the East African cam- 
paign of World War I, Uganda prospered from wartime agricul- 
tural production. After the population losses during the era of 
conquest and the losses to disease at the turn of the century (par- 
ticularly the devastating sleeping sickness epidemic of 1900-06), 
Uganda's population was growing again. Even the 1930s depres- 
sion seemed to affect smallholder cash farmers in Uganda less se- 
verely than it did the white settler producers in Kenya. Ugandans 
simply grew their own food until rising prices made export crops 
attractive again. 

Two issues continued to create grievances through the 1930s and 
1940s. The colonial government strictly regulated the buying and 
processing of cash crops, setting prices and reserving the role of 
intermediary for Asians, who were thought to be more efficient. 
The British and Asians firmly repelled African attempts to break 
into cotton ginning. In addition, on the Asian-owned sugar plan- 
tations established in the 1920s, labor for sugarcane and other cash 
crops was increasingly provided by migrants from peripheral areas 
of Uganda and even from outside Uganda. 

The Issue of Independence 

In 1949 discontented Baganda rioted and burned down the houses 
of progovernment chiefs. The rioters had three demands: the right 
to bypass government price controls on the export sales of cotton, 
the removal of the Asian monopoly over cotton ginning, and the 
right to have their own representatives in local government replace 
chiefs appointed by the British. They were critical as well of the 
young kabaka, Frederick Walugembe Mutesa II (also known as 
Kabaka Freddie), for his inattention to the needs of his people. 
The British governor, Sir John Hall, regarded the riots as the work 
of communist- inspired agitators and rejected the suggested reforms. 



16 



Kabaka Daudi Chwa, with regents (left) and 
British administrators (right) 

Far from leading the people into confrontation, Uganda's would- 
be agitators were slow to respond to popular discontent. Neverthe- 
less, the Uganda African Farmers Union, founded by I.K. Musazi 
in 1947, was blamed for the riots and was banned by the British. 
Musazi' s Uganda National Congress replaced the farmers union 
in 1952, but because the congress remained a casual discussion 
group more than an organized political party, it stagnated and came 
to an end just two years after its inception. 

Meanwhile, the British began to move ahead of the Ugandans 
in preparing for independence. The effects of Britain's postwar with- 
drawal from India, the march of nationalism in West Africa, and 
a more liberal philosophy in the Colonial Office geared toward fu- 
ture self-rule all began to be felt in Uganda. The embodiment of 
these issues arrived in 1952 in the person of a new and energetic 
reformist governor, Sir Andrew Cohen (formerly undersecretary 
for African affairs in the Colonial Office). Cohen set about preparing 
Uganda for independence. On the economic side, he removed ob- 
stacles to African cotton ginning, rescinded price discrimination 
against African- grown coffee, encouraged cooperatives, and estab- 
lished the Uganda Development Corporation to promote and 
finance new projects. On the political side, he reorganized the Legis- 
lative Council, which had consisted of an unrepresentative selection 



17 



Uganda: A Country Study 

of interest groups heavily favoring the European community, to 
include African representatives elected from districts throughout 
Uganda. This system became a prototype for the future parliament. 

Power Politics in Buganda 

The prospect of elections caused a sudden proliferation of new 
political parties. This development alarmed the old- guard leaders 
within the Uganda kingdoms because they realized that the center 
of power would be at the national level. The spark that ignited wider 
opposition to Governor Cohen's reforms was a 1953 speech in Lon- 
don in which the secretary of state for colonies referred to the pos- 
sibility of a federation of the three East African territories (Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanganyika), similar to that established in central 
Africa. Many Ugandans were aware of the Federation of Rhode- 
sia and Nyasaland (later Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi) and 
its domination by white settler interests. Ugandans deeply feared 
the prospect of an East African federation dominated by the racist 
settlers of Kenya, which was then in the midst of the bitter Mau 
Mau uprising. They had vigorously resisted a similar suggestion 
by the 1930 Hilton Young Commission. Confidence in Cohen 
vanished just as the governor was preparing to urge Buganda to 
recognize that its special status would have to be sacrificed in the 
interests of a new and larger nation-state. 

Kabaka Freddie, who had been regarded by his subjects as unin- 
terested in their welfare, now refused to cooperate with Cohen's 
plan for an integrated Buganda. Instead, he demanded that Bugan- 
da be separated from the rest of the protectorate and transferred 
to Foreign Office jurisdiction. Cohen's response to this crisis was 
to deport the kabaka to a comfortable exile in London. His forced 
departure made the kabaka an instant martyr in the eyes of the 
Baganda, whose latent separatism and anticolonial sentiments set 
off a storm of protest. Cohen's action had backfired, and he could 
find no one among the Baganda prepared or able to mobilize sup- 
port for his schemes. After two frustrating years of unrelenting Gan- 
da hostility and obstruction, Cohen was forced to reinstate Kabaka 
Freddie. 

The negotiations leading to the kabaka 's return had an outcome 
similar to the negotiations of Commissioner Johnston in 1900; 
although appearing to satisfy the British, they were a resounding 
victory for the Baganda. Cohen secured the kabaka' s agreement not 
to oppose independence within the larger Uganda framework. Not 
only was the kabaka reinstated in return, but for the first time since 
1889, the monarch was also given the power to appoint and dis- 
miss his chiefs (Buganda government officials) instead of acting 



18 



Historical Setting 



as a mere figurehead while they conducted the affairs of govern- 
ment. The kabaka? s new power was cloaked in the misleading claim 
that he would be only a "constitutional monarch," while in fact 
he was a leading player in deciding how Uganda would be governed. 
A new grouping of Baganda calling themselves the "King's 
Friends" rallied to the kabaka' s defense. They were conservative, 
fiercely loyal to Buganda as a kingdom, and willing to entertain 
the prospect of participation in an independent Uganda only if it 
were headed by the kabaka. Baganda politicians who did not share 
this vision or who were opposed to the "King's Friends" found 
themselves branded as the "King's Enemies," which meant po- 
litical and social ostracism. 

The major exception to this rule were the Roman Catholic Bagan- 
da who had formed their own party, the Democratic Party (DP), 
led by Benedicto Kiwanuka. Many Catholics had felt excluded from 
the Protestant-dominated establishment in Buganda ever since Lu- 
gard's Maxim had turned the tide in 1892. The kabaka had to be 
Protestant, and he was invested in a coronation ceremony modeled 
on that of British monarchs (who are invested by the Church of 
England's Archbishop of Canterbury) that took place at the main 
Protestant church. Religion and politics were equally inseparable 
in the other kingdoms throughout Uganda. The DP had Catholic 
as well as other adherents and was probably the best organized of 
all the parties preparing for elections. It had printing presses and 
the backing of the popular newspaper Munno, which was published 
at the St. Mary's Kisubi mission. 

Elsewhere in Uganda, the emergence of the kabaka as a political 
force provoked immediate hostility. Political parties and local in- 
terest groups were riddled with divisions and rivalries, but they 
shared one concern: they were determined not to be dominated 
by Buganda. In 1960 a political organizer from Lango, Milton 
Obote, seized the initiative and formed a new party, the Uganda 
People's Congress (UPC), as a coalition of all those outside the 
Roman Catholic-dominated DP who opposed Buganda hegemony. 

The steps Cohen had initiated to bring about the independence 
of a unified Uganda state had led to a polarization between fac- 
tions from Buganda and those opposed to its domination. Bugan- 
da' s population in 1959 was 2 million, out of Uganda's total of 
6 million. Even discounting the many non-Baganda resident in 
Buganda, there were at least 1 million people who owed allegiance 
to the kabaka — too many to be overlooked or shunted aside, but 
too few to dominate the country as a whole. It was obvious that au- 
tonomy for Buganda and a strong unitary government were incom- 
patible, but no compromise emerged, and the decision on the form 



19 



Uganda: A Country Study 

of government was postponed. The British announced that elec- 
tions would be held in March 1961 for "responsible government," 
the next-to-last stage of preparation before the formal granting of 
independence. It was assumed that those winning the election would 
gain valuable experience in office, preparing them for the proba- 
ble responsibility of governing after independence. 

In Buganda the "King's Friends" urged a total boycott of the 
election because their attempts to secure promises of future auton- 
omy had been rebuffed. Consequently, when the voters went to 
the polls throughout Uganda to elect eighty-two National Assem- 
bly members, in Buganda only the Roman Catholic supporters of 
the DP braved severe public pressure and voted, capturing twenty 
of Buganda' s twenty-one allotted seats. This artificial situation gave 
the DP a majority of seats, although it had a minority of 416,000 
votes nationwide versus 495,000 for the UPC. Benedicto Kiwanuka 
became the new chief minister of Uganda. 

Shocked by the results, the Baganda separatists, who formed a 
political party called Kabaka Yekka (KY), had second thoughts 
about the wisdom of their election boycott. They quickly welcomed 
the recommendations of a British commission that proposed a fu- 
ture federal form of government. According to these recommen- 
dations, Buganda would enjoy a measure of internal autonomy if 
it participated fully in the national government. For its part, the 
UPC was equally anxious to eject its DP rivals from government 
before they became entrenched. Obote reached an understanding 
with Kabaka Freddie and the KY, accepting Buganda' s special fed- 
eral relationship and even a provision by which the kabaka could 
appoint Buganda' s representatives to the National Assembly, in 
return for a strategic alliance to defeat the DP. The kabaka was also 
promised the largely ceremonial position of head of state of Ugan- 
da, which was of great symbolic importance to the Baganda. 

This marriage of convenience between the UPC and the KY 
made inevitable the defeat of the DP interim administration. In 
the aftermath of the April 1962 final election leading up to indepen- 
dence, Uganda's national parliament consisted of forty-three UPC 
delegates, twenty-four KY delegates, and twenty-four DP delegates. 
The new UPC-KY coalition led Uganda into independence in Oc- 
tober 1962, with Obote as prime minister and the kabaka as head 
of state. 

Independence: The Early Years 

Uganda's approach to independence was unlike that of most other 



20 



Historical Setting 



colonial territories where political parties had been organized to 
force self-rule or independence from a reluctant colonial regime. 
Whereas these conditions would have required local and regional 
differences to be subordinated to the greater goal of winning in- 
dependence, in Uganda parties were forced to cooperate with one 
another, with the prospect of independence already assured. One 
of the major parties, KY, was even opposed to independence un- 
less its particular separatist desires were met. The UPC-KY part- 
nership represented a fragile alliance of two fragile parties. 

In the UPC, leadership was factionalized. Each party function- 
ary represented a local constituency, and most of the constituen- 
cies were ethnically distinct. For example, Obote's strength lay 
among his Langi kin in eastern Uganda; George Magezi represent- 
ed the local interests of his Banyoro compatriots; Grace S.K. Ibin- 
gira's strength was in the Ankole kingdom; and Felix Onama was 
the northern leader of the largely neglected West Nile District in 
the northwest corner of Uganda. Each of these regional political 
bosses and those from the other Uganda regions expected to receive 
a ministerial post in the new Uganda government, to exercise 
patronage, and to bring the material fruits of independence to lo- 
cal supporters. Failing these objectives, each was likely either to 
withdraw from the UPC coalition or realign within it. 

Moreover, the UPC had had no effective urban organization 
before independence, although it was able to mobilize the trade 
unions, most of which were led by non-Ugandan immigrant work- 
ers from Kenya (a situation that contributed to the independent 
Uganda government's almost immediate hostility toward the trade 
unions). No common ideology united the UPC, the composition 
of which ranged from the near reactionary Onama to the radical 
John Kakonge, leader of the UPC Youth League. As prime 
minister, Obote was responsible for keeping this loose coalition of 
divergent interest groups intact. 

Obote also faced the task of maintaining the UPC's external al- 
liances, primarily the coalition between the UPC and the kabaka, 
who led Buganda's KY. Obote proved adept at meeting the diverse 
demands of his many partners in government. He even temporar- 
ily acceded to some demands that he found repugnant, such as 
Buganda's claim for special treatment. This accession led to de- 
mands by other kingdoms for similar recognition. The Busoga chief- 
doms banded together to claim that they, too, deserved recognition 
under the rule of their newly defined monarch, the kyabasinga. Not 
to be outdone, the Iteso people, who had never recognized a 
precolonial king, claimed the title kingoo for Teso District's politi- 
cal boss, Cuthbert Obwangor. Despite these separatist pressures, 



21 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Obote's long-term goal was to build a strong central government 
at the expense of entrenched local interests, especially those of 
Buganda. 

The first major challenge to the Obote government came not 
from the kingdoms, nor the regional interests, but from the mili- 
tary. In January 1964, units of the Ugandan army mutinied, de- 
manding higher pay and more rapid promotions (see The First 
Obote Regime: The Growth of the Military, ch. 5). Minister of 
Defense Onama, who courageously went to speak to the mutineers, 
was seized and held hostage. Obote was forced to call in British 
troops to restore order, a humiliating blow to the new regime. In 
the aftermath, Obote's government acceded to all the mutineers' 
demands, unlike the governments of Kenya and Tanganyika, which 
responded to similar demands with increased discipline and tight- 
er control over their small military forces. 

The military then began to assume a more prominent role in 
Ugandan life. Obote selected a popular junior officer with minimal 
education, Idi Amin Dada, and promoted him rapidly through the 
ranks as a personal protege. As the army expanded, it became a 
source of political patronage and of potential political power. 

Later in 1964, Obote felt strong enough to address the critical 
issue of the "lost counties," which the British had conveniently 
postponed until after independence. The combination of patronage 
offers and the promise of future rewards within the ruling coali- 
tion gradually thinned opposition party ranks, as members of parlia- 
ment "crossed the floor" to join the government benches. After 
two years of independence, Obote finally acquired enough votes 
to give the UPC a majority and free himself of the KY coalition. 
The turning point came when several DP members of parliament 
(MPs) from Bunyoro agreed to join the government side if Obote 
would undertake a popular referendum to restore the "lost coun- 
ties" to Bunyoro. The kabaka, naturally, opposed the plebiscite. 
Unable to prevent it, he sent 300 armed Baganda veterans to the 
area to intimidate Banyoro voters. In turn, 2,000 veterans from 
Bunyoro massed on the frontier. Civil war was averted, and the 
referendum was held. The vote demonstrated an overwhelming 
desire by residents in the counties annexed to Buganda in 1900 
to be restored to their historical Bunyoro allegiance, which was duly 
enacted by the new UPC majority despite KY opposition. 

This triumph for Obote and the UPC strengthened the central 
government and threw Buganda into disarray. KY unity was 
weakened by internal recriminations, after which some KY stal- 
warts, too, began to "cross the floor" to join Obote's victorious 
government. By early 1966, the result was a parliament composed 



22 



Historical Setting 



of seventy-four UPC, nine DP, eight KY, and one independent 
MP. Obote's efforts to produce a one-party state with a powerful 
executive prime minister appeared to be on the verge of success. 

Paradoxically, however, as the perceived threat from Buganda 
diminished, many non-Baganda alliances weakened. And as the 
possibility of an opposition DP victory faded, the UPC coalition 
itself began to come apart. The one-party state did not signal 
the end of political conflict, however; it merely relocated and in- 
tensified that conflict within the party. The issue that brought the 
UPC disharmony to a crisis involved Obote's military protege, Idi 
Amin. 

In 1966 Amin caused a commotion when he walked into a Kam- 
pala bank with a gold bar (bearing the stamp of the government 
of the Belgian Congo) and asked the bank manager to exchange 
it for cash. Amin's account was ultimately credited with a deposit 
of £217,000. Obote rivals questioned the incident, and it emerged 
that the prime minister and a handful of close associates had used 
Colonel Amin and units of the Ugandan army to intervene in the 
neighboring Congo crisis. Former supporters of Congolese leader 
Patrice Lumumba, led by a "General Olenga," opposed the 
American-backed government and were attempting to lead the 
eastern region into secession. These troops were reported to be trad- 
ing looted ivory and gold for arms supplies secretly smuggled to 
them by Amin. The arrangement became public when Olenga later 
claimed that he had failed to receive the promised munitions. This 
claim appeared to be supported by the fact that in mid- 1965, a 
seventy-five-ton shipment of Chinese weapons was intercepted by 
the Kenyan government as it was being moved from Tanzania to 
Uganda. 

Obote's rivals for leadership within the UPC, supported by some 
Baganda politicians and others who were hostile to Obote, used 
the evidence revealed by Amin's casual bank deposit to claim that 
the prime minister and his closest associates were corrupt and had 
conducted secret foreign policy for personal gain, in the amount 
of £225,000 each. Obote denied the charge and said the money 
had been spent to buy the munitions for Olenga' s Congolese troops. 
On February 4, 1966, while Obote was away on a trip to the north 
of the country, an effective "no confidence" vote against Obote 
was passed by the UPC MPs. This attempt to remove Obote ap- 
peared to be organized by UPC Secretary General Grace S.K. Ibin- 
gira, closely supported by the UPC leader from Bunyoro, George 
Magezi, and a number of other southern UPC notables. Only the 
radical UPC member, John Kakonge, voted against the motion. 



23 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Because he was faced with a nearly unanimous disavowal by his 
governing party and national parliament, many people expected 
Obote to resign. Instead, Obote turned to Idi Amin and the army, 
and, in effect, carried out a coup d'etat against his own govern- 
ment in order to stay in power. Obote suspended the constitution, 
arrested the offending UPC ministers, and assumed control of the 
state. He forced a new constitution through parliament without 
a reading and without the necessary quorum. That constitution 
abolished the federal powers of the kingdoms, most notably the 
internal autonomy enjoyed by Buganda, and concentrated presiden- 
tial powers in the prime minister's office. The kabaka objected, and 
Buganda prepared to wage a legal battle. Baganda leaders rhetor- 
ically demanded that Obote 's "illegal" government remove itself 
from Buganda soil. 

Buganda, however, once again miscalculated, for Obote was not 
interested in negotiating. Instead, he sent Idi Amin and loyal troops 
to attack the kabaka' 's palace on nearby Mengo Hill. The palace 
was defended by a small group of bodyguards armed with rifles 
and shotguns. Amin's troops had heavy weapons but were reluc- 
tant to press the attack until Obote became impatient and demanded 
results. By the time the palace was overrun, the kabaka had taken 
advantage of a cloudburst to exit over the rear wall. He hailed a 
passing taxi and was driven off to exile. After the assault, Obote 
was reasonably secure from open opposition. The new republican 
1967 constitution abolished the kingdoms altogether. Buganda was 
divided into four districts and ruled through martial law, a fore- 
runner of the military domination over the civilian population that 
all of Uganda would experience after 1971. 

Obote 's success in the face of adversity reclaimed for him the 
support of most members of the UPC , which then became the only 
legal political party. The original independence election of 1962, 
therefore, was the last one held in Uganda until December 1980. 
On the homefront, Obote issued the "Common Man's Charter," 
echoed the call for African Socialism by Tanzanian president Julius 
Nyerere, and proclaimed a "move to the left" to signal new ef- 
forts to consolidate power. His critics noted, however, that he placed 
most control over economic nationalization in the hands of an Asian 
millionaire who was also a financial backer of the UPC . Obote cre- 
ated a system of secret police, the General Service Unit (GSU). 
Headed by a relative, Akena Adoko, the GSU reported on sus- 
pected subversives (see Internal Security Services, ch. 5). The Spe- 
cial Force Units of paramilitary police, heavily recruited from 
Obote 's own region and ethnic group, supplemented the security 
forces within the army and police. 



24 



Historical Setting 



Although Buganda had been defeated and occupied by the mili- 
tary, Obote was still concerned about security there. His concerns 
were well founded; in December 1969, he was wounded in an as- 
sassination attempt and narrowly escaped more serious injury when 
a grenade thrown near him failed to explode. He had retained power 
by relying on Idi Amin and the army, but it was not clear that 
he could continue to count on their loyalty. 

Obote appeared particularly uncertain of the army after Amin's 
sole rival among senior army officers, Brigadier Acap Okoya, was 
murdered early in 1970. (Amin later promoted the man rumored 
to have recruited Okoya' s killers.) A second attempt was made on 
Obote 's life when his motorcade was ambushed later that year, but 
the vice president's car was mistakenly riddled with bullets. Obote 
began to recruit more Acholi and Langi troops, and he accelerated 
their promotions to counter the large numbers of soldiers from 
Amin's home, which was then known as West Nile District. Obote 
also enlarged the paramilitary Special Force Units as a counter- 
weight to the army. 

Amin, who at times inspected his troops wearing an outsized 
sport shirt with Obote' s face across the front and back, protested 
his loyalty. But in October 1970, Amin was placed under temporary 
house arrest while investigators looked into his army expenditures, 
reportedly several million dollars over budget. Another charge 
against Amin was that he had continued to aid southern Sudan's 
Anya Nya rebels in opposing the regime of Jafaar Numayri even 
after Obote had shifted his support away from the Anya Nya to 
Numayri. This foreign policy shift provoked an outcry from Is- 
rael, which had been supplying the Anya Nya rebels. Amin was 
close friends with several Israeli military advisers who were in Ugan- 
da to help train the army, and their eventual role in Amin's ef- 
forts to oust Obote remained the subject of continuing controversy. 

Military Rule under Amin 

By January 1971 , Obote was prepared to rid himself of the poten- 
tial threat posed by Amin. Departing for the Commonwealth Con- 
ference of Heads of Government at Singapore, he relayed orders 
to loyal Langi officers that Amin and his supporters in the army 
were to be arrested. Various versions emerged of the way this news 
was leaked to Amin; in any case, Amin decided to strike first. In 
the early morning hours of January 25, 1971, mechanized units 
loyal to him attacked strategic targets in Kampala and the airport 
at Entebbe, where the first shell fired by a pro- Amin tank com- 
mander killed two Roman Catholic priests in the airport waiting 
room. Amin's troops easily overcame the disorganized opposition 



25 



Uganda: A Country Study 



to the coup, and Amin almost immediately initiated mass execu- 
tions of Acholi and Langi troops, whom he believed to be pro- 
Obote. 

The Amin coup was warmly welcomed by most of the people 
of the Buganda kingdom, which Obote had attempted to disman- 
tle. They seemed willing to forget that their new president, Idi 
Amin, had been the tool of that military suppression. Amin made 
the usual statements about his government's intent to play a mere 
"caretaker role" until the country could recover sufficiently for 
civilian rule. Amin repudiated Obote 's nonaligned foreign policy, 
and his government was quickly recognized by Israel, Britain, and 
the United States. By contrast, presidents Julius Nyerere of Tan- 
zania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initially refused to ac- 
cept the legitimacy of the new military government. Nyerere, in 
particular, opposed Amin's regime, and he offered hospitality to 
the exiled Obote, facilitating his attempts to raise a force and return 
to power. 

Amin's military experience, which was virtually his only ex- 
perience, determined the character of his rule. He renamed Govern- 
ment House "the Command Post," instituted an advisory defense 
council composed of military commanders, placed military tribunals 
above the system of civil law, appointed soldiers to top govern- 
ment posts and parastatal agencies, and even informed the newly 
inducted civilian cabinet ministers that they would be subject to 
military discipline. Uganda was, in effect, governed from a collec- 
tion of military barracks scattered across the country, where bat- 
talion commanders, acting like local warlords, represented the 
coercive arm of the government. The GSU was disbanded and 
replaced by the State Research Bureau (SRB; see Idi Amin and 
Military Rule, ch. 5). SRB headquarters at Nakasero became the 
scene of torture and grisly executions over the next several years. 

Despite its outward display of a military chain of command, 
Amin's government was arguably more riddled with rivalries, 
regional divisions, and ethnic politics than the UPC coalition that 
it had replaced. The army itself was an arena of lethal competi- 
tion, in which losers were usually eliminated. Within the officer 
corps, those trained in Britain opposed those trained in Israel, and 
both stood against the untrained, who soon eliminated many of 
the army's most experienced officers. In 1966, well before the Amin 
era, northerners in the army had assaulted and harassed soldiers 
from the south. In 1971 and 1972, the Lugbara and Kakwa (Amin's 
ethnic group) from the West Nile District were slaughtering north- 
ern Acholi and Langi, who were identified with Obote. Then the 



26 



Idi Amin addresses the United Nations General Assembly 

in New York, October 1975. 
Courtesy United Nations (T. Chen) 

Kakwa fought the Lugbara. Amin came to rely on Nubians and 
on former Any a Nya rebels from southern Sudan. 

The army, which had been progressively expanded under Obote, 
was further doubled and redoubled under Amin. Recruitment was 
largely, but not entirely, in the north. There were periodic purges, 
when various battalion commanders were viewed as potential 
problems or became real threats. Each purge provided new op- 
portunities for promotions from the ranks. The commander of the 
air force, Smuts Guweddeko, had previously worked as a telephone 
operator; the unofficial executioner for the regime, Major 
Malyamungu, had formerly been a nightwatch officer. By the 
mid-1970s, only the most trustworthy military units were allowed 
ammunition, although this prohibition did not prevent a series of 
mutinies and murders. An attempt by an American journalist, 
Nicholas Stroh, and his colleague, Robert Siedle, to investigate one 
of these barracks outbreaks in 1972 at the Simba Battalion in 
Mbarara led to their disappearances and later deaths. 

Amin never forgot the source of his power. He spent much of 
his time rewarding, promoting, and manipulating the army. 
Financing his ever-increasing military expenditures was a continu- 
ing concern. Early in 1972, he reversed foreign policy — never a 



27 



Uganda: A Country Study 

major issue for Amin — to secure financial and military aid from 
Muammar Qadhafi of Libya. Amin expelled the remaining Israe- 
li advisers, to whom he was much indebted, and became vocifer- 
ously anti-Israel. To induce foreign aid from Saudi Arabia, he 
rediscovered his previously neglected Islamic heritage. He also com- 
missioned the construction of a great mosque on Kampala Hill in 
the capital city, but it was never completed because much of the 
money intended for it was embezzled. 

In September 1972, Amin expelled almost all of Uganda's 50,000 
Asians and seized their property. Although Amin proclaimed that 
the "common man" was the beneficiary of this drastic act — which 
proved immensely popular — it was actually the army that emerged 
with the houses, cars, and businesses of the departing Asian minori- 
ty. This expropriation of property proved disastrous for the already 
declining economy. Businesses were run into the ground, cement 
factories at Tororo and Fort Portal collapsed from lack of main- 
tenance, and sugar production literally ground to a halt, as un- 
maintained machinery jammed permanently. Uganda's export 
crops were sold by government parastatals, but most of the for- 
eign currency they earned went for purchasing imports for the army. 
The most famous example was the so-called "whiskey run" to 
Stansted Airport in Britain, where planeloads of Scotch whiskey, 
transistor radios, and luxury items were purchased for Amin to 
distribute among his officers and troops. An African proverb, it 
was said, summed up Amin's treatment of his army: "A dog with 
a bone in its mouth can't bite." 

The rural African producers, particularly of coffee, turned to 
smuggling, especially to Kenya. The smuggling problem became 
an obsession with Amin; toward the end of his rule, he appointed 
his mercenary adviser, the former British citizen Bob Astles, to 
take all necessary steps to eliminate the problem. These steps in- 
cluded orders to shoot smugglers on sight. 

Another near-obsession for Amin was the threat of a counterat- 
tack by former president Obote. Shortly after the expulsion of Asians 
in 1972, Obote did launch such an attempt across the Tanzanian 
border into southwestern Uganda. His small army contingent in 
twenty- seven trucks set out to capture the southern Ugandan mili- 
tary post at Masaka but instead settled down to await a general 
uprising against Amin, which did not occur. A planned seizure 
of the airport at Entebbe by soldiers in an allegedly hijacked East 
African Airways passenger aircraft was aborted when Obote 's pi- 
lot blew out the aircraft's tires and it remained in Tanzania. Amin 
was able to mobilize his more reliable Malire Mechanical Regi- 
ment and expel the invaders. 



28 



Historical Setting 



Although jubilant at his success, Amin realized that Obote, with 
Nyerere's aid, might try again. He had the SRB and the newly 
formed Public Safety Unit (PSU) redouble their efforts to uncover 
subversives and other imagined enemies of the state. General fear 
and insecurity became a way of life for the populace, as thousands 
of people disappeared. In an ominous twist, people sometimes 
learned by listening to the radio that they were "about to disap- 
pear." State terrorism was evidenced in a series of spectacular in- 
cidents; for example, High Court Judge Benedicto Kiwanuka, 
former head of government and leader of the banned DP, was seized 
directly from his courtroom. Like many other victims, he was forced 
to remove his shoes and then bundled into the trunk of a car, never 
to be seen alive again. Whether calculated or not, the symbolism 
of a pair of shoes by the roadside to mark the passing of a human 
life was a bizarre yet piercing form of state terrorism. 

Amin did attempt to establish ties with an international terrorist 
group in July 1976, when he offered the Palestinian hijackers of 
an Air France flight from Tel Aviv a protected base at the old air- 
port at Entebbe, from which to press their demands in exchange 
for the release of Israeli hostages. The dramatic rescue of the 
hostages by Israeli commandos was a severe blow to Amin, unas- 
suaged by his murder of a hospitalized hostage, Dora Block, and 
his mass execution of Entebbe airport personnel. 

Amin's government, conducted by often erratic personal procla- 
mation, continued on. Because he was illiterate — a disability shared 
with most of his higher ranking officers — Amin relayed orders and 
policy decisions orally by telephone, over the radio, and in long 
rambling speeches to which civil servants learned to pay close at- 
tention. The bureaucracy became paralyzed as government ad- 
ministrators feared to make what might prove to be a wrong 
decision. The minister of defense demanded and was given the 
Ministry of Education office building, but then the decision was 
reversed. Important education files were lost during their transfer 
back and forth by wheelbarrow. In many respects, Amin's govern- 
ment in the 1970s resembled the governments of nineteenth-century 
African monarchs, with the same problems of enforcing orders at 
a distance, controlling rival factions at court, and rewarding loyal 
followers with plunder. However, Amin's regime was possibly less 
efficient than those of the precolonial monarchs. 

Religious conflict was another characteristic of the Amin regime 
that had its origins in the nineteenth century. After rediscover- 
ing his Islamic allegiance in the effort to gain foreign aid from 
Libya and Saudi Arabia, Amin began to pay more attention to the 
formerly deprived Muslims in Uganda, a move that turned out to 



29 



Uganda: A Country Study 

be a mixed blessing for them. Muslims began to do well in what 
economic opportunities yet remained, the more so if they had rela- 
tives in the army. Construction work began on Kibule Hill, the 
site of Kampala's most prominent mosque. Many Ugandan Mus- 
lims with a sense of history believed that the Muslim defeat by 
Christians in 1889 was finally being redressed. Christians, in turn, 
perceived that they were under siege as a religious group; it was 
clear that Amin viewed the churches as potential centers of oppo- 
sition. A number of priests and ministers disappeared in the course 
of the 1970s, but the matter reached a climax with the formal pro- 
test against army terrorism in 1977 by Church of Uganda ministers, 
led by Archbishop J anan Luwum. Although Luwum's body was 
subsequently recovered from a clumsily contrived ' 'auto accident," 
subsequent investigations revealed that Luwum had been shot to 
death by Amin himself. This latest in a long line of atrocities was 
greeted with international condemnation, but apart from the con- 
tinued trade boycott initiated by the United States in July 1978, 
verbal condemnation was not accompanied by action. 

By 1978 Amin's circle of close associates had shrunk signifi- 
cantly — the result of defections and executions. It was increasingly 
risky to be too close to Amin, as his vice president and formerly 
trusted associate, General Mustafa Adrisi, discovered. When Adrisi 
was injured in a suspicious auto accident, troops loyal to him be- 
came restive. The once reliable Malire Mechanized Regiment mu- 
tinied, as did other units. In October 1978, Amin sent troops still 
loyal to him against the mutineers, some of whom fled across the 
Tanzanian border. Amin then claimed that Tanzanian president 
Nyerere, his perennial enemy, had been at the root of his trou- 
bles. Amin accused Nyerere of waging war against Uganda, and, 
hoping to divert attention from his internal troubles and rally Ugan- 
da against the foreign adversary, Amin invaded Tanzanian terri- 
tory and formally annexed a section across the Kagera River 
boundary on November 1 , 1978 (see Idi Amin and Military Rule, 
ch. 5). 

Nyerere mobilized his citizen army reserves and counterattacked, 
joined by Ugandan exiles united as the Uganda National Libera- 
tion Army (UNLA). The Ugandan army retreated steadily, ex- 
pending much of its energy by looting along the way. Libya's 
Qadhafi sent 3,000 troops to aid fellow Muslim Amin, but the Lib- 
yans soon found themselves on the front line, while behind them 
Ugandan army units were using supply trucks to carry their new- 
ly plundered wealth in the opposite direction. Tanzania and the 
UNLA took Kampala in April 1979, and Amin fled by air, first 
to Libya and later to a seemingly permanent exile at Jiddah, Saudi 



30 



Historical Setting 



Arabia. The war that had cost Tanzania an estimated US$1 mil- 
lion per day was over. What kind of government would attempt 
the monumental task of rebuilding the economically and psycho- 
logically devastated country, which had lost an estimated 300,000 
victims to Amin's murderous eight-year regime? 

Uganda after Amin 

The Interim Period, 1979-80 

A month before the liberation of Kampala, representatives of 
twenty-two Ugandan civilian and military groups were hastily called 
together at Moshi, Tanzania, to try to agree on an interim civilian 
government once Amin was removed. Called the Unity Confer- 
ence in the hope that unity might prevail, it managed to establish 
the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) as the political 
representative of the UNLA. Dr. Yusuf Lule, former principal of 
Makerere University, became head of the UNLF executive com- 
mittee. As an academic rather than a politician, Lule was not 
regarded as a threat to any of the contending factions. Shortly af- 
ter Amin's departure, Lule and the UNLF moved to Kampala, 
where they established an interim government. Lule became presi- 
dent, advised by a temporary parliament, the National Consultative 
Council (NCC). The NCC, in turn, was composed of representa- 
tives from the Unity Conference. 

Conflict surfaced immediately between Lule and some of the 
more radical of the council members who saw him as too conser- 
vative, too autocratic, and too willing as a Muganda to listen to 
advice from other Baganda. After only three months, with the ap- 
parent approval of Nyerere, whose troops still controlled Kampa- 
la, Lule was forcibly removed from office and exiled. He was 
replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, a Muganda like Lule, but one who 
had previously served as a high-ranking member of Obote's UPC. 
It was not an auspicious start to the rebuilding of a new Uganda, 
which required political and economic stability. Indeed, the quar- 
rels within the NCC, which Binaisa enlarged to 127 members, re- 
vealed that many rival and would-be politicians who had returned 
from exile were resuming their self-interested operating styles. 
Ugandans who endured the deprivations of the Amin era became 
even more disillusioned with their leaders. Binaisa managed to stay 
in office longer than Lule, but his inability to gain control over 
a burgeoning new military presence proved to be his downfall. 

At the beginning of the interim government, the military num- 
bered fewer than 1 ,000 troops who had fought alongside the Tan- 
zanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) to expel Amin. The army 



31 



Uganda: A Country Study 



was back to the size of the original King's African Rifles (KAR) 
at independence in 1962. But in 1979, in an attempt to consoli- 
date support for the future, such leaders as Yoweri Kaguta Museve- 
ni and Major General (later Chief of Staff) David Oyite Ojok began 
to enroll thousands of recruits into what were rapidly becoming 
their private armies. Museveni's 80 original soldiers grew to 8,000; 
Ojok's original 600 became 24,000. When Binaisa sought to curb 
the use of these militias, which were harassing and detaining po- 
litical opponents, he was overthrown in a military coup on May 
10, 1980. The coup was engineered by Ojok, Museveni, and others 
acting under the general direction of Paulo Muwanga, Obote's 
right-hand man and chair of the Military Commission (see The 
Second Obote Regime: Repression Continues, ch. 5). The TPDF 
was still providing necessary security while Uganda's police force — 
which had been decimated by Amin — was rebuilt, but Nyerere re- 
fused to help Binaisa retain power. Many Ugandans claimed that 
although Nyerere did not impose his own choice on Uganda, he 
indirectly facilitated the return to power of his old friend and ally, 
Milton Obote. In any case, the Military Commission headed by 
Muwanga effectively governed Uganda during the six months lead- 
ing up to the national elections of December 1980. 

Further evidence of the militarization of Ugandan politics was 
provided by the proposed expenditures of the newly empowered 
Military Commission. Security and defense were to be allotted more 
than 30 percent of the national revenues. For a country desperate- 
ly seeking funds for economic recovery from the excesses of the 
previous military regime, this allocation seemed unreasonable to 
civilian leaders. 

Shortly after Muwanga' s 1980 coup, Obote made a triumphant 
return from Tanzania. In the months before the December elec- 
tions, he began to rally his former UPC supporters. Ominously, 
in view of recent Ugandan history, he often appeared on the plat- 
form with General Ojok, a fellow Langi. Obote also began to speak 
of the need to return to a UPC one-party state. 

The national election on December 10, 1980, was a crucial turn- 
ing point for Uganda. It was, after all, the first election in eigh- 
teen years. Several parties contested, the most important of which 
were Obote's UPC and the DP led by Paul Kawanga Ssemoge- 
rere. Most of Uganda's Roman Catholics were DP members, along 
with many others whose main concern was to prevent the return 
of another Obote regime. Because the Military Commission, as 
the acting government, was dominated by Obote supporters (nota- 
bly chairman Paulo Muwanga), the DP and other contenders faced 
formidable obstacles. By election day, the UPC had achieved some 



32 



Historical Setting 



exceptional advantages, summarized by Minority Rights Group 
Report Number 66 as follows. Seventeen UPC candidates were 
declared 1 'unopposed" by the simple procedure of not allowing 
DP or other candidates to run against them. Fourteen district com- 
missioners, who were expected to supervise local polling, were 
replaced with UPC nominees. The chief justice of Uganda, to whom 
complaints of election irregularities would have to be made, was 
replaced with a UPC member. In a number of districts, non-UPC 
candidates were arrested, and one was murdered. Even before the 
election, the government press and Radio Uganda appeared to treat 
the UPC as the victor. Muwanga insisted that each party have a 
separate ballot box on election day, thus negating the right of secret 
ballot. There were a number of other moves to aid the UPC, in- 
cluding Muwanga' s statement that the future parliament would 
also contain an unspecified number of unelected representatives 
of the army and other interest groups. 

Polling appeared to be heavy on election day, and by the end 
of the voting, the DP, on the basis of its own estimates, declared 
victory in 81 of 126 constituencies. The British Broadcasting Cor- 
poration and Voice of America broadcast the news of the DP tri- 
umph, and Kampala's streets were filled with DP celebrants. At 
this point, Muwanga seized control of the Electoral Commission, 
along with the power to count the ballots, and declared that any- 
one disputing his count would be subject to a heavy fine and five 
years in jail. Eighteen hours later, Muwanga announced a UPC 
victory, with seventy- two seats. Some DP candidates claimed the 
ballot boxes were simply switched to give their own vote tally to 
the UPC runner-up. Nevertheless, a small contingent of neutral 
election watchers, the Commonwealth Observer Group, declared 
itself satisfied with the validity of the election. Some Ugandans criti- 
cized the Commonwealth Observer Group, suggesting that mem- 
bers of the group measured African elections by different standards 
than those used elsewhere or that they feared civil war if the results 
were questioned. Indeed, popular perception of a stolen election 
actually helped bring about the civil war the Commonwealth Ob- 
server Group may have feared. 

The Second Obote Regime, 1981-85 

In February 1981 , shortly after the new Obote government took 
office, with Paulo Muwanga as vice president and minister of de- 
fense, a former Military Commission member, Yoweri Museveni, 
and his armed supporters declared themselves the National Re- 
sistance Army (NRA). Museveni vowed to overthrow Obote by 
means of a popular rebellion, and what became known as "the 



33 



Uganda: A Country Study 

war in the bush" began. Several other underground groups also 
emerged to attempt to sabotage the new regime, but they were even- 
tually crushed. Museveni, who had guerrilla war experience with 
the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Liberta- 
gao de Mozambique — Frelimo), campaigned in rural areas hostile 
to Obote's government, especially central and western Buganda 
and the western regions of Ankole and Bunyoro. 

The Obote government's four-year military effort to destroy its 
challengers resulted in vast areas of devastation and greater loss of 
life than during the eight years of Amin's rule. The UNLA's many 
Acholi and Langi had been hastily enrolled with minimal training 
and littie sense of discipline. Although they were survivors of Amin's 
genocidal purges of northeast Uganda, in the 1980s they were armed 
and in uniform, conducting similar actions against Bantu-speaking 
Ugandans in the south, with whom they appeared to feel no em- 
pathy or even pity. In early 1983, to eliminate rural support for 
Museveni's guerrillas, the area of Luwero District, north of Kam- 
pala, was targeted for a massive population removal affecting almost 
750,000 people. These artificially created refugees were packed into 
several internment camps subject to military control, which in real- 
ity meant military abuse. Civilians outside the camps, in what came 
to be known as the "Luwero Triangle," were presumed to be guer- 
rillas or guerrilla sympathizers and were treated accordingly. The 
farms of this highly productive agricultural area were looted — roofs, 
doors, and even door frames were stolen by UNLA troops. Civilian 
loss of life was extensive, as evidenced some years later by piles 
of human skulls in bush clearings and alongside rural roads. 

The army also concentrated on the northwestern corner of 
Uganda, in what was then West Nile District. Bordering Sudan, 
West Nile had provided the ethnic base for much of Idi Amin's 
earlier support and had enjoyed relative prosperity under his rule. 
Having borne the brunt of Amin's anti- Acholi massacres in previ- 
ous years, Acholi soldiers avenged themselves on inhabitants of 
Amin's home region, whom they blamed for their losses. In one 
famous incident in June 1981, Ugandan army soldiers attacked 
a Catholic mission where local refugees had sought sanctuary. When 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported 
a subsequent massacre, the government expelled it from Uganda. 

Despite these activities, Obote's government, unlike Amin's 
regime, was sensitive to its international image and realized the 
importance of securing foreign aid for the nation's economic recov- 
ery. Obote had sought and followed the advice of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), even though the austerity 
measures ran counter to his own ideology. He severely devalued 



34 



Historical Setting 



the Uganda shilling, attempted to facilitate the export of cash crops, 
and postponed any plans he may once have entertained for reestab- 
lishing one-party rule. The continued sufferance of the DP, although 
much harried and abused by UPC stalwarts, became an impor- 
tant symbol to international donors. The government's inability 
to eliminate Museveni and win the civil war, however, sapped its 
economic strength, and the occupation of a large part of the coun- 
try by an army hostile to the Ugandans living there furthered dis- 
content with the regime. Abductions by the police, as well as the 
detentions and disappearances so characteristic of the Amin peri- 
od, recurred. In place of torture at the infamous State Research 
Bureau at Nakasero, victims met the same fate at so-called "Nile 
Mansions." Amnesty International, a human rights organization, 
issued a chilling report of routine torture of civilian detainees at 
military barracks scattered across southern Uganda. The overall 
death toll from 1981 to 1985 was estimated as high as 500,000. 
Obote, once seen by the donor community as the one man with 
the experience and will to restore Uganda's fortunes, now appeared 
to be a liability to recovery. 

In this deteriorating military and economic situation, Obote 
subordinated other matters to a military victory over Museveni. 
North Korean military advisers were invited to take part against 
the NRA rebels in what was to be a final campaign that won neither 
British nor United States approval. But the army was war- weary, 
and after the death of the highly capable General Ojok in a helicop- 
ter accident at the end of 1983, it began to split along ethnic lines. 
Acholi soldiers complained that they were given too much front- 
line action and too few rewards for their services. Obote delayed 
appointing a successor to Ojok for as long as possible. In the end, 
he appointed a Langi to the post and attempted to counter the ob- 
jection of Acholi officers by spying on them, reviving his old 
paramilitary counterweight, the mostly Langi Special Force Units, 
and thus repeating some of the actions that led to his overthrow 
by Amin. As if determined to replay the January 1971 events, Obote 
once again left the capital after giving orders for the arrest of a 
leading Acholi commander, Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) 
Basilio Olara Okello, who mobilized troops and entered Kampala 
on July 27, 1985. Obote, together with a large entourage, fled the 
country for Zambia. This time, unlike the last, Obote allegedly 
took much of the national treasury with him. 

The Return of Military Rule, 1985 

The military government of General Tito Lutwa Okello ruled 
from July 1985 to January 1986 with no explicit policy except the 



35 



Uganda: A Country Study 

natural goal of self-preservation — the motive for their defensive 
coup. To stiffen the flagging efforts of his army against the NRA, 
Okello invited former soldiers of Amin's army to reenter Uganda 
from the Sudanese refugee camps and participate in the civil war 
on the government side. As mercenaries fresh to the scene, these 
units fought well, but they were equally interested in looting and 
did not discriminate between supporters and enemies of the govern- 
ment. The reintroduction of Amin's infamous cohorts was poor 
international public relations for the Okello government and helped 
create a new tolerance of Museveni. 

In 1986 a cease-fire initiative from Kenya was welcomed by Okel- 
lo, who could hardly expect to govern the entire country with only 
war-weary and disillusioned Acholi troops to back him. Negotia- 
tions dragged on, but with Okello and the remnants of the UNLA 
army thoroughly discouraged, Museveni had only to wait for the 
regime to disintegrate. In January 1986, welcomed enthusiastically 
by the local civilian population, Museveni moved against Kam- 
pala. Okello and his soldiers fled northward to their ethnic base 
in Acholi. Yoweri Museveni formally claimed the presidency on 
January 29, 1986. Immense problems of reconstruction awaited 
the new regime. 

* * * 

The best general introductions to Uganda in the precolonial and 
colonial periods are S. Karugire's A Political History of Uganda and 
J. Jorgensen's Uganda: A Modern History. For the place of Uganda 
in the larger context of East African and African history, see B. 
Davidson's A History of East and Central Africa to the Late 19th Century; 
Zamani: A Survey of East African History, edited by B. Ogot and J. 
Kieran; and the relevant chapters in History of East Africa, published 
by Oxford University, and The Cambridge History of Africa. 

More specialized treatment of Ugandan issues can be found in 
T. Sathyamurthy's The Political Development of Uganda, 1900-1986; 
D. Rothchild and M. Rogin's "Uganda" in G. Carter's National 
Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States; D. Apter's The Political 
Kingdom in Uganda, F. Welbourn's Religion and Politics in Uganda, 
1952-1962; N. Kasfir's The Shrinking Political Arena; and C. Gert- 
zel's Party and Locality in Northern Uganda. 

The destructive period of Amin in the 1970s produced a series 
of studies, among them D. Martin's General Amin, H. Kyemba's 
A State of Blood, A. Mazrui's Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda, M. 
Twaddle's Expulsion of a Minority, G.I. Smith's Ghosts of Kampala, 



36 



Historical Setting 



and the International Commission of Jurists' Uganda and Human 
Rights. 

Sources for Uganda since the fall of Amin are T. Avirgan and 
M. Honey's War in Uganda, H. Hansen and M. Twaddle's Ugan- 
da Now, P. Wiebe and C. Dodge's Beyond Crisis, K. Rupesinghe's 
Conflict Resolution in Uganda, and the Minority Rights Group's Ugan- 
da and Sudan — North and South. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



37 



A fisherman casting his 



UGANDA'S LOCATION between the two arms of the Great Rift 
Valley provides the country with an alluvial plateau and plentiful 
lakes and rivers. Mountain peaks mark geological fault lines along 
its eastern and western boundaries and provide cooler tempera- 
tures and ample rainfall. This environment was peopled by suc- 
cessive waves of immigrants, some of whom displaced indigenous 
hunting societies during the first millennium A.D. Most of the new- 
comers eventually settled in the region that would become southern 
Uganda, and their evolving political and cultural diversity contribut- 
ed to conflicts that flared up over several centuries. These enmi- 
ties still simmered in the twentieth century, but none of them 
seriously derailed the modernization process that was occurring in 
Uganda as it approached independence in 1962. 

Some local beliefs reinforced the process of acculturation, em- 
phasizing patronage as a means of advancement and valuing edu- 
cation as a necessary step toward that advancement. British 
educational systems and world religions were readily accepted in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The focus of moderniza- 
tion was clearly in Buganda, however, and during the decades af- 
ter independence, national progress toward modernization slowed 
as the nation's non-Baganda (people of Buganda; sing., Muganda) 
majority attempted to adjust this balance in their favor. Military 
rule — a precarious alternative to dominance by the Baganda — 
failed to implant a sense of nationhood because the notion of govern- 
ment as a mechanism for expropriating wealth was merely replaced 
by that of government as a brutalizing force. 

In the late 1980s, Uganda's recovery from the damage of more 
than two decades of corrupt government and civil war was slowed 
by the scourge of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
This disease shook but did not destroy most people's confidence 
in human institutions as the major determinants of their future, 
and it also provided a fertile environment for new religions that 
might claim to control the disease. Religions provided channels 
for political organization and protest, especially the Holy Spirit 
Movement (HSM), which challenged government controls in the 
northeast. 

One of the challenges facing the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) government was balancing traditional forces against pres- 
sures for modernization brought to bear by Uganda's growing edu- 
cated elite. Women, too, have often been a force for modernization, 



41 



Uganda: A Country Study 

as they demanded educational and economic opportunities denied 
under traditional and colonial rulers. The focus of these pressures 
in the 1980s was Uganda's still strong educational system. Through 
education, people struggled to bolster the institutions that under- 
lay civil society in an environment that bore scars from govern- 
ment neglect and abuse. 

Physical Setting 
Location and Size 

Uganda is a landlocked country astride the equator, about 800 
kilometers inland from the Indian Ocean (see fig. 1). It lies on the 
northwestern shores of Lake Victoria, extending from 1° south to 
4° north latitude and 30° to 35° east longitude. 

Uganda is bordered by Tanzania and Rwanda to the south, Zaire 
to the west, Sudan to the north, and Kenya to the east. With a 
land surface of 241,139 square kilometers (roughly twice the size 
of the state of Pennsylvania), Uganda occupies most of the Lake 
Victoria Basin, which was formed by the geological shifts that creat- 
ed the Great Rift Valley during the Pleistocene era. The Sese Is- 
lands and other small islands in Lake Victoria also lie within 
Uganda's borders. 

Land Use 

In the southern half of the country, rich soil and rainfall permit 
extensive agriculture, and in the drier and less fertile northern areas, 
pastoral economies are common. Approximately 21 percent of the 
land is cultivated and 45 percent is woodland and grassland, some 
of which has been cleared for roads, settlements, and farmland in 
the south. Approximately 13 percent of the land is set aside as na- 
tional parks, forests, and game reserves. Swampland surrounding 
lakes in the southern and central regions supports abundant papy- 
rus growth. The central region's woodlands and savanna give way 
to acacia and cactus growth in the north. Valuable seams of cop- 
per, cobalt, and other minerals have been revealed along geologi- 
cal fault lines in the southeast and southwest (see Mining, ch. 3). 
Volcanic foothills in the east contain phosphates and limestone. 

Mountains 

Most of south-central Uganda lies at an altitude of about 1 , 100 
meters above sea level (see fig. 3). The plateau that stretches north- 
ward from Lake Victoria declines to an altitude of approximately 
900 meters on the Sudan border. The gradually sloping terrain is 



42 



The Society and Its Environment 



interrupted by a shallow basin dipping toward the center of the 
country and hilly areas toward the west and southwest. 

Both eastern and western borders are marked by mountains. The 
Ruwenzori Mountains (often called the Mountains of the Moon) 
form about eighty kilometers of the border between Uganda and 
Zaire. The highest peaks of Mount Stanley in the Ruwenzoris are 
snow-capped. Foremost among these are Margherita (5,113 meters) 
and Alexandra (5,094 meters). Farther south the northernmost of 
the Virunga Mountains reach 4,132 meters on Mount Muhavura; 
3,648 meters on Mount Mgahinga; and 3,477 meters on Mount 
Sabinio, which marks the border with Rwanda and Zaire. 

In eastern Uganda, the border with Kenya is also marked by 
volcanic hills. Dominating these, roughly 120 kilometers north of 
the equator, is Mount Elgon, which rises from the 1,200-meter 
plains to reach a height of 4,324 meters. Mount Elgon is the cone 
of an extinct volcano, with ridges radiating thirty kilometers from 
its crater. Rich soil from its slopes is eroded into the plains below. 
North of Mount Elgon are Kadam (also known as Debasien or 
Tabasiat) Peak, which reaches a height of 3,054 meters, and Mount 
Moroto, at 3,085 meters. In the far northeast, Mount Zulia, Mount 
Morungole, and the Labwor and Dodoth Hills reach heights in 
excess of 2,000 meters. The lower Imatong Mountains and Mount 
Langia, at 3,029 meters, mark the border with Sudan. 

Lakes and Rivers 

Uganda is a well- watered country. Nearly one-fifth of the total 
area, or 44,000 square kilometers, is open water or swampland. 
Four of East Africa's Great Lakes — Lake Victoria, Lake Kyoga, 
Lake Albert, and Lake Edward — lie within Uganda or on its bor- 
ders. Lake Victoria dominates the southeastern corner of the nation, 
with almost one-half of its 10,200-square-kilometer area lying 
inside Ugandan territory. It is the second largest freshwater lake 
in area in the world (after Lake Superior), and it feeds the upper 
waters of the Nile River, which is referred to in this region as the 
Victoria Nile. 

Lake Kyoga and the surrounding basin dominate central Ugan- 
da. Extensions of Lake Kyoga include Lake Kwania, Lake Bugon- 
do, and Lake Opeta. These "finger lakes" are surrounded by 
swampland during rainy seasons. All lakes in the Lake Kyoga Ba- 
sin are shallow, usually reaching a depth of only eight or nine 
meters, and Lake Opeta forms a separate lake during dry seasons. 
Along the border with Zaire, Lake Albert and Lake Edward oc- 
cupy troughs in the western Great Rift Valley. 



45 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Leaving Lake Victoria at Owen Falls, the Victoria Nile descends 
as it travels toward the northwest. Widening to form Lake Kyoga, 
the Nile receives the Kafu River from the west before flowing north 
to Lake Albert. From Lake Albert, the Nile is known as the Albert 
Nile as it travels roughly 200 kilometers to the Sudan border. In 
southern and western Uganda, geological activity over time has 
shifted drainage patterns. The land west of Lake Victoria is tra- 
versed by valleys that were once rivers carrying the waters of Lake 
Victoria into the Congo River system. The Katonga River flows 
westward from Lake Victoria to Lake George. Lake George and 
Lake Edward are connected by the Kazinga Channel. The Semliki 
River flows north out of Lake Edward to Lake Albert, draining 
parts of Zaire and forming a portion of the Uganda-Zaire border. 

Spectacular waterfalls occur at Murchison (Kabalega) Falls on 
the Victoria Nile River just east of Lake Albert. At the narrowest 
point on the falls, the waters of the Nile pass through an opening 
barely seven meters wide. One of the tributaries of the Albert Nile, 
the Zoka River, drains the northwestern corner of Uganda, a region 
still popularly known as the West Nile although that name was not 
officially recognized in 1990. Other major rivers include the Ach- 
wa River (called the Aswa in Sudan) in the north, the Pager River 
and the Dopeth-Okok River in the northeast, and the Mpologo- 
ma River, which drains into Lake Kyoga from the southeast. 

Climate 

Uganda's equatorial climate provides plentiful sunshine, moder- 
ated by the relatively high altitude of most areas of the country. 
Mean annual temperatures range from about 16°C in the south- 
western highlands to 25 °C in the northwest; but in the northeast, 
temperatures exceed 30 °C about 254 days per year. Daytime tem- 
peratures average about eight to ten degrees warmer than night- 
time temperatures in the Lake Victoria region, and temperatures 
are generally about fourteen degrees lower in the southwest. 

Except in the northeastern corner of the country, rainfall is well 
distributed. The southern region has two rainy seasons, usually 
beginning in early April and again in October. Little rain falls in 
June and December. In the north, occasional rains occur between 
April and October, while the period from November to March is 
often very dry. Mean annual rainfall near Lake Victoria often ex- 
ceeds 2,100 millimeters, and the mountainous regions of the 
southeast and southwest receive more than 1,500 millimeters of 
rainfall yearly. The lowest mean annual rainfall in the northeast 
measures about 500 millimeters. 



46 



The Society and Its Environment 

Population 

Size 

In 1990 the Ugandan government estimated the nation's popu- 
lation to be 16.9 million people; international estimates ranged as 
high as 17.5 million (see table 2, Appendix). Most estimates were 
based on extrapolations from the 1969 census, which enumerated 
approximately 9.5 million people. The results of the 1980 census, 
which counted 12.6 million people, were cast in doubt by the loss 
of census data in subsequent outbreaks of violence. 

Life expectancy in 1989 averaged fifty-three years, roughly two 
years higher for women than men. The population was increasing 
by over 3.2 percent per year, a substantial increase over the rate 
of 2.5 percent in the 1960s and significantly more than the 2.8 per- 
cent growth rate estimated for most of East Africa. At this rate, 
Uganda's population was expected to double between 1989 and 
the year 2012. The crude birth rate, estimated to be 49.9 per 1 ,000 
population, was equivalent to other regional estimates. Fertility 
ratios, defined as the number of live births per year per 1 ,000 wom- 
en between the ages of sixteen and forty-five years, ranged from 
115 in the south to more than 200 in the northeast. In general, 
fertility declined in more developed areas, and birth rates were lower 
among educated women. 

The crude death rate was 18 per 1,000 population, equivalent 
to the average for East Africa as a whole. Infant mortality in the 
first year of life averaged 120 per 1,000 population, but some in- 
fant deaths were not reported to government officials. Deaths from 
AIDS were increasing in the late 1980s (see Health and Welfare, 
this ch.). Death rates were generally lower in high-altitude areas, 
in part because of the lower incidence of malaria. 

Composition and Distribution 

Ministry of Planning and Economic Development officials esti- 
mated that nearly 50 percent of the population was under the age 
of 15 and the median age was only 15.7 years in 1989 (see fig. 4). 
The sex ratio was 101.8 males per 100 females. The dependency 
ratio — a measure of the number of young and old in relation to 
100 people between the ages of fifteen and sixty — was estimated 
at 104. 

Uganda's population density was found to be relatively high in 
comparison with that of most of Africa, estimated to be fifty-three 
per square kilometer nationwide. However, this figure masked a 
range from fewer than 30 per square kilometer in the north-central 
region to more than 120 in the far southeast and southwest, and 



47 



Uganda: A Country Study 




1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 
POPULATION IN MILLIONS 



Figure 4. Population by Age and Sex, 1989 

even these estimates overlooked some regions that were depopu- 
lated by warfare. 

In late 1989, nearly 10 percent of the population lived in urban 
centers of more than 2,000 people. This figure was increasing in 
the late 1980s but remained relatively low in comparison with the 
rest of Africa and was only slightly higher than Uganda's 1969 es- 
timate of 7.3 percent. Rural-to-urban migration declined during 
the 1970s as a result of deteriorating security and economic condi- 
tions. Kampala, with about 500,000 people, accounted for almost 
one-half of the total urban population but recorded a population 
increase of only 3 percent during the 1980s. Jinja, the main in- 
dustrial center and second largest city, registered a population of 
about 55,000— an increase of 10,000 from the 1980 population 
estimate. Six other cities— Kabale, Kabarole, Entebbe, Masaka, 
Mbarara, and Mbale— had populations of more than 20,000 in 
1989. Urban migration was expected to increase markedly during 
the 1990s. 



48 



The Society and Its Environment 



Uganda was the focus of migration from surrounding African 
countries until 1970, with most immigrants coming from Rwanda, 
Burundi, and Sudan. In the 1970s, immigrants were estimated to 
make up 11 percent of the population. About 23,000 Ugandans 
were living in Kenya, and a smaller number had fled to other neigh- 
boring countries. Emigration increased dramatically during the 
1970s and was believed to slow during the 1980s. 

In 1989 Uganda reported 163,000 refugees to the United Na- 
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Most of these 
were from Rwanda, but several other neighboring countries were 
also represented. At the same time, Zaire and Sudan registered 
a total of nearly 250,000 refugees from Uganda. 

Ethnic Diversity and Language 

All governments after independence declared their opposition 
to discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. Neither the 1969 nor 
the 1980 census recorded ethnic identity. However, Ugandans con- 
tinued to take pride in their family histories, and government offi- 
cials, like many other people, continued to consider ethnic factors 
in decision making. Moreover, much of Uganda's internal upheaval 
traditionally was based in part on historical differences among ethnic 
groups. 

The forty or more distinct societies that constitute the Ugan- 
dan nation are usually classified according to linguistic similarities. 
Most Ugandans speak either Nilo-Saharan or Congo-Kordofan- 
ian languages. Nilo-Saharan languages, spoken across the north, 
are further classified as Eastern Nilotic (formerly Nilo-Hamitic), 
Western Nilotic, and Central Sudanic. The many Bantu languages 
in the south are within the much larger Congo-Kordofanian lan- 
guage grouping. 

Lake Kyoga in central Uganda serves as a rough boundary be- 
tween the Bantu-speaking south and the Nilotic and Central Su- 
danic language speakers in the north. Despite the popular image 
of north-versus-south in political affairs, however, this boundary 
runs roughly from northwest to southeast near the course of the 
Nile River, and many Ugandans live among people who speak other 
languages. Some sources describe regional variation in terms of 
physical characteristics, clothing, bodily adornments, and man- 
nerisms, but others also claim that these differences are disap- 
pearing. 

Bantu-speakers probably entered southern Uganda by the end 
of the first millennium A.D. and developed centralized kingdoms 
by the fifteenth or sixteenth century. Following independence, 



49 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Internatonal 

boundary 
ITESO Ethnic group 
® National capital 
• Populated place 
25 50 Kilometers 



25 50 Miles 



A 




ACHOLI 



KARAMOJONG \ 



. Lira 

LANGI 



ITESO 



BASOGA 



BAGISU 
Mbale* /' 



BAGANDA 




Kampala 



BANYAN KOLE Masaka . 



)BAKIGA - 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 5. Major Ethnic Groups 



Bantu-language speakers comprised roughly two-thirds of the popu- 
lation. They were classified as Eastern Lacustrine and Western 
Lacustrine Bantu, referring to the populous region around East 
Africa's Great Lakes (Victoria, Kyoga, Edward, and Albert in 
Uganda; Kivu and Tanganyika to the south). Eastern Lacustrine 
Bantu- speakers included the Baganda (people of Buganda, whose 
language is Luganda), Basoga, and many smaller societies in Ugan- 
da, Tanzania, and Kenya. Western Lacustrine Bantu-speakers in- 
cluded the Banyoro (people of Bunyoro), Batoro, Banyankole, and 
several smaller populations (see fig 5). 

Nilotic-language speakers probably entered the area from the 
north beginning about A.D. 1000. They were the first catde-herding 
people in the area but relied on crop cultivation to supplement 
livestock herding for subsistence. The largest Nilotic populations 
in Uganda in the 1980s were the Iteso and Karamojong cluster 
of ethnic groups, who speak Eastern Nilotic languages, and the 
Acholi, Langi, and Alur, who speak Western Nilotic languages. 



50 



The Society and Its Environment 



Central Sudanic languages, which also arrived in Uganda from 
the north over a period of centuries, are spoken by the Lugbara, 
Madi, and a few small groups in the northwestern corner of the 
country. 

One of the most recent major languages to arrive in Uganda 
is English. Introduced by the British in the late nineteenth century, 
it was the language of the colonial administration. After indepen- 
dence English became the official language of Uganda; it is used 
in government and commerce and is the primary medium of educa- 
tional instruction. Official publications and most major newspapers 
appear in English, and English is often employed in radio and tele- 
vision broadcasts. Most Ugandans also speak at least one African 
language. Swahili and Arabic are also widely spoken. 

Eastern Lacustrine Bantu 

Baganda 

The Baganda (sing., Muganda; often referred to simply by the 
root word and adjective, Ganda) make up the largest Ugandan eth- 
nic group, although they represent only about 16.7 percent of the 
population. (The name Uganda, the Swahili term for Buganda, 
was adopted by British officials in 1894 when they established the 
Uganda Protectorate, centered in Buganda.) Buganda's bound- 
aries are marked by Lake Victoria on the south, the Victoria Nile 
River on the east, and Lake Kyoga on the north. This region was 
never conquered by colonial armies; rather the powerful king {kaba- 
ka), Mutesa, agreed to protectorate status. At the time, Mutesa 
claimed territory as far west as Lake Albert, and he considered the 
agreement with Britain to be an alliance between equals. Baganda 
armies went on to help establish colonial rule in other areas, and 
Baganda agents served as tax collectors throughout the protectorate. 
Trading centers in Buganda became important towns in the pro- 
tectorate, and the Baganda took advantage of the opportunities 
provided by European commerce and education. At Uganda's in- 
dependence in 1962, Buganda had achieved the highest standard 
of living and the highest literacy rate in the country. 

Authoritarian control is an important theme of Ganda culture. 
In precolonial times, obedience to the king was a matter of life and 
death. A second important theme of Ganda culture, however, is 
the emphasis on individual achievement. An individual's future 
is not entirely determined by status at birth. Instead, individuals 
carve out their fortunes by hard work as well as by choosing friends, 
allies, and patrons carefully. 



51 



Uganda: A Country Study 

The traditional Ganda economy relied on crop cultivation. In 
contrast with many other East African economic systems, cattle 
played only a minor role. Many Baganda hired laborers from the 
north as herders. Bananas were the most important staple food, 
providing the economic base for the region's dense population 
growth. This crop does not require shifting cultivation or bush fal- 
lowing to maintain soil fertility, and, as a result, Ganda villages 
were quite permanent. Women did most of the agricultural work, 
whereas men often engaged in commerce and politics (and in 
precolonial times, warfare). 

Ganda social organization emphasized descent through males. 
Four or five generations of descendants of one man, related through 
male forebears, constituted a patrilineage (see Glossary). A group 
of related lineages constituted a clan (for lineage and clan — see Glos- 
sary). Clan leaders could summon a council of lineage heads, and 
council decisions affected all lineages within the clan. Many of these 
decisions regulated marriage, which had always been between two 
different lineages, forming important social and political alliances 
for the men of both lineages. Lineage and clan leaders also helped 
maintain efficient land use practices, and they inspired pride in 
the group through ceremonies and remembrances of ancestors. 

Ganda villages, sometimes as large as forty or fifty homes, were 
generally located on hillsides, leaving hilltops and swampy lowlands 
uninhabited, to be used for crops or pastures. Early Ganda vil- 
lages surrounded the home of a chief or headman, which provided 
a common meeting ground for members of the village. The chief 
collected tribute from his subjects, provided tribute to the kabaka, 
distributed resources among his subjects, maintained order, and 
reinforced social solidarity through his decision-making skills. Late 
nineteenth-century Ganda villages became more dispersed as the 
role of the chiefs diminished in response to political turmoil, popu- 
lation migration, and occasional popular revolts. 

Most lineages maintained links to a home territory {butaka) 
within a larger clan territory, but lineage members did not neces- 
sarily live on butaka land. Men from one lineage often formed the 
core of a village; their wives, children, and in-laws joined the vil- 
lage. People were free to leave if they became disillusioned with 
the local leader to take up residence with other relatives or in-laws, 
and they often did so. 

The twentieth-century influence of the Baganda in Uganda has 
reflected the impact of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century develop- 
ments (see Uganda Before 1900, ch. 1). A series of kabakas amassed 
military and political power by killing rivals to the throne, abolishing 
hereditary positions of authority, and exacting higher taxes from 



52 



The Society and Its Environment 



their subjects. Ganda armies also seized territory held by Bunyoro, 
the neighboring kingdom to the west. Ganda cultural norms also 
prevented the establishment of a royal clan by assigning the chil- 
dren of the kabaka to the clan of their mother. At the same time, 
this practice allowed the kabaka to marry into any clan in the society. 

One of the most powerful appointed advisers of the kabaka was 
the katikiro, who was in charge of the kingdom's administrative and 
judicial systems — effectively serving as both prime minister and 
chief justice. The katikiro and other powerful ministers formed an 
inner circle of advisers who could summon lower-level chiefs and 
other appointed advisers to confer on policy matters. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, the kabaka had replaced many clan heads 
with appointed officials and claimed the tide "head of all the clans." 

The power of the kabaka impressed British officials, but political 
leaders in neighboring Bunyoro were not receptive to British offi- 
cials who arrived with Baganda escorts. Buganda became the cen- 
terpiece of the new protectorate, and many Baganda were able to 
take advantage of opportunities provided by schools and business- 
es in their area. Baganda civil servants also helped administer other 
ethnic groups, and Uganda's early history was written from the 
perspective of the Baganda and the colonial officials who became 
accustomed to dealing with them. 

The family in Buganda is often described as a microcosm of the 
kingdom. The father is revered and obeyed as head of the family. 
His decisions are generally unquestioned. A man's social status 
is determined by those with whom he establishes patron-client rela- 
tionships, and one of the best means of securing this relationship 
is through one's children. Baganda children, some as young as three 
years old, are sent to live in the homes of their social superiors, 
both to cement ties of loyalty among parents and to provide avenues 
for social mobility for their children. Even in the 1980s, Baganda 
children were considered psychologically better prepared for adult- 
hood if they had spent several years living away from their par- 
ents at a young age. 

Baganda recognize at a very young age that their superiors, too, 
live in a world of rules. Social rules require a man to share his wealth 
by offering hospitality, and this rule applies more stringently to 
those of higher status. Superiors are also expected to behave with 
impassivity, dignity, self-discipline, and self-confidence, and adopt- 
ing these mannerisms sometimes enhances a man's opportunities 
for success. 

Ganda culture tolerates social diversity more easily than many 
other African societies. Even before the arrival of Europeans, many 
Ganda villages included residents from outside Buganda. Some had 



53 



Uganda: A Country Study 

arrived in the region as slaves, but by the early twentieth century, 
many non-Baganda migrant workers stayed in Buganda to farm. 
Marriage with non-Baganda was fairly common, and many Bagan- 
da marriages ended in divorce. After independence, Ugandan offi- 
cials estimated that one-third to one-half of all adults married more 
than once during their lives. 

Basoga 

The traditional territory of the Basoga (people of Busoga; sing. , 
Musoga; adj. Soga) is in southeastern Uganda, east of the Victor- 
ia Nile River. The Basoga make up about 8 percent of the popula- 
tion. Before the arrival of Europeans, the Basoga were subsistence 
farmers who also kept cattle, sheep, and goats. Basoga often had 
gardens for domestic use close to the homestead. There the wom- 
en of the household cared for the most common staple foods — 
bananas, millet, cassava, and sweet potatoes. Men generally cared 
for cash crops — coffee, cotton, peanuts, and corn. 

Traditional Soga society consisted of a number of small king- 
doms not united under a single paramount leader. Society was or- 
ganized around a number of principles, the most important of which 
was descent. Descent was traced through male forebears, leading 
to the formation of the patrilineage, which included an individu- 
al's closest relatives. This group provided guidance and support 
for each individual and united related homesteads for economic, 
social, and religious purposes. Lineage membership determined 
marriage choices, inheritance rights, and obligations to the ances- 
tors. An individual usually attempted to improve on his economic 
and social position, which was initially based on lineage member- 
ship, by skillfully manipulating patron-client ties within the authori- 
ty structure of the kingdom. A man's patrons, as much as his lineage 
relatives, influenced his status in society. 

Unlike the kabakas of Buganda, Basoga kings are members of 
a royal clan, selected by a combination of descent and approval 
by royal elders. In northern Busoga, near Bunyoro, the royal clan, 
the Babito, is believed to be related to the Bito aristocracy in 
Bunyoro (see Western Lacustrine Bantu, this ch.). Some Basoga 
in this area maintain that they are descended from people of 
Bunyoro. 

Bagisu 

The Bagisu (people of Bugisu; adj., Gisu) constitute roughly 5 per- 
cent of the population. They occupy the well- watered western slopes 
of Mount Elgon, where they grow millet, bananas, and corn for sub- 
sistence, and coffee and cotton as cash crops. Bugisu has the highest 



54 



The Society and Its Environment 



population density in the nation, rising to 250 per square kilome- 
ter. As a result, almost all land in Bugisu is cultivated, and land 
pressure causes population migration and social conflicts. 

A large number of Bagisu were drawn into the cash economy 
in 1912, with the organization of smallholder production of arabi- 
ca coffee and the extension of Uganda's administrative network 
into Bugisu. After that, the Bagisu were able to exploit their fer- 
tile environment by producing large amounts of coffee and threaten- 
ing to withhold their produce from the market when confronted 
with unreasonable government demands. One of the mechanisms 
for organizing coffee production was the Bugisu Cooperative Un- 
ion (BCU), which became one of the most powerful and most ac- 
tive agricultural cooperatives in Uganda. Bugisu 's economic 
strength was based in part on the fact that coffee grown on Mount 
Elgon was of the highest quality in Uganda, and total output in 
this small region constituted more than 10 percent of the coffee 
produced nationwide (see Crops, ch. 3). 

Land pressure during the early decades of colonial rule caused 
the Bagisu to move northward, impinging on the territory of the 
Sebei people, who have fought against Gisu dominance for over 
a century. The Bagwere and Bakedi people to the south have also 
claimed distinct cultural identities and have sought political au- 
tonomy. 

Western Lacustrine Bantu 

The Banyoro, Batoro, and Banyankole people of western Uganda 
are classified as We:tern Lacustrine Bantu language speakers. Their 
complex kingdoms are believed to be the product of acculturation 
between two different ethnic groups, the Hima (Bahima) and the 
Iru (Bairu). In each of these three societies, two distinct physical 
types are identified as Hima and Iru. The Hima are generally tall 
and are believed to be the descendants of pastoralists who migrat- 
ed into the region from the northeast. The Iru are believed to be 
descendants of agricultural populations that preceded the Hima 
as cultivators in the region. 

Banyoro 

Bunyoro lies in the plateau of western Uganda. The Banyoro 
(people of Bunyoro; sing., Munyoro; adj. Nyoro) constitute roughly 
3 percent of the population. Their economy is primarily agricul- 
tural, with many small farms of two or three hectares. Many peo- 
ple also keep goats, sheep, and chickens. People often say that the 
Banyoro once possessed large herds of cattle, but their herds were 
reduced by disease and warfare. Cattle raising is still a prestigious 



55 



Uganda: A Country Study 

occupation, generally reserved for people of Hima descent. The 
traditional staple is millet, and sweet potatoes, cassava, and legumes 
of various kinds are also grown. Bananas are used for making beer 
and occasionally as a staple food. Cotton and tobacco are impor- 
tant cash crops. 

Nyoro homesteads typically consist of one or two mud-and-wattle 
houses built around a central courtyard, surrounded by banana 
trees and gardens. Homesteads are not gathered into compact vil- 
lages; rather, they form clustered settlements separated from each 
other by uninhabited areas. Each Munyoro belongs to a clan, or 
large kinship group based on descent through the male line. A woman 
retains her membership in her clan of birth after marriage, even 
though she lives in her husband's home. Adult men usually live near, 
but not in, their father's homestead. Men of the same clan are also 
dispersed throughout Bunyoro, as a result of generations of popu- 
lation migration based on interpersonal loyalties and the demand 
for farmland. 

The traditional government of Bunyoro consisted of a hereditary 
ruler, or king (omukama), who was advised by his appointed council 
consisting of a prime minister, chief justice, and treasurer. The omuka- 
ma occupied the apex of a graded hierarchy of territorial chiefs, of 
whom the most important were four county chiefs. Below them in 
authority were subcounty chiefs, parish chiefs, and village heads. 

The Nyoro omukama was believed to be descended from the first 
ruler, Kintu, whose three sons were tested to determine the rela- 
tionship that would endure among their descendants. As a result 
of a series of trials, the oldest son became a servant and cultivator, 
the second became a herder, and the third son became the ruler 
over all the people. This tale served to legitimize social distinctions 
in Nyoro society that viewed pastoral life- styles as more prestigious 
than peasant agriculture and to emphasize the belief that socioeco- 
nomic roles were divinely ordained. 

During colonial times, the king was a member of the Bito clan. 
Bito clan members, especially those closest to the king, were consid- 
ered members of royalty, based on their putative descent from Kin- 
tu 's youngest son, who was chosen to rule. The pastoralist Hima 
were believed to be descended from Kintu' s second son, and the 
Iru, or peasant cultivators, were said to be descended from Kintu 's 
eldest son, the cultivator. Even during the twentieth century, when 
many Banyoro departed from their traditional occupations, these 
putative lines of descent served to justify some instances of social 
behavior. 

Among the most important of the omukama's advisers were his 
"official brother" (pkwiri) and "official sister" (kafyota), who represented 



56 



Murchison (Kabalega) Falls on the Victoria Nile River near Lake Albert 

Lake Victoria at Entebbe 
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer 



57 



Uganda: A Country Study 

his authority within the royal clan, effectively removing the king 
from the demands of his family. The kalyota was forbidden to marry 
or bear children, protecting the king against challenges from her 
offspring. The king's mother, too, was a powerful relative, with 
her own property, court, and advisers. The king had numerous 
other retainers, including custodians of royal graves, drums, 
weapons, stools, and other regalia, as well as cooks, musicians, pot- 
ters, and other attendants. Most of these were his close relatives 
and were given land as a symbol of their royalty; a few palace ad- 
visers were salaried. 

Almost all Nyoro political power derived from the king, who ap- 
pointed territorial chiefs at all levels. High-ranking chiefs were 
known as the "king's men' ' and were obligated to live in the royal 
homestead, or capital. The chiefs advisers, messengers, and 
delegates administered his territory according to his dictates. During 
colonial times, the three highest ranks of chiefs were assigned 
county, subcounty, and parish-level responsibilities to conform with 
the system British officials used in Buganda. Most kings appoint- 
ed important Hima cattle farmers to be chiefs. People provided 
the chiefs with tribute — usually grain, beer, and cattle — most of 
which was supposed to be delivered to the king. Failure to provide 
generous tribute weakened a man's standing before the throne and 
jeopardized his family's security. 

Batoro 

The Toro kingdom evolved out of a breakaway segment of 
Bunyoro some time before the nineteenth century. The Batoro (peo- 
ple of Toro) and Banyoro speak closely related languages, Lutoro 
and Lunyoro, and share many other similar cultural traits. The 
Batoro live on Uganda's western border, south of Lake Albert. They 
constitute roughly 3.2 percent of the population, but the Toro king 
(also called amukama) also claims to rule over the Bakonjo and Baam- 
ba people in the more fertile highlands above the plains of Toro. 
These highlands support cultivation of coffee as well as cotton, rice, 
sugarcane, and cocoa. Jurisdictional disputes have erupted into vio- 
lence many times during colonial and independent rule and led 
to the formation of the Ruwenzururu political movement that was 
still disrupting life in Toro in the late 1980s. 

Toro is a highly centralized kingdom like Buganda but similar 
in stratification to Bunyoro. The omukama has numerous retainers 
and royal advisers. Chiefs govern at several levels below the king, 
and like the kabaka of Buganda, the Toro ruler can appoint favored 
clients to these positions of power. Clientship — often involving cattle 
exchange — is an important means of social advancement. 



58 



The Society and Its Environment 



Banyankole 

Ankole (Nkole) is a large kingdom in southwestern Uganda, 
where the pastoralist Hima established dominion over the agricul- 
tural Iru some time before the nineteenth century. The Hima and 
Iru established close relations based on trade and symbolic recog- 
nition, but they were unequal partners in these relations. The Iru 
were legally and socially inferior to the Hima, and the symbol of 
this inequality was cattle, which only the Hima could own. The 
two groups retained their separate identities through rules prohibit- 
ing intermarriage and, when such marriages occurred, making them 
invalid. 

The Hima provided cattle products that otherwise would not have 
been available to Iru farmers. Because the Hima population was 
much smaller than the Iru population, gifts and tribute demanded 
by the Hima could be supplied fairly easily. These factors proba- 
bly made Hima-Iru relations tolerable, but they were nonetheless 
reinforced by the superior military organization and training of 
the Hima. 

The kingdom of Ankole expanded by annexing territory to the 
south and east. In many cases, conquered herders were incorpo- 
rated into the dominant Hima stratum of society, and agricultural 
populations were adopted as Iru or slaves and treated as legal in- 
feriors. Neither group could own cattle, and slaves could not herd 
cattle owned by the Hima. 

Ankole society evolved into a system of ranked statuses, where 
even among the cattle-owning elite, patron-client ties were impor- 
tant in maintaining social order. Men gave cattle to the king {mugabe) 
to demonstrate their loyalty and to mark life-cycle changes or vic- 
tories in cattle-raiding. This loyalty was often tested by the king's 
demands for catde or for military service. In return for homage and 
military service, a man received protection from the king, both from 
external enemies and from factional disputes with other cattle owners. 

The mugabe authorized his most powerful chiefs to recruit and 
lead armies on his behalf, and these warrior bands were charged 
with protecting Ankole borders. Only Hima men could serve in 
the army, however, and the prohibition on Iru military training 
almost eliminated the threat of Iru rebellion. Iru legal inferiority 
was also symbolized in the legal prohibition against Iru owning 
cattle. And, because marriages were legitimized through the ex- 
change of cattle, this prohibition helped reinforce the ban on Hima- 
Iru intermarriage. The Iru were also denied high-level political ap- 
pointments, although they were often appointed to assist local ad- 
ministrators in Iru villages. 



59 



Uganda: A Country Study 

The Iru had a number of ways to redress grievances against Hima 
overlords, despite their legal inferiority. Iru men could petition the 
king to end unfair treatment by a Hima patron. Iru people could 
not be subjugated to Hima catde-owners without entering into a 
patron-client contract. 

A number of social pressures worked to destroy Hima domina- 
tion of Ankole. Miscegenation took place despite prohibitions on 
intermarriage, and children of these unions (abambari) often 
demanded their rights as catde owners, leading to feuding and catde- 
raiding. From what is present-day Rwanda, groups launched 
repeated attacks against the Hima during the nineteenth century. 
To counteract these pressures, several Hima warlords recruited Iru 
men into their armies to protect the southern borders of Ankole. 
And, in some outlying areas of Ankole, people abandoned distinc- 
tions between Hima and Iru after generations of maintaining le- 
gal distinctions that had begun to lose their importance. 

Eastern Nilotic Language Groups 

Historians believe that Uganda's northeastern districts were in- 
habited by herders migrating from the east over a period of sever- 
al centuries. Their twentieth-century descendants live in Kenya, 
Sudan, and Uganda, where the largest groups are the Karamojong 
(people of Karamoja) ethnic groups. These include the Karamojong 
proper, as well as the Jie, Dodoth, and several small related groups, 
constituting about 12 percent of the population. All Karamojong 
peoples speak almost the same language (Akaramojong), with differ- 
ent pronunciations. The Iteso (people of Teso) south of Karamoja 
also speak an Eastern Nilotic language (Ateso) and are historically 
related to the Karamojong, but the Iteso are sometimes classified 
separately, based on cultural differences (many of which are re- 
cently acquired). The small Teuso (Ik), Tepeth, and Labwor popu- 
lations in the northeast also speak Eastern Nilotic languages but 
maintain separate cultural identities. In northwestern Uganda, the 
Kakwa are also classified as Eastern Nilotic, based on linguistic 
similarities to the Karamojong, despite the fact that Kakwa socie- 
ty is surrounded by Western Nilotic and Central Sudanic language 
speakers. 

Karamojong Cluster 

The relatively sparse rainfall in northeastern Uganda supports 
a pastoralist economy, and most people also raise crops to supple- 
ment their diet, which centers around meat, milk, and blood from 
cattle. Even after independence in 1962, most Ugandan govern- 
ments dealt with the Karamojong as rather difficult rural citizens 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



who sometimes impeded administration of the region. Most 
Karamojong resisted government pressures to abandon their herd- 
ing life-styles, but officials estimated that as many as 20 percent 
of the population may have died in the drought and famine that 
swept through much of the African Sahel in the early 1980s. 

Karamojong, Jie, and Dodoth oral historians have recounted 
their forebears' arrival in the region from the north. According 
to these accounts, they found an indigenous society, the Oropom, 
who were forced to move southward, leaving an Oropom clan 
among the Karamojong as an apparent remnant of this society. 
The Dodoth people are believed to have separated from the 
Karamojong proper in the mid-eighteenth century. They migrated 
northward into more mountainous territory. As a result, their cul- 
ture resembles that of the Karamojong in many respects. Dodoth 
homesteads are generally in valleys, with dry- season pastures on 
nearby hillsides. As a result, the Dodoth do not practice the trans- 
humant migration patterns that required other Karamojong peo- 
ples to establish dry-season cattle camps. 

Cattle are of great symbolic and economic importance, and peo- 
ple recalled the devastating rinderpest epidemic that swept the area 
in the late nineteenth century. Using that tragedy to educate the 
young, they also told of cattie herds that were saved by being moved 
to highland grazing areas. 

British control of the region was fairly ineffective well into the 
twentieth century, although successful trading centers had been es- 
tablished as early as 1890. Traders brought ivory and, occasional- 
ly, cattle to augment local herds, and received grain, spears, and 
other metal products in return. 

Most Karamojong peoples supplement their pastoral economy 
with crop cultivation, which is almost entirely in the hands of wom- 
en. Millet is an important staple, but many people also grow corn 
and peanuts. Tobacco is often grown within the stockade that sur- 
rounds most homesteads. The homestead is usually a circular con- 
figuration, and within this enclosure, each married woman has a 
house built of mud and brushwood walls with a thatched roof. The 
center of this is a cattle kraal, usually with only one opening to 
the outside. 

Wives live in their husband's homestead after marriage. Each 
wife has a separate, small house that serves as a kitchen, and some 
women also cultivate plots of ground several hours' walk away from 
their homes. Men were traditionally scornful of widowers and old 
men who cared for their own gardens, but after plows were intro- 
duced in the 1950s and farming became more financially rewarding, 



61 



Uganda: A Country Study 

many young men claimed plots of ground for their own use and 
hired women to work in them. 

Dodoth homesteads are larger than those of the Karamojong 
proper and more isolated from one another. Surrounding the 
homestead, upright poles are thrust into the earth, intertwined with 
branches and packed with mud and cow dung, forming a sturdy 
wall with only one or two small openings to the outside. As many 
as forty people often live in one homestead. Each wife has her own 
hut and hearth, and adolescent girls often build huts of their own 
next to their mothers' huts. Adolescent boys also build a larger 
"men's house," where they live before marriage. People keep catde 
and other animals inside the fortified wall at night. A woman often 
keeps a small garden near her hut, but fields and pastures are out- 
side the homestead. 

Among most Karamojong peoples, men living within a home- 
stead are related by descent through male forebears. This group, 
the patrilineage, is augmented by wives and children, and occa- 
sionally by unmarried brothers of the lineage head. A group of 
brothers usually shares the ownership of a herd of cattle, although 
animals are divided among individuals for milking and other domes- 
tic purposes. Cattle are usually branded with clan markings, 
although a man normally knows each animal in his family herd. 
Only when the last surviving brother dies is the herd divided among 
the next generation, with each set of full brothers inheriting a small 
herd. 

Grazing areas are common ground outside the stockade, although 
milk cows sometimes stay near the homestead. During the driest 
months, usually February and March, cattle are moved to seasonal 
camps some distance from the homestead. In these camps, men 
live almost entirely on milk and blood drawn from live cattle, and, 
occasionally, meat. In the homestead, women, children, and old 
people forage for food, including flying ants, if stores of grain are 
depleted. In very lean times, milk is reserved for children and calves 
before adults. 

Most societies of northeastern Uganda are organized into kin- 
ship groups larger than the lineage. Among the Jie, patrilineages 
maintaining the belief that they are distantly related often keep 
homesteads near one another, but this practice is less common 
among other Karamojong. The clan comprises related lineages, 
often numbering over 100 people. Jie clans are exogamous, meaning 
that two people of the same clan cannot marry one another. In 
addition, men generally avoid marriage with a woman of their 
mother's clan or that of her close relatives. Jie clan members share 
some symbolic recognition of their common identity, such as jewelry, 



62 




Residents relax in the evening at a park in downtown Kampala. 

Conducting business in a fabric shop in Kampala 
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer 



63 



Uganda: A Country Study 

but they do not observe the ritual taboos of animals or foods that 
are characteristic of many other African clan groupings. 

Two important sources of social solidarity link members of un- 
related lineages to one another. Intermarriage forms bonds based 
on brideprice cattle, which are given by a man's family to that of 
his bride, and children, who are important to their own lineage 
and to that of their mother. Age-sets (see Glossary) form bonds 
among groups of men close in age. (Clan leaders establish a new 
age-set about every twenty-five years.) Members of an age-set are 
generally obligated to maintain ties of friendship and assist each 
other when in need. 

Cattle are so vital in Karamoja that it is often difficult for 
Westerners to understand the attitudes surrounding them. Own- 
ing cattle is a mark of adulthood for men. Being without cattle is 
almost as onerous as being seriously ill; it threatens life. Moreover, 
a man can lose his entire herd of cattle in a brief raid. A mistake 
in judgment, such as a poor choice of pastures or travel routes, 
can cost a life's work. At the same time, outsiders are sometimes 
surprised to realize that these herders perceive themselves as 
poverty-ridden or uncivilized. In fact, the value of their cattle is 
often much greater than the value of the salaries received by govern- 
ment civil servants who come from the south to administer the 
region of the Karamojong. 

Living among the Karamojong peoples in the far northeast are 
several small ethnic groups who rely on hunting and cattle-raiding 
for much of their subsistence, but some have also gained a reputa- 
tion as spies and informers in the local system of raiding and 
warfare. One such group, the Teuso, were moved from their 
homeland in the 1960s to clear land for Kidepo National Park. Most 
of their Karamojong neighbors despised the Teuso, so much so 
that people were willing to see them starve rather than allow them 
to join nearby villages. Some Teuso died, and others left the area 
to become low- wage earners in nearby towns. The social system 
that developed in response to depopulation and deprivation em- 
phasized individual survival at the expense of other people. The 
Uganda government reacted strongly against the unfavorable pub- 
licity generated by one anthropological account of this society in 
the early 1970s, and security problems limited travel in the area. 
As a result, by the late 1980s, information about their society was 
scarce. 

The Tepeth also lived among the Karamojong, although they 
were usually classified as a separate Eastern Nilotic- speaking group. 
Oral histories relate that they were forced by government edict to 
vacate their homes in caves high in the mountains in northeastern 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



Uganda. The move increased their vulnerability to attack by peo- 
ple and disease, and an influx of refugees from Sudan further dis- 
rupted life. Warfare and conflict increased, and the Tepeth 
developed a variety of religious cults and rituals to maintain their 
cultural integrity in the face of Karamojong and Sudanese influence. 
In the late 1980s, little was known of the life-style of the remain- 
ing Tepeth people. 

The Labwor people, who live on the border between Acholi and 
Karamoja, are historically and linguistically related to the Karamo- 
jong but have adopted much of the life- style of the Acholi. The 
Labwor region is also a center of trade between cultivators to the 
west and pastoralists to the east. The local economy centers around 
crops — chiefly sorghum, eleusine (finger millet, a cereal), corn, 
gourds, sweet potatoes, beans, and peanuts — but people also raise 
cattle and goats. A small number of men from Labwor have 
achieved substantial wealth as itinerant traders in northeastern 
Uganda. Labwor society is organized into homesteads centered 
around the core of patrilineally related men and their wives and 
children. In addition, age-sets are important stabilizing factors, 
forming cross-cutting ties among lineages. 

Iteso 

The Iteso (people of Teso) are an acculturated branch of the 
Eastern Nilotic language speakers. With roughly 8.1 percent of the 
population of Uganda, they are believed to be the nation's second 
largest ethnic group. Teso territory stretches south from Karamo- 
ja into the well- watered region of Lake Kyoga. The traditional econ- 
omy emphasizes crop growing. Many Iteso joined Uganda's cash 
economy when coffee and cotton were introduced in 1912, and the 
region has thrived through agriculture and commerce. 

Traditional Teso settlements consist of scattered homesteads, each 
organized around a stockade and several granaries. Groups of 
homesteads are united around a hearth, where men who form the 
core of the settlement gather for ritual and social purposes. These 
groups usually consist of patrilineally related males, whose wives, 
children, and other relatives form the remainder of the settlement. 
Several groups of lineages form a clan. Clans are only loosely or- 
ganized, but clan elders maintain ritual observances in honor of 
their ancestors. Men of the clan consult the elders about social cus- 
toms, especially marriage. Much of the agricultural work is per- 
formed by women. Women may also own land and granaries, but 
after the introduction of cash-crop agriculture, most land was 
claimed by men and passed on to their sons. 



65 



Uganda: A Country Study 

All Iteso men within a settlement, both related and unrelated, 
are organized according to age. Each age-set spans fifteen to twenty 
years, providing a generational framework for sharing the work 
of the settlement. Age-sets exercise social control by recognizing 
status distinctions based on seniority, both between and within age- 
groups. They also share responsibility for resolving disputes within 
the settlement or among neighboring settlements. 

The small population of Kumam people living on the western 
border of Teso are historically related to the Iteso, but the Ku- 
mam have adopted many cultural features of their neighbors to 
the west, the Langi. The Kumam economy is based on mixed farm- 
ing and cotton, but little other information was available regard- 
ing their culture in the 1980s. 

Kakwa 

Although Kakwa people speak an Eastern Nilotic language, they 
are geographically separated from other Eastern Nilotic speakers. 
Kakwa society occupies the region of extreme northwestern Uganda 
that borders southern Sudan and northeastern Zaire. Those liv- 
ing in Uganda constitute less than 1 percent of the population, but 
Kakwa society has achieved widespread notoriety because the father 
of Idi Amin Dada, president of Uganda from 1971 to 1979, was 
Kakwa. (Amin's mother was from a neighboring society, the Lug- 
bara.) The Kakwa are believed to have migrated to the region from 
the northeast. Their indigenous political system features small vil- 
lages centered around a group of men who are related by descent. 
A council of male elders wields political and judicial authority. Most 
land is devoted to cultivating corn, millet, potatoes, and cassava. 
Cattle are part of the economy but not central to it. After Amin 
was deposed in 1979, many Kakwa people fled. Government and 
rebel troops inflicted a wave of revenge on the area, even though 
Amin had lived in Buganda as a child and had spent little time 
among Kakwa villagers. 

Western Nilotic Language Groups 

Western Nilotic language groups in Uganda include the Acho- 
li, Langi, Alur, and several smaller ethnic groups. Together they 
comprise roughly 15 percent of the population. Most Western Ni- 
lotic languages in Uganda are classified as Lwo, closely related to 
the language of the Luo society in Kenya. The two largest ethnic 
groups, the Acholi and Langi, speak almost identical languages, 
which vary slightly in pronunciation, suggesting that the two groups 
divided as recently as the early or mid-nineteenth century. The 
Alur, who live west of the Acholi and Langi, are culturally similar 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 

to neighboring societies of the West Nile region, where most peo- 
ple speak Central Sudanic languages. 

Langi and Acholi 

The Langi and Acholi occupy north-central Uganda. The Lan- 
gi represent roughly 6 percent of the population. Despite their lin- 
guistic affiliation with other Lwo speakers, the Langi reject the 
"Lwo" label. The Acholi represent 4 percent of the population 
but suffered severe depopulation and dislocation in the violence 
of the 1970s and 1980s. 

By about the thirteenth century A.D., Lwo-speaking peoples 
migrated from territory now in Sudan into Uganda and Kenya. 
They were probably pastoralists, organized in segmentary patriline- 
ages rather than highly centralized societies, but with some posi- 
tions of ritual or political authority. They encountered horticultural 
Bantu-speakers, organized under the authority of territorial chiefs. 
The newcomers probably claimed to be able to control rain, fertil- 
ity, and supernatural forces through ritual and sacrifice, and they 
may have established positions of privilege for themselves based 
on their spiritual expertise. Some historians believe the Langi 
represent the descendants of fifteenth-century dissenters from 
Karamojong society to the east. 

Both societies are organized into localized patrilineages and fur- 
ther grouped into clans, which are dispersed throughout the terri- 
tory. Clan members claim descent from a common ancestor, but 
they are seldom able to recount the nature of their relationship to 
the clan founder. Acholi lineages are ranked according to their prox- 
imity to a royal lineage, and the head of this lineage is recognized 
as a king, although his power is substantially less than that of 
monarchs in the south. 

Acholi and Langi societies rely on millet cultivation and animal 
husbandry for subsistence. In some areas, people also cultivate corn, 
eleusine, peanuts, sesame seed, sweet potatoes, and cassava. Both 
Langi and Acholi generally assign agricultural tasks either to men 
or women; in many cases men are responsible for cattle while wom- 
en work in the fields. (In some villages, only adult men may milk 
cows.) An Acholi or Langi man may marry more than one wife, 
but he may not marry within his lineage or that of his mother. A 
woman normally leaves her own family to live in her husband's 
homestead, which may include his brothers and their families. Each 
wife has a separate house and hearth for cooking. 

Alur 

The Alur political system is a series of overlapping, interlocking 



67 



Uganda: A Country Study 

chiefdoms, which were never unified in a single polity during 
precolonial times. Related lineages from different chiefdoms per- 
formed some religious ceremonies together, and intermarriage 
among chiefdoms was also fairly common. People also recognized 
other Alur speakers as neighbors. The Acholi claimed land east 
of Alur territory, and the Alur lost land in 1952, with the creation 
of Murchison (Kabalega) National Game Park. The Alur subse- 
quently incorporated some Sudanic- speaking groups into their so- 
ciety as they expanded to the west. 

Alur territory was remote from British commerce during colonial 
times, but once colonial boundaries were set, people found ways 
to profit from cross-border smuggling. Only a few churches, schools, 
and medical dispensaries were established, and many Alur became 
migrant laborers in Buganda to earn money to pay their taxes. 
Despite its geographical isolation, Alur territory in the 1980s showed 
signs of substantial but uneven acculturation, influenced by 
Sudanese, Zairian, and other Ugandan cultures. Alur society also 
became the object of some of the anti-Amin revenge that swept 
through the region in the 1980s. 

Central Sudanic Language Groups 

Central Sudanic languages are spoken by about 6 percent of 
Ugandans, most of whom live in the northwest. The Lugbara 
(roughly 3.8 percent of the total) and the Madi (roughly 1.2 per- 
cent) are the largest of these groups, representing the southeastern 
corner of a wide belt of Central Sudanic language speakers stretch- 
ing from Chad to Sudan. The Lugbara live in the highlands, on 
an almost treeless plateau that marks the watershed between the 
Congo River and the Nile. The Madi live in the lowlands to the east. 

Lugbara and Madi speak closely related languages and bear 
strong cultural similarities. Both groups raise millet, cassava, sor- 
ghum, legumes, and a variety of root crops. Chickens, goats, and, 
at higher elevations, cattle are also important. Corn is grown for 
brewing beer, and tobacco is an important cash crop. 

This region is densely populated, dotted with small settlements 
separated from one another by streams or patches of bush. Each 
settlement consists of a family cluster, with a core of patrilineal 
relatives and their polygynous families living under the authority 
of a lineage elder. Membership in a settlement is flexible, however; 
people leave and rejoin a village on the basis of interpersonal rela- 
tionships. 

The clan leaders adjudicate most disputes. They can order a man 
to pay compensation for assault or property damage; murder is 
often avenged by killing. The entire clan shares responsibility in 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



most matters, but the clan segment, or lineage, shares more im- 
mediate responsibility for avoiding conflict. 

Foreigners 

Nubians 

Roughly 10,000 Ugandans of Sudanese descent are classified as 
Nubians, referring to their origin in the area of the Nuba Moun- 
tains in Sudan. They are descendants of Sudanese military recruits 
who entered Uganda in the late nineteenth century as part of the 
colonial army and were employed to quell popular revolts (see Early 
Development, ch. 5). Their ethnic identities varied, but some spoke 
Western Nilotic languages, similar to that of the Acholi people, their 
closest relatives in Uganda. Many Nubians also spoke a variant of 
Arabic, and they practiced Islam. Moreover, they believed they were 
superior to Ugandans because of their mercenary status. Nubian 
armies raided surrounding villages, capturing slaves and wives. Their 
villages were organized around their military status. They raised 
cotton, most of which was used for making uniforms, and they were 
paid salaries throughout most of the protectorate years. 

Both colonial and independent governments attempted to regula- 
rize the status of the Nubian community. Many Nubians settled 
in northern Buganda, near the site of the colonial military head- 
quarters. Others lived among the Acholi in northern Uganda and 
among other Ugandan Muslim communities in the north. In the 
late 1980s, they were primarily a dispersed urban population. They 
generally avoided Western education, opting to send their children 
to Quranic schools instead. Nubians often worked as unskilled or 
semi-skilled laborers, or as traders. Most spoke Swahili — a Bantu 
language with strong Arabic influence. Baganda tolerated, but did 
not especially welcome, the Nubian population that lived among 
them, along with other non-Baganda. 

Rwandans 

Almost 6 percent of the population was of Rwandan descent, 
comprising Hutu and Tutsi (Watutsi) ethnic groups, in 1969, but 
at that time, most Rwandans in Uganda were citizens. They were 
Bantu-speakers, culturally related to the Hima and Iru of the south- 
western kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole. Most Rwan- 
dans lived in Buganda, where they worked in agriculture, business, 
and a variety of service occupations. Most were Roman Catho- 
lics. In the early 1980s, as refugees migrated freely across national 
boundaries throughout East Africa, the government attempted to 
limit Rwandan influence by restricting those who lacked Ugandan 



69 



Uganda: A Country Study 



citizenship to refugee camps and by expelling some to Tanzania. 
In the late 1980s, more than 120,000 Rwandans were recognized 
as refugees in Uganda by the UNHCR. 

Asians 

The 1969 census enumerated about 70,000 people of Indian or 
Pakistani descent — generally referred to as Asians in Uganda. They 
were officially considered foreigners despite the fact that more than 
one-half of Uganda's Asians were born in Uganda. Many of their 
forebears had arrived in Uganda by way of trade networks cen- 
tered on the Indian Ocean island of Zanzibar (united with Tan- 
ganyika in 1964 to form Tanzania), which brought iron, cotton, 
and other products from India even before the nineteenth centu- 
ry. In the late nineteenth century, many indentured laborers from 
India remained in Uganda after their service ended, but the govern- 
ment refused to sell them land, and most became traders. Wealthy 
Baganda traders were almost eliminated as their earliest rivals when 
the Buganda Agreement of 1900 made land ownership more lucra- 
tive than commerce for most Baganda. Indians gained control of 
retail and wholesale trade, cotton ginning, coffee and sugar process- 
ing, and other segments of commerce. After independence, and 
especially when the Obote government threatened to nationalize 
many industries in 1969, Asians exported much of their wealth and 
were accused of large-scale graft and tax evasion. President Amin 
deported about 70,000 Asians in 1972, and only a few returned 
to Uganda in the 1980s to claim compensation for their expropri- 
ated land, buildings, factories, and estates. In 1989 the Asian popu- 
lation in Uganda was estimated to be about 10,000. 

Religion 

In the late 1980s, Ugandan officials estimated that 66 percent 
of the population was Christian — almost equally divided among 
Protestants and Roman Catholics. Approximately 15 percent of 
Ugandans were Muslims. Roughly 19 percent of the people 
professed belief in local religions or denied any religious affilia- 
tion. The basic tenets of all religions — that a spiritual realm exists 
and that spiritual and physical beings can influence one another — 
permeated much of Ugandan society. World religions and local 
religions had coexisted for more than a century, and many people 
established a coherent set of beliefs about the nature of the universe 
by combining elements of the two. Except in a few teachings, world 
religions were seldom viewed as incompatible with local religions. 

Throughout Uganda's colonial and postcolonial history, reli- 
gious identity has had economic and political implications. Church 



70 




71 



Uganda: A Country Study 

membership has influenced opportunities for education, employ- 
ment, and social advancement. As a result, the distinction between 
material and spiritual benefits of religion has not been considered 
very important, nor have the rewards of religious participation been 
expected to arrive only in an afterlife. 

World Religions 

Christianity 

One of the largest denominations is Anglican (Episcopal). In 1990 
about 4 million Ugandans, or roughly 22 percent of the popula- 
tion, belonged to the nineteen dioceses of the Anglican Church of 
Uganda. Protestant churches, including Methodist, Lutheran, Bap- 
tist, and Presbyterian, together had fewer than 1 million members. 
About 5 million Roman Catholics (roughly 28 percent of the popu- 
lation) were members of the thirteen Catholic dioceses in Uganda. 
The Catholic and Anglican archbishops and other church leaders 
were Ugandans. 

The first Christian missionaries represented the Anglican Church 
Missionary Society (CMS) and arrived in Buganda in 1877 (see 
Long-Distance Trade and Foreign Contact, ch. 1). Roman Catholic 
priests from the Society of Missionaries of Africa (White Fathers), 
a French religious order, arrived two years later. These and later 
Catholic and Protestant missions competed for converts in southern 
Uganda and became embroiled in local politics. British and Ger- 
man military commanders organized Protestant and Catholic con- 
verts to defend imperial interests against each other and against 
Muslim armies. Many early converts to Christianity were persecut- 
ed by local rulers, and nineteenth-century martyrs were commemo- 
rated in shrines in several places in southern Uganda. 

After the victories of Protestant armies in the conflicts of the 1890s 
in southern Uganda, membership in the Anglican church was a 
requirement for each kabaka of Buganda. The Anglican Cathedral 
on Namirembe Hill in Kampala became the site of the kabaka' 's 
coronation. (A Roman Catholic cathedral was built on nearby 
Rubaga Hill in 1925.) When Protestant Baganda formed the 
political party Kabaka Yekka (KY) to press for autonomy for 
Buganda at independence, Catholics formed the Democratic Party 
(DP) to oppose the parochial interests of the KY. The DP also won 
support in areas where opposition to Buganda was high, and other 
political parties organized in reaction to KY and DP demands. 
Religion continued to be a factor in national politics through the 
first three decades of independence. 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



Islam 

In 1990 Islam was practiced by an estimated 2.6 million Ugan- 
dans, representing roughly 15 percent of the population. Islam had 
arrived in Uganda from the north and through inland networks 
of the East African coastal trade by the mid-nineteenth century. 
Some Baganda Muslims trace their family's conversion to the period 
in which the kabaka, Mutesa I, converted to Islam in the nineteenth 
century. 

Islam is a monotheistic religion based on revelations received 
in seventh-century Arabia by the prophet Muhammad. His life 
is recounted as the early history of the religion, beginning with his 
travels from the Arabian town of Mecca about A.D. 610. Muham- 
mad denounced the polytheistic religions of his homeland, preaching 
a series of divine revelations. He became an outcast, and in A.D. 
622, he was forced to flee to the town of Yathrib, which became 
known as Medina (the city) through its association with Muham- 
mad. The flight (hijra) marked the beginning of the Islamic era 
and of Islam as a powerful force in history. It also marked the year 
A.D. 622 as the beginning of the Islamic calendar. Muhammad 
ultimately defeated his detractors in battle and consolidated his in- 
fluence as both temporal and spiritual leader of many Arabs be- 
fore his death in A.D. 632. 

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled his words that 
they believed were direct from God (Allah) and produced the Qu- 
ran, the holy scripture of Islam. Muhammad's teachings and his 
actions as recalled by those who knew him became the hadith (say- 
ings). From these sources, the faithful constructed the Prophet's 
customary practice, or sunna, which they emulate. The Quran, 
hadith, and sunna form a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethi- 
cal, and social life of the faithful in most Muslim countries. 

The central requirement of Islam is submission to the will of God, 
and, accordingly, a Muslim is a person who has submitted his will 
to God. The most important demonstration of faith is the shahada 
(profession of faith), which states, ''There is no God but God (Al- 
lah), and Muhammad is his prophet." Salat (daily prayer), zakat 
(almsgiving), sawm (fasting), and hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) are 
also required of the faithful. 

When Idi Amin, a Ugandan Muslim, became president in 1971 , 
his presidency seemed to be a victory for Uganda's Muslim com- 
munity. Then in 1972, Amin's expulsion of Asians from Uganda 
reduced the Muslim population significantly. As his administra- 
tion deteriorated into a brutal and unsuccessful regime, Uganda's 
Muslims began to distance themselves from those in power. After 



73 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Amin's overthrow in 1979, Muslims became the victims of the back- 
lash that was directed primarily against the Kakwa and Nubian 
ethnic groups who had supported Amin. Yusuf Lule, who served 
a brief term as president from 1979 to 1980, was also a Muslim 
(and a Muganda). He was not a skillful politician, but he was suc- 
cessful in reducing the public stigma attached to Islam. In 1989 
President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni appealed to Uganda's Mus- 
lim community to contribute to national reconstruction, and he 
warned other Ugandans not to discriminate against Muslims. But 
at the same time, Museveni admonished Ugandans to avoid "sec- 
tarian" allegiances, and this warning was directed at the Islamic 
community as well as other ethnic and religious groups. 

Local Religions 

Roughly 19 percent of Ugandans professed belief in local religions 
in the late 1980s. In Uganda as in other countries, religion serves 
social and political purposes, as well as individual needs. An im- 
portant social function of religion is reinforcing group solidarity 
by providing elements necessary for society's survival — 
remembrances of the ancestors, means of settling disputes, and 
recognition of individual achievement. Another social function of 
religion is helping people cope with negative aspects of life — pain, 
suffering, and defeat — by providing an explanation of their causes. 
Religious beliefs and practices also serve political aims, especially 
by bolstering the authority of temporal rulers and at other times 
by allowing new leaders to mobilize political opposition and im- 
plement political change. 

Among Bantu-speaking societies in southern Uganda, many local 
religions include beliefs in a creator God, usually known as Ntu 
or a variant of that term (e.g. , Muntu). Most religions involve be- 
liefs in ancestral and other spirits, and people offer prayers and 
sacrifices to symbolize respect for the dead and to maintain proper 
relationships among the living. An important example of this reli- 
gious attitude is found in western Uganda among members of the 
Mbandwa religion and related belief systems throughout the region. 
Mbandwa mediators act on behalf of other believers, using trance 
or hypnosis and offering sacrifice and prayer to beseech the spirit 
world on behalf of the living. In Bunyoro, for example, the ances- 
tral spirits, who protect those who pray to them, are believed to 
be the early mythical rulers, the Chwezi. As a result, the Mbandwa 
religion in these areas is sometimes called the Chwezi religion. 

Ancestors are also important in the lives of the Lugbara people 
of northwestern Uganda. Ancestors communicate with the living, 
influence their luck, and can be appeased by those in authority. 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



A lineage elder is said to "own" an ancestral shrine, and this owner- 
ship serves to reinforce his power to communicate with the ances- 
tors. The elder can invoke a curse on a relative, and people with 
illnesses often consult diviners to interpret the conditions of their 
lives and determine which elder might have caused the illness. 

More secular functions of religion are evident in the Ganda be- 
lief system, which reinforces the institution of kingship. The kaba- 
ka is not considered to be the descendant of gods, but his skill as 
a leader is judged in part by his ability to defend his people from 
spiritual danger. Most spiritual beings are considered to be the 
source of misfortune, rather than good fortune — forces to be pla- 
cated. A good kabaka is one who can defend his kingdom from di- 
vine retribution. Important gods in the Ganda pantheon include 
Kibuka and Nende, the gods of war; Mukasa, the god of children 
and fertility; a number of gods of the elements — rain, lightning, 
earthquake, and drought; gods of plague and smallpox; and a god 
of hunting. Sacrifices to appease these deities include food, animals, 
and, at times in the past, human beings. 

Religion in the Tepeth society in northeastern Uganda also rein- 
forces political values. Authority is concentrated in the hands of 
a small group of priests and clan elders. They admit men whom 
they judge to be most capable to a cult known as Sor. Sor initiates 
make sacrifices to enhance fertility, ensure adequate rainfall, and 
avoid disease. Men also become members of a society of mediums, 
who are highly respected, or priests, who are also respected but 
less so. Women receive spiritual communications regarding social 
ills, such as crime, but are believed to be incapable of seeing the 
spirits that communicate with them. Mediums, priests, and 
others — including women — are allowed to perform rituals that sym- 
bolize their spiritual and social prestige. 

Religion overlaps with politics in many other areas of life. An- 
cestors and their agents on earth often support authority systems 
by punishing transgressions against elders. Killing or striking senior 
kin is sometimes sufficient to destroy a descent group. The trans- 
gressor can avert this tragedy by engaging a spiritual healer and 
paying the prescribed penalty. Illness is often interpreted as a 
penalty for flouting the authority of an elder. Illness and a wide 
variety of misfortunes provide opportunities for individuals to ex- 
amine their own actions and relationships, admit their weakness- 
es to a respected leader, and compensate those who otherwise might 
become their enemies. This pattern of behavior — both political and 
religious — contributes to stability in many societies. 



75 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Millenarian Religions 

A number of millenarian religions (promising a "golden age," 
or millennium) existed in Uganda in the 1980s. They have often 
arisen in response to rapid culture change or other calamities and 
have sought to overthrow the political order that allowed the crisis 
to arise. Many millenarian religions, sometimes called cults, are 
led by a charismatic prophet who promises followers relief from 
sufferings. The strength of people's faith sometimes allows a prophet 
to make extraordinary demands on believers, and a successful 
prophet can win new converts when political upheaval is compound- 
ed by natural disaster, such as epidemics (possibly to include the 
spread of AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s). 

Yakan Religion 

One of the most successful millenarian religions in Uganda was 
the Yakan cult, which arose in Sudan in the late nineteenth centu- 
ry. Leaders from Kakwa society (whose territory extends across 
the Uganda-Sudan border) traveled south in search of protection 
against epidemics, Arab slave caravans, and European military 
forces, all of which were sweeping Kakwa society in the 1890s. They 
returned home from the neighboring Lugbara territory with spring 
water they called "the water of Yakan." To those who drank it, 
they promised restored health, eternal life, and the return of the 
ancestors and dead cattle. In Kakwa society, Yakan leaders 
promised protection from bullets, and many Yakan leaders predict- 
ed the arrival of wagonloads of rifles to drive out all Europeans. 

When sleeping sickness ravaged Lugbara society in 1911, Lug- 
bara leaders sought out the Yakan prophets. One of them — 
Rembe — traveled to Uganda and dispensed the water of Yakan. 
He was subsequendy deported to Sudan and executed in 1917. With 
its new martyr, the cult flourished. When the British administra- 
tion declared the sect illegal, people built shrines inside the walls 
of their homesteads, and believers used Yakan water to provide 
what they believed was spiritual protection against British patrols. 
The ban on the Yakan religion was impossible to enforce, and when 
it was lifted, Yakan believers felt their faith was vindicated. 

As the religion developed, people began to use trance and speak- 
ing in tongues to strengthen and demonstrate their faith. In some 
areas, Yakan leaders appointed their followers to positions of pres- 
tige, and, as their power increased, a gradual reorganization of 
villages began to take place. Religious notables exercised political 
authority, and eventually they became so oppressive that their fol- 
lowers revolted. Colonial troops came in to restore peace, and the 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



Yakan religion declined in influence but did not disappear. Promises 
of a millennium continued to arise in similar form in the 1980s. 

Holy Spirit Movement 

In the 1980s, the Holy Spirit Movement arose in Acholi territo- 
ry of northern Uganda, where warfare and political killings had 
ravaged society for nearly two decades. Alice Lakwena, an Acholi 
prophet, claimed to bring messages from the spiritual world ad- 
vising people, even though unarmed, to oppose government in- 
tervention in Acholi territory. Lakwena, known locally as i 'Alice," 
also advised her followers to protect themselves against bullets by 
smearing cooking oil on their skin and declared that stones or bot- 
tles thrown at government troops would turn into hand grenades. 
Many of Alice's followers were killed in these confrontations, and 
many others acquired guns to reinforce their supposed spiritual 
armor. In 1987, however, Alice fled to Kenya, where she was jailed. 
A self-proclaimed mystic, Joseph Kony, and Odong Latek succeed- 
ed her as leaders of the Holy Spirit Movement. 

The appeal of the Holy Spirit Movement continued, and in early 
1989, it disrupted the establishment of the grass-roots resistance 
councils (RCs), which were intended to serve as the base for a peo- 
ple's democracy under the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
(see Local Administration, ch. 4). Government officials proclaimed 
periods of amnesty and sought to weaken the Holy Spirit Move- 
ment's appeal by cutting off supplies of weapons (and cooking oil) 
to the region. As of 1989, the NRM was unable to quell this popular 
rebellion that clothed itself in religious dogma. 

Social Change 

Uganda in the 1980s bore the imprint of complex stratification 
systems that had evolved well before colonial agents arrived in the 
area. These, in turn, were shaped in part by the Arab slave trade 
that flourished in the mid-nineteenth century, providing laborers 
for French sugar and tobacco plantations on several Indian Ocean 
islands. Tens of thousands of slave captives were taken from north- 
ern Uganda, where societies had been organized primarily around 
descent rules, ritual needs, and cattle. British imperial agents ar- 
riving in the north in the late nineteenth century encountered many 
small village- and lineage-based social units specialized for mobil- 
ity and warfare. 

Karamojong societies in the northeast were highly segmented, 
allowing people to move away and rejoin a group without disrupt- 
ing social relations or their pastoral life-style. West of the 
Karamojong, Acholi and Langi peoples developed a more sedentary 



77 



Uganda: A Country Study 

economy relying largely on crop cultivation. In most northern so- 
cieties, status distinctions were based on age, gender, and, in some 
cases, spiritual prowess. Men with military expertise were also im- 
portant, but these societies did not develop powerful kingdoms as 
did those that would dominate southern Uganda. In the south, a 
more favorable climate contributed to the formation of highly strati- 
fied kingdoms, relying in part on labor from the north. Patron- 
client relationships bound individuals of different strata to one 
another, and military elites sometimes dominated society, espe- 
cially in times of war. By the late nineteenth century, British im- 
perial agents saw Buganda as an orderly kingdom with extensive 
commercial ties throughout the region, ruled by a king who wel- 
comed those who proselytized on behalf of world religions — an ideal 
environment for establishing a colonial presence. 

In 1900 Baganda chiefs agreed to protectorate status for the region 
in return for title to freehold land, and even in the 1980s, many 
of Uganda's wealthiest landowners were Baganda who had inherited 
or purchased that land (still known as mailo land because it was 
measured in square miles) from these early landowners. Similar 
landowning classes were created in Toro and Ankole, where the 
British granted freehold tenure to a small group of chiefs, and to 
a lesser extent in Bunyoro, where the omukama followed suit to ap- 
pease his most important clients. These agreements displaced line- 
age and clan heads, who became trespassers on ancestral land they 
had formerly controlled, and the shift from dispersed, temporary 
power centers to a petite bourgeoisie of African landowners be- 
gan. Asians, who came to dominate retail and wholesale trade, and 
a few high-ranking civil servants were also among the new elites. 

Tenant farmers began to exercise their political power as the tri- 
angular relationship among landlords, tenant farmers, and the state 
achieved a sort of balance. The state demanded taxes from both 
landowners and tenant farmers; landlords demanded rent (and a 
portion of the produce) from their tenants; and farmers threatened 
to reduce their crop yields if the demands of the other two became 
too onerous. At times, disgruntled farmers were so successful in 
withholding production that the state stepped in to impose limits 
on demands by landlords, thereby protecting the state's ability to 
tax both landlord and tenant farmer. Successful landowners received 
government loans at low interest rates, and some of them used the 
money to purchase facilities for processing cash crops, which would 
become especially lucrative after independence. Wealthy farmers 
organized agricultural cooperatives — and eventually, political 
parties — to implement their demands during the pre-independence 



78 




Marketing farm produce in Kampala 
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer 



79 



Uganda: A Country Study 

years. They recruited members among their own ethnic or reli- 
gious groups, however, and therefore most peasant farmers re- 
mained poor. 

During the years surrounding independence, land ownership was 
an important factor in the new nation's social organization, but 
colonial policies also entrenched racial and ethnic differences that 
hampered the accumulation of wealth by most people. African busi- 
ness people were unable to compete with Asians in many areas of 
commerce because of discriminatory government licensing regu- 
lations and red tape. Urban unskilled workers, lacking both land 
and political organization, were hampered from organizing nation- 
wide labor actions, and in general the poor found their avenues 
to middle-class status blocked. Most northerners remained peasants 
or laborers because agribusiness, commerce, transportation, and 
educational centers were centered in the south. 

Each government after independence altered the identity of the 
major participants in the national economy without changing the 
basic nature of that participation. The 1960s government of Mil- 
ton Obote reduced the privileged status of the southern kingdoms, 
especially Buganda, and brought northerners into business and 
politics in increasing numbers. During the 1970s, Amin expelled 
the Asian commercial bourgeoisie and eliminated many others from 
the entrenched elite. By expropriating their wealth and nationalizing 
foreign businesses, Amin's followers acquired substantial resources 
for patronage purposes, and, as a result, former peripheral groups, 
such as the Nubian military community, assumed new power and 
wealth. Many uneducated, untrained military recruits also received 
important military and political appointments, but by the end of 
Amin's term in office in 1979, the state's resources for rewarding 
political clients had begun to dwindle. 

Under these conditions of political and economic uncertainty, 
many skilled workers, even from urban areas, reverted to subsis- 
tence cultivation in order to survive. Urban and rural elites fled 
from state terror tactics and economic destruction, and many who 
could afford to travel went to other African countries or Britain. 
Cities and towns stagnated. At the same time, shortages of basic 
commodities and foodstuffs provided new avenues to wealth through 
black-market operations and smuggling. For many citizens, the in- 
stitutions of government became almost irrelevant to social progress. 

As the government lost its ability to impose economic and polit- 
ical order, a few people were able to accumulate impressive wealth 
through open manipulation of illegal economic networks. A special- 
ized vocabulary for black-market activities, termed magendo, and 
its most successful participants, mqfuta mingi ("dripping in oil"), 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



came to symbolize the importance of this thriving sector of the econ- 
omy. Local economists estimated that during the early 1980s, magen- 
do activities generated as much as one-third of the national output 
of goods and services, and mqfuta mingi, both those in government 
office and "private- sector magendoists, " constituted the wealthiest 
class of Ugandans. Together with its lower-class beneficiaries — 
including those who carried out risky smuggling ventures, ran er- 
rands, and stored goods for their superiors, as well as those who 
were simply thieves (bayaye) — magendo was thought to provide a living 
for about 7 percent of the population. 

President Amin also embarrassed many Ugandans with his un- 
educated style as president; his example and tolerance of brutality 
were viewed with revulsion. Government agents committed much 
of the violence, provoking violent revenge, and ethnic identity be- 
came the basis for much of this revenge. Pervasive violence height- 
ened the destructive impact of widespread corruption. When 
Museveni seized power in 1986, none of the four administrations 
that had succeeded Amin had been able to restore order or public 
confidence in government. The restoration of a viable middle class 
began, and some urban activity revived, but continuing warfare 
delayed nationwide social programs. Economic disaster loomed 
again when international coffee prices plummeted in 1989, and the 
policy of coopting former rebel opponents produced a burgeoning, 
expensive military establishment. Museveni's fledgling demo- 
cratic institutions provided some hope of peace and economic recov- 
ery in the 1990s; many members of the small but very wealthy 
Ugandan elite, however, had accumulated wealth under earlier 
regimes. Middle-class workers and farmers were struggling just to 
provide for their families. Government workers were sometimes 
unpaid, and many civil servants found it necessary to hold more 
than one job. Urban workers often farmed or had members of their 
families cultivate rural plots of land for subsistence and profit. Un- 
skilled workers and peasant farmers — i.e., the majority of 
Ugandans — appeared likely to remain poor. 

Women in Society 

Women's roles were clearly subordinate to those of men, despite 
the substantial economic and social responsibilities of women in 
Uganda's many traditional societies. Women were taught to ac- 
cede to the wishes of their fathers, brothers, husbands, and some- 
times other men as well, and to demonstrate their subordination 
to men in most areas of public life. Even in the 1980s, women in 
rural areas of Buganda were expected to kneel when speaking to 
a man. At the same time, however, women shouldered the primary 



81 



Uganda: A Country Study 

responsibilities for childcare and subsistence cultivation, and in the 
twentieth century, women had made substantial contributions to 
cash-crop agriculture. 

Many men claimed that their society revered women, and it was 
true that Ugandan women had some traditional rights that exceeded 
those of women in Western societies. Many Ugandans recognized 
women as important religious leaders, who sometimes had led re- 
ligious revolts that overthrew the political order dominated by men. 
In some areas of Uganda, women could own land, influence cru- 
cial political decisions made by men, and cultivate crops for their 
own profit. But when cash-crop agriculture became lucrative, as 
in southeastern Uganda in the 1920s, men often claimed rights to 
land owned by their female relatives, and their claims were sup- 
ported by local councils and protectorate courts. 

Poly gy nous marriage practices, which permit a man to marry 
more than one woman, have reinforced some aspects of male 
dominance, but they also have given women an arena for cooper- 
ating to oppose male dominance. Moreover, a man sometimes 
granted his senior wife "male" status, allowing her to behave as 
an equal toward men and as a superior toward his other wives. 
But in the twentieth century, polygynous marriages had created 
bonds that were not legally recognized as marriage, leaving wom- 
en without legal rights to inheritance or maintenance in the event 
of divorce or widowhood. 

Women began to organize to exercise their political power be- 
fore independence. In 1960 the Uganda Council of Women passed 
a resolution urging that laws regarding marriage, divorce, and in- 
heritance should be recorded in written form and publicized 
nationwide — a first step toward codifying customary and modern 
practices. During the first decade of independence, this council also 
pressed for legal reforms that would grant all women the right to 
own property and retain custody of their children if their mar- 
riages ended. 

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the violence that swept Uganda 
inflicted a particularly heavy toll on women. Economic hardships 
were felt first in the home, where women and children lacked eco- 
nomic choices available to most men. Women's work became more 
time-consuming than it had been; the erosion of public services 
and infrastructure reduced access to schools, hospitals, and mar- 
kets. Even traveling to nearby towns was often impossible. Some 
Ugandan women believed that the war years strengthened their 
independence, however, as the disruption of normal family life 
opened new avenues for acquiring economic independence, and 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 

government reports suggested that the number of women employed 
in commerce increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 

The Museveni government of the late 1980s pledged to eliminate 
discrimination against women in official policy and practice. Women 
are active in the National Resistance Army (NRA), and Museveni 
appointed a woman, Joan Kakwenzire, to a six-member commis- 
sion to document abuses by the military (see Human Rights, 
ch. 5). The government also has decreed that one woman would 
represent each district on the National Resistance Council (NRC — 
see The National Resistance Council, ch. 4). In addition, the 
government-operated Uganda Commercial Bank has launched a 
rural credit plan to make farm loans more easily available to women 
(see Banking, ch. 3). 

Museveni appointed Joyce Mpanga minister for women and 
development in 1987, and she proclaimed the government's in- 
tention to raise women's wages, increase women's credit and em- 
ployment opportunities, and improve the lives of women in general. 
In 1989 there were two women serving as ministers and three serv- 
ing as deputy ministers in the NRM cabinet. Women civil servants 
and professionals also formed an organization, Action for Develop- 
ment, to assist women in war- torn areas, especially the devastated 
Luwero region in central Uganda. 

The Uganda Association of Women Lawyers, which was founded 
in 1976, established a legal-aid clinic in early 1988 to defend women 
who faced the loss of property or children because of divorce, sepa- 
ration, or widowhood. The association also sought to expand educa- 
tional opportunities for women, increase child- support payments 
(equivalent to US$0.50 per month in 1989) in case of divorce, es- 
tablish common legal grounds for divorce for both men and wom- 
en, establish common criminal codes for men and women, assist 
women and children who were victims of AIDS, and implement 
nationwide education programs to inform women of their legal 
rights. 

Education 

Mission schools were established in Uganda in the 1890s, and 
in 1924 the government established the first secondary school for 
Africans. By 1950, however, the government operated only three 
of the fifty- three secondary schools for Africans. Three others were 
privately funded, and forty-seven were operated by religious or- 
ganizations. Education was eagerly sought by rural farmers as well 
as urban elites, and after independence many villages, especially 
in the south, built schools, hired teachers, and appealed for and 
received government assistance to operate their own village schools. 



83 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Most subjects were taught according to the British syllabus un- 
til 1974, and British examinations measured a student's progress 
through primary and secondary school. In 1975 the government 
implemented a local curriculum, and for a short time most school 
materials were published in Uganda. School enrollments continued 
to climb throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, but as the econ- 
omy deteriorated and violence increased, local publishing almost 
ceased, and examination results deteriorated. 

The education system suffered the effects of economic decline 
and political instability during the 1970s and 1980s. The system 
continued to function, however, with an administrative structure 
based on regional offices, a national school inspectorate, and cen- 
tralized, nationwide school examinations. Enrollments and expen- 
ditures increased steadily during this time, reflecting the high 
priority Ugandans attach to education, but at all levels, the physi- 
cal infrastructure necessary for education was lacking, and the qual- 
ity of education declined. School maintenance standards suffered, 
teachers fled the country, morale and productivity deteriorated 
along with real incomes, and many facilities were damaged by 
warfare and vandalism. 

In 1990 adult literacy nationwide was estimated at 50 percent. 
Improving this ratio was important to the Museveni government. 
In order to reestablish the national priority on education, the 
Museveni government adopted a two-phase policy — to rehabilitate 
buildings and establish minimal conditions for instruction, and to 
improve efficiency and quality of education through teacher training 
and curriculum upgrading. Important long-term goals included es- 
tablishing universal primary education, extending the seven-year 
primary cycle to eight or nine years, and shifting the emphasis in 
postsecondary education from purely academic to more technical 
and vocational training. 

The School System 

Formal education had four levels. The first level consisted of seven 
primary- school grades (standards one through seven), usually be- 
ginning about age six. Based on test scores in seventh grade, pupils 
could enter one of several types of institutions — a four-year second- 
ary school ("O-level"), a three-year technical training institution, 
or a four-year teacher training college. About 40 percent of those 
who passed ''O-level" examinations continued their education 
through one of several options — an advanced two-year second- 
ary course ("A-level"), an advanced two-year teacher training 
course, a technical institute, or a specialized training program 
provided by the government. Those who completed "A-level" 



84 




CHILDREN 

CROSSING 

■Bf£ CAREFULLY 



Children waiting for a school bus near Kampala 
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer 

examinations might study at Makerere University in Kampala or 
they might study abroad. Other options for "A-level" graduates 
were the Uganda Technical College, the Institute of Teachers' Edu- 
cation (formerly the National Teachers' College), or National Col- 
lege of Business Studies. 

Primary Education 

In 1989, the last year for which official figures were available, 
the government estimated that more than 2.5 million youngsters 
were enrolled in primary schools; about 45 percent of primary stu- 
dents were female (see table 3, Appendix). This figure represented 
a four- fold increase from primary enrollment levels of the late 1960s 
and a near doubling of the almost 1 . 3 million pupils enrolled in 
1980. In that year, just over half of eligible six- to twelve-year-olds 
were attending government-aided primary schools, while an addi- 
tional 80,000 pupils were enrolled in private primary schools. 

Officials estimated that roughly 61 percent of primary pupils com- 
pleted seventh grade. Of those, about 25 percent went on to fur- 
ther study. The central government was responsible for training, 
posting, and promoting primary school teachers, setting salaries 
and school fees, providing supplies, inspecting schools, and appoint- 
ing educational committees to deal with local problems. Local school 



85 



Uganda: A Country Study 

officials, including the headmaster or headmistress, and district edu- 
cation officials were responsible for collecting fees, ordering sup- 
plies, and administering the school according to national policy. 
The District Education Office provided an important intermedi- 
ary between the school and the Ministry of Education. 

Secondary Education 

In 1989 secondary school enrollments on all levels totaled 265,000 
pupils. Of this number, 238,500 were enrolled in forms one through 
six in government- aided secondary schools; 35 percent of those en- 
rolled were female. Some 216,000 pupils were enrolled in the first 
four years (forms one to four) in "O level" studies, while an addi- 
tional 22,000 were attending teacher training schools or technical 
institutes on the lower secondary level. Just over 22,000 pupils were 
enrolled in forms five and six in upper secondary ("A level") 
studies; at the same time, 4,400 other pupils on this level were en- 
rolled in teacher training colleges or technical institutes. 

The most complete breakdown of primary and secondary en- 
rollments was for the year 1980, when about 7 percent of children 
aged thirteen to sixteen years (about 75,000 pupils) were enrolled 
in the first four years (forms one to four) of secondary-level educa- 
tion in about 170 government-funded schools. About 70 percent 
of these pupils were boys. Roughly 66,200 were attending second- 
ary schools in preparation for "O-level" exams, which would quali- 
fy them for further academic study, teacher training, or other 
technical training programs beyond the secondary level. Roughly 
6,000 people in the thirteen- to sixteen-year-old age- group were 
attending teacher training colleges, and about 2,800 were enrolled 
in technical schools. 

Upper secondary education (forms five and six) enrolled about 
6,900 pupils in 1980. In addition, about 1,200 students were en- 
rolled in teacher training colleges at this level, and 1,100 in tech- 
nical training institutes. These 9,200 pupils represented 1.8 percent 
of the seventeen- and eighteen-year-old age- group. Female students 
made up roughly 20 percent of the total. In addition to these en- 
rollments, a further 20,000 pupils were attending private secon- 
dary schools. 

Postsecondary Education 

Established in 1922, Makerere University in Kampala was the 
first college in East Africa. Its primary aim was to train people for 
government employment, but by the 1980s, it had expanded to 
include colleges of liberal arts and medicine serving more than 5,000 
students from Uganda and other African countries. In 1986 the 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



College of Commerce separated from Makerere to become the Na- 
tional College of Business Studies, and at the same time, the Na- 
tional Teachers' College became a separate Institute of Teachers' 
Education. In 1980 these institutions enrolled 5,750 postsecondary 
students, roughly 23 percent of whom were women. By 1989 en- 
rollments totaled an estimated 8,900 students. 

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) financed the 
opening of the Islamic University at Mbale in southern Uganda 
in 1988. This campus provides Islamic educational services primar- 
ily to English-speaking students from African nations. In late 1989, 
a second national university campus opened in Mbarara. Its cur- 
riculum is designed to serve Uganda's rural development needs. 
Development plans for higher education rely largely on interna- 
tional and private donors. In 1989 Makerere University received 
US$50 million in pledged support from its graduates as part of a 
US$150-million renovation plan. 

In the late 1980s, many other educational opportunities were 
available. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare operated 
four vocational training centers, providing apprenticeships and 
classes to upgrade technical skills. The Ministry of Agriculture, 
Animal Husbandry, and Fisheries conducted training courses at 
eighteen district farm institutions. Ministry of Community Develop- 
ment personnel also staffed fifteen rural training centers. Other 
government ministries offered in-service training in agriculture, 
health, community development, cooperatives, commerce, indus- 
try, and public services to satisfy technical labor requirements of 
these agencies. In addition, the Young Women's Christian Associ- 
ation (YWCA) offered a variety of training courses for women. 

Teachers 

There was a severe shortage of teachers during the 1980s, made 
acute by the departure of both Ugandan and expatriate teachers 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Aside from shortages of sup- 
plies and equipment, high student-teacher ratios, often more than 
twenty-five to one, made teaching especially difficult. Teacher 
morale suffered, although the number of teacher training candi- 
dates continued to rise during and after the 1970s. The propor- 
tion of untrained teachers in primary schools also increased from 
14 percent in 1971 to 35 percent in 1981. Although unlicensed 
teachers continued to teach during the 1980s, teacher training 
colleges had full enrollments and attempted to train teachers to 
cope with both the educational and economic problems they would 
face. 



87 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Educational Finance 

In the mid-1980s, the educational sector was the largest public- 
sector employer, but after 1986, observers estimated that the defense 
establishment surpassed education in this regard. The Ministry of 
Education received about 18 percent of the government's current 
budget, most of which was used to pay teacher salaries in govern- 
ment schools. Primary and secondary pupils paid school fees ranging 
from US$5 to US$10 per year, and most schools asked pupils and 
their parents to contribute labor, food, or materials to the school. 
"A-level" secondary schools, teacher training institutions, and 
other postsecondary institutions did not charge fees during the 
1980s, but their students were required to bring materials, such 
as food and bedding, for their own use. 

Health and Welfare 

In 1989 Uganda's estimated life expectancy, crude death rate, 
and infant mortality represented significant improvements over 
those of the 1960s, but local officials also believed the 1980s esti- 
mates were optimistic, based on incomplete reports. Health ser- 
vices and record keeping deteriorated during the 1970s and early 
1980s, when many deaths resulted from government neglect, vio- 
lence, and civil war. 

In 1989 officials estimated that measles, respiratory tract infec- 
tions, and gastroenteritis caused one-half of all deaths attributed 
to illness. Other fatal illnesses included anemia, tetanus, and whoop- 
ing cough, but some people also died of malnutrition. An estimat- 
ed 20 percent of all deaths were caused by diseases that were not 
well known among international health officials. Ugandan health 
workers were especially concerned about infant mortality, most 
often caused by low birth weight, premature birth, or neonatal teta- 
nus. Childhood diseases such as measles, gastroenteritis, malaria, 
and respiratory tract infections also claimed many lives. Malaria 
and tuberculosis caused an increasing number of deaths among 
adults during the 1980s. 

Certain forms of cancer were common in Uganda before they 
were first systematically studied in any country. Burkitt's lympho- 
ma, which caused a large number of cancer deaths in children across 
Africa, was first described in Uganda in 1958. This malignancy 
was thought to be related to the incidence of malaria and possibly 
to food storage practices that allowed the growth of carcinogenic 
strains of bacteria or molds in stored grain or peanuts. Other 
research, although inconclusive, suggested that the spread of certain 
cancers might be related to parasites or other insect-borne diseases. 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) 

During the 1980s, Uganda developed the highest known inci- 
dence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), with an 
infection rate of over 15 cases per 100,000 population. By mid- 1989, 
the Ministry of Health had reported 7,573 AIDS cases to the World 
Health Organization (WHO). In mid- 1990, local officials report- 
ed that at least 17,400 cases had been diagnosed and the number 
of actual AIDS cases was doubling every six months. In Kampala 
health officials also reported that more than 790,000 people had 
positive test results for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the 
infectious agent believed to cause AIDS, a figure estimated at 1.3 
million by late 1990. Over 25,000 children under the age of fifteen 
were HIV-positive, along with 22 percent of all women seeking 
prenatal medical care at Mulago Hospital, the nation's largest hospi- 
tal in Kampala. Belgium's Institute of Tropical Medicine report- 
ed that an estimated 20 percent of all infant deaths in Kampala 
were related to HIV infections, and many tuberculosis patients were 
also infected with HIV. 

Uganda's first officially recognized AIDS deaths occurred in 
1982, when seventeen traders in the southern district of Rakai died 
of symptoms that came to be associated with the disease. Within 
a year, AIDS (then known as "Slim") was diagnosed in Masaka, 
Rakai, and Kampala, and by 1989, all districts of Uganda were 
affected. The disease appeared to spread by heterosexual contact, 
often along main transportation routes. Men and women were 
equally affected, although the death of a man was more likely to 
be reported to officials. The majority of AIDS cases occurred in 
people between sixteen and forty years of age, and by the late 1980s, 
an increasing number of babies were born HIV-positive. These 
cases, more than adult deaths, shocked people into changing be- 
havior that risked AIDS infection. Fewer than ten AIDS cases were 
reported among school-age children, who constituted nearly one- 
half of the population, prompting intensive efforts to prevent its 
spread into this age- group. 

Government health officials initiated an aggressive nationwide 
school education program to prevent the spread of the disease 
among the young, and they implemented nationwide blood screen- 
ing and public education programs, including television, radio, and 
local press warnings in English and local languages. By the late 
1980s, however, it was clear that the nation's beleaguered health 
care system could not cope with the increased health needs, and 
the government intensified efforts to gain international assistance 
to slow the spread of this deadly disease. The need to combat AIDS 



89 



Uganda: A Country Study 

was urgent: according to one estimate, Uganda's population in 2015 
could total about 20 million, rather than the 32 million that 
demographers anticipated, because of AIDS, and the number of 
orphaned children would rise dramatically throughout the 1990s 
and after. 

The transmission of AIDS was complicated by economic decline 
and problems of national security. In many areas, warfare had de- 
stroyed communication systems and health care facilities. At the 
same time, AIDS slowed the pace of economic development, be- 
cause skilled workers and young, educated Ugandans had high in- 
fection rates. A few people were able to capitalize on the tragedy 
of AIDS — a small number of local medical practitioners claimed 
to have cured AIDS victims and became wealthy fairly quickly. 
A few street vendors in Kampala sold vials of a liquid they identi- 
fied as Azidothymidine (AZT), a drug being tested for possible 
AIDS treatment, at prices ranging as high as US$1,000 per vial. 
They were able to reap fortunes from desperate AIDS victims and 
their families, despite government warnings that no AZT was avail- 
able in Uganda. 

Health Care 

Uganda had a total of seventy-nine hospitals in 1989, providing 
approximately 20,000 hospital beds. The government operated 
forty- six of these institutions, while thirty- three were staffed and 
equipped by religious and other private organizations. In addition, 
more than 600 smaller health facilities, including community health 
centers, maternity clinics, dispensaries, subdispensaries, leprosy 
centers, and aid posts, operated nationwide. At least one hospital 
was located in each district except the southern district of Rakai; 
the best-served districts were Mukono and Mpigi, each with five 
hospitals, and Kampala with seven. In the more sparsely populat- 
ed northern districts, however, people sometimes traveled long dis- 
tances to receive medical care, and facilities were generally inferior 
to those in the south. In 1990 Uganda's entire health care system 
was served by about 700 doctors. 

Uganda's per capita spending on health amounted to less than 
US$2 per year for most of the 1980s. This rate of spending increased 
slightly in 1989, when the government allocated US$63 million, 
roughly 26 percent of its development budget, for social services, 
and US$24 million of this amount for health services in particu- 
lar. The amount represented an increase of 50 percent over health 
spending for the previous year. 

The highest priority in government programs was rehabilitat- 
ing existing facilities and improving supplies. In 1989 funding from 



90 



Distribution of food to mothers and children in Kabong 
Courtesy World Bank Photo Library 

the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
International Development Association (IDA) was earmarked for 
rehabilitating nineteen of the nation's hospitals, primarily through 
building repairs and upgrading water and electrical systems. 
Primary health-care projects, including immunization programs, 
prescription drugs, clean water supplies, and public hygiene, also 
received special priority. European Development Fund (EDF) 
assistance was also used to construct twenty new health centers and 
one district health office and to train health-care practitioners. 

A number of governmental and nongovernmental organizations 
were involved in health research in the late 1980s, much of this 
sponsored by the Ministry of Health, the Institute of Public Health, 
and Makerere University. The nation's largest health-care facili- 
ty, Mulago Hospital, conducted research on local nutrition and 
endemic diseases, and researchers there developed child nutrition 
programs to be implemented through the United Nations Emer- 
gency (UNICEF) and the Save the Children Fund. 

Several government ministries sponsored research and im- 
plemented community programs designed to improve health and 
nutrition. The Ugandan Red Cross and the Ministry of Health, 
in cooperation with several international agencies, opened an 



91 



Uganda: A Country Study 



orthopedic workshop in Kampala for handicapped children and 
adults, most of whom had suffered from poliomyelitis or severe 
wounds in outbreaks of violence. Catholic and Protestant missions, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, the In- 
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Oxford 
Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam) were also active in emer- 
gency relief projects involving food and nutrition. Many Ugan- 
dans criticized their own government for inadequate attention to 
popular health needs, but they also hoped that government efforts 
to eliminate violence and warfare would lay the foundation for im- 
proved health care. 

Social Welfare 

Social services were an important factor in government plan- 
ning in the late 1980s, both to support efforts to improve health 
care and to upgrade living standards in general. Providing run- 
ning water in rural areas was a high priority, although even small 
improvements in water supplies were cosdy. Projects in the late 
1980s focused on drilling wells, protecting springs, replacing and 
repairing pumps, and training community workers to oversee water 
systems. The government also recognized that many people had 
to walk several kilometers to carry water to their homes and declared 
its intention to extend pipelines into rural areas. Sewage systems, 
too, were considered an important but expensive improvement. 
Even so, many urban pipelines and septic tanks were in disrepair, 
and most rural areas lacked pipelines or sewage treatment facili- 
ties. Government workers began installing sewage systems in several 
small towns, including Rakai, Nebbi, and Bushenyi, in 1988. 

Housing was an important symbol of development in Uganda 
under the NRM government. Providing low-cost urban housing 
was a high government priority. Projects in Masaka, Mbarara, 
Arua, and Namuwongo exceeded government spending projections 
in 1988 and 1989. In 1990 at least three housing projects were 
underway in Kampala. Estimates were that some 8,000 housing 
units needed to be built each year throughout the 1990s in urban 
areas alone to keep pace with population growth. Given the short- 
age of investment funds and the high cost of imported construction 
materials, it was unlikely that such a goal would be met. Rural hous- 
sing development was also an important goal, but in the late 1980s, 
most rural residents built their own homes. Although these were 
often mud-and-wattle huts, they were, nonetheless, a source of 
pride. Having a well-kept home was important to many Ugandans, 
even the very poor. People considered deteriorating housing stan- 
dards a symbol of social disintegration, one that characterized a few 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



poverty-stricken areas and those hardest hit by AIDS. Village 
cooperative societies in the Luwero region organized brick-making 
factories in 1988 and 1989, and the government was attempting 
to organize similar projects in other areas. Other government pro- 
grams aimed at increasing credit opportunities and improving 
materials and transportation facilities for rural homebuilders. In 
the late 1980s, housing assistance was received from Austria, Brit- 
ain, Finland, and the Netherlands. 

One social problem with tragic implications for Uganda's fu- 
ture was the children — more than 1.5 million of them, almost 10 
percent of the population — who had been orphaned by the spread 
of warfare or by AIDS in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By 1990 
the number of war orphans alone was estimated at more than half 
a million. No reliable figures were available for AIDS orphans, 
but one study predicted that their number would grow over the 
next twenty years to 4 to 5 million. 

Several thousands of these orphans were young boys who had 
attached themselves to the army. By the late 1980s, the govern- 
ment had established a few schools to provide boarding facilities 
and primary education for these kadogos, or child- soldiers. Others 
sometimes lived on city streets or in small groups without any regu- 
lar supervision. Many Ugandans accepted the responsibility for 
caring for others' children, but this responsibility was generally 
believed to apply only within the boundaries of the extended fam- 
ily. Many children had lost a large number of relatives, in addi- 
tion to their parents, and some orphans chose to avoid living with 
relatives they did not know well. As a result, neither government 
nor private agencies were able to surmount the economic and so- 
cial obstacles to programs for immediate care for orphans. One 
of several ominous implications of this failure was that orphans and 
kadogos could remain on the periphery of society for the rest of their 
lives. 

Despite the political turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s, pub- 
lications by several government ministries and the Office of the 
President testify to the national commitment to disseminating in- 
formation about Uganda. C. Obbo's research on women in Uganda 
and G. Ibingira's and D. Mudoola's political analyses are among 
the many contributions by Ugandan scholars to the growing un- 
derstanding of their society. Makerere Institute of Social Research 
also publishes frequent reports by international researchers in 
Uganda. 



93 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Two compilations of essays assessing Uganda's social and polit- 
ical development in the 1980s are Uganda Now, edited by H. Han- 
sen and M. Twaddle, and Conflict Resolution in Uganda, edited by 
K. Rupesinghe. Numerous works by N. Kasfir have also contribut- 
ed an understanding of Uganda's political environment. Volumes 
in the Ethnographic Survey of Africa series by G. W. B. Hunting- 
ford, P. and P. H. Gulliver, and M. Fallers preserve Uganda's 
rich cultural heritage in the ethnographic present. Field reports and 
ethnographic analyses from the decades just before and after inde- 
pendence also provide much of the basis for the 1980s' understand- 
ing of Ugandan society. These publications include works by J. 
Beattie, L. Fallers, L. Mair, and A. Richards on Bantu-speaking 
societies of the south; H. Morris on Uganda's once-thriving Asi- 
an community; and A. Southall's publications on Alur society and 
acculturation in other areas. Works by B. Langlands survey Ugan- 
da's social and physical geography. 

Several scholars have applied class analysis and dependency the- 
ory to Ugandan society without becoming mired in debates over 
geopolitical alignment. Examples of such works are M. Mamda- 
ni's Politics and Class Formation in Uganda; S. Bunker's Double De- 
pendency and Constraints on Class Formation in Bugisu, Uganda and 
Peasants Against the State; and J. Vincent's African Elite and Teso in 
Transformation. S. Heyneman's research on education in the 1970s 
and early 1980s demonstrates the national commitment to educa- 
tion. Information on AIDS is available in 1988 and 1989 publica- 
tions by the World Health Organization and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



94 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Women drying coffee berries in the sun 



UGANDA WAS ONCE RICH in human and natural resources 
and possessed a favorable climate for economic development, but 
in the late 1980s it was still struggling to end a period of political 
and economic chaos that had destroyed the country's reputation 
as the "pearl" of Africa. Most of the economic infrastructure, in- 
cluding the power supply system, the transportation system, and 
industry, operated at only a fraction of capacity. Other than limited 
segments of the agricultural sector — notably coffee and subsistence 
production — cultivation was almost at a standstill. And in the wake 
of the much publicized atrocities of the Idi Amin Dada regime from 
1971 to 1979 and the civil war that continued into the 1980s, Ugan- 
da's once flourishing tourist industry faced the challenges of recon- 
struction and restoring international confidence. Successive 
governments had proclaimed their intention to salvage the econo- 
my and attract the foreign assistance necessary for recovery, but 
none had remained in power long enough to succeed. 

Agricultural production based primarily on peasant cultivation 
has been the mainstay of the economy. In the 1950s, coffee replaced 
cotton as the primary cash crop. Some plantations produced tea 
and sugar, but these exports did not alter the importance of coffee 
in the economy. Similarly, some industries developed before 1970, 
but most were adjuncts to cotton or sugar production, and they 
were not major contributors to gross domestic product (GDP — 
see Glossary). Moreover, Uganda did not possess significant quan- 
tities of valuable minerals, such as oil or gold. In sum, although 
the economy provided a livelihood for the population, it was based 
largely on agricultural commodities with fluctuating international 
values. This dependence forced Uganda to import vehicles, ma- 
chinery, and other major industrial equipment, and it limited de- 
velopment choices. The economy seemed to have the potential to 
stabilize, but throughout the decade of the 1980s its capacity to 
generate growth, especially industrial growth, was small. 

After 1986 the National Resistance Movement (NRM) succeeded 
in stabilizing most of the nation and began to diversify agricul- 
tural exports away from the near-total dependence on coffee. By 
1988 Western donors were beginning to offer cautious support for 
the three-year-old regime of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. But in 1989, 
just as the hard work of economic recovery was beginning to 
pay off, world coffee prices plummeted, and Uganda's scarce for- 
eign exchange dwindled further. Despite the country's record of 



97 



Uganda: A Country Study 

economic resilience, it still faced serious obstacles to the goal of 
economic self-sufficiency. 

Historical Background 

Peasant agricultural production has been the predominant eco- 
nomic activity since precolonial times. Despite an active trade in 
ivory and animal hides linking Uganda with the east coast of Africa 
long before the arrival of Europeans, most Ugandans were subsis- 
tence farmers. After declaring Uganda a protectorate in 1893, Brit- 
ain pursued economic policies that drew Uganda into the world 
economy primarily to serve Britain's late-nineteenth-century tex- 
tile industry. Cotton cultivation increased in importance after 1904, 
and once it became clear that cotton plantations would be too 
difficult and expensive to maintain, official policy encouraged small- 
holder farmers to produce and market their cotton through local 
cooperative associations. 

By 1910 cotton had become Uganda's leading export. In the fol- 
lowing decades, the government encouraged the growth of sugar 
and tea plantations. Following World War II, officials introduced 
coffee cultivation to bolster declining export revenues, and coffee 
soon earned more than half of Uganda's export earnings. 

Uganda enjoyed a strong and stable economy in the years ap- 
proaching independence. Agriculture was the dominant activity, 
but the expanding manufacturing sector appeared capable of in- 
creasing its contribution to GDP, especially through the produc- 
tion of foodstuffs and textiles. Some valuable minerals, notably 
copper, had been discovered, and water power resources were sub- 
stantial. In 1967 Uganda and the neighboring countries of Kenya 
and Tanzania joined together to form the East African Commu- 
nity (EAC), hoping to create a common market and share the cost 
of transport and banking facilities, and Uganda registered impres- 
sive growth rates for the first eight years after independence. 

The economy deteriorated under the rule of President Idi Amin 
Dada from 1971 to 1979. Amin used nationalist, militarist rhetoric 
and ill-chosen economic policies to eliminate foreign economic in- 
terests and build up the military establishment. In 1972 he expelled 
holders of British passports, including approximately 70,000 Asians 
of Indian and Pakistani descent. Many Asians had been active in 
agribusiness, manufacturing, and commerce. Their mass expul- 
sion and Amin's efforts to expropriate foreign businesses under- 
mined investor confidence in Uganda. Amin also increased public 
expenditures on military goods, a practice that contributed to es- 
calating foreign and domestic debt during the 1970s. Relations with 
Uganda's neighbors soured, the EAC disbanded in 1977, and 



98 



The Economy 



Tanzanian troops finally led a joint effort to overthrow the unpopu- 
lar Amin regime in 1979. By 1980 the economy was nearly de- 
stroyed. 

Following Amin's departure, successive governments attempted 
to restore international confidence in the economy through a mix- 
ture of development plans and austere government budgets. Be- 
ginning in 1980, the second government of Milton Obote obtained 
foreign donor support, primarily from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — see Glossary), by floating the Uganda shilling (USh; 
for value of the Uganda shilling — see Glossary), removing price 
controls, increasing agricultural producer prices, and setting strict 
limits on government expenditures. In addition, Obote tried to per- 
suade foreign companies to return to their former premises, which 
had been nationalized under Amin. These recovery initiatives 
created real growth in agriculture between 1980 and 1983. The 
lack of foreign exchange was a major constraint on government 
efforts, however, and it became a critical problem in 1984 when 
the IMF ended its support following a disagreement over budget 
policy. During the brief regime of Tito Lutwa Okello in 1985, the 
economy slipped almost out of control as civil war extended across 
the country. 

After seizing power in January 1986, the new NRM govern- 
ment published a political manifesto that had been drawn up when 
the NRM was an army of antigovernment rebels (see The Ten- 
Point Program, ch. 4). Several points in the Ten-Point Program 
emphasized the importance of economic development, declaring 
that an independent, self-sustaining national economy was vital 
to protect Uganda's interests. The manifesto also set out specific 
goals for achieving this self-sufficiency: diversifying agricultural ex- 
ports and developing industries that used local raw materials to 
manufacture products necessary for development. The Ten-Point 
Program also set out other economic goals: to improve basic so- 
cial services, such as water, health care, and housing; to improve 
literacy skills nationwide; to eliminate corruption, especially in 
government; to return expropriated land to its rightful Ugandan 
owners; to raise public-sector salaries; to strengthen regional ties 
and develop markets among East African nations; and to main- 
tain a mixed economy combining private ownership with an ac- 
tive government sector. 

The NRM government proposed a major Rehabilitation and De- 
velopment Plan (RDP) for fiscal years (FY— see Glossary) 1987-88 
through 1990-91, with IMF support; it then devalued the shilling 
and committed itself to budgetary restraint. The four-year plan 
set out primarily to stabilize the economy and promote economic 



99 



Uganda: A Country Study 

growth. More specific goals were to reduce Uganda's dependence 
on external assistance, diversify agricultural exports, and encourage 
the growth of the private sector through new credit policies. Set- 
ting these priorities helped improve Uganda's credentials with in- 
ternational aid organizations and donor countries of the West, but 
in the first three years of Museveni's rule, coffee production re- 
mained the only economic activity inside Uganda to display con- 
sistent growth and resilience. When coffee-producing nations failed 
to reach an agreement on prices for coffee exports in 1989, Uganda 
faced devastating losses in export earnings and sought increased 
international assistance to stave off economic collapse. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

When coffee replaced cotton as Uganda's principal export in the 
1950s, it was still produced in the pattern of small peasant hold- 
ings and local marketing associations that had arisen early in the 
century. The economy registered substantial growth, but almost 
all real growth was in agriculture, centered in the southern prov- 
inces. The fledgling industrial sector, which emphasized food 
processing for export, also increased its contribution as a result of 
the expansion of agriculture. 

Growth slowed in the late 1950s, as fluctuating world market 
conditions reduced export earnings and Uganda experienced the 
political pressures of growing nationalist movements that swept 
much of Africa. For the first five years following independence in 
1962, Uganda's economy resumed rapid growth, with GDP, in- 
cluding subsistence agriculture, expanding approximately 6.7 per- 
cent per year. Even with population growth estimated at 2.5 percent 
per year, net economic growth of more than 4 percent suggested 
that people's lives were improving. By the end of the 1960s, com- 
mercial agriculture accounted for more than one-third of GDP. 
Industrial output had increased to nearly 9 percent of GDP, primar- 
ily the result of new food-processing industries. Tourism, trans- 
portation, telecommunications, and wholesale and retail trade still 
contributed nearly one-half of total output. 

Although the government envisioned annual economic growth 
rates of about 5.6 percent in the early 1970s, civil war and politi- 
cal instability almost destroyed Uganda's once promising economy. 
GDP declined each year from 1972 to 1976 and registered only 
slight improvement in 1977 when world coffee prices increased. 
Negative growth resumed, largely because the government con- 
tinued to expropriate business assets. Foreign investments, too, 
declined sharply, as President Idi Amin's erratic policies destroyed 
almost all but the subsistence sector of the economy. 



100 



The Economy 



The economic and political destruction of the Amin years con- 
tributed to a record decline in earnings by 14.8 percent between 
1978 and 1980. When Amin fled from Uganda in 1979, the na- 
tion's GDP measured only 80 percent of the 1970 level. Industrial 
output declined sharply, as equipment, spare parts, and raw mate- 
rials became scarce. From 1981 to 1983, the country experienced 
a welcome 17.3 percent growth rate, but most of this success oc- 
curred in the agricultural sector. Litde progress was made in manu- 
facturing and other productive sectors. Renewed political crisis led 
to negative growth rates of 4.2 percent in 1984, 1.5 percent in 1985, 
and 2.3 percent in 1986. 

Throughout these years of political uncertainty, coffee produc- 
tion by smallholders — the pattern developed under British rule — 
continued to dominate the economy, providing the best hope for 
national recovery and economic development. As international 
coffee prices fluctuated, however, Uganda's overall GDP suffered 
despite consistent production. 

The economic decline again seemed to end, and in 1987 GDP 
rose 4.5 percent above the 1986 level. This rise marked Uganda's 
first sign of economic growth in four years, as security improved 
in the south and west and factories increased production after years 
of stagnation. This modest rate of growth increased in 1988, when 
GDP expansion measured 7.2 percent, with substantial improve- 
ments in the manufacturing sector. In 1989 falling world market 
prices for coffee reduced growth to 6.6 percent, and a further decline 
to 3.4 percent growth occurred in 1990, in part because of drought, 
low coffee prices, and a decline in manufacturing output. 

Uganda had escaped widespread famine in the late 1970s and 
1980s only because many people, even urban residents, reverted 
to subsistence cultivation in order to survive. Both commercial and 
subsistence farming operated in the monetary and nonmonetary 
(barter) sectors, and the latter presented the government with for- 
midable problems of organization and taxation. By the late 1980s, 
government reports estimated that approximately 44 percent of 
GDP originated outside the monetary economy (see fig. 6; table 4, 
Appendix). Most (over 90 percent) of nonmonetary economic ac- 
tivity was agricultural, and it was the resilience of this sector that 
ensured survival for most Ugandans. 

Role of the Government 

In 1986 the newly established Museveni regime committed it- 
self to reversing the economic disintegration of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Museveni proclaimed the national economic orientation to be 
toward private enterprise rather than socialist government control. 



101 



Uganda: A Country Study 



FY 1 989 - GDP 995.6 billion Uganda shillings* 



g] AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 26% 

[g MANUFACTURING 4% 

□ CONSTRUCTION 3% 
g TRADE 12% 

□ TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 4% 
S GOVERNMENT 4% 

Q OTHER MONETARY SECTOR 3% 

□ NONMONETARY SECTOR 



* For value of the Uganda shilling-see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Uganda, Ministry of Planning and Economic Develop- 
ment, Background to the Budget, 1990-1991, Kampala, 1990, 158; and Economist Intelli- 
gence Unit, Country Report: Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, No. 1, London, 1991, 3. 



Figure 6. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Fiscal Year 1989 




MONETARY 
SECTOR 
56% 



102 



The Economy 



Many government policies were aimed at restoring the confidence 
of the private sector. In the absence of private initiatives, however, 
the government took over many abandoned or formerly expropri- 
ated companies and formed new parastatal enterprises. In an ef- 
fort to bring a measure of financial stability to the country and 
attract some much-needed foreign assistance in 1987, it also in- 
itiated an ambitious RDP aimed at rebuilding the economic and 
social infrastructure. Officials then offered to sell several of the larg- 
est parastatals to private investors, but political and personal rival- 
ries hampered efforts toward privatization throughout 1988 and 
1989. 

In Museveni's first three years in office, the role of government 
bureaucrats in economic planning gave rise to charges of official 
corruption. A 1988 audit accused government ministries and other 
departments of fraudulently appropriating nearly 20 percent of the 
national budget. The audit cited the Office of the President, the 
Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Education. Education 
officials, in particular, were accused of paying salaries for fictitious 
teachers and paying labor and material costs for nonexistent build- 
ing projects. In order to set a public example in 1989, Museveni 
dismissed several high-level officials, including cabinet ministers, 
who were accused of embezzling or misusing government funds. 

Direct Economic Involvement 

By 1987 the Ugandan government was directly involved in the 
economy through four institutions. First, it owned a number of 
parastatals that had operated as private companies before being 
abandoned by their owners or expropriated by the government. 
Second, the government operated marketing boards to monitor sales 
and regulate prices for agricultural producers. Third, the govern- 
ment owned the country's major banks, including the Bank of 
Uganda and Uganda Commercial Bank (see Banking and Cur- 
rency, this ch.). And fourth, the government controlled all imports 
and exports through licensing procedures (see Foreign Trade and 
Assistance, this ch.). 

In July 1988, officials announced that they would sell twenty- 
two companies that were entirely or partially government-owned, 
in an effort to trim government costs and curb runaway inflation. 
These enterprises included textile mills, vehicle import companies, 
and iron and gold mines. Officials hoped to sell some of them to 
private owners and to undertake joint ventures with private com- 
panies to continue operating several others. Among the roughly 
sixty parastatals that would remain in operation after 1989 were 
several in which the government planned to continue as the sole 



103 



Uganda: A Country Study 

or majority shareholder. These parastatals included the electric 
power company, railroads and airlines, and cement and steel 
manufacturers. Banking and export-import licensing would remain 
in government hands, along with a substantial number of the na- 
tion's hotels. Retail trade would be managed almost entirely by 
the private sector. By late 1989, however, efforts to privatize 
parastatal organizations had just begun, as personal and political 
rivalries delayed the sale of several lucrative corporations. The In- 
ternational Development Association (IDA) awarded Uganda 
US$16 million to help improve the efficiency of government-owned 
enterprises. Funds allocated through this Public Enterprise Project 
would be used to pay for consultancy services and supplies and 
to commission a study of ways to reform public- sector adminis- 
tration. 

By the 1980s, more than 3,500 primary marketing cooperative 
societies serviced most of Uganda's small-scale farmers. These 
cooperatives purchased crops for marketing and export, and they 
distributed consumer goods and agricultural inputs, such as seeds 
and fertilizers. Prices paid by marketing boards for commodities 
such as coffee, tea, and cotton were fairly stable but often artifi- 
cially low, and payments were sometimes delayed until several 
weeks after purchases. Moreover, farmers sometimes complained 
that marketing boards applied inconsistent standards of quality and 
that weights and measurements of produce were sometimes faulty. 
In 1989 the government was attempting to reduce expensive and 
inefficient intermediary activity in crop marketing, and Museveni 
urged producers to report buyers who failed to pay for commodi- 
ties when they were received. 

Budgets 

Uganda registered a substantial budget deficit for every year of 
the 1970s except 1977, when world coffee price increases provided 
the basis for a surplus. Deficits equivalent to 50 to 60 percent of 
revenues were not unusual, and the deficit reached 100 percent 
in 1974. Although declining levels of production and trade, smug- 
gling, and inefficiency all eroded revenues, the Amin government 
made only modest efforts to restrain expenditures. Amin increased 
government borrowing from local banks from 50 percent to 70 per- 
cent during his eight-year rule. 

The budgets of the early 1980s were cautious. They set limits 
on government borrowing and domestic credit and linked these 
limits to a realistic exchange policy by allowing the shilling to 
float in relation to other currencies. Between 1982 and 1989, cur- 
rent revenue increased continuously in nominal terms, in part 



104 



The Economy 



because of revisions and improvements in the tax system and 
depreciation of the shilling. In FY 1985 and FY 1986, export 
taxes — primarily on coffee — contributed about 60 percent of the 
total current revenue. Export taxes then declined, contributing less 
than 20 percent of revenues in FY 1989. The share of sales tax 
remained roughly constant at 20 percent from FY 1983 to FY 1986 
but increased to about 38 percent by 1989. Income tax increased 
its share of the total revenue from about 5 percent in FY 1986 to 
about 11 percent in FY 1989. 

Government expenditures increased during the early 1980s, and 
the rate of increase rose after 1984. In 1985 civil service salaries 
were tripled, but in general, the ministries of defence, education, 
and finance, and the Office of the President were the biggest 
spenders. In 1988 and 1989, the Ministry of Defence spent roughly 
2.9 percent and the Ministry of Education about 15 percent of the 
current budget. The percentage share of the Ministry of Finance 
declined from about 30 percent in 1985 to about 22 percent in 1989. 
The 1987 budget ended with a deficit amounting to 32 percent of 
total spending. This deficit was reduced to about 19 percent in 1988 
and rose slightly in 1989 to just over 20 percent. 

The government implemented measures to reform the tax system 
in FY 1988 and FY 1989. A graduated tax rate, with twenty-five 
grades, rose from a USh300 minimum to a USh5,000 maximum 
to account for all classes of income earners. Overall income tax 
rates were raised in order to gain revenue for local authorities and 
to allow them greater self-sufficiency in rendering public services. 
The government also called upon local governing bodies, or 
resistance councils (RCs) to spearhead the war against tax evaders 
and defaulters by assuming responsibility for assessing and collecting 
taxes and monitoring the use of public funds (see Local Adminis- 
tration, ch. 4). Despite all measures to balance the economy, how- 
ever, the budget deficit in FY 1989 reached USh38.9 million or 
nearly one-third of total spending, a substantial increase over the 
government's original target. 

The FY 1989 budget sought to reduce current spending in several 
government departments, including cuts of 25 percent in the Office 
of the President and 18 percent in the Ministry of Defence, but 
defense spending in FY 1989 exceeded budget estimates. At the 
same time, total government expenditures increased to accommo- 
date civil service wage hikes and infrastructural rehabilitation. The 
government sought to meet these increased expenditures in part 
through a major revenue collection effort and increased external 
aid. To help secure this assistance, it implemented reforms, includ- 
ing cuts in executive spending, advocated by the World Bank (see 



105 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Glossary) and the IMF. The FY 1989 budget also included agricul- 
tural producer price increases ranging from 100 percent to 150 per- 
cent. But at the same time, its reduced government subsidies for 
gasoline and sugar prices resulted in substantial price increases for 
those products. 

In FY 1990, total government expenditures amounted to 
UShl69.3 billion, of which UShl05.5 billion was for current ex- 
penditures and USh63.7 billion for development expenditures. Total 
receipts came to UShlll.4 billion, of which USh86.5 billion was 
current revenues — only 82 percent of anticipated receipts — leaving 
a deficit of USh57.9 billion or about 34 percent of total spending. 
As in earlier years, the ministries that consumed the bulk of cur- 
rent expenditures were defence (39 percent) and education (14 per- 
cent), together with foreign affairs (4 percent) and health (4 percent). 

Uganda operated under a separate development budget during 
the 1980s. This budget consisted of domestic revenues and expen- 
ditures on development projects, but it excluded revenues from for- 
eign donors. The development budget increased from FY 1981 to 
FY 1988, primarily because of inflation, but was trimmed slightly 
in FY 1989. The Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defence con- 
sumed most of the development budget, however, in part because 
agricultural and livestock projects were often funded by foreign 
donors. The Ministry of Housing also received nearly 17.3 per- 
cent of FY 1988 development allocations, and much of this amount 
was earmarked for renovations on government-owned tourist hotels. 

Rehabilitation and Development Plan 

In June 1987, the government launched a four-year RDP for 
fiscal years 1988-91 (see table 5, Appendix). It aimed to restore 
the nation's productive capacity, especially in industry and com- 
mercial agriculture; to rehabilitate the social and economic in- 
frastructure; to reduce inflation by 10 percent each year; and to 
stabilize the balance of payments. The plan targeted industrial and 
agricultural production, transportation, and electricity and water 
services for particular improvements. The plan envisioned an an- 
nual 5 percent growth rate, requiring US$1,289 million funding 
over the four-year period. Transportation would receive the major 
share of funding (29.4 percent), followed by agriculture (24.4 per- 
cent), industry and tourism (21.1 percent), social infrastructure 
(17.2 percent), and mining and energy (6.9 percent). Although the 
response of the international financial community was encourag- 
ing in terms of debt rescheduling and new loans, the initial rate 
of economic recovery was modest. In its first phase, FY 1988, 
twenty- six projects were implemented under the RDP, but by late 



106 



The Economy 



1989, officials considered the plan's success to be mixed. Improved 
security and private- sector development contributed to economic 
growth; however, external shocks, overvalued currency, and high 
government spending continued to erode investors' and interna- 
tional donors' confidence in Uganda's future. 

Labor Force 

In the late 1980s, most Ugandans worked outside the monetary 
economy, in part because the number of jobs in industry was dwin- 
dling and the value of Ugandan salaries was declining. Through- 
out the decade, official wages failed to keep up with the rising cost 
of living, and most wage earners were able to survive only because 
they had access to land and raised food crops. By the mid-1980s, 
typical average wages at the official exchange rate were only US$10 
a month for factory workers, US$20 a month for lower-level civil 
servants, and US$40 a month for university lecturers. In the late 
1980s, the converted value of these wages declined even further 
as the value of the shilling dropped. In addition, the decline in in- 
dustrial production in the 1970s and 1980s had reduced the pro- 
portion of high-paying jobs. As a result, more industrial workers 
pursued black-market activities in order to support themselves. 

Upon seizing power in 1986, the Museveni government tried 
to improve the status of wage laborers. The 1987 RDP aimed to 
enhance the country's self-sufficiency by increasing the number 
of skilled workers in industry. During the late 1980s, the govern- 
ment initiated a number of programs to improve working condi- 
tions in industry and provide training for industrial workers as well 
as government administrators. The Occupational Health and 
Hygiene Department implemented several projects to minimize oc- 
cupational hazards in industry and to improve workers' health care. 
The Directorate of Industrial Training coordinated several voca- 
tional training programs, and the Rural Entrepreneurial/Vocational 
Training Center was established at Bowa. In addition, the govern- 
ment renovated the Institute of Public Administration, which 
provided training for government employees, and in 1988 it under- 
took a Public Service Improvement Project to train local adminis- 
trators. Makerere University also established several training 
programs in surveying skills, agriculture, environmental studies, 
pharmacy, and computer science. 

A lack of reliable labor statistics hampered the Museveni govern- 
ment 's planning efforts in relation to the labor force. To collect 
reliable data, the government implemented a labor survey in Oc- 
tober 1986. The survey concentrated on the formal sector of the 
economy, assessing available skills, training needs, vacancies in 



107 



Uganda: A Country Study 

the labor market, and training facilities. In September 1988, the 
International Labour Office (ILO) surveyed the informal economic 
sector to assess the potential for growth in this sector. 

By the late 1980s, the government, which had become the sin- 
gle major employer in the country, experienced significant problems 
as a result of almost two decades of economic decline and lax ac- 
counting procedures. A major problem was the lack of an accurate 
count of public wage earners, and to meet this urgent need, the 
government conducted a census of civil servants in 1987. It discov- 
ered 239,528 government employees and a wage bill for the month 
of May 1987 of USh53.2 million. Teaching and related activities 
employed 42 percent of all government workers; about 10 percent 
of civil servants worked in health-related fields. The largest con- 
centration of government workers was in Kampala, although they 
represented a surprisingly low 15 percent of all government em- 
ployees. The remaining 85 percent worked in other towns and cities. 

Low wage scales led to the second serious problem confronting 
the government — i.e., corruption and inefficiency in the public sec- 
tor. Both in government departments and parastatals, charges of 
corruption were widespread and were often attributed to low earn- 
ings. The highest-paid civil servant, the chief justice, received only 
about USh7,000 a month in 1988 (roughly US$117 at 1988 ex- 
change rates). Gross monthly average pay was USh3,127 (US$52) 
in government posts, but the lowest-paid civil servants received 
only UShl,175 (US$20) a month. Workers in parastatal organi- 
zations received a monthly wage averaging USh5,786 (US$96), 
and in the private sector, roughly USh7,312 (US$122). Such in- 
come levels explained why a 1989-90 survey showed that more than 
half of all Ugandans lived below the poverty line, defined by the 
government as a household income of USh25,000 a month (roughly 
US$49 at official 1990 exchange rates). 

Then in an attempt to streamline the civil service, the govern- 
ment announced plans to eliminate 30 percent of the nation's civil 
service jobs, leaving about 200,000 people employed by the govern- 
ment. This plan was not implemented, however. A labor survey 
in 1989 revealed that more than 244,000 people still worked for 
the national government, in addition to those in parastatal organi- 
zations. 

Agriculture 

Uganda's favorable soil conditions and climate have contributed 
to the country's agricultural success. Most areas of Uganda usu- 
ally receive plenty of rain. In some years, small areas of the south- 
east and southwest have averaged more than 150 millimeters 



108 



Terraced fields in eastern Uganda 
Houses in northern Uganda 
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer 



109 



Uganda: A Country Study 

per month. In the north, there is often a short dry season in Decem- 
ber and January. Temperatures vary only a few degrees above or 
below 20°C but are moderated by differences in altitude. These 
conditions have allowed continuous cultivation in the south but only 
annual cropping in the north, and the driest northeastern corner 
of the country has supported only pastoralism. Although popula- 
tion growth has created pressures for land in a few areas, land short- 
ages have been rare, and only about one-third of the estimated area 
of arable land was under cultivation by 1989. 

Throughout the 1970s, political insecurity, mismanagement, and 
a lack of adequate resources seriously eroded incomes from com- 
mercial agriculture. Production levels in general were lower in the 
1980s than in the 1960s. Technological improvements had been 
delayed by economic stagnation, and agricultural production still 
used primarily unimproved methods of production on small, widely 
scattered farms, with low levels of capital outlay. Other problems 
facing farmers included the disrepair of the nation's roads, the 
nearly destroyed marketing system, increasing inflation, and low 
producer prices. These factors contributed to low volumes of ex- 
port commodity production and a decline in per capita food produc- 
tion and consumption in the late 1980s (see table 6, Appendix). 

The decline in agricultural production, if sustained, posed major 
problems in terms of maintaining export revenues and feeding 
Uganda's expanding population. Despite these serious problems, 
agriculture continued to dominate the economy. In the late 1980s, 
agriculture (in the monetary and nonmonetary economy) contrib- 
uted about two-thirds of GDP, 95 percent of export revenues, and 
40 percent of government revenues. Roughly 20 percent of regu- 
lar wage earners worked in commercial agricultural enterprises, 
and an additional 60 percent of the work force earned some in- 
come from farming. Agricultural output was generated by about 
2.2 million small-scale producers on farms with an average of 2.5 
hectares of land. The 1987 RDP called for efforts both to increase 
production of traditional cash crops, including coffee, cotton, tea, 
and tobacco, and to promote the production of nontraditional 
agricultural exports, such as corn, beans, peanuts, soybeans, sesame 
seeds, and a variety of fruit and fruit products. 

Crops 

Uganda's main food crops have been plantains, cassava, sweet 
potatoes, millet, sorghum, corn, beans, and peanuts. Major cash 
crops have been coffee, cotton, tea, and tobacco, although in the 
1980s many farmers sold food crops to meet short-term expenses. 
The production of cotton, tea, and tobacco virtually collapsed 



110 



The Economy 



during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the late 1980s, the govern- 
ment was attempting to encourage diversification in commercial 
agriculture that would lead to a variety of nontraditional exports. 
The Uganda Development Bank and several other institutions sup- 
plied credit to local farmers, although small farmers also received 
credit direcdy from the government through agricultural coopera- 
tives. For most small farmers, the main source of short-term credit 
was the policy of allowing farmers to delay payments for seeds and 
other agricultural inputs provided by cooperatives. 

Cooperatives also handled most marketing activity, although 
marketing boards and private companies sometimes dealt directly 
with producers. Many farmers complained that cooperatives did 
not pay for produce until long after it had been sold. The generally 
low producer prices set by the government and the problem of 
delayed payments for produce prompted many farmers to sell 
produce at higher prices on illegal markets in neighboring coun- 
tries. During most of the 1980s, the government steadily raised 
producer prices for export crops in order to maintain some incen- 
tive for farmers to deal with government purchasing agents, but 
these incentives failed to prevent widespread smuggling. 

Coffee 

Coffee continued to be Uganda's most important cash crop 
throughout the 1980s. The government estimated that farmers 
planted approximately 191,700 hectares of robusta coffee, most of 
this in southeastern Uganda, and about 33,000 hectares of arabica 
coffee in high-altitude areas of southeastern and southwestern 
Uganda. These figures remained almost constant throughout the 
decade, although a substantial portion of the nation's coffee out- 
put was smuggled into neighboring countries to sell at higher prices. 
Between 1984 and 1986, the European Economic Community 
(EEC) financed a coffee rehabilitation program that gave improved 
coffee production a high priority. This program also supported 
research, extension work, and training programs to upgrade coffee 
farmers' skills and understanding of their role in the economy. Some 
funds were also used to rehabilitate coffee factories. 

When the NRM seized power in 1986, Museveni set high pri- 
orities on improving coffee production, reducing the amount of 
coffee smuggled into neighboring countries, and diversifying ex- 
port crops to reduce Uganda's dependence on world coffee prices. 
To accomplish these goals, in keeping with the second phase of 
the coffee rehabilitation program, the government raised coffee 
prices paid to producers in May 1986 and February 1987, claim- 
ing that the new prices more accurately reflected world market prices 



111 



Uganda: A Country Study 

and local factors, such as inflation. The 1987 increase came after 
the Coffee Marketing Board launched an aggressive program to 
increase export volumes. Parchment (dried but unhulled) robusta 
producer prices rose from USh24 to USh29 per kilogram. Clean 
(hulled) robusta prices rose from USh44.40 to USh53.70 per kilo- 
gram. Prices for parchment arabica, grown primarily in the Bugisu 
district of southeastern Uganda, were USh62.50 a kilogram, up 
from USh50. Then in July 1988, the government again raised coffee 
prices from USh50 per kilogram to UShlll per kilogram for 
robusta, and from USh62 to UShl25 per kilogram for arabica. 

By December 1988, the Coffee Marketing Board was unable to 
pay farmers for new deliveries of coffee or to repay loans for previous 
purchases. The board owed UShl ,000 million to its suppliers and 
USh2,500 million to the commercial banks, and although the 
government agreed to provide the funds to meet these obligations, 
some of them remained unpaid for another year. 

Uganda was a member of the International Coffee Organiza- 
tion (ICO), a consortium of coffee-producing nations that set in- 
ternational production quotas and prices. The ICO set Uganda's 
annual export quota at only 4 percent of worldwide coffee exports. 
During December 1988, a wave of coffee buying pushed the ICO 
price up and triggered two increases of 1 million (60-kilogram) bags 
each in worldwide coffee production limits. The rising demand and 
rising price resulted in a 1989 global quota increase to 58 million 
bags. Uganda's export quota rose only by about 3,013 bags, 
however, bringing it to just over 2.3 million bags. Moreover, 
Uganda's entire quota increase was allocated to arabica coffee, 
which was grown primarily in the small southeastern region of 
Bugisu. In revenue terms, Uganda's overall benefit from the world 
price increase was small, as prices for robusta coffee — the major 
export — remained depressed. 

In 1989 Uganda's coffee production capacity exceeded its quota 
of 2.3 million bags, but export volumes were still diminished by 
economic and security problems, and large amounts of coffee were 
still being smuggled out of Uganda for sale in neighboring coun- 
tries. Then in July 1989, the ICO agreement collapsed, as its mem- 
bers failed to agree on production quotas and prices, and they 
decided to allow market conditions to determine world coffee prices 
for two years. Coffee prices plummeted, and Uganda was unable 
to make up the lost revenues by increasing export volumes. In Oc- 
tober 1989, the government devalued the shilling, making Uganda's 
coffee exports more competitive worldwide, but Ugandan officials 
still viewed the collapse of the ICO agreement as a devastating blow 
to the local economy. Fears that 1989 earnings for coffee exports 



112 



The Economy 



would be substantially less than the US$264 million earned the previ- 
ous year proved unfounded. Production in 1990, however, declined 
more than 20 percent to an estimated 133,000 tons valued at US$142 
million because of drought, management problems, low prices, and 
a shift from coffee production to crops for local consumption. 

Some coffee farmers cultivated cacao plants on land already 
producing robusta coffee. Cocoa production declined in the 1970s 
and 1980s, however, and market conditions discouraged interna- 
tional investors from viewing it as a potential counterweight to 
Uganda's reliance on coffee exports. Locally produced cocoa was 
of high quality, however, and the government continued to seek ways 
to rehabilitate the industry. Production remained low during the 
late 1980s, rising from 1,000 tons in 1986 to only 5,000 tons in 1989. 

Cotton 

In the 1950s, cotton was the second most important traditional 
cash crop in Uganda, contributing 25 percent of total agricultural 
exports. By the late 1970s, this figure had dropped to 3 percent, 
and government officials were pessimistic about reviving this in- 
dustry in the near future. Farmers had turned to other crops in 
part because of the labor-intensive nature of cotton cultivation, in- 
adequate crop-finance programs, and a generally poor marketing 
system. The industry began to recover in the 1980s, and the govern- 
ment rehabilitated ginneries and increased producer prices. In 1985, 
199,000 hectares were planted in cotton, and production had risen 
from 4,000 tons to 16,300 tons in five years. Cotton exports earned 
US$13.4 million in 1985. Earnings fell to US$5 million in 1986, 
representing about 4,400 tons of cotton. Production continued to 
decline after 1986, as violence plagued the major cotton-producing 
areas of the north, but showed some improvement in 1989. 

Cotton provided the raw materials for several local industries, 
such as textile mills, oil and soap factories, and animal feed facto- 
ries. And in the late 1980s, it provided another means of diver- 
sifying the economy. The government accordingly initiated an 
emergency cotton production program, which provided extension 
services, tractors, and other inputs for cotton farmers. At the same 
time, the government raised cotton prices from USh32 to USh80 
for a kilogram of grade A cotton and from UShl8 to USh42 for 
Grade B cotton in 1989. However, prospects for the cotton indus- 
try in the 1990s were still uncertain. 

Tea 

Favorable climate and soil conditions enabled Uganda to develop 
some of the world's best quality tea. Production almost ceased in 



113 



Uganda: A Country Study 

the 1970s, however, when the government expelled many owners 
of tea estates — mostly Asians. Many tea farmers also reduced 
production as a result of warfare and economic upheaval. Succes- 
sive governments after Amin encouraged owners of tea estates to 
intensify their cultivation of existing hectarage. Mitchell Cotts (Brit- 
ish) returned to Uganda in the early 1980s and formed the Toro 
and Mityana Tea Company (Tamteco) in a joint venture with the 
government. Tea production subsequently increased from 1,700 
tons of tea produced in 1981 to 5,600 tons in 1985. These yields 
did not approach the high of 22,000 tons that had been produced 
in the peak year of 1974, however, and they declined slightly after 
1985. 

The government doubled producer prices in 1988, to USh20 per 
kilogram, as part of an effort to expand tea production and reduce 
the nation's traditional dependence on coffee exports, but tea 
production remained well under capacity. Only about one- tenth 
of the 21 ,000 hectares under tea cultivation were fully productive, 
producing about 4,600 tons of tea in 1989. Uganda exported about 
90 percent of tea produced nationwide. In 1988 and 1989, the 
government used slighdy more than 10 percent of the total to meet 
Uganda's commitments in barter exchanges with other countries. 
In 1990 the tea harvest rose to 6,900 tons, of which 4,700 were 
exported for earnings of US$3.6 million. The government hoped 
to produce 10,000 tons in 1991 to meet rising market demand. 

Two companies, Tamteco and the Uganda Tea Corporation (a 
joint venture between the government and the Mehta family), 
managed most tea production. In 1989 Tamteco owned three large 
plantations, with a total of 2,300 hectares of land, but only about 
one-half of Tamteco 's land was fully productive. The Uganda Tea 
Corporation had about 900 hectares in production and was ex- 
panding its landholdings in 1989. The state-owned Agricultural 
Enterprises Limited managed about 3,000 hectares of tea, and an 
additional 9,000 hectares were farmed by about 1 1,000 smallholder 
farmers, who marketed their produce through the parastatal Uganda 
Tea Growers' Corporation (UTGC). Several thousand hectares 
of tea estates remained in a "disputed" category because their own- 
ers had been forced to abandon them. In 1990 many of these es- 
tates were being sold to private individuals by the departed Asians' 
Property Custodian Board as part of an effort to rehabilitate the 
industry and improve local management practices. 

Both Tamteco and the Uganda Tea Corporation used most of 
their earnings to cover operational expenses and service corporate 
debts, so the expansion of Uganda's tea-producing capacity was 
still just beginning in 1990. The EEC and the World Bank provided 



114 



Harvesting grain in Kabong, 1980 
Courtesy United Nations (0. Monsen) 
Mechanized farming in Buganda 
Courtesy United Nations 



115 



Uganda: A Country Study 

assistance to resuscitate the smallholder segment of the industry, 
and the UTGC rehabilitated seven tea factories with assistance from 
the Netherlands. Both Tamteco and the Uganda Tea Corporation 
were also known among tea growers in Africa for their leading role 
in mechanization efforts. Both companies purchased tea harvesters 
from Australian manufacturers, financed in part by the Uganda 
Development Bank, but mechanized harvesting and processing of 
tea was still slowed by shortages of operating capital. 

Tobacco 

For several years after independence, tobacco was one of Uganda's 
major foreign exchange earners, ranking fourth after coffee, cot- 
ton, and tea. Like all other traditional cash crops, tobacco produc- 
tion also suffered from Uganda's political insecurity and economic 
mismanagement. Most tobacco grew in the northwestern corner 
of the country, where violence became especially severe in the late 
1970s, and rehabilitation of this industry was slow. In 1981, for 
example, farmers produced only sixty-three tons of tobacco. There 
was some increase in production after 1981 , largely because of the 
efforts of the British American Tobacco Company, which repos- 
sessed its former properties in 1984. Although the National Tobacco 
Corporation processed and marketed only 900 tons of tobacco in 
1986, output had more than quadrupled by 1989. 

Sugar 

Uganda's once substantial sugar industry, which had produced 
152,000 tons in 1968, almost collapsed by the early 1980s. By 1989 
Uganda imported large amounts of sugar, despite local industrial 
capacity that could easily satisfy domestic demand. Achieving local 
self-sufficiency by the year 1995 was the major government aim 
in rehabilitating this industry. 

The two largest sugar processors were the Kakira and Lugazi 
estates, which by the late 1980s were joint government ventures 
with the Mehta and Madhvani families. The government commis- 
sioned the rehabilitation of these two estates in 1981 , but the spread- 
ing civil war delayed the projects. By mid- 1986, work on the two 
estates resumed, and Lugazi resumed production in 1988. The 
government, together with a number of African and Arab donors, 
also commissioned the rehabilitation of the Kinyala Sugar Works, 
and this Masindi estate resumed production in 1989. Rehabilita- 
tion of the Kakira estate, delayed by ownership problems, was com- 
pleted in 1990 at a cost of about US$70 million, giving Uganda 
a refining capacity of at least 140,000 tons per year (see Manufac- 
turing, this ch.). 



116 



The Economy 



Livestock 

The country's natural environment provided good grazing for 
cattle, sheep, and goats, with indigenous breeds dominating most 
livestock in Uganda. Smallholder farmers owned about 95 percent 
of all cattle, although several hundred modern commercial ranches 
were established during the 1960s and early 1970s in areas that 
had been cleared of tsetse-fly infestation. Ranching was successful 
in the late 1960s, but during the upheaval of the 1970s many ranches 
were looted, and most farmers sold off their animals at low prices 
to minimize their losses. In the 1980s, the government provided 
substantial aid to farmers, and by 1983 eighty ranches had been 
restocked with cattle. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s, the livestock 
sector continued to incur heavy animal losses as a result of dis- 
ease, especially in the northern and northeastern regions. Civil strife 
in those areas also led to a complete breakdown in disease control 
and the spread of tsetse flies. Cattle rustling, especially along the 
Kenyan border, also depleted herds in some areas of the northeast. 

The government hoped to increase the cattle population to 10 
million by the year 2000. To do this, it arranged a purchase of 
cattle from Tanzania in 1988 and implemented a US$10.5 million 
project supported by Kuwait to rehabilitate the cattie industry. The 
government also approved an EEC -funded program of artificial 
insemination, and the Department of Veterinary Services and 
Animal Industry tried to save existing cattle stock by containing 
diseases such as bovine pleuro-pneumonia, hoof-and-mouth dis- 
ease, rinderpest, and trypanosomiasis. 

Uganda's dairy farmers have worked to achieve self-sufficiency 
in the industry but have been hampered by a number of problems. 
Low producer prices for milk, high costs for animal medicines, and 
transportation problems were especially severe obstacles to dairy 
development. The World Food Programme (WFP) undertook an 
effort to rehabilitate the dairy industry, and the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other UN agencies also helped 
subsidize powdered milk imports, most of it from the United States 
and Denmark. But the WFP goal of returning domestic milk 
production to the 1972 level of 400 million liters annually was 
criticized by local health experts, who cited the nation's popula- 
tion growth since 1972 and urgent health needs in many war- torn 
areas. 

Local economists complained that the dairy industry demon- 
strated Uganda's continuing dependence on more developed econ- 
omies. Uganda had ample grazing area and an unrealized capacity 
for dairy development. Malnutrition from protein deficiency had 



117 




118 




Farmers' market in Kampala 
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer 



119 



Uganda: A Country Study 

not been eliminated, and milk was sometimes unavailable in non- 
farming areas. Imported powdered milk and butter were expen- 
sive and required transportation and marketing, often in areas 
where local dairy development was possible. School farms, once 
considered potentially important elements of education and board- 
ing requirements, were not popular with either pupils or teachers, 
who often considered agricultural training inappropriate for aca- 
demic institutions. Local economists decried Uganda's poor 
progress in controlling cattle diseases, and they urged the govern- 
ment to develop industries such as cement and steel, which could 
be used to build cattle-dips and eliminate tick-borne diseases. 

Goat farming also contributed to local consumption. By the late 
1980s, the poultry industry was growing rapidly, relying in part 
on imported baby chicks from Britain and Zambia. Several pri- 
vate companies operated feed mills and incubators. The major con- 
straint to expanding poultry production was the lack of quality feeds, 
and the government hoped that competition among privately owned 
feedmills would eventually overcome this problem. In 1987 the Arab 
Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries, the International Development 
Bank, and the Ugandan government funded a poultry rehabilita- 
tion and development project worth US$17.2 million to establish 
hatchery units and feed mills and to import parent stock and baby 
chicks. 

Uganda's beekeeping industry also suffered throughout the years 
of civil unrest. In the 1980s, the Cooperative for American Relief 
Everywhere (CARE) Apiary Development Project assisted in re- 
habilitating the industry, and by 1987 more than fifty cooperatives 
and privately owned enterprises had become dealers in apiary 
products. More than 4,000 hives were in the field. In 1987 an esti- 
mated 797 tons of honey and 614 kilograms of beeswax were 
produced. 

Fishing 

Lakes, rivers, and swamps covered 44,000 square kilometers, 
about 20 percent of Uganda's total area. Fishing was therefore an 
important rural industry. In all areas outside the central Lake Kyoga 
region, fish production increased throughout the 1980s. The govern- 
ment supported several programs to augment fish production and 
processing. In 1987 a government-sponsored Integrated Fisheries 
Development Project established a boat construction and repair 
workshop at Jinja, a processing plant, several fish collecting cen- 
ters, and fish marketing centers in several areas of Uganda. They 
also implemented the use of refrigerated insulated vehicles for 



120 



Herd of cattle showing the effects of the mid-1980s drought 
at Ugandan refugee camp in Rwanda 
Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (Frangoise Wolff) 

transporting fish. China had managed the reconstruction of cold 
storage facilities in Kampala in the early 1980s. Soon after that 
time, the government established the Sino-Uganda Fisheries Joint 
Venture Company to exploit fishing opportunities in Lake Victoria. 

Uganda's Freshwater Fisheries Research Organization monitored 
fishing conditions and the balance of flora and fauna in Uganda's 
lakes. In 1989 this organization warned against overfishing, espe- 
cially in the Lake Kyoga region, where the combined result of im- 
proved security conditions and economic hardship was a 40-percent 
increase in commercial and domestic fishing activity. A second en- 
vironmental concern in the fishing industry was the weed infesta- 
tion that had arisen in lakes suffering from heavy pollution. In late 
1989, officials were relatively unsuccessful in restricting the types 
and levels of pollutants introduced into the nation's numerous lakes. 

A few fishermen used explosives obtained from stone quarries 
to increase their catch, especially in the Victoria Nile region near 
Jinja. Using byproducts from beer manufacturing to lure fish into 
a feeding area, they detonated small packs of explosives that killed 
large numbers of fish and other aquatic life. Several people also 
drowned in the frantic effort to collect dead fish that floated to the 
surface of the water. Environmental and health concerns led the 



121 



Uganda: A Country Study 



government to outlaw this form of fishing, and local officials were 
seeking ways to ban the sale of fish caught in this manner. Both 
bans were difficult to enforce, however, and fishing with dynamite 
continued in 1989 despite the widespread notoriety attached to this 
activity. 

Forestry 

In the late 1980s, 7.5 million hectares of land in Uganda con- 
sisted of forest and woodland. About 1.5 million hectares, or 7 per- 
cent of Uganda's dry land area, were protected forest reserves. 
Roughly 25,000 hectares of protected reserves were tree farms. The 
most important forest products were timber, firewood, charcoal, 
wood pulp, and paper, but other important products included leaves 
for fodder and fertilizer, medicinal herbs, fruits, and fibers, and 
a variety of grasses used in weaving and in household applications. 
Production of most materials increased as much as 1 00 percent be- 
tween 1980 and 1988, but the output of timber for construction 
declined from 1980 to 1985, before increasing slightly to 433 mil- 
lion units in 1987 and continuing to increase in 1988. Paper produc- 
tion also increased substantially in 1988. 

Nationwide forest resources were being depleted rapidly, 
however. Deforestation was especially severe in poverty-stricken 
areas, where many people placed short-term survival needs ahead 
of the long-term goal of maintaining the nation's forestry sector. 
Agricultural encroachment, logging, charcoal making, and harvest- 
ing for firewood consumed more wooded area each year. An addi- 
tional toll on forest reserves resulted from wildfires, often the result 
of illegal charcoal-making activity in reserves. Neither natural 
regrowth nor tree-planting projects could keep pace with the de- 
mand for forest products. 

In 1988 the Ministry of Environmental Protection was respon- 
sible for implementing forest policy and management. Ministry 
officials warned that the loss of productive woodlands would even- 
tually lead to land erosion, environmental degradation, energy 
shortages, food shortages, and rural poverty in general, and they 
hoped to change traditional attitudes toward forests and other nat- 
ural resources. In 1989 the government implemented a six-year 
forestry rehabilitation project financed by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO). This project included 
a nationwide tree-planting campaign and a series of three-year train- 
ing courses for rural extension agents, leaders of women's groups, 
educators, and farmers. Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany 



122 



The Economy 



(West Germany), and several multilateral donor agencies also 
provided assistance in the forestry sector. 

Economic crises often hampered efforts to conserve natural 
resources, however. Many people lacked the motivation to plan 
for future generations when their own survival was at risk. As a 
result, illegal activities, including logging, charcoal making, and 
firewood gathering in posted reserves contributed to rapid deforesta- 
tion. Government forestry agents, who were generally underpaid, 
sometimes sold firewood for their own profit or permitted illegal 
activities in return for bribes. In these ways, entrenched poverty 
and corruption drained public resources from use by present and 
future generations. In 1989 officials threatened to prosecute trespass- 
ers in posted forest areas, but by the end of the year, Uganda had 
not implemented this policy. 

Industry 

When the NRM seized power in 1986, Uganda's industrial 
production was negligible. Manufacturing industries, based primar- 
ily on processing agricultural products unavailable in Uganda, oper- 
ated at approximately one- third of their 1972 level. The mining 
industry had almost come to a standstill. The rudiments of indus- 
trial production existed in the form of power stations, factories, 
mines, and hotels, but these facilities needed repairs and improved 
maintenance, and government budgets generally assigned these 
needs lower priority than security and commercial agricultural de- 
velopment. The city of Jinja, the nation's former industrial hub, 
was marked by signs of poverty and neglect. The dilapidated road 
system in and around Jinja provided one of the most serious ob- 
stacles to industrial growth. 

Industrial growth was a high priority in the late 1980s, however. 
The government's initial goal was to decrease Uganda's depen- 
dence on imported manufactured goods by rehabilitating existing 
enterprises. These efforts met with some success, and in 1988 and 
1989, industrial output grew by more than 25 percent, with much 
of this increase in the manufacturing sector. Industry's most seri- 
ous problems were capital shortages and the need for skilled work- 
ers and people with management experience. Engineers and repair 
people, in particular, were in demand, and government planners 
sought ways to gear vocational training toward these needs. 

Energy 

In the 1980s, local officials estimated that charcoal and fuel wood 
met more than 95 percent of Uganda's total energy requirements. 
These two materials produced 75 percent of the nation's commercial 



123 



Uganda: A Country Study 



energy, and petroleum products, 21 percent; electricity provided 
only 3 percent of commercial energy. By the late 1980s, the govern- 
ment sought alternate energy sources to reduce the nation's reli- 
ance on forestry resources for fuelwood. Alternative technologies 
were sought for the tobacco-curing and brick and tile manufactur- 
ing industries, in particular, because they both consumed substantial 
quantities of fuelwood. More than 80 percent of fuelwood consump- 
tion was still in the home — primarily for cooking — and to reduce 
this dependence, the government attempted to promote the 
manufacture and use of more fuel-efficient stoves. Even this modest 
effort was difficult and expensive to implement on a nationwide 
basis, in part because cooking methods were established by long- 
standing tradition. 

Managing the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) was increasingly 
difficult during the 1980s. Factors contributing to this problem in- 
cluded increased UEB operating costs and shortages of spare parts, 
especially conductors and transformers that had been destroyed by 
vandals during the war years. Supply lines were often vandalized, 
and oil was even drained from UEB equipment. Despite these 
problems, the UEB maintained the existing supply system and sup- 
plied electricity to a few new coffee factories and corn mills in the 
late 1980s. The demand for new connections increased, largely as 
a result of escalating prices of other energy sources, such as kero- 
sene and charcoal. Electricity consumption rose by 21 percent in 
1987 despite the upward adjustment of tariffs by 536 percent. 

Power generation at Owen Falls dropped from 635.5 million 
kilowatt-hours in 1986 to 609.9 million kilowatt-hours in 1987. By 
November 1988, six of the station's ten generators had broken 
down. Officials hoped that the rehabilitation of Maziba Hydro- 
electric Power Station at Kabale and the Mubuku Power Scheme 
at Kasese would ease the pressure on the Owen Falls facilities. As 
of 1989, planners expected the power generated at the country's 
existing power station at Owen Falls to be fully used by 1995, so 
the government rushed to begin a six-year construction project to 
build a 480-megawatt capacity hydroelectric power station near 
Murchison (Kabalega) Falls on the Nile River. Officials hoped the 
new station would meet Uganda's electric power needs up to the 
year 2020. Environmentalists protested that this project would dis- 
rupt the ecosystem of nearby Murchison (Kabalega) National Game 
Park (one of Uganda's prime tourist attractions), and the govern- 
ment agreed to move the power station two kilometers upstream 
in response to these complaints. 

In the 1980s, Uganda imported all of its petroleum products. 
The transportation sector consumed about 69 percent of the 



124 



The Economy 



available supply, whereas the aviation and industrial sectors re- 
quired 9 percent and 5 percent, respectively. Uganda relied on 
Kenyan road and rail systems to transport oil imports. When po- 
litical relations with Kenya worsened in the 1970s, the government 
tried to expand the country's strategic petroleum product reserves 
by rehabilitating existing storage facilities and constructing new 
ones. By late 1989, new tanks at Jinja and Nakasongola were ex- 
pected to provide a six-month oil supply cushion. Officials also 
changed procurement procedures for oil from an open general 
licensing system to the use of letters of credit. An oil board was 
to be established to import and store petroleum products and to 
supervise their distribution. 

Several international companies were also exploring for oil in 
western Uganda in 1989. A consortium of four oil companies — 
Shell, Exxon, Petrofina, and Total — had tendered bids for test drill- 
ing to determine if commercial quantities of oil were present. The 
World Bank provided US$5.2 million to purchase equipment and 
train Ugandans in drilling procedures. The major areas marked 
for test drilling were in Masindi, Hoima, Bundibugyo, and 
Kabarole. Test blocks were also set aside in the southwestern dis- 
trict of Kigezi and portions of Arua and Nebbi districts in the 
northwest. 

In 1989, however, several of these companies appeared to be 
losing interest in Ugandan oil prospects. Shell withdrew from the 
consortium, leaving Petrofina operating most oi,l rigs and Exxon 
and Total providing most financial backing. Among the reasons 
for the declining international interest were the slump in crude oil 
prices worldwide and the high cost of exploring in the relatively 
remote western region of Uganda. Moreover, uncertain political 
relations between Uganda and Kenya suggested that prospects for 
building a trans-Kenya pipeline were becoming more remote, and 
shipping oil through Tanzania promised to be too costly. 

Manufacturing 

In the late 1980s, most manufacturing industries relied on agricul- 
tural products for raw materials and machinery, and, as a result, 
the problems plaguing the agriculture sector hampered both produc- 
tion and marketing in manufacturing. Processing cotton, coffee, 
sugar, and food crops were major industries, but Uganda also 
produced textiles, tobacco, beverages, wood and paper products, 
construction materials, and chemicals. 

In the late 1980s, the government began to return some nation- 
alized manufacturing firms to the private sector in order to en- 
courage private investment. The primary aim was to promote 



125 



Uganda: A Country Study 

self-sufficiency in consumer goods and strengthen linkages between 
agriculture and industry. By 1989 the government estimated 
manufacturing output to be only about one-third of postindepen- 
dence peak levels achieved in 1970 and 1971. Only eleven out of 
eighty-two manufacturing establishments surveyed by the Minis- 
try of Planning and Economic Development were operating at more 
than 35 percent capacity. Overall industrial output increased be- 
tween January 1986 and June 1989, and the contribution from 
manufacturing increased from only 5 percent to more than 1 1 per- 
cent during the same period. 

Construction Materials 

In the late 1980s, eight companies produced steel products in 
Uganda, but they were operating at only about 20 percent of ca- 
pacity, despite increased output after 1986. Their most widely used 
products were gardening hoes and galvanized corrugated sheets 
of steel. The production of steel sheets declined dramatically in 1987, 
leaving some factories operating at only 5 percent of capacity. At 
the same time, hoe production increased 30 percent over 1986 levels. 
The government attempted to rejuvenate the industry in 1987 by 
assessing the availability of scrap iron and the demand for steel 
products and by providing US$2 . 7 million in machinery and equip- 
ment for use by the government-operated East African Steel Cor- 
poration. 

The nation's two cement-producing plants at Hoima and Tororo, 
both operated by the Uganda Cement Industry, also reduced 
production sharply, from more than 76,000 tons of cement in 1986 
to less than 16,000 tons in 1988. Neither plant operated at more 
than 5 percent of capacity during this time. The government again 
provided funds, roughly US$3.2 million, for rehabilitating the in- 
dustry and initiated a study of ways to improve this potentially vital 
sector of the economy. 

Consumer (roods 

In 1989 the government estimated that the nation's four textile 
mills manufactured about 8 million meters of cotton cloth per year, 
but Uganda's growing population required at least ten times this 
amount to attain self-sufficiency. The government began rehabilitat- 
ing three other mills for weaving and spinning operations, and the 
United Garment Industries commissioned a plant to manufacture 
knitted apparel, some of it for export, under a US$3 million re- 
habilitation loan. 

The production of beverages, including alcoholic beverages and 
soft drinks, increased in the late 1980s, and officials believed Uganda 



126 



The Economy 



could achieve self-sufficiency in this area in the 1990s. In 1987 three 
breweries increased their production by an average of 100 percent, 
to more than 16 million liters. In the same year, five soft drink 
producers increased output by 15 percent to nearly 6 million liters. 
In addition, Lake Victoria Bottling Company, producers of Pepsi 
Cola, completed construction of a new plant at Nakawa. 

Sugar production was vital to the soft drink industry, so re- 
habilitating the sugar industry promised to assist in attaining self- 
sufficiency in beverage production (see Crops, this ch.). The govern- 
ment hoped to reduce sugar imports from Cuba as the Lugazi and 
Kakira estates resumed production in 1989 and 1990. In 1988 and 
1989, Uganda's dairy industry relied on imports of dried milk pow- 
der and butter to produce milk for sale to the general public. 
Processed milk, produced under monopoly by the government- 
owned Uganda Dairy Corporation, registered an increase of 29.5 
percent, from 13 million liters in 1986 to 16.9 million liters in 1987. 
To improve the local dairy industry, the government rehabilitated 
milk cooling and collection centers, milk processing plants, and 
the industry's vehicles. And in the late 1980s, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fisheries imported 1,500 in- 
calf frisian heifers to form the nucleus of a restocking effort on pri- 
vate and government farms (see Livestock, this ch.). 

Production of wheat and corn flour increased in 1987, 1988, and 
1989, despite continuing low-capacity utilization in the industry. 
Only one establishment, the Uganda Millers, which worked at just 
over 20 percent of capacity, produced wheat flour. The company 
nonetheless increased production to 9.5 thousand tons in 1987, 32 
percent more than the previous year. At the same time, corn 
production increased 87.3 percent in 1987, to 4.6 thousand tons. 

In 1988 only one cigarette-manufacturing plant, the British 
American Tobacco Company, operated in Uganda. Its produc- 
tion increased slightly between 1986 and 1987 to 1,434.8 million 
cigarettes. In 1988 the government provided a loan of US$1.43 
million to rehabilitate the company's tobacco redrying plant in 
Kampala. 

In November 1988, President Museveni opened an edible oil 
mill at Tororo to process cotton, sunflowers, peanuts, and sesame 
seeds. The plant had the capacity to process fifteen tons of raw oil 
daily into 4.3 tons of refined cooking oil and to produce an esti- 
mated 300 tons of soap annually as a by-product. The mill was 
built under a barter deal with Schwermaschinen Kombinat Ernst 
Thaelmann of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), 
which received coffee and cotton in exchange. In its first year of 
production, the plant encountered operating difficulties, but its 



127 



Uganda: A Country Study 

officers still expected Uganda to achieve self-sufficiency in edible 
oil manufacturing during the 1990s. Mukwano Industries, Uganda's 
largest soap-manufacturing company, doubled production in 1988 
and 1989. 

The Uganda Leather and Tanning Industry was the nation's 
only leather producer, operating at less than 5 percent of capacity 
in 1987, when output dropped by nearly 40 percent from the previ- 
ous year. Although three footwear producers were in operation, 
the Uganda Bata Shoe Company produced 98 percent of the na- 
tion's shoes, and it increased production in 1988 and 1989. 

Mining 

Although the government recognized the existence of several com- 
mercially important mineral deposits, it had not conducted com- 
prehensive exploration surveys for non-oil minerals and, therefore, 
lacked estimates of their size. In the early 1970s, copper, tin, bis- 
muth, tungsten, rare earths, phosphates, limestone, and beryl were 
being mined by commercial companies. The mining sector em- 
ployed 8,000 people and accounted for 9 percent of exports. By 
1979 almost all mineral production had ceased, and in 1987 only 
the mining and quarrying sector recorded any growth. Mining out- 
put increased an estimated 20 percent, largely because of the rapid 
growth in demand for road and housing construction materials, 
such as sand and gravel. In 1988 the government established the 
National Mining Commission, intended to encourage investment 
in the mining sector through joint ventures with the government. 
This commission also provided some support for small mining oper- 
ations. In early 1988, the government introduced regulations of 
gold mining operations that gave the Bank of Uganda monopoly 
rights to buy gold mined in the country and to market gold at its 
discretion. In addition, the government initiated projects to rehabili- 
tate the Kilembe copper mine and to extract cobalt from slag heaps 
at the mine at a combined cost of US$70 million. By late 1990, 
financing had been secured for preliminary rehabilitation of the 
mine's facilities, part of it from the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (North Korea). The French were involved in the cobalt 
venture; plans called for processing and export to France of at least 
1,000 tons per year once technology was in place. 

Tourism 

During the 1960s, revenue from tourism, including restaurants, 
hotels, and related services, increased faster than any other sector 
of the economy. In 1971, the peak year for tourist receipts, more 
than 85,000 foreigners visited Uganda, making tourism the nation's 



128 



Local bus stop outside Kampala 
Municipal bus station in Kampala 
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer 



129 



Uganda: A Country Study 

third largest source of foreign exchange, after coffee and cotton. 
After 1972, however, political instability destroyed the tourist in- 
dustry. Rebels damaged and looted hotels, decimated wildlife herds, 
and made many national park roads impassable. Part of the air- 
port at Entebbe was also destroyed. 

Recognizing the role tourism could play in economic develop- 
ment, the government assigned high priority to restoring the tourism 
infrastructure in its RDP. To this end, the government planned 
to rehabilitate hotels and promote wildlife management. In Febru- 
ary 1988, ministry officials announced a plan to build four new 
hotels worth US$120 million as part of a barter trade agreement 
with Italy. The Italian company Viginter agreed to construct the 
200-room hotels at Masaka, Fort Portal, Jinja, and Mbale. Inter- 
national tourist arrivals gradually increased, from about 32,000 
in 1986 to more than 40,000 in each of the next two years. Tourism 
earned roughly US$4.2 million in 1988. At the same time, con- 
tinuing unrest in the north halted rehabilitation efforts in Murchi- 
son (Kabalega) Falls and Kidepo national parks, and many tourist 
attractions awaited a reduced climate of violence before maintenance 
and repairs could be improved. 

Transportation and Communications 

Like the industrial sector, the transportation and communica- 
tion infrastructure remained in extreme disrepair during the late 
1980s, primarily as a result of more than two decades of continu- 
ous warfare. Damaged roads and railroads were accorded high pri- 
ority in the government's RDP, which allocated 29 percent of 
planned investment to transportation and communications. The 
government also hoped to extend Uganda's links with Indian Ocean 
ports through Tanzania in order to reduce the dependence on 
Kenya. Air transportation, however, reached a critical state in the 
late 1980s, with a severe shortage of both aircraft and skilled 
management personnel. 

Rail and Road Systems 

Uganda's railroad system extended to 1,240 kilometers in the 
late 1980s, and about 27,000 kilometers of roads reached all areas 
of the country (see fig. 7). About 6,000 kilometers of these were 
all-weather, and 1,800 kilometers were paved. By 1988 many rail 
sections needed relaying, regrading, or realigning, and the condi- 
tion of most road surfaces was very poor. Road transport systems 
also suffered from an acute shortage of vehicles and spare parts 
for buses, vans, and trucks. Under the RDP, the government resur- 
faced more than 4,000 kilometers of roads in 1987 and 1988. Road 



130 



The Economy 



improvement continued to be a high priority, largely because offi- 
cials viewed transportation infrastructure as the key to stimulat- 
ing the rural economy. 

The government tried to transfer long-distance traffic, particu- 
larly bulky freight, from the dilapidated road system to the rail sys- 
tem operated by the Uganda Railways Corporation. The war years 
of 1985 and 1986, however, followed by ongoing rebel activity in 
eastern and northern Uganda, undermined rail performance and 
disrupted service in these areas. In 1987 workers completed con- 
struction on the Nalukolongo Diesel Workshop, which repaired 
locomotives. In addition, the government purchased 700 wagons 
and 13 locomotives in 1987. The government also bought a fleet 
of three wagon ferries for operation on Lake Victoria, shortening 
the transportation time for wagons and facilitating the opening of 
the Tanzanian route to the coast. In 1987 these ferries carried over 
28,000 tons of exports and imports between Jinja and the Lake 
Victoria ports of Mwanza and Kisumu. In 1990 rehabilitation of 
the Kampala-Kasese rail line began, with the aim of promoting 
agriculture, mining, and oil exploration in western Uganda. 

Because of strained relations with Kenya, Uganda tried to reduce 
its overall dependence on the Kenyan road link to the Indian Ocean 
by promoting an alternative rail route through Tanzania. More- 
over, rail traffic between Kampala and the Kenyan border was 
irregular, so Ugandan officials hoped to build up the Tanzanian 
link, despite capacity and rolling stock problems. In 1988 Ugan- 
dan and Tanzanian officials began exploring this possibility. Ugan- 
dan officials indicated they were prepared to invest in Tanzania's 
railroad if they could plan on three trains a week from Dar es Salaam 
to Mwanza. 

Air Transport 

In the late 1980s, Uganda's major international airport at 
Entebbe was handling about 135,000 passengers annually, a sub- 
stantial increase over the early and mid-1980s. Six scheduled airlines 
flew into Entebbe, one of five airports with paved runways. The 
national airline, Uganda Airlines, suffered several financial set- 
backs, however, operating a fleet of only four outmoded and un- 
reliable aircraft. British authorities banned the B-707 aircraft from 
operating in Britain because of noise abatement restrictions. Uganda 
Airlines also reduced its European service to one flight per week 
to Italy and West Germany. Uganda then signed a lease agree- 
ment with Zambian Airways for a weekly flight to Britain. When 
this arrangement proved too expensive, a similar agreement was 



131 



Uganda: A Country Study 





Intprnatinnal 
ii no i ictuuf lai 




boundary 





Main road 




Secondary road 




Railroad 




National capital 


• 


Populated place 


+ 


Airport 


J/ 


Port 





25 50 Kilometers 




25 50 Miles 



Kaabong^ 




IYA 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 7. Major Transportation Routes, 1990 



signed with Ghana Airways, which began operation of a DC- 10 
flight between Entebbe and London in April 1988. 

The October 1988 crash of a Uganda Airlines Boeing aircraft 
in Rome seriously crippled the airline's operations. That aircraft 
was the only one in the fleet fitted with a "hush kit" to reduce 
noise to European standards. Although Uganda Airlines resumed 
service with a leased aircraft in December 1988, the financial via- 
bility of that service remained questionable. Uganda Airlines 
continued to operate service to the Middle East and Nairobi in 
1988, but these flights, too, were canceled in late 1989. Domestic 



132 



The Economy 



routes, too, had been reduced to those between Entebbe and the 
Arua and Kasese airfields. Uganda Airlines was exploring the pos- 
sibility of merging with Air Tanzania and Zambian Airways, as 
all three airlines sought to find ways to operate newer, larger air- 
craft economically but lacked the passenger and freight traffic to 
do so. 

The government contracted with a British consulting firm, Psiair, 
to conduct a management study of Uganda Airlines Corporation. 
The 1989 Psiair report urged a complete overhaul of the airlines, 
citing fiscal and labor mismanagement and safety problems as 
among the most serious concerns. By late 1989, the government 
was considering a policy that would require all airline personnel 
to resign and reapply for their jobs, in an effort to remove "ghost 
employees" from the payroll and reduce nepotism among airline 
management. 

Communications 

Uganda's telecommunications system provided fair service for 
city dwellers, and in 1990 was undergoing improvements after a 
period of neglect during the early 1980s. Long-distance commu- 
nications went via a radio-relay system centered in Kampala, and 
a high-capacity radio-relay link with 960 channels connected the 
Ugandan capital with Nairobi. A satellite ground station at Mpoma 
near Kampala had two antennas, one working with the Interna- 
tional Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) Atlan- 
tic Ocean satellite and the other with the Intelsat Indian Ocean 
satellite. This ground station provided excellent international tele- 
phone and television transmissions and permitted international 
direct dialing both into and out of the country. At the end of 1990, 
Uganda counted 61,600 telephones nationwide, or 2.6 telephones 
per 100 inhabitants. 

Radio transmissions originated in Kampala and other large 
towns, but broadcasts, along with programs from neighboring coun- 
tries, were received in all areas of the country. Kampala had six 
of the country's ten amplitude modulation (AM) stations, which 
broadcast in English, French, Swahili, and several local languages 
and used both medium and shortwave frequencies. Nine television 
stations in the larger cities operated in the afternoons and eve- 
nings with programs in English, Swahili, and Luganda. 

In 1990 several improvements were underway that, when com- 
pleted, would significantly upgrade the telecommunications sys- 
tem. A new fiber-optic link was being built from the international 
switching center in the capital to the satellite ground station, and 
additional telephone exchanges were under construction in Kampala 
and Kabale. 



133 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Banking and Currency 

Uganda's years of political turmoil left the country with sub- 
stantial loan repayments, a weak currency, and soaring inflation. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, numerous foreign loans were 
for nonproductive uses, especially military purchases. Even after 
the Museveni regime seized power, debts climbed while the produc- 
tive capacity of the country deteriorated. To resolve these problems, 
the government tapped both external creditors and domestic 
sources, crowding out private- sector borrowers. The Museveni 
government then attempted to reduce the percentage of govern- 
ment borrowing from domestic sources and to reschedule payments 
of foreign loans. The government also implemented successive 
devaluations of the shilling in order to stabilize the economy. 

Banking 

Government-owned institutions dominated most banking in 
Uganda. In 1966 the Bank of Uganda, which issued currency 
and managed foreign exchange reserves, became the Central Bank. 
The Uganda Commercial Bank, which had fifty branches through- 
out the country, dominated commercial banking and was wholly 
owned by the government. The Uganda Development Bank was 
a state-owned development finance institution, which channeled 
loans from international sources into Ugandan enterprises and ad- 
ministered most of the development loans made to Uganda. The 
East African Development Bank, established in 1967 and jointly 
owned by Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, was also concerned with 
development finance. It survived the breakup of the East African 
Community and received a new charter in 1980. Other commer- 
cial banks included local operations of Grindlays Bank, Bank of 
Baroda, Standard Bank, and the Uganda Cooperative Bank. 

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the number of commercial 
bank branches and services contracted significantly. Whereas 
Uganda had 290 commercial bank branches in 1970, by 1987 there 
were only 84, of which 58 branches were operated by government- 
owned banks. This number began to increase slowly the following 
year, and in 1989 the gradual increase in banking activity signaled 
growing confidence in Uganda's economic recovery. 

Domestic Credit 

By 1981 the rate of growth of domestic credit was 100 percent 
per year, primarily as a result of government borrowing from domes- 
tic sources. The 1981 budget attempted to reestablish financial control 



134 




by reducing government borrowing and by floating the shilling in 
relation to world currencies. This measure led to a sharp decline 
in the growth rate of domestic credit and to a temporary decline 
in the central government's share of domestic credit from 73 per- 
cent to 44 percent in 1986. The following year, however, domes- 
tic credit recorded growth of over 100 percent, primarily reflecting 
credit extended to private-sector owners for crop financing. Dur- 
ing 1987 crop financing for private owners again increased, while 
the government's share of domestic credit fell even further, from 
45.3 percent to 30.7 percent. Crop finance accounted for 86 per- 
cent of all financing for agriculture, crowding out commercial credit 
to other areas within agriculture. Commercial lending for trade 
and commerce also increased during 1987, rising from 15.6 per- 
cent to 23.7 percent of total lending in 1986. Commercial lending 
to manufacturing, building and construction, and transportation 
rose marginally, while lending to other sectors declined. 

The Uganda Commercial Bank introduced a new program, the 
"rural farmers scheme," to help small farmers through troubled 
economic times. This program aimed to boost agricultural output 
by lending small sums directly to farmers, mostly women, on the 
basis of character references but without requiring loans to be se- 
cured. Most of these loans were in the form of inputs such as hoes, 
wheelbarrows, or machetes, with small amounts of cash provided 
for labor. The farmers repaid the loans over eighteen months, with 



135 



Uganda: A Country Study 

interest calculated at 32 percent — marginally lower than commer- 
cial rates. Under this program, the bank had loaned USh400 mil- 
lion to approximately 7,000 farmers by 1988. The program attracted 
more than US$20 million in foreign aid, including US$18 million 
from the African Development Bank. 

Currency and Inflation 

Between 1981 and 1988, the government repeatedly devalued 
the Uganda shilling in order to stabilize the economy. Before 1981 
the value of the shilling was linked to the IMF's special drawing 
right (SDR — see Glossary). In mid- 1980 the official exchange rate 
was USh9.7 per SDR or USh7.3 per United States dollar. When 
the Obote government floated the shilling in mid- 1981, it dropped 
to only 4 percent of its previous value before settling at a rate of 
USh78 per US$1. In August 1982, the government introduced a 
two- tier exchange rate. It lasted until June 1984, when the govern- 
ment merged the two rates at USh299 per US$1. A continuing 
foreign exchange shortage caused a decline in the value of the shill- 
ing to USh600 per US$1 by June 1985 and UShl,450 in 1986. 
In May 1987, the government introduced a new shilling, worth 
100 old shillings, along with an effective 76 percent devaluation. 
Ugandans complained that inflation quickly eroded the new cur- 
rency's value. As a result, the revised rate of USh60 per US$1 was 
soon out of line with the black market rate of USh350 per US$1 . 
Following the May 1987 devaluation, the money supply continued 
to grow at an annual rate of 500 percent until the end of the year. 
In July 1988, the government again devalued the shilling by 60 
percent, setting it at UShl50 per US$1; but at the same time, the 
parallel rate had already risen to USh450 per US$1. President 
Museveni regretted this trend, saying, "If we can produce more, 
the situation will improve, but for the time being we are just put- 
ting out fires. ' ' The government announced further devaluations 
in December 1988 to UShl65 per US$1; in March 1989, to USh200 
per US$1 ; and in October 1989, to USh340 per US$1 . By late 1990, 
the official exchange rate was USh510 per US$1; the black mar- 
ket rate was USh700 per US$1. 

All of the government's efforts to bring the economy under con- 
trol succeeded in reducing the country's staggering inflation from 
over 300 percent in 1986 to about 72 percent in 1988. Then the 
government contributed to rising inflation by increasing the money 
supply to purchase coffee and other farm produce and to cover in- 
creased security costs in early 1989, a year in which inflation was 
estimated at more than 100 percent. Low rainfall levels in the south 
contributed to higher prices for bananas, corn, and other foodstuffs. 



136 



The Economy 



Shortages of consumer goods and bottlenecks in transportation, 
distribution, marketing, and production also contributed to rising 
prices. Moreover, the depreciation of the United States dollar in- 
creased the cost of Uganda's imports from Japan and Europe. The 
government tried to curb inflation by increasing disbursements of 
import- support funds and tightening controls on credit. These mea- 
sures helped lower the rate of inflation to 30 percent by mid- 1990, 
but by late 1990, inflation had once again resumed its upward spiral. 

Foreign Trade and Assistance 

In order to rebuild the economy in the late 1980s, Uganda needed 
foreign goods, technology, and services, but its chronic shortage 
of foreign currency and uncertain political climate weakened the 
nation's standing as a trading partner. The government sought to 
strengthen Uganda's standing in the world economy, but to meet 
short-term needs officials turned to foreign donors. Acquiring for- 
eign assistance through direct aid, loans, or grants became an im- 
portant focus of the government's economic efforts. The nation's 
balance of trade and payments reflected the fluctuating world value 
of Uganda's major export, coffee, even though the volume of coffee 
exports remained almost constant through 1986 and declined only 
slightly after that. The government encouraged export diversifi- 
cation, and these two important goals — restoring international con- 
fidence and reducing the nation's dependence on a single 
export — dominated external economic planning in the late 1980s. 

Foreign Trade 

Agricultural products have dominated Uganda's exports through- 
out its history. Coffee became the most important export after 1950, 
but cotton, tea, tobacco, and some manufactured goods were also 
important. During the 1970s, all exports except coffee declined as 
a result of low producer prices, marketing problems, declining ex- 
change rates, and general economic disruption. Coffee production 
declined only slightly during these years of political turmoil, but 
the value of sales was vulnerable to shifts in world market prices. 

From 1981 to 1984, general exports steadily increased, but only 
in 1984 and 1985 were they sufficient to produce a trade surplus. 
In 1986 a trend of declining exports and increasing imports devel- 
oped and continued to the end of the decade (see table 7, Appen- 
dix). Uganda sent most of its exports to the United States, Britain, 
the Netherlands, and France. Exports to regional trading partners 
were less important but increased slightly in the late 1980s. 

During the early 1980s, the value of imports remained fairly 
steady, constrained mainly by the shortage of foreign exchange. 



137 



Uganda: A Country Study 



However, in the late 1980s, imports rose dramatically, causing a 
large deficit in the trade balance. The government normally allo- 
cated foreign exchange for the purchase of essential goods such as 
fuel, vehicles, machinery, medical supplies, and military equip- 
ment. Principal imports — mainly construction materials, ma- 
chinery, and spare parts — came from Kenya, Britain, Malaysia, 
and Italy. 

In November 1988, the government announced a new program 
to support the expansion of nontraditional exports in an effort to 
diversify exports and increase foreign exchange earnings. Under 
this plan, private companies with export licenses granted by the 
Ministry of Commerce were permitted to retain foreign exchange 
earned for nontraditional exports, especially including a variety 
of fruits and vegetables that could be cultivated and transported 
fairly readily. Under the plan, international traders would be per- 
mitted to sell all or part of the foreign exchange received for these 
exports to the Central Bank. They could then apply for import 
licenses valued at the equivalent of their foreign exchange earn- 
ings in order to finance imports within 180 days. 

At the same time, the government established a United States 
Agency for International Development (AID) export trade promo- 
tion credit amounting to US$12.5 million to assist the private sec- 
tor in expanding production, marketing, and trade in these and 
other nontraditional exports. Items eligible to be financed under 
the trade promotion credit included improved seeds, high analysis 
fertilizers, raw jute for manufacturing gunny sacks, tin for local 
manufacture of farm tools, and packaging materials. 

An important development in Ugandan trade in the late 1980s 
was the growth of countertrade, or barter, agreements at both 
government and company levels. Faced with serious foreign ex- 
change shortages, the Ugandan government used this approach 
to secure essential goods and services, such as petroleum products 
and technical advice. Between 1986 and 1990, the government 
transacted more than seventy barter deals valued at an estimated 
US$534 million. By mid- 1989 the turnover from barter trade ar- 
rangements was approximately US$60 million a year, or 10 to 15 
percent of the value of conventional trade. The Ugandan input was 
almost always coffee or cotton. These barter deals included some 
imaginative and innovative schemes, notably hotel and road build- 
ing projects and plans for technology transfer. They also provided 
a wider range of imports than would have been possible under con- 
ventional trading, especially in view of the continuing shortage of 
foreign exchange. 



138 



The Economy 



Under separate barter agreements in 1988, Uganda received two 
consignments of petroleum products from Algeria and Libya. The 
consignment from Libya was part of a US$60 million deal to ex- 
change Libyan oil, cement, and trucks for Ugandan coffee, tobacco, 
and tea. A similar agreement worth more than US$24 million over 
three years was signed with Algeria in January 1988. 

Uganda declared a temporary moratorium on new barter deals 
in 1988 because it had insufficient agricultural produce to fulfill 
existing agreements. Cuba had received only 3,000 tons of the 
10,000 tons of beans promised under a 1986 agreement, and other 
countertrade partners awaited deliveries of agricultural products. 
Farmers blamed an inadequate round of producer price increases 
in January 1988 for continuing shortfalls in several crops. Problems 
were particularly acute surrounding trade in corn. The govern- 
ment promised approximately 10,000 tons of corn to Algeria, Cuba, 
Egypt, and Libya, plus 12,000 tons to North Korea and 5,000 tons 
to Yugoslavia. By late 1989, none of these shipments had been de- 
livered, although Uganda had received consignments of industrial 
goods as part of these barter agreements. 

Despite problems in the supply of local products, the govern- 
ment signed two protocol agreements in early 1988 with Rwanda 
and North Korea. The Rwanda agreement was worth US$10 mil- 
lion over a one-year period; in exchange for exports such as corn, 
salt, tobacco, wood, and bananas, Uganda was to receive Rwan- 
dan goods such as blankets or paint. In June 1988, Uganda and 
North Korea signed a protocol on barter trade for 1988 and 1989, 
including Korean cement, machinery, tools, and electrical goods, 
in return for Ugandan cotton lint, meat, and other agricultural 
products. The protocol extended over a period of eighteen to twenty- 
four months and was worth US$14 million to each country. Of 
this amount, US$8 million was for cement. By late 1990, however, 
many barter deals were still under suspension and at least some 
were being renegotiated because of continued shortfalls in Uganda's 
agricultural production. 

In 1988 and 1989, to bring the balance of trade and payments 
under control, the government imposed new import and export 
licensing procedures. Imports designated as ' ' foreign exchange re- 
quired," which included most commercial imports, were processed 
through a bank. Importers presented their license applications to 
a bank, together with supporting documentation and a foreign ex- 
change application form. If Ministry of Trade officials approved 
the application, they issued an import license entitling the bank 
to open a letter of credit. For imports designated "no foreign ex- 
change required," where the importer already had the foreign 



139 



Uganda: A Country Study 

exchange or the goods were financed by foreign sources, an im- 
port license was required. Imports from other members of the 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa 
enjoyed increasingly favored treatment, while imports from Israel 
and South Africa were prohibited. The Societe Generale de Sur- 
veillance of Geneva operated an import contract administration 
program to ensure contract provisions regarding quantity and qual- 
ity were met. Each export deal required a Ministry of Trade license 
stating the agreed price in foreign currency and declaring receipts 
to the Central Bank. Licenses for nonperishable goods were sub- 
ject to advance payment to the Central Bank. Some goods could 
only be exported through official agencies such as the Produce 
Marketing Board and the Coffee Marketing Board. 

Balance of Payments 

The economic decline of the 1970s caused a trade deficit, largely 
the result of a drop in official coffee exports and a steady capital 
outflow. The government strengthened financial controls in 1981, 
after Uganda had registered a US$169.2 million trade deficit. By 
1984 these controls had enabled Uganda to convert its deficit to 
a US$65.7 million trade surplus. This improvement, together with 
declining net imports of services, changed the current account 
balance from a deficit of US$170.6 million in 1981 to a surplus 
of US$107.1 million in 1984. During the same three years, however, 
an outflow of US$120.4 million in short-term capital led to a 
decrease in reserves of US$56.2 million in 1984. In 1985 the trade 
balance remained positive, as did the balance on current account. 

During the 1980s, the volume of Uganda's major exports main- 
tained a fairly consistent increase, despite the decline in unit value. 
In particular, the country's major export, coffee, experienced er- 
ratic price movements between 1980 and 1987. The price of coffee 
dropped sharply for two years but recovered to 87 percent of the 
1980 level in 1984. It then plummeted to about 74 percent in 1985 
and improved to 91 percent in 1986. This recovery was not sus- 
tained in 1987, when the index fell sharply to 66 percent. Simi- 
larly, the unit values of tea and tobacco, two other traditional 
exports, also declined, while the price index of cotton, another tradi- 
tional export crop, recovered from 57 percent in 1986 to 66 per- 
cent in 1987. An increase in the volume of exports was not enough 
to compensate for the loss caused by the sharp fall in unit value. 
Export income from coffee fell sharply from US$394 million in 1986 
to US$264 million in 1989. Cotton suffered a similar fate, drop- 
ping from US$5 million to US$4 million during the same period. 



140 



The Economy 



While export revenues fell, the value of many imports increased. 
During 1987 total merchandise imports increased to a record 
US$635 million. Of this amount, imports financed by official 
resources were US$249 million on a cash basis, including suppli- 
ers' credit, US$34 million received on barter terms, and US$23 
million acquired through the EAC Compensation Fund. Private 
imports using unofficial foreign exchange were estimated at US$98 
million. Loans and grants financed imports worth US$228 mil- 
lion. A major part of the rise in the import bill consisted of fully 
funded capital goods considered necessary inputs for national re- 
habilitation and development projects. 

Reflecting the decline in the overall value of exports and increased 
import costs, the trade deficit increased sharply in 1987 to US$301 
million. The current account (trade balance, net services, and un- 
requited transfers, taken together) registered a marginal surplus 
in 1986 but deteriorated substantially during 1987 to register the 
highest deficit since 1982. At the same time, the capital account 
balance strengthened in 1987 to register a surplus. This increase 
resulted in large part from the improvement in medium-term and 
long-term loans. In sum, the overall balance showed a US$3 mil- 
lion deficit in 1987, a substantial decline from the US$127 million 
surplus registered in 1986. Domestic (bank and nonbank) sources 
financed approximately 75 percent of the deficit while external 
sources financed the remainder. 

External Debt 

Although Uganda was not one of the largest debtor nations in 
Africa, by the late 1980s the country had accumulated a signifi- 
cant external debt. By 1980, following eight years of economic 
decline under President Amin, external liabilities rose to over 
US$700 million. The Obote government's recovery program 
produced a further debt increase to US$1 .043 billion by 1984. By 
1987 Uganda's outstanding external debt stood at US$1,405 bil- 
lion, representing over half of GDP and nearly three and a half 
times the level of exports. At the end of 1989, total external debt 
was US$1.8 billion; by late 1990, it was approaching US$2 bil- 
lion. At the same time, the cost of servicing the foreign debt rose 
sharply from US$45 million in 1986 to US$70 million in 1987 and 
an estimated US$139 million in 1988. With Uganda's foreign earn- 
ings sharply down in 1987 and declining further in 1988, the debt 
service ratio also rose from 11 percent in 1986 to 18.9 percent in 
1987 and an estimated 56 percent in 1988. If all debt maturities 
were to be cleared, payments would still absorb almost 60 percent 



141 



Uganda: A Country Study 

of export earnings. Arrears due in 1989 were estimated at about 
US$70 million. 

In 1988 more than 95 percent of Uganda's debt was official or 
officially guaranteed, reflecting the country's weak capacity to bor- 
row from private banks. Nearly 83 percent of the debt was conces- 
sional, leading to some improvement in the average grace and 
maturity periods of the debts. Nevertheless, multilateral debts 
claimed a significant share of the total, and these debts could not 
be rescheduled. In FY 1987-88, US$170 million in medium-term 
and long-term debt reached maturity, comprising US$126.4 mil- 
lion in principal and US$43.6 million in interest. Of this total, 
US$135.7 million, or about 80 percent, was owed to multilateral 
creditors, the remainder to bilateral creditors. 

The Museveni government tried to counteract these problems 
with a revised loan program. In particular, the government wanted 
to obtain grants or project-related loans in agriculture, industry, 
tourism, and energy to promote local productivity. In addition, 
terms of the new loans averaged twenty-year maturity periods, with 
five-year grace periods. Museveni was successful in rescheduling 
and refinancing some old debt. In June 1987, the Paris Club (see 
Glossary) rescheduled US$1 13 million in loans to Uganda, and fur- 
ther Paris Club rescheduling took place in mid- 1989. 

In September 1988, the IMF approved the second-year struc- 
tural adjustment program of US$39 million, after the Ugandan 
government cleared roughly US$18 million in arrears to the agency. 
Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Israel expressed sat- 
isfaction with Uganda's progress under the IMF program and re- 
scheduled approximately US$25 to 30 million worth of debt. 

Aid 

Following the political upheavals of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
Uganda required substantial financial assistance to rebuild its so- 
cial and economic infrastructure. The recovery program launched 
by the Obote government in 1982 called for US$1.7 billion in 
balance of payments and commodity support, but by 1985 many 
Western donor countries had decided to withhold financial sup- 
port in protest against the government's poor human rights record. 
Many agencies again suspended disbursements at the end of 1985, 
when the short-lived Okello administration failed to end the polit- 
ical chaos. Upon coming to power in January 1986, President 
Museveni proposed an emergency six-month relief program that 
would cost US$160 million. Some international support was forth- 
coming, but most of the major bilateral and multilateral donors 
preferred to wait until the government had drawn up a more 



142 



The Economy 



comprehensive plan. In 1987 the government responded with the 
RDP, which included a US$1 .3 billion budget over four years. Ap- 
proximately US$600 million of this amount was already funded 
when the plan was launched. 

After launching the RDP, the government enjoyed the increas- 
ing confidence of Western donor nations (see table 8, Appendix). 
In 1988 donors pledged over US$377 million in aid, and Uganda 
received major support and a vote of confidence from both the IMF 
and the Paris Club. The IMF approved a purchase equivalent to 
US$33.7 million under the compensatory financing facility to cover 
an estimated shortfall in export earnings resulting from lower coffee 
revenues. In October 1988, a consultative group meeting in Paris 
arranged by the World Bank pledged aid and concessionary loans 
worth US$550 million. The Ugandan government told potential 
donors that the government needed a minimum new aid commit- 
ment of US$440 million in 1989 in order to meet its development 
targets and continue disbursements for existing commitments. 

Regional Cooperation 

In addition to sporadic attempts to revive the defunct East Afri- 
can Community, composed of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, 
Uganda participated in four regional economic organizations. These 
included the PTA, the Lome Convention, the Kagera Basin Or- 
ganization, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD). The PTA, with fifteen member states in 
east, central, and southern Africa, aimed to create a regional com- 
mon market, liberalize trade, and encourage cooperation in indus- 
try, agriculture, transport, and communications. The progressive 
liberalization of intra-PTA trade began on July 1, 1984, with the 
adoption of a common list of 209 items of trade. A multilateral 
clearing facility was established in Harare in February 1984. It han- 
dled transactions worth US$10 million in 1985 and twice that 
amount in 1987. A PTA monetary unit of account (the uapta), 
was made equivalent to the SDR and used to settle interstate debts 
every two months. Outstanding balances were payable in United 
States dollars. The practical effect of the PTA was constrained by 
rules, known as "rules of origin," which allowed preferential treat- 
ment only for goods produced by companies in which citizens of 
the member state managed their operations and held at least 51 
percent of the equity in the company. 

The Lome Convention, a trade and aid agreement between the 
EEC and sixty- six African, Caribbean, and Pacific nations, includ- 
ing forty-five African countries, guaranteed duty-free entry to the 
EEC for specific commodities from these countries. Uganda has 



143 



Uganda: A Country Study 

benefited from this agreement and assistance from the European 
Development Fund, which disbursed aid to member countries. 

In 1981 Uganda joined the Kagera Basin Organization, which 
was established by Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi in 1977. The 
organization's major goal was to develop 60,000 square kilometers 
of the Kagera River Basin, which extended into all four countries. 
Areas of interest to the organization included transport, agricul- 
ture, power, mining, hydroelectricity, and external finance, but 
by the late 1980s its programs were slowed by funding constraints. 

Six East African countries established IGADD in 1986. IGADD 
members included Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Uganda. The organization's aim was to coordinate and channel 
funding into key regional programs addressing the issues of drought, 
desertification, and agricultural development. IGADD received ap- 
proximately US$70 million in aid in 1987 but by 1989 had not yet 
completed any of its development and environmental projects. 

Authoritative information on the Ugandan economy can be found 
in the Background to the Budget, which is published annually by 
Uganda's Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. Two 
Ugandan newspapers are also useful — the government publication, 
The New Vision, and Financial Times, which specializes in economic 
reporting. Economic statistics are available through the publica- 
tions of the major international financial institutions, including 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The best 
secondary sources on Uganda, widely available in the United States, 
are the publications of the Economist Intelligence Unit, including 
the annual Country Profile: Uganda and quarterly Country Report: 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and monthly reports of Africa 
Research Bulletin, Economic Series. For information on Uganda's early 
economic development, see the three-volume History of East Africa 
published by Oxford University. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



144 



Parliament building in Kampala 



THE CENTRAL QUESTION facing Uganda after the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 
came to power in January 1986 was whether or not this new govern- 
ment could break the cycle of insecurity and decay that had afflicted 
the country since independence in 1962. Each new government 
had made that goal more difficult to achieve. Despite Ugandans' 
hopes for improvement after the war that ended President Idi Amin 
Dada's rule in April 1979, national political and economic difficul- 
ties worsened in the seven years that followed. A new guerrilla war 
began in 1981. The National Resistance Army (NRA), military 
wing of the NRM, seized Kampala and control of the national 
government in January 1986. The NRM pledged it would estab- 
lish legitimate and effective political institutions within the next 
four years. It failed to achieve this goal, however, partly because 
new civil wars broke out in the north and the east, and in October 
1989 the NRM extended its interim rule until 1995. 

Few of the basic political questions that confronted Uganda at 
independence had been settled when the NRM seized power in 
1986. Under protectorate rule after 1894, Uganda's various regions 
had developed along different paths and at different rates. As a 
result, at independence the most politically divisive issue was the 
difference in accumulated wealth among these regions. Political 
tensions centered around the relatively wealthy region of Buganda, 
which also formed the most cohesive political unit in Uganda, and 
its relationship to the rest of the country. Adding to these tensions 
by the late 1960s, northern military domination had been abruptly 
translated into political domination. Moreover, some political lead- 
ers represented the interests of Protestant church organizations in 
a country that had a Catholic majority and a small but growing 
Islamic minority. Ugandan officials increasingly harassed citizens, 
often for their own economic gain, while imprisonment, torture, 
and violence, although universally deplored as a means of settling 
political disputes, had become commonplace. All of these factors 
contributed to political fragmentation. 

The NRM government promised fundamental change to estab- 
lish peace and democracy, to rebuild the economy, and, above all, 
to end military indiscipline. The new government's political 
manifesto, the Ten-Point Program, written during the guerrilla 
war of the 1980s, traced Uganda's problems to the fact that previ- 
ous political leaders had relied on ethnicity and religion in decision 



147 



Uganda: A Country Study 

making at the expense of development concerns. The Ten-Point 
Program argued that resolving these problems required the crea- 
tion of grass-roots democracy, a politically educated army and police 
force, and greater national economic independence. It also insisted 
that the success of Uganda's new political institutions would de- 
pend on public servants who would forego self-enrichment at the 
nation's expense. Political education would be provided to explain 
the reasons for altering institutions and policies Uganda had used 
since independence. The new institutions and policies that the NRM 
announced it intended to put in their place involved drastic changes 
from the practices of earlier regimes. 

At the time that the NRA seized power, however, its organiza- 
tional life had been brief, its personnel were few, and its political 
base was narrow. It had few resources to achieve its ambitious 
proposals for reform. The NRA had been formed in 1981, but its 
political wing, the NRM, had not been organized as a government 
until 1985. And because the NRA had been confined primarily 
to Buganda and western Uganda when it ousted the northern-based 
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), many Ugandans be- 
lieved it had simply substituted southern political control for north- 
ern domination. Separate civil wars resumed in the north and east 
only a few months later, and many people in those areas remained 
deeply skeptical about NRM promises. 

In addition, as soon as it came to power, the NRM implemented 
the policy of broad-based government that Museveni had adopted 
during the guerrilla war. He appointed leaders of rival political 
parties and armies to high-level military and cabinet offices. These 
new leaders generally did not share the NRM's approach to re- 
forms, however. Furthermore, as a government, the NRM had 
to rely on existing state institutions, particularly government minis- 
tries, local administrative offices, and the court system. Govern- 
ment procedures had enjoined public servants working within these 
institutions from any political activity. Many officials were neither 
sympathetic to the objectives of the NRM nor convinced that po- 
litical education for public servants was a legitimate means to ac- 
complish those goals. As a result, Museveni's government was 
partly led and predominantly staffed by officials who preferred to 
restore the policies pursued by the Ugandan government in the 
1960s. They shared power with a few NRM officials who were com- 
mitted to radical changes. 

Nonetheless, NRM leaders made the most important policy de- 
cisions in the regime's first four years, relying on the wave of popu- 
lar support that accompanied their rise to power and their control 
over the national army. They introduced several new political 



148 



Government and Politics 



bodies, including an inner circle of NRM and NRA officials who 
had risen to leadership positions during the guerrilla war, a hier- 
archy of popular assemblies known as resistance councils (RCs), 
the NRM secretariat, and schools for political education. But the 
NRM had too few trained cadres or detailed plans to implement 
the Ten-Point Program during this period. As Museveni himself 
conceded, the NRM came to power before it was ready to govern. 

For these reasons — lack of a nationwide political base, creation 
of a broad-based government, the absence of sufficient trained 
cadres of its own, and the necessity of relying on existing govern- 
ment ministries — the new government's leaders chose a path of 
compromise, blending ideas they had developed during the guer- 
rilla war with existing government institutions on a pragmatic, 
ad-hoc, day-to-day basis. As a result, during its first four years, 
the government maintained an uneasy and ambiguous reliance on 
both old and new procedures and policies. And it was often difficult 
to determine which official in the government, the NRM, or the 
NRA possessed either formal or actual responsibility for a partic- 
ular policy decision. 

New civil wars and ill-chosen economic policies diverted the 
government's energies from many of its ambitious political and 
economic reforms, but others were begun. In frequent public state- 
ments, Museveni returned to the basic themes of the Ten-Point 
Program, indicating that they had not been abandoned. 

The Ten-Point Program 

The context in which the NRM's political program was written 
helps to explain the importance that Museveni and other govern- 
ment leaders who were involved in the guerrilla struggle attached 
to it. During the interim period after the fall of Amin in April 1979, 
several small political groups maneuvered to shape the rules for 
the national parliamentary elections that were held in December 
1980 (see Uganda after Amin, ch. 1). Only a few months before 
the elections, the decision was made to require candidates to run 
as representatives of parties rather than as individuals. In response, 
Museveni and other progressives formed a new party, the Uganda 
People's Movement (UPM), which chose Museveni as its leader. 
The party nominated candidates in most constituencies, but won 
only one seat. Museveni ran a close third in Mbarara North con- 
stituency. 

Following widespread allegations that Milton Obote's Uganda 
People's Congress (UPC) had manipulated the electoral results to 
deprive the Democratic Party (DP) of victory, Museveni and a few 
followers went underground in Luwero District in February 1981, 



149 



Uganda: A Country Study 

organized the Popular Resistance Army (PRA), and, along with 
other small bands of fighters, started a guerrilla war. A year later, 
the PRA broadened its base by negotiating a merger with Yusuf 
Lule, the first president of Uganda after the fall of Amin, and in- 
corporating the guerrillas Lule had recruited. The new organiza- 
tion was named the NRA; Lule became chair and Museveni became 
deputy chair and army commander. This arrangement enabled 
Museveni to recruit and train Baganda (people of Buganda; sing. , 
Muganda) men and women to fight for the NRA, even though 
he was a Muhima from Mbarara District. When Lule died in 1985, 
Museveni became chair of the NRA. 

Until April 1985, the war was fought exclusively in Buganda, 
primarily in the Luwero Triangle (named for the area included 
within the roads between Kampala, Hoima, and Masindi) to oust 
the UPC government headed by Milton Obote (see The Second 
Obote Regime: 1981-85, ch. 1). The NRA then left Buganda to 
open a second front in the west and occupied the entire region fol- 
lowing the July 1985 coup d'etat in which General Tito Lutwa 
Okello replaced Milton Obote as head of state. Museveni's NRA 
undertook a program of political education following classic guer- 
rilla tactics Museveni had learned fifteen years earlier from the liber- 
ation movement in Mozambique. NRA soldiers were taught the 
reasons for their struggle, to respect the villagers among whom they 
lived, and to pay for food and goods they needed. A political infra- 
structure to support the NRA was organized through secret, 
although democratically elected, RCs in villages in Luwero Dis- 
trict. The Ten-Point Program, written during the guerrilla cam- 
paign, reflects the principles with which the NRA created a 
disciplined army, organized popular support through RCs, and, 
in particular, developed a coherent political and economic ex- 
planation of why the NRA was fighting against the Ugandan 
government. 

The Ten-Point Program argued that postindependence Ugan- 
dan political rulers had greatly exacerbated the problems of eco- 
nomic distortion introduced by British colonial rule. The solution 
to these problems required a new political and economic strategy 
that contained ten points. First, real democracy had to be organized 
at all levels from the village up by elections to " people's commit- 
tees," by elections to parliament, and on the basis of a decent stan- 
dard of living so that ordinary people could resist the blandishments 
of unprincipled politicians. Second, because insecurity in Uganda 
had been largely the result of " state-inspired violence," it could be 
eliminated through local democracy, "a politicized army and police, 
and the absence of corruption at the top." Third, national unity 
could be consolidated by eliminating sectarianism — that is, through 



150 



Government and Politics 



the removal of politics based on religious, linguistic, and ethnic 
factional issues. Fourth, it was possible to stop the interference of 
foreign interests in Uganda's domestic concerns since independence, 
but only if the Ugandan leadership developed independent priori- 
ties based on Ugandan interests. Fifth, the most important pro- 
tection for these interests was to construct an independent, 
integrated, and self-sustaining national economy that would stop 
the leakage of Uganda's wealth abroad. 

Beyond these goals of the new political strategy were practical 
steps for achieving these goals. The sixth of the ten points was that 
basic social services — clean water, health dispensaries, literacy, and 
housing — had to be restored, particularly in the areas ravaged by 
the wars that ended the regimes of Amin and Obote. Seventh, be- 
cause corruption, particularly in the public service, reinforced basic 
economic distortions, the government had to eliminate it in order 
to attack economic distortions effectively. Eighth, the problems of 
victims of past governments should be resolved: land should be 
returned to thousands of people displaced by mistaken develop- 
ment projects and land seizures; the Karamojong (see Ethnic Diver- 
sity and Language, ch. 2) should be settled by providing adequate 
water; and workers and public servants should receive salaries that 
would allow them to meet the cost of living. Ninth, Uganda should 
seek cooperation with other African countries, particularly its neigh- 
bors, in order to create larger markets and a more rational use of 
resources. Nevertheless, Uganda should also defend democratic and 
human rights of African people against dictators who suppressed 
them. Finally, Uganda should maintain a mixed economy — com- 
bining both capitalist and socialist methods — with small businesses 
in the hands of private entrepreneurs, and with import-export licens- 
ing, monetary policy, ownership of heavy industry, and construc- 
tion of schools and hospitals under the control of the state. 

This analysis of Uganda's problems differed substantially from 
the general approach taken by previous Ugandan governments. 
It called for new patterns of organization of Uganda's political econ- 
omy instead of rehabilitation and restoration of political and eco- 
nomic life as it had existed in the 1960s. Whereas politicians and 
civil servants from the former regimes had believed the problem 
was to remove corrupt and ineffectual personnel, the Ten-Point 
Program called for new structures based on popular control and 
political education. It claimed that if ordinary citizens understood 
the basic causes for Uganda's political and economic decay, they 
would support these basic reforms. 

NRM and NRA officials chose to emphasize political education 
through mass meetings during the latter half of 1985, when, for 



151 



Uganda: A Country Study 

the first time, they were in open and unchallenged control of part 
of Uganda. Special district administrators (DAs) were appointed 
as the most authoritative representatives of the NRM in each dis- 
trict (see Local Administration, this ch.). The largest proportion 
of their time was spent traveling to villages to explain why ordi- 
nary people should become directly involved in politics on the basis 
of their own economic problems, rather than through the sectarian 
attachments on which the established political parties were based. 
Discipline of soldiers who violated the rights of citizens was car- 
ried out in front of people in soccer stadiums. A strong change- 
oriented and populist flavor marked this first effort of the NRM 
to introduce the Ten-Point Program. But the situation changed 
significantly when the NRM administration was established in 
Kampala and became responsible for the government. 

Constitutional Development 

Uganda has adopted three constitutions since independence. The 
first was promulgated in 1962 and attempted a quasi-federal ar- 
rangement, granting various degrees of autonomy to different local 
governments established during the protectorate. Of the four king- 
doms it recognized, only Buganda received significant federal 
powers allowing it to raise its own tax revenues, pass laws on speci- 
fied subjects, enjoy entrenched protection for land tenure and its 
local courts, and even control through its local legislature the elec- 
tion of the kingdom's representatives to the national parliament. 
The other three kingdoms — Ankole, Toro, and Bunyoro — and the 
district of Busoga became "federal states" with fewer powers. The 
remaining districts, with the exception of Karamoja, retained suffi- 
cient autonomy to elect their own councils and pass laws on speci- 
fied topics but were otherwise governed directly by the national 
authorities. Because it was the least developed part of the country, 
Karamoja became a "special district" under central government 
control. 

Nonfederal districts were permitted to elect constitutional heads, 
who occupied a position equivalent to that of the kings in Buganda, 
Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole. The central government held no power 
to alter the constitutions or form of government in Buganda or the 
federal states. This complex distribution of powers increased local 
competition among districts and thus strengthened the bases of 
power of local leaders. After four years of independence, a strug- 
gle for power among local leaders seriously weakened the position 
of then Prime Minister Milton Obote (see Independence: The Early 
Years, ch. 1). He responded by suspending the 1962 constitution 
in April 1966. 



152 



Government and Politics 



At the same time and with a show of military force, Obote or- 
dered members of parliament (MPs) to pass the 1 966 constitution 
without debate. Though understood to be merely an interim con- 
stitution, it made sweeping changes that removed all federal pro- 
visions in favor of a centralized government. Buganda, the three 
federal states, and the non-federal districts lost their autonomy; 
Buganda lost its right to elect its MPs indirectly; and the king of 
Buganda (the kabaka) lost his privileged status. At the national level, 
the prime minister became an executive president, in place of the 
preceding ceremonial president. These arrangements strengthened 
Obote 's precarious hold on government while appearing to respect 
the rule of law. Obote became president in place of the king of 
Buganda, who had been elected to the position under the 1962 con- 
stitution. 

A year later, a draft version of the 1967 constitution was in- 
troduced in parliament and debated at length. When it was passed 
three months later, it completed the process of centralization begun 
the previous year. The 1967 constitution confirmed the president's 
position as the chief executive. It also continued to sanction multi- 
party political competition. Each political party had the right to 
nominate a candidate for president from among its candidates for 
parliament. Each parliamentary candidate had to declare which 
candidate for president he or she supported. The elected members 
of parliament then elected the president. The constitution defined 
parliament to include members of the National Assembly and the 
president and made it impossible for MPs to pass a law without 
the concurrence of the president. The president could also dismiss 
the National Assembly and legislate by decree in its absence. The 
1967 constitution also took the fateful step of abolishing the kings, 
the kingdoms, and the constitutional heads of the districts. In the 
case of Buganda, Obote went even further by dividing it into four 
districts, thus removing official recognition of its cultural unity. 
Parliament received the authority to change the form of district 
councils and to allow council members to be appointed rather than 
elected. The 1967 constitution also empowered the government to 
employ preventive detention during states of emergency, or as the 
government deemed necessary. 

The 1967 constitution provided for citizenship on the basis of 
birth in Uganda to a parent (or grandparent) who was a citizen 
or birth outside Uganda to a father who was a citizen. It also 
recognized citizenship acquired prior to this constitution, and it 
gave the right to register for citizenship to women married to 
Ugandan citizens. According to the 1967 constitution, Ugandan 
nationals holding dual citizenship who failed to renounce their other 



153 



Uganda: A Country Study 

citizenship would lose their Ugandan citizenship. The most im- 
portant purpose of these provisions was to deprive Indians whose 
applications for Ugandan citizenship had not been approved by 
1967, and those who had dual citizenship, of any claim to be Ugan- 
dan nationals, and thus it allowed the government to treat them 
as non-nationals. Citizenship was also the basic criterion for the 
right to vote, although a voter also had to be twenty-one and a 
resident in Uganda for six months. 

Upon coming to power in January 1986, the NRM government 
issued a proclamation accepting the authority of the 1967 consti- 
tution but suspending portions that granted executive and legisla- 
tive powers to the president and parliament. Citizenship, most 
fundamental rights, and government procedures continued on the 
basis of the 1967 document. With regard to executive and legisla- 
tive powers, however, the NRM government declared that the Na- 
tional Resistance Council (NRC) "shall have supreme authority 
of the Government," including the power to pass laws and to choose 
the national president. Members of the NRC included the chair, 
representatives of the NRM, and representatives of the NRA. 
However, the 1986 proclamation noted that the NRC would be 
increased "from time to time" by adding members from other "po- 
litical forces" and districts. In addition, the NRC was enjoined 
"to seek the views of the National Resistance Army Council 
(NRAC) "on all matters the National Resistance Council considers 
important." Finally, the proclamation declared the NRM regime 
an "interim government" to "hold office for a period not exceed- 
ing four years." 

For the first time in Uganda's history, the national army acquired 
constitutional standing in the legislative process by virtue of the 
requirement in the 1986 proclamation that the NRC had to con- 
sult the NRAC on any matter the NRC thought important. In 1989 
amendments to the original proclamation expanded this principle 
by declaring that both the NRC and the NRAC "shall participate 
in the discussion, adoption, and promulgation of the Constitution." 
These amendments also gave the NRC and NRAC the power to 
"assemble together and jointly elect or remove the President from 
office," or "approve a declaration of a state of emergency or in- 
surgency. ' ' The effect of the changes in the 1967 constitution created 
by the 1986 proclamation, and reinforced by the 1989 amendments, 
was to give the NRM — although only for a four-year period — a 
monopoly of constitutional authority, even while it brought mem- 
bers of other political forces into the government. 

In October 1989, the NRC extended the interim period for five 
more years until January 1995 in order to allow time to draft, 



154 



Government and Politics 



debate, and adopt a permanent constitution, and to complete the 
political, economic, and rehabilitation programs that had been in- 
terrupted by the civil wars in the north and east. Thus, by the end 
of 1989, the membership of the NRC had been greatly expanded 
beyond the trusted followers of the NRM and NRA. The govern- 
ment retained the authority to legislate its own program over the 
objections of any other political forces and extended that author- 
ity for an additional five years. 

The NRM government had also declared its intention to in- 
troduce a new constitution democratically. In November 1988, the 
NRC passed the Constitutional Commission Act of 1988, which 
established a body to hear public testimony and draft a new con- 
stitution. The government also set guidelines, or minimum require- 
ments, for the commission that included guarantees of fundamental 
individual rights; separation of the three powers of government, 
with checks and balances among them; an independent judiciary; 
a democratic, free, and fair electoral system; and popular account- 
ability. These guidelines conformed to conventional constitutional 
virtues, though the separation of powers and the imposition of 
checks and balances represented a change from the notion of 
parliamentary supremacy in the British Westminster tradition as 
well as in the original NRM proclamation of 1986. 

The guidelines for the constitutional commission did not sug- 
gest the creation of a vanguard organization made up of NRM 
figures who had waged the guerrilla struggle, nor the continua- 
tion of a political role for the army. They were also silent on the 
question of a single or multiparty system. Many Ugandans believed 
the old political parties would be likely to regain power in a multi- 
party system. Consequently, they suspected the NRM would need 
the shelter of a single party, or a ban on all parties, to remain the 
government after elections were held. Furthermore, the guidelines 
did not suggest how members of the constitutional commission 
would eliminate sectarian politics or ensure the achievement of the 
strategy for an independent self-sustaining economy proposed in 
the Ten-Point Program. In May 1989, the newly appointed head 
of the commission announced that it would be two years before 
the draft was ready to be debated by the Constituent Assembly. 
The process of hearing public testimony began a few months later. 

System of Government 

By the end of 1989, Uganda was in the middle of a transition 
period in which the structure of government was being defined. 
President Museveni served as head of state, head of the military, 
and chair of the highest legislative body, the NRC. Below the NRC 



155 



Uganda: A Country Study 

was a hierarchy of district, county, subcounty, parish, and village 
RCs, each with decision-making authority in that area. RC mem- 
bers at each level were elected by RG members at the next lower 
level. Uganda had also developed a complex hierarchy of courts 
under British rule, supplemented by Islamic and customary insti- 
tutions for resolving disputes. 

The Executive 

Under the 1986 proclamation, the president became head of the 
executive branch (head of state) with the power to appoint a cabi- 
net of ministers with NRC approval. He was also empowered, again 
with the approval of the NRC , to appoint a prime minister to con- 
duct the business of government. Provisions of the 1967 constitu- 
tion continuing in force authorized the president to organize the 
ministries of the public service. Ministers took responsibility for 
the implementation of government policy. A permanent secretary 
took responsibility for the organization and operation of each minis- 
try. In addition, the president appointed an inspector general of 
police, an auditor general, and a director of public prosecutions. 
The president, or a person he authorized, made treaties and agree- 
ments between Uganda and other countries and international or- 
ganizations. Among the chapters of the 1967 constitution that were 
suspended was the provision specifying a five-year term for the presi- 
dent, but the 1986 proclamation did not clearly spell out a new 
term. Presumably, the president served until dismissed by the NRC 
(the NRC made this appointment) or until the end of the interim 
period of the NRM government. The power of the NRC, acting 
in concert with the NRAC , to dismiss the president was made ex- 
plicit in the February 1989 amendments to the original procla- 
mation. 

The NRM consistently followed the principle of broad-based 
government from its days of guerrilla warfare through its first four 
years in power. NRM leaders viewed this principle as an NRM 
reform intended to reverse political disorder by inviting opponents 
of the government to share power, instead of following the previ- 
ous practice of monopolizing power in the hands of the victors. 
The NRM's commitment to broad-based government was most 
clearly demonstrated in its first cabinet appointments. By reach- 
ing outside its own ranks for appointments at the highest levels, 
the NRM acknowledged the importance of this principle for na- 
tional reconciliation. Because the leadership of the NRM consisted 
predominantly of new and untested political figures who originated 
primarily from the southern part of the country, these appoint- 
ments reassured many Ugandans that the NRM did not intend 



156 



Government and Politics 



to monopolize high government positions. Dr. Samson Kisekka, 
a senior associate of former President Yusuf Lule who had joined 
the NRM when Museveni and Lule merged their movements, be- 
came prime minister. An older Muganda politician and medical 
doctor, Kisekka held more conservative views than Museveni and 
thus reassured many Baganda that the NRM would not make too 
many radical changes. 

The number of members of the DP in Museveni's first cabinet 
surprised many observers because the DP had participated in the 
Okello government, which the NRA had overthrown. The DP had 
been formed in 1954 and had briefly formed the national govern- 
ment just before independence. The DP had also become the offi- 
cial opposition when the UPC claimed victory following the 1980 
elections, although most observers believed the DP had actually 
won the elections. DP leaders did not serve in government until 
the party president, Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, became minister 
of internal affairs following the July 1985 coup d'etat that removed 
the UPC government. Under the first NRM government, not only 
did Ssemogerere continue at internal affairs, but the significant port- 
folios of finance; agriculture, animal husbandry, and fisheries; com- 
merce; and justice were given to DP politicians as well. The leader 
of the Conservative Party, Joshua Mayanga-Nkangi, who had been 
the last prime minister of Buganda (in 1966) and whose party, 
Kabaka Yekka (KY), stood for the return of the Buganda monar- 
chy, was appointed minister of education. The president took the 
defense portfolio and appointed an NRM official as minister of for- 
eign affairs, but in general NRM leaders were given responsibili- 
ty for less important ministries or became deputy ministers in more 
critical ministries. 

Additional cabinet members were recruited through negotiations 
with other guerrilla groups, after the president stated that he was 
willing to promote peace by merging rivals into his government 
through negotiation, instead of fighting with them. Museveni's first 
cabinet contained several such leaders who had switched sides 
shortly before the NRA took power. Dr. Andrew Kayiira and Dr. 
David Lwanga, leaders of other guerrilla groups who had opposed 
Obote, were appointed to the energy and environmental protec- 
tion ministries, respectively. In July 1986, Moses Ali, leader of 
a faction of the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) made up 
of soldiers originally from Amin's army, became minister of tourism 
and wildlife. Ali had been Amin's minister of finance, so this was 
a significant expansion of the principle of broad-based government. 
By narrowing the government's definition of "political criminals" 
it intended to prosecute, the appointment was a further step toward 
national reconciliation. The principle of broad-based government 



157 



Uganda: A Country Study 

also led Museveni to expand the size of his cabinet. Between 1986 
and 1990, the number of ministers, ministers of state, and deputy 
ministers grew from thirty-three to seventy- two, including three 
deputy prime ministers added to the cabinet in April 1989. By this 
time, a greater proportion of appointments to key ministries came 
from NRM and NRA ranks. 

The commitment to broad-based government in the cabinet had 
two important consequences for policy making. First, bringing op- 
ponents of the NRM into the highest levels of government diluted 
the policy approach provided in the Ten-Point Program. Second, 
introducing different perspectives into the cabinet led to sudden 
and unexpected reversals in policy. The most dramatic example 
of both points was the change in the government's position regard- 
ing the conditions of structural adjustment required by the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) in return for foreign 
loans. At first, Museveni and his advisers who had engaged in the 
guerrilla struggle rejected the IMF as a source of funds because 
they believed it would force Uganda to become more dependent 
on foreign capitalist institutions, while the Ten-Point Program called 
for the creation of an independent economy. Nevertheless, the 
government's first budget in May 1986 resembled orthodox IMF 
strategy, particularly by sharply devaluing the Uganda shilling 
(USh; for value — see Glossary) and restricting spending. In 
response, opponents of structural adjustment were able to persuade 
the cabinet to approve an anti-IMF budget only three months later. 
This version revalued the shilling and greatly expanded spending 
beyond the revenue base. Then in May 1987, the government, faced 
with dizzying inflation, reversed itself again and signed an agree- 
ment with the IMF. Once again the shilling was greatiy devalued, 
and government spending was cut (see Currency and Inflation, 
ch. 3). 

The National Resistance Council 

Since independence Uganda's governments have been ambiva- 
lent about the principle of parliamentary supremacy. Subscribing 
at first to the British model of government, the 1962 constitution 
made the prime minister and the cabinet collectively responsible 
to the parliament. The 1967 constitution provided for a far more 
powerful executive president while continuing to pay lip service 
to the principle of parliamentary supremacy. Following Idi Amin's 
graphic demonstration of the dangers of a chief executive who ig- 
nores the rule of law, the Moshi Declaration, which created the 
Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) government in 1979 
to replace Amin, put supreme power in its parliament. The 1967 



158 




0* 




• it- . 

iiiiimii^m 




Uganda's parliament building was formerly occupied by the National 
Assembly. Since the advent of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
government in January 1986, all legislative powers have been 
vested in the National Resistance Council (NRC). 

Courtesy Nelson Kasfir 



constitution was restored by the UPC when it returned to power 
in December 1980. In its 1986 proclamation, the NRM govern- 
ment once again placed the supreme authority of government in 
the NRC , the parliament it had created during the war. But despite 
its formal importance, the NRC met rarely for the first year of 
NRM rule and played an insignificant role in directing the govern- 
ment. For example, it did not even debate the budget of May 1986 
(although it did debate the August 1986 revision). 

At the time the NRM government seized power, the thirty-eight 
leading cadres in the NRA and the NRM formed the membership 
of the NRC by virtue of service, not elections. For the first year, 
they continued to be the only members of the NRC. Meanwhile, 
applying the principle of broad-based government meant that most 
senior ministers were appointed from outside the ranks of the NRM. 
Governance became particularly awkward for two reasons. First, 
the cabinet, rather than the NRC , was taking most policy initia- 
tives. Second, cabinet members were excluded from the supreme 
authority of government. The situation was rectified by expand- 
ing the NRC in April 1987 to include all ministers and their 



159 



Uganda: A Country Study 

deputies, enlarging the NRC to more than seventy members. Then 
as the ranks of ministerial appointments grew in response to ne- 
gotiations with more opponents of the government, the NRC au- 
tomatically expanded as well. After that, the NRC met more 
frequently but often failed to achieve a quorum because so many 
of its members had official obligations elsewhere. Frustrated by low 
attendance over the following year, Haji Moses Kigongo, vice chair 
of the NRM and chair at most of the NRC meetings, warned in 
May 1988 that he would suspend members who missed three con- 
secutive meetings. The next day only fifteen members showed up, 
and that session, too, was canceled for lack of a quorum. On occa- 
sion the NRC managed to hold meetings with lively debates and 
passed legislation in many areas, but few Ugandans would have 
described it as the nerve center of the government. 

In February 1989, new legislation recognized the appointments 
of the original thirty-eight members of the NRC and provided for 
the enlargement of the NRC through the election and appointment 
of additional members. Each county and each district would elect 
one representative (only women could be candidates for district 
representative). In addition, one or more of the representatives 
would be elected by municipalities, depending upon the size of their 
populations. Provision also was made for five representatives elected 
by a youth organization and three elected by a workers organiza- 
tion. (But the act did not make clear whether the organizations 
whose members would comprise the electorate would be existing 
youth and worker organizations or new ones.) The legislation 
providing for the elections also created thirty new appointed 
representatives to the NRC , twenty appointed by the president and 
ten by the NRAC from the ranks of NRA officers. 

Thus, in response to widespread criticism that the 1967 consti- 
tution had given too much power to the president, the NRM put 
supreme power entirely in the hands of the new parliament but 
limited its membership at first to its own trusted followers. The 
original parliamentary representatives were legitimized by their par- 
ticipation in the guerrilla struggle, not by elections. Though polit- 
ical figures who had not been part of the NRM or NRA during 
the war were later appointed to the NRC and in 1989 elected to 
it, the original NRC members continued to occupy a privileged 
position. They did not have to stand for election to the NRC. In 
addition, their special status was formalized in February 1989 with 
the creation of the National Executive Committee (NEC), a stand- 
ing committee of the NRC, to contain these original members plus 
one elected member from each district and ten members appointed 
by the chair of the NRC from among its members. Because the 



160 



Government and Politics 



purposes of the NEC were to "determine the policies and political 
direction" of the NRM and "monitor and oversee the general per- 
formance of the Government," it acquired both a formal vanguard 
role within the NRC and a powerful position to set the political 
agenda. But in 1990, it remained unclear whether the NEC would 
exercise this power to press for the implementation of the Ten-Point 
Program. 

Local Administration 

In the early protectorate period, the district commissioner (DC), 
the representative of the governor, was the most important govern- 
ment official in each district. Before the kingdoms were abolished 
in 1967, each one had a local government made up of chiefs, who 
reported to the king, and a central government official who was 
an adviser to the king. The 1919 Native Authority Ordinance gave 
the DC responsibility for a hierarchy of appointed chiefs at village, 
parish, subcounty, and county levels. Councils, originally consisting 
of these chiefs, were created during the 1930s at each level. After 
1949 local administration in Uganda was shared by central and 
district government officials. The Local Government Ordinance 
of 1 949 established the district as a local government area and as 
the basis for a separate district administration. During the 1950s, 
elections to district councils were introduced, and the councils were 
given responsibility for district administration. Nevertheless, the 
central government retained the power to control most district coun- 
cil decisions. Chiefs were salaried local government officials but 
responsible to the central government through the DC for the proper 
administration of their areas. 

At independence Uganda consisted of ten districts, four king- 
doms, and one special district (Karamoja). The 1967 constitution 
abolished the kingdoms and made them districts as well. Because 
the kingdom of Buganda was separated into four districts, the coun- 
try was thus divided into eighteen districts. In 1974 President Amin 
further increased the number of districts to thirty-eight and grouped 
them into ten provinces. In 1979 after Amin was overthrown, the 
number of districts was reduced to thirty-three. Moreover, each 
district was named for its capital in an effort to reduce the sig- 
nificance of ethnicity in politics. In February 1989, however, the 
addition of Kalangala (the Sese Islands) brought the number of 
districts back up to thirty-four, and the number of counties increased 
to 150 (see fig. 1 ; fig. 2). There were also sixty-five urban authori- 
ties, including Kampala City Council, fourteen municipalities, 
twenty- seven town councils, and twenty-three town boards. 



161 



Uganda: A Country Study 

The 1962 constitution had required that nine-tenths of district 
council members be directly elected. In keeping with its overall 
emphasis on strengthening central control, the 1967 constitution 
gave the parliament the right to establish district councils and their 
offices, to decide whether some or all of their members would be 
elected or nominated, and to empower a national minister to sus- 
pend a district council or to undertake any of its duties. The 1967 
Local Administrations Act and the 1964 Urban Authorities Act 
created a uniform set of regulations that gave the central gov- 
ernment direct control over local administration in each district. 
District councils were limited to specified areas of responsibility — 
particularly primary education, road construction, land allocation, 
community development, law and order, and local tax collection. 
When district councils were revived in 1981, their members were 
again nominated by the central government. Chiefs and local offi- 
cials continued to be appointed on the basis of the 1967 act until 
1986. 

The NRM government significantly altered local administration 
by introducing elected resistance councils (RCs) in villages, par- 
ishes, subcounties, and districts throughout the nation. The origi- 
nal RCs had been created during the early 1980s to support the 
NRA during its guerrilla war. But after 1986, the introduction of 
these new assemblies sharply curtailed the powers of chiefs and 
provided an indirect channel for popular influence at the district 
level and above. Creation of the RCs was in response to the first 
point of the Ten-Point Program, which insisted on democracy at 
all levels of government. In no other respect during its first four 
years did the NRM government achieve as much progress in im- 
plementing the political program it had adopted before taking 
power. 

By September 1987, the NRC had established both district ad- 
ministrations and a hierarchy of RCs (see fig. 8). All adults auto- 
matically became members of their village resistance council, known 
as an RC-I, and came together to elect a nine-person resistance 
committee, which administered the affairs of the village. An RC 
was given the right to remove any of its elected resistance commit- 
tee officers who broke the law or lost the confidence of two-thirds 
of the council. The nine officials on the resistance committee elected 
by the RC-I joined with all other village resistance committees to 
form the parish resistance council, the RC-II, and elected the nine 
officials who formed the parish resistance committee. The mem- 
bers of this committee assembled with the other parish committee 
members in the subcounty to form the subcounty resistance coun- 
cil (RC-III) and elected the nine officials who formed the subcounty 



162 



Government and Politics 



resistance committee. County resistance councils (RC-IVs) were 
established in the statute but functioned only intermittently as 
governing bodies, principally for election purposes. The district 
resistance council (RC-V) contained two representatives elected 
from each RC-III and one representative for women elected from 
each RC-IV and from each municipal RC. At all RC levels, heads 
of government departments serving that council, including chiefs, 
were made ex officio members of their respective RCs but without 
the right to vote. In 1989 the NRC determined that each RC-III 
would choose one representative for the NRC, and each district 
resistance council (RC-V) would choose a woman as its represen- 
tative on the NRC. Thus, direct RC elections and popular recall 
existed at the village level only. The term of each RC was two years, 
and the RC could be suspended by the minister of local govern- 
ment for disrupting public security, participating in sectarian poli- 
tics, engaging in smuggling, obstructing national plans, or diverting 
commodities to its members' private use. However, the NRC was 
given the power to overrule the minister. 

The NRC also replaced the DC with a new official, the district 
administrator (DA), appointed by the president as the political head 
of the district. In addition to providing political direction to the 
district, the DAs were responsible for overseeing the implementa- 
tion of central government policy, chairing the security and de- 
velopment committees, and organizing RCs. Providing political 
direction included organizing courses in political education for offi- 
cials and ordinary citizens. A second new post, that of district ex- 
ecutive secretary (DES), was filled by former DCs. The DES was 
required to supervise all government departments in the district, 
integrate district and central administration, supervise the im- 
plementation of district resistance council policies, and serve as the 
accounting officer for the district. 

The formal change from the officially neutral DC to the explicitiy 
political DA suggests the importance that the NRM government 
placed on political education in order to gain support for basic po- 
litical and economic reforms. The addition of a new bureaucratic 
level of assistant district administrators, with responsibilities for 
administration at the county and subcounty levels, and reporting 
through the DA to the president, further entrenched the central 
government at the expense of the RCs. The creation of this posi- 
tion further reduced the direct popular control that was contem- 
plated in the Ten-Point Program and that had been enthusiastically 
supported by NRM officials. 

In 1990 the exact duties of the RCs and their relation to the chiefs 
had not been fully determined. The purpose of RCs during the 



163 



Uganda: A Country Study 



NATIONAL EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE (NEC) 



NATIONAL 
RESISTANCE 
COUNCIL (NRC) 



DISTRICT EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE 



DISTRICT 
RESISTANCE 
COUNCIL (RC-V) 



COUNTY EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE 



COUNTY 
RESISTANCE 
COUNCIL (RC-IV) 



NEC-ORIGINAL NRC MEMBERS; ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
EACH DISTRICT, ELECTED BY NRC FROM AMONG DISTRICT 
REPRESENTATIVES TO NRC; TEN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 
FROM NRC. 

NRC-ORIGINAL NRC MEMBERS {CONSTITUTED DURING 
RESISTANCE WAR); ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH 
COUNTY, ELECTED BY SU8COUNTY RESISTANCE COUNCILS; 
TEN ARMY REPRESENTATIVES; ONE WOMAN REPRESENTING 
EACH COUNTY, ELECTED BY DISTRICT RESISTANCE COUNCILS; 
FIVE YOUTH REPRESENTATIVES; THREE WORKERS* 
REPRESENTATIVES; ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH 
DIVISION OF THE CITY OF KAMPALA. ELECTED BY WARD 
COUNCILS IN EACH DIVISION; ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
EACH MUNICIPALITY {TWO FROM J1NJA), ELECTED BY LOCAL 
COUNCILS; TWENTY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES. 



RC-V-TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH SUBCOUNTY AND 
TOWN; ONE WOMAN REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH COUNTY 
AND MUNICIPALITY. 



RC-W--ALL MEMBERS OF SUBCOUNTY EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEES IN COUNTY 



SUBCOUNTY EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE 



SUBCOUNTY 
RESISTANCE 
COUNCIL (RC-III) 



PARISH EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE 



PARISH 
RESISTANCE 
COUNCIL (RC-II) 



ROIII -ALL MEMBERS OF PARISH EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES 
IN SUBCOUNTY. 



ROII-ALL MEMBERS OF VILLAGE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES 



IN PARISH. 













VILLAGE EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE 



VILLAGE 
RESISTANCE 
COUNCIL (RC-I) 



RC-I-ALL VILLAGE RESIDENTS AGE EIGHTEEN AND OVER. 



Electa (rom amortg Its members. 
Constitutes rwxt higher body. 



Figure 8. Structure of Resistance Councils and Executive Committees, 1990 

guerrilla war had been far easier to establish before the NRM took 
power. In addition, continuing civil war and the sheer effort of elect- 
ing RCs in every village, parish, subcounty, and district drew at- 
tention away from the business of the RCs. RCs were new to 
Uganda, and it took people time to understand how to make use 
of them. In 1987 the NRC had given the RCs the power "to identify 



164 



Government and Politics 



local problems and find solutions." During times of shortages of 
basic commodities, such as sugar in June 1986, the RCs were ef- 
fectively used as distribution centers. But because RC officials below 
the district level received no compensation, they were reluctant to 
give too much time to managing local affairs. In addition, the po- 
sition of the chiefs remained ambiguous. Chiefs still reported to 
the Ministry of Local Government. Many chiefs were uncertain 
how much power they had under the new system, or even whom 
to obey when the Ministry of Local Government and the RC dis- 
agreed over the proper course of action a chief should follow. 

Judicial System 

The legal system that existed in 1990 included customary, and 
in some cases Islamic, law in addition to statutory law. Statutory 
law was published in the government Gazette. The constitution 
provided for a High Court with a chief justice and as many other 
judges as parliament decided to create. It empowered the presi- 
dent to appoint High Court judges, although it allowed him to 
choose only the chief justice without following the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC), which was headed by the chief 
justice. The constitution restricted the choice of judges to those al- 
ready presiding over courts of unlimited jurisdiction or to lawyers 
who had practiced for five years before such courts. The High Court 
heard appeals from magistrates' courts located in each district. In 
addition, the High Court acted as the court of first instance in ques- 
tions involving elections to or vacancies in parliament. The 1967 
constitution also declared that decisions of the High Court could 
be appealed to the Court of Appeal for East Africa (CAEA), or 
to a new court of appeal established by parliament. 

With the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977, 
the Ugandan government withdrew from the CAEA and created 
a national Court of Appeal. In 1980 the government made the chief 
justice the head of the High Court only and appointed a separate 
president of the Court of Appeal. These changes led to problems 
in the administration of justice during the next several years. The 
problems stemmed primarily from the anomalous position of a chief 
justice constitutionally restricted to be head of an inferior court. 
To eliminate these problems, the NRM government introduced 
the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 1987, and the Judicature Act 
(Amendment) Bill, 1987, which the NRC passed in August 1987. 
The name of the Court of Appeal was changed to the Supreme 
Court of Uganda. The chief justice became its head and the chief 
administrator of the judiciary. Two new positions were created, 
a deputy chief justice of the Supreme Court and a principal judge, 



165 



Uganda: A Country Study 

who became head of the High Court. Appeals from any decision 
of the High Court were to be referred to the Supreme Court. To 
be appointed judge of the Supreme Court, a person must have quali- 
fied and served as judge of the High Court for at least seven years. 
Power to appoint the justices and chief justice of the Supreme Court 
was placed in the hands of the president. Following the precedent 
of the 1967 constitution, the president had to accept the advice of 
the JSC except in the appointment of the chief justice. The deputy 
chief justice was to be appointed from among the principal judge 
and justices of the Supreme Court. 

In 1988 the NRM government substantially changed grass-roots 
adjudication by giving judicial powers over civil disputes, which 
up until then had been exercised by chiefs, to elected resistance 
committees in each village, parish, and subcounty (see Local Ad- 
ministration, this ch.). In the past, despite their pretense of neu- 
trality, chiefs had often discriminated against opponents of the ruling 
party or military government. The new local court system respond- 
ed to the first point in the Ten-Point Program by placing petty 
and customary conflicts in the hands of democratically chosen offi- 
cials. The new system also received broad popular support, accord- 
ing to a commission of inquiry into local government. 

Each elected resistance committee was empowered to constitute 
itself as a court headed by the chair of the committee. If some of 
the committee members were absent, other members of the re- 
sistance council that had elected the committee could be co-opted. 
Cases involving contracts, debts, or assault and battery could be 
heard only if they involved less than USh5,000, a relatively small 
sum. However, other civil disputes concerning conversion or dam- 
age to property or trespassing, and customary disputes involving 
land held by customary tenure, the marital status of women, the 
paternity of children, customary heirs, impregnation of or elope- 
ment with a female under age eighteen, and customary bail proce- 
dures could be heard regardless of amount. The orders that these 
courts had the power to make ranged from apology and reconcili- 
ation to compensation or attachment and sale. Appeals went to the 
next higher resistance committee and eventually to the High Court. 

One of the most important stated objectives of the NRM govern- 
ment was to restore the rule of law. Toward that end, three com- 
missions were either revived or created. The Commission for Law 
Reform, which had been established in the Ministry of Justice dur- 
ing the Amin government but had been ineffective for lack of finan- 
cial resources and because of instability, was given a fresh start 
with the appointment of Justice Matthew Opu of the High Court 
as commissioner in 1986. The Commission for Law Revision, which 



166 



Government and Politics 



had the task of clearing the laws of statutes that had been repealed 
or had become obsolete and of adding consequential amendments, 
was revived. The Commission of Inquiry into the Violation of 
Human Rights was created in 1986 to establish the human rights 
record from independence up to the take-over by the NRM govern- 
ment. A High Court justice, Arthur Oder, and five other com- 
missioners began public hearings on human rights violations in 
December 1986. 

Elections 

National parliamentary elections have occurred five times but 
only twice since independence. In all five cases, the elections failed 
to give a clear indication of popular feelings, and on two other oc- 
casions scheduled elections did not even occur. During the pro- 
tectorate period, general elections to the Legislative Council were 
held in 1958, 1961, and 1962. The 1958 elections were flawed by 
the refusal of several local governments to agree to any voting at 
all. The DP won the 1961 elections by unexpectedly winning seats 
in Buganda where a few of its followers voted despite a mass boy- 
cott of the polls organized by the kingdom government. The 
Buganda seats enabled the DP to form Uganda's first party govern- 
ment under the British governor, even though only a minority of 
the national electorate had voted for it. Consequently, indepen- 
dence was delayed to permit a second general election. 

In the final negotiations for independence, the Kingdom of 
Buganda acquired the right to elect its national representatives in- 
directly through its local assembly, the Lukiiko. Elections to the 
Lukiiko were held in February 1962. The newly formed Kabaka 
Yekka (KY) party, which reflected intense feelings of cultural unity 
among the predominantly Baganda electorate, won sixty-five of 
sixty-eight seats (see Power Politics in Buganda, ch. 1). The Lukiiko 
then elected KY members to all of the Buganda seats in the Na- 
tional Assembly. The UPC and DP split the seats outside Buganda, 
leaving no party with a clear national mandate. An unlikely coali- 
tion between the mildly progressive UPC and the aggressively 
ethnic-oriented KY formed the first postindependence govern- 
ment under Obote's leadership in October 1962. The coalition un- 
raveled soon after and was dissolved less than two years after in- 
dependence. 

Postindependence elections scheduled for 1967 were "postponed" 
by Obote because of the crisis of 1966 (see Independence: The Early 
Years, ch. 1). Elections organized for 1971 were canceled by Idi 
Amin when he took power through a military coup d'etat. The 



167 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), an interim govern- 
ment formed when the Tanzanian army overthrew Amin's mili- 
tary regime in 1979, organized the first national elections since 
independence. These elections were held in December 1980 under 
conditions that favored the UPC, which was still led by Obote (see 
The Interim Period: 1979-80, ch. 1). Widespread local opinion 
regarded these elections as neither free nor fair, despite acceptance 
of the results by a Commonwealth Observer Group, which moni- 
tored them. The UPC was declared the winner, but most Ugan- 
dans believed it actually lost the elections to the DP and took power 
by altering the results. Thus, before the NRM came to power, only 
one set of national elections had been held since independence, and 
its results had been hotly disputed. 

In February 1989, the NRM government organized local and 
national elections on the basis of the RC structure that it had 
created. The government announced in the middle of January that 
there would be new elections, starting only three weeks later, for 
all resistance committee positions in RCs at every level, includ- 
ing, for the first time, the NRC. At the village, parish, and sub- 
county levels, the elections followed procedures the NRM had 
already introduced to form the RCs out of the combined member- 
ship of the resistance committees elected by the councils at each 
level. The same procedure was followed for the set of successive 
elections in urban areas, except that the RC-IIIs were named 
"wards" rather than subcounties and the RC-IVs "divisions" in- 
stead of counties. However, the RC-IIIs also gathered as an elec- 
toral college representing their counties or urban divisions to elect 
three representatives to the district RC, one of whom had to be 
a woman, as well as one representative to the NRC. Unlike other 
RC elections, nominees for the NRC did not have to win succes- 
sive elections in the lower RCs in order to be candidates. Each dis- 
trict RC also chose one representative to the NRC . Only women 
were permitted to run for this position. 

Many of the original NRC members, who continued in office 
without facing an election in 1989, were appointed to be election 
supervisors. The only restrictions placed on candidates were to re- 
quire them to be residents of their constituencies and to prohibit 
former members of Obote 's or Amin's intelligence agencies from 
becoming candidates. The use of county and district boundaries 
for constituencies removed the possibility of gerrymandering. Nomi- 
nation required completion of two simple forms and the support 
of five qualified electors. Candidates did not have to pay a 
"deposit." There was no registration of voters. No campaigning 
was allowed, and candidates could not publicly identify themselves 



168 



Queuing up to vote in a resistance council election in a village just outside 

Kampala, August 1986 
Courtesy Nelson Kasfir 

with a political party. The rules limited candidates' campaigns to 
a brief introductory speech at the time of the elections. 

The elections had to be held in sequence because the RCs formed 
a pyramid in which the electorate at each higher level (above RC-II) 
was composed of elected officials from the next lower level. Elec- 
tions of resistance committee officials by voters in village and par- 
ish RCs were held only three weeks after President Museveni's 
announcement in most parts of the country. One week later, elec- 
tions were held for subcounty resistance committees. The newly 
elected subcounty committees immediately traveled to their county 
headquarters to choose two representatives to the district RC ; the 
following week they assembled again to elect both the county's 
representative to the NRC and the county's woman representa- 
tive to the district RC. Finally, at the end of February 1989, each 
district RC (except Gulu) elected its woman representative to the 
NRC. 

Election was determined by public queuing behind the preferred 
candidate. Contestants stood facing away from the queues and were 
not permitted to turn around to see who was supporting them. The 
use of public queuing as a voting procedure was sharply criticized 
because it opened the possibility of coercion. The government 



169 



Uganda: A Country Study 

agreed that a secret ballot would have been better, but argued that, 
for the time being, the expense and prospect of misuse of ballot 
boxes made queuing a more desirable method of voting. All elec- 
tions were held during February 1989, except in Gulu District and 
Usuk County, Soroti District, where they were delayed because 
of security problems. The Usuk elections were held the following 
month and the Gulu elections in October 1989. The youth and 
workers elections had not been held by the end of 1990. 

In the February 1989 elections, village turnout was reported to 
be high in most areas other than those where rebels were active. 
Almost all elected resistance committee members, the only voters 
permitted in higher elections, participated in electing NRC mem- 
bers and the upper RCs. Fourteen ministers and deputy ministers 
lost NRC elections. Only two women won elections in contests 
against men. Four important members of Obote's government be- 
tween 1980 and 1985 won seats in county constituencies, and their 
success provided an indication of the absence of government in- 
terference in the voting. Most losers conceded that the elections 
were conducted fairly, although they frequently objected to the rules 
under which they had to compete. The most vociferous criticism 
came from party leaders in the DP and the UPC. As a party, the 
UPC had not been active since the NRM government took office. 
DP politicians, on the other hand, had run in the earlier RC elec- 
tions and had won a large number of them. According to the DP's 
own calculations, in two-thirds of the district RCs its candidates 
had won 84 percent of the seats in elections before February 1989. 
DP leaders felt they had a good chance to win national power 
democratically through the RC system, if the DP were permitted 
to compete as a party. Officials of both parties regarded the elec- 
tion rules as a step by the NRM government to remove them from 
competitive political activity. They insisted that elections without 
participation by competing parties could not be considered 
democratic. The government response was, in a meeting with the 
DP in 1989, to question whether or not political parties were neces- 
sary for democracy. 

Political Dynamics 

When the NRM took power in 1986, it added a new element 
to the unsolved political issues that had bedeviled Uganda since 
independence. It promised new and fundamental changes, but it 
also brought old fears to the surface. If this government demon- 
strated magnanimity toward its opponents and innovative solutions 
to Uganda's political difficulties, it also contributed significantly 
to the country's political tensions. This paradox appeared in one 



170 



Government and Politics 



political issue after another through the first four years of the in- 
terim period. The most serious political question was the deepen- 
ing division between the north and the south, even though these 
units were neither administrative regions nor socially or even geo- 
graphically coherent entities. The relationship of Buganda to the 
rest of Uganda, an issue forcibly kept off the public agenda for 
twenty years, re-emerged in public debate. Tension between the 
NRM and the political parties that had competed for power since 
independence became a new anxiety. In addition, the government's 
resort to political maneuvers and surprise tactics in two of its most 
important initiatives in 1989, national elections and the extension 
of the interim period of government, illustrated the NRM's difficul- 
ties in holding the nation to its political agenda. 

Fears of Regional Domination 

For the first time since the protectorate was founded, the NRA 
victory in 1986 gave a predominantly southern cast to both the new 
political and the new military rulers of Uganda. For reasons of cli- 
mate, population, and colonial economic policy, parts of the south, 
particularly Buganda, had developed economically more rapidly 
than the north (see The Colonial Era, ch. 1). Until the railroad 
was extended from the south, cotton could not become an estab- 
lished cash crop in the north. Instead, early in the colonial period, 
northerners established a pattern of earning a cash income through 
labor on southern farms or through military service. Although there 
had never been a political coalition that consisted exclusively, or 
even predominantly, of southerners or northerners, the head of the 
government had come from the north for all but one of the preceding 
twenty- three years of independence, and each succeeding army's 
officers and recruits were predominantly northerners. Northern- 
ers feared southern economic domination, while southerners chafed 
under what they considered northern political and military con- 
trol. Thus, the military victory of the NRA posed a sobering po- 
litical question to both northerners and southerners: was the 
objective of its guerrilla struggle to end sectarianism, as the Ten- 
Point Program insisted, or to end northern political domination? 

In the first few days following the NRA takeover of Kampala 
in January 1986, there were reports of incidents of mob action 
against individual northerners in the south, but the new govern- 
ment took decisive steps to prevent their repetition. By the end of 
March, NRA troops had taken military control of the north. A 
period of uneasy calm followed, during which northerners consi- 
dered their options. Incidents of looting and rape of northern 
civilians by recently recruited southern NRA soldiers, who had 



171 



Uganda: A Country Study 

replaced better disciplined but battle- weary troops, intensified north- 
erners' belief that southerners would take revenge for earlier atroc- 
ities and that the government would not stop them. In this 
atmosphere, the NRA order in early August 1986 for all soldiers 
in the former army, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), 
to report to local police stations gave rise to panic. These soldiers 
knew that during the Obote and Amin governments such an order 
was likely to have been a prelude to execution. Instead of report- 
ing, many soldiers joined rebel movements, and a new round of 
civil wars began in earnest (see The Rise of the National Resistance 
Army, ch. 5). 

Although the civil wars occurred in parts of the east as well, they 
sharpened the sense of political cleavage between north and south 
and substantiated the perception that the NRM was intent on con- 
solidating southern domination. Rebels killed some local RC offi- 
cials because they were the most vulnerable representatives of the 
NRM government. Because war made northern economic recov- 
ery impossible, new development projects were started only in the 
south. And because cash crop production in the north was also im- 
possible, the income gap between the two areas widened. Most 
government officials sent north were southerners because the NRA 
officer corps and the public service were mostly southern. By 
mid- 1990, the NRA had gained the upper hand in the wars in the 
north, but the political damage had been done. The NRM govern- 
ment had become embroiled in war because it had failed to per- 
suade northerners that it had a political program that would end 
regional domination. And its military success meant that for some 
time to come its response to all political issues would carry that 
extra burden of suspicion. 

Buganda and the Kingship 

At independence the kingship controversy was the most impor- 
tant issue in Ugandan politics. Although there were four kingdoms, 
the real question was how much control over Buganda the central 
government should have. The power of the king as a uniting sym- 
bol for the Baganda became apparent following his deportation by 
the protectorate government in 1953 (see Power Politics in Buganda, 
ch. 1). When negotiations for independence threatened the autono- 
mous status of Buganda, leading notables organized a political party 
to protect the king. The issue was successfully presented as a ques- 
tion of survival of the Baganda as a separate nation because the 
position of the king had been central to Buganda' s precolonial cul- 
ture. On that basis, defense of the kingship attracted overwhelm- 
ing support in local Buganda government elections, which were 



172 



Downtown Kampala 
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer 



173 



Uganda: A Country Study 

held just before independence. To oppose the king in Buganda at 
that time would have meant political suicide. 

After the 1967 constitution abolished all kings, the Ugandan army 
turned the king's palace into their barracks and the Buganda parlia- 
ment building into their headquarters. It was difficult to know how 
many Baganda continued to support the kingship and how intensely 
they felt about it because no one could express support openly. After 
a brief flirtation with restoration, Amin also refused to consider 
it. By the 1980s, more than half of all Baganda had never lived 
under their king. The Conservative Party, a marginal group led 
by the last man to serve as Buganda' s prime minister under a king, 
contested the 1980 elections but received litde support. NRM lead- 
ers could not be sure that the Baganda would accept their govern- 
ment or the Ten-Point Program. The NRA was ambivalent in its 
response to this issue. On the one hand, until its final year, the 
guerrilla struggle to remove Obote had been conducted entirely 
in Buganda, involved a large number of Baganda fighters, and de- 
pended heavily on the revulsion most Baganda felt for Obote and 
the UPC. On the other hand, many Baganda who had joined the 
NRA and received a political education in the Ten-Point Program 
rejected ethnic loyalty as the basis of political organization. 
Nevertheless, though a matter of dispute, many Ugandans reported 
that Museveni promised in public, near the end of the guerrilla 
struggle, to restore the kingship and to permit Ronald Mutebi, the 
heir apparent, to become king. Many other Ugandans opposed the 
restoration just as strongly, primarily for the political advantages 
it would give Buganda. 

Controversy erupted a few months after the NRM takeover, 
when the heads of each of the clans in Buganda organized a public 
campaign for the restoration of the kingship, the return of the 
Buganda parliament building (which the NRA had continued to 
use as the army headquarters), and permission for Mutebi to return 
to Uganda. Over the next month, the government struggled to 
regain the political initiative from the clan heads. First, in July 1986 
the prime minister, Samson Kisekka — a Muganda — told people 
at a public rally in Buganda to stop this "foolish talk." Without 
explanation, the government abruptly ordered the cancellation of 
celebrations to install the heir of another kingdom a week later. 
Nevertheless, the newspapers reported more demands for the return 
of Mutebi by Buganda clan elders. The cabinet then issued a state- 
ment conceding the intensity of public interest but insisting the ques- 
tion of restoring kings was up to the forthcoming Constitutional 
Assembly and not within the powers of the interim government. 
Then, three weeks later, the NRM issued its own carefully worded 



174 



Government and Politics 



statement calling supporters of restoration "disgruntled opportunists 
purporting to be monarchists" and threatening to take action 
against anyone who continued to agitate on this issue. At the same 
time, the president agreed to meet with the clan elders, even though 
that gave a fresh public boost to the controversy. Then, in a sur- 
prise move, the president convinced Mutebi to return home secretly 
in mid- August 1986, presenting the clan elders with a fait accom- 
pli. Ten days later, the government arrested a number of Baganda, 
whom it accused of a plot to overthrow the government and re- 
store the king. But while Museveni managed to take the wind from 
the sails of Buganda nationalism, he was forced to go to inordinate 
lengths to defuse public feeling, and nothing was settled. The king- 
ship issue was likely to re-emerge with equal intensity and unpredic- 
table consequences when the draft for a new constitution was 
presented for public discussion. 

Political Parties 

With the NRM's accession to power, the very existence of the 
old political parties, particularly the DP and the UPC, became an 
issue. The Ten-Point Program blamed much of Uganda's previ- 
ous difficulties on the excessive reliance of the leaders of the old 
parties upon manipulation of ethnic and religious loyalties for their 
own benefit. The alternative, though not spelled out, would be poli- 
tics without parties. Even though the results were rigged, the 1980 
general elections had demonstrated that both the DP and the UPC 
retained a mass following despite their repression by the Amin dic- 
tatorship and that the UPM, the predecessor party of many im- 
portant NRM leaders, did not attract many voters. For its own 
part, the NRM claimed that it was a political movement, not a party; 
but the NRM did not have sufficient political support to liquidate 
the old parties. Instead, in an ambiguous, informal, and often shift- 
ing compromise, it restricted the public activities of the old parties 
but invited several of their political leaders to participate in its cabi- 
net and even to contest RC elections. 

The old parties were permitted to maintain their headquarters 
and to issue statements but could not hold rallies or campaign on 
behalf of candidates for RC elections. This decision stirred fears 
among adherents of the old parties that the NRM intended to con- 
solidate its hold on power and eventually eliminate them. Neverthe- 
less, the NRM's adroit use of another of its principles, broad-based 
government, kept an uneasy peace with the parties, particularly 
the DP, through the appointment of party leaders to important 
government positions. The DP was awarded so many important 
portfolios in the first cabinet in 1986 that it almost seemed to be 



175 



Uganda: A Country Study 

the senior coalition partner. In addition, the NRM turned a blind 
eye toward the successful election of many DP party members in 
RC elections during the first two years of the interim period. Ac- 
cording to the DP's own estimates, it had won 84 percent of the 
seats in RC-Vs, the district resistance councils, in twenty-two of 
the then thirty-three districts, compared with only 7 percent for 
the NRM and 7 percent for the UPC. 

At the DP's insistence, the NRM met sporadically between 1986 
and March 1988 for private discussions over the appropriate party 
system for Uganda. These meetings ended when the NRM unilater- 
ally insisted that party activities must be suspended for an unspeci- 
fied period of time, after which a referendum would be held to 
decide whether the constitution would adopt a system permitting 
multiparty competitive politics. Northerners in the rebel Uganda 
People's Democratic Army (UPDA) expressed similar anxieties. 
In the peace agreement they signed with the NRM in June 1988, 
they insisted on a national referendum on the party system and 
on the form of government to replace interim rule. However, the 
relationship of the referendum to the process of drafting a new con- 
stitution, or even if one would be held, remained unclear at the 
end of 1990. 

When the NRM extended its prohibition on parties to prevent 
them from campaigning and from nominating candidates for new 
members of the NRC in the elections of February 1989, the issue 
became considerably more threatening to the officials of the old 
parties. The UPC promptly responded by denouncing the elections 
as a charade intended to consolidate the NRM's grip on power 
and by insisting that no UPC members would participate. Nonethe- 
less, several prominent UPC politicians did contest NRC seats, 
but without making any public reference to their party identity. 
Even more DP politicians ran for the NRC while also following 
the government rules. After the elections, the DP headquarters is- 
sued a statement deploring the ban on parties and warning the 
NRM not to impose its own choice of government on the people. 
The DP appeared to have lost its pre-eminent position in the lower 
RC elections in 1989, and it did not do particularly well in the 
parliamentary contests either, though its members probably won 
more elections than UPC politicians. However, data to substanti- 
ate this point were not available. Leaders of the NRM defended 
the elections as successful because they were free from overt sec- 
tarian influences. But many observers believed that the NRM's 
chances for continuing in power through elections might depend 
on not having to compete on an equal footing with the other 
parties. If that prediction were widely believed by Ugandans, the 



176 




Clock tower in Mbale 
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer 



Constitutional Assembly, likely to be the next arena to consider 
this issue, could find it difficult to resolve. 

Surprise Political Tactics 

The adroit political maneuvering of the NRM disguised its weak- 
ness in implementing its political agenda. Two of the more im- 
portant political initiatives it took during its first four years were 
the general elections of February 1989 and the extension of interim 
rule the following October. In both cases, the government designed 
the initiatives to protect itself. It kept tight control by surprising 
its opponents and then moving too fast to permit them to take any 
political advantages. Museveni announced the February elections 
only three weeks before they began. The rules ensured that the 
NRM could not lose control over the government, regardless of 
the outcome. Aspiring candidates had to make an immediate choice 
to oppose the electoral system or to participate in it. 

The NRM's October 1989 extension of the interim period until 
1995 broke the most important promise the NRM had made in 
taking power, though the difficulties created by the war and the 
economy had made the four-year deadline impractical. The NRM 
rushed legislation for the five-year extension through the NRG in 
one week, despite demands from some parliamentarians for time 



177 



Uganda: A Country Study 

to consult their constituents. The first person in Uganda ever to 
resign from parliament did so over the government's failure to allow 
public discussion of this issue. The government undoubtedly feared 
that a public campaign against the extension would serve as a vehicle 
for other political issues and so cripple its legitimacy. As in the case 
of outwitting the Baganda clan heads, the government's clever tac- 
tics helped it win the day but only at the expense of attending to 
its own agenda. In addition, NRM leaders were sufficiently flexi- 
ble to bring their opponents into office under the umbrella of broad- 
based government, but that also reduced their political options by 
forcing them to respond to their opponents' interests in maintain- 
ing their own ethnic, religious, and patronage connections. 

At the same time, until 1990 the government did not use sur- 
prise tactics to set up a new constitution. It allowed the commis- 
sion appointed for that purpose to take two years to collect public 
testimony and write a draft. Indeed, completing the constitutional 
process without a rush was an important reason for extending the 
interim period. NRM leaders knew the minefield of Ugandan pol- 
itics. Giving their opponents more time or room for maneuver might 
have mired each initiative or forced the government into using coer- 
cion and losing any chance to build political support. The inter- 
connections of the north-south question, the Buganda question, 
and the party question made the government's tactical strategy all 
the more imperative. The NRM's use of tactics, so reminiscent 
of its surprise attacks during the guerrilla struggle against the Obote 
government, allowed it to retain the political initiative. But it also 
indicated that NRM leaders had discovered how difficult and how 
slow it would be to make any of the fundamental changes they had 
called for in the Ten-Point Program. 

Foreign Relations 

Uganda is landlocked and depends on foreign imports for most 
of its consumer goods and energy requirements. Even before in- 
dependence, maintaining an open trade route to the Indian Ocean 
was the primary foreign policy objective of all governments. For 
this reason, once the railroad from Mombasa to Kampala was com- 
pleted early in the protectorate period, relations with Kenya be- 
came the government's most significant foreign concern. During 
much of the period of British rule, the most worrying foreign issue 
for politically conscious Ugandans was the possibility that Kenyan 
white settlers would gain control over all of East Africa. During 
the 1950s, when African nationalism gained the upper hand in the 
four East African territories, the achievement of closer relations 
among the four also became an important foreign policy objective. 



178 



Government and Politics 



Later, however, economic differences eroded initiatives toward fed- 
eration and eventually led to hostilities between Uganda and Kenya 
in the 1980s that would have been unimaginable two decades earlier. 
After independence, political issues erupting into violence within 
Uganda or its neighbors also caused serious strains in their bilateral 
relations, frequently involving rebels, refugees, and even military 
incursions. Because of its former colonial rule, Britain maintained 
a close and special relationship with Uganda. But over time, this 
role slowly diminished as Uganda cultivated new links with other 
industrialized countries. And, despite its protestations of nonalign- 
ment, Uganda remained far more closely linked, both economi- 
cally and politically, to the capitalist than to the socialist bloc. 

Ugandan foreign policy objectives changed considerably after 
Idi Amin's coup d'etat in 1971 . For the first decade after indepen- 
dence, policymakers had emphasized cooperation with Uganda's 
neighbors and the superpowers, participation in international or- 
ganizations, and nonalignment in order to protect the state's 
sovereignty and support the African bloc as much as possible 
without losing opportunities for expanding trade or gaining as- 
sistance for development. When Amin seized power, he followed 
a far more aggressive, though unpredictable, foreign policy. Uganda 
threatened its neighbors both verbally and militarily. The gratui- 
tous verbal attacks that Amin launched on foreign powers served 
mainly to isolate Uganda. 

The NRM government introduced new radical foreign policy 
objectives when it first came to power and consequendy brought 
new complications into Uganda's foreign relations. At the outset, 
President Museveni enthusiastically supported international and 
especially African cooperation but conditioned it on an ideologi- 
cal evaluation of whether or not other regimes were racist, dicta- 
torial, or corrupt, or violated human rights. On this basis, shortly 
after taking power the government went to great lengths to enter 
trade agreements with other developing countries based on barter 
rather than cash, in order to publicize Uganda's autonomy, even 
though most of its exports continued to consist of coffee purchased 
by the United States or by European states, and most of its im- 
ports came from Europe. In response, Uganda's neighbors were 
suspicious of Museveni's radical pronouncements and felt that he 
was attacking their rule through his denunciations of their human 
rights policies. They also avoided close ties to Uganda because they 
suspected that the NRM government, having come to power 
through a guerrilla struggle, might assist dissidents intending to 
overthrow them. 



179 



Uganda: A Country Study 

During its first four years in power, the NRM government 
moderated its foreign policy stance to one that more closely reflected 
the conventional positions of preceding Ugandan governments than 
the changes proposed in its Ten-Point Program. Uganda main- 
tained friendly relations with Libya, the Soviet Union, the Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), and Cuba, 
although most of its trade and development assistance came from 
the West. In addition, though it consistently maintained its stance 
of geopolitical nonalignment, the fact that the NRM government 
accepted an IMF structural adjustment plan made it more politi- 
cally acceptable to Western leaders. During this period, many Afri- 
can leaders overcame their suspicion of Museveni and the NRM 
and elected him chair of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
in July 1990. 

Postindependence heads of government in Uganda made almost 
all significant foreign policy-making decisions themselves, leaving 
their foreign ministers to carry them out or explain them away. 
In order to shore up their domestic power bases, Obote, Amin, 
and Museveni often introduced new foreign policies that broke 
sharply with existing relations. They also used foreign policy sym- 
bolically to signal the international posture they wished to culti- 
vate. Amin's pronouncements were the most puzzling because they 
frequently incurred enormous costs for Uganda's relations with 
other states. Foreign ministry officials never knew when it was safe 
to ignore his orders or when they had to take them seriously. All 
three presidents often used foreign policy as a public gesture in 
an effort to give the government more autonomy in international 
affairs, improve its public standing with radical states, or satisfy 
vocal militants in the government. In such cases, the government 
usually gave public support to radical states and causes, while con- 
tinuing privately to maintain its more conservative foreign rela- 
tionships. Foreign relations with radical countries, however much 
they irritated United States and British officials, did not play a sig- 
nificant role in shaping Ugandan foreign policy. 

Regional Organizations 

Even before independence, overlapping cultural, linguistic, and 
economic ties, as well as common nationalist sentiments, stim- 
ulated a desire for East African federation among Ugandans, 
Kenyans, and Tanzanians. A declaration of intent, signed in 1963, 
led to the formation of the East African Community (EAC) in 1967. 
In 1977 the EAC was dissolved, the victim of Ugandan and 
Tanzanian fears of Kenyan economic dominance, and, for differ- 
ent reasons, Kenyan and Tanzanian government opposition to 



180 



Government and Politics 



Amin. Despite its brief life, the EAC provided Uganda's deepest 
regional involvement since independence. In the Ten-Point Pro- 
gram, the NRM government bitterly assailed the break-up of the 
EAC , blaming national leaders in all three countries for their short- 
sightedness. Nevertheless, the NRM government chose to partici- 
pate in African organizations that served larger regions, rather than 
to try to resurrect a union limited to the three East African states. 

Given the importance the NRM attached to African coopera- 
tion, it was no surprise that its leaders strongly supported initia- 
tives to build closer economic and developmental relations among 
states in eastern and southern Africa. The Ugandan government 
set great store by its membership in the Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa, which contained sixteen 
member states in Central, Southern, and East Africa from Djibouti 
in the northeast to Zimbabwe in the south. The PTA's main pur- 
pose was to stimulate regional trade by removing tariffs among its 
member states and by arranging for direct payment in their own 
nonconvertible currencies rather than using their reserves of con- 
vertible foreign exchange. In December 1987, the Ugandan govern- 
ment hosted the PTA summit of heads of state in Kampala where 
the decision was taken to eliminate tariffs among members by the 
year 2000. In his address to the United Nations (UN) in October 
1987, Museveni had predicted that the PTA would help to create 
a single market among member states that could sustain industrial 
development (see Regional Cooperation, ch. 3). 

The NRM government joined with five other states — Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia — to form the Inter- 
Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) 
in January 1986. The organization intended to coordinate projects 
involving drought, desertification, and agriculture in the region 
and to interest donors in their implementation. In its first few years, 
it did little to accomplish this goal. But it did serve as an annual 
occasion for the heads of member states to meet and discuss press- 
ing political issues. 

Uganda also joined the Kagera Basin Organization in 1981 . The 
organization, formed by Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi in 1977, 
attempted to promote various development projects in the Kagera 
River Basin but was unable to secure sufficient financing to make 
much progress toward its objectives. 

Kenya and Tanzania 

A general climate of good neighborliness and noninterference 
in each others' affairs marked relations among the three East African 
states during the 1960s. But these ties became strained at the end 



181 



Uganda: A Country Study 

of the decade, as Obote's tentative moves toward more radical 
domestic and foreign policies caused anxiety among the more con- 
servative Kenyan leadership and drew praise from the socialist- 
minded Tanzanians. Amin's coup d'etat in 1971 created a sharp 
break in Uganda's ties to Tanzania and upset relations with Kenya. 
Immediately after the coup, the Kenyan authorities forced Obote 
to leave Nairobi, and Kenya recognized Amin's government. The 
Tanzanians welcomed Obote and continued to consider him the 
Ugandan head of state until shortly before the overthrow of Amin 
in 1979. Kenyan business people took sufficient advantage of short- 
ages in Uganda during the Amin period that Kenya eventually 
replaced Britain as Uganda's main trading partner. However, many 
of Kenya's exports to Uganda were actually goods transshipped 
from Europe and the United States. Kenyan business people were 
frequently paid in Ugandan coffee, which they smuggled across 
the border and sold to the Kenyan government. These ties were 
temporarily disrupted in 1976 when Amin suddenly claimed for 
Uganda all Kenyan territory west of Lake Naivasha on the basis 
of early colonial boundaries. A large number of Ugandan refugees, 
particularly the highly educated, found jobs in Kenya during the 
1970s. 

Meanwhile, the Tanzanian government supported an unsuccess- 
ful invasion of Uganda organized by Obote in 1972 (see Military 
Rule under Amin, ch. 1). In 1978 Amin sent the Ugandan army 
into the Kagera Salient in northwest Tanzania, where it plundered 
the area. The Tanzanian authorities sent their army to oust the 
Ugandans but, after meeting litde resistance, invaded Uganda with 
a small contingent of Ugandan irregulars to overthrow Amin and 
install a Ugandan liberation front as his successor. The Tanzanian 
army remained in Uganda to maintain peace while the Ugandan 
liberation front organized elections to return the country to civilian 
rule. Officially, the Tanzanians were neutral, leaving political de- 
cisions to Ugandan officials. However, in early 1980, the Tanza- 
nian army acquiesced in the removal of the interim president by 
Obote's supporters in the newly formed Ugandan army. After the 
1980 election, President Obote discreetly distanced himself from 
the Tanzanian government and formed amicable relations with 
Kenyan officials and business people. After Obote was overthrown 
in 1985, the short-lived military government maintained friendly 
ties with the Kenyan president, Daniel T. arap Moi. 

The Okello government engaged in a war with the NRM that 
few observers thought it could win. Moi successfully mediated peace 
negotiations between the NRM and the Okello government in 
Nairobi in late 1985. However, the agreement for the two sides 



182 




Ugandan foreign minister Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere meets in New York 
with United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, October 1988. 

Courtesy United Nations (M. Grant) 



to share power was never implemented, as war broke out a month 
later and quickly resulted in the NRM's seizure of Kampala. Presi- 
dent Moi, together with the heads of state from Zaire and Rwanda, 
met with Museveni shortly thereafter in Goma, Zaire, but he re- 
mained irritated over the NRM's 1 'betrayal" of the agreement in 
which he had invested much of his time and prestige. In addition, 
Moi feared that the example of a guerrilla force taking power from 
an established African government might give heart to Kenyan dis- 
sidents and that the NRM government might even assist them. 
He also regarded Museveni's government as left-wing and likely 
to make alliances with radical states, which Kenya shunned. A year 
later, Moi accused the Ugandans of permitting Kenyan dissidents 
to arrange for guerrilla training by Libya. 

In its first year in office, the NRM government attempted to 
reduce the cost of transporting its coffee to the Kenyan port of Mom- 
basa by shifting from private Kenyan trucking companies, thought 
to have connections with Kenyan government figures, to rail deliv- 
ery. It also announced plans to shift some of its other trade from 
Kenyan to Tanzanian routes. The Kenyan government and its press 
reacted strongly by castigating Uganda, disrupting supplies and 
telephone service, and unilaterally closing the border on several 



183 



Uganda: A Country Study 

occasions. In response, in the middle of 1987 Uganda closed down 
its supply of electricity to Kenya and suspended all coffee shipments 
through Kenya. It also accused Kenya of assisting Ugandan dissi- 
dents fighting in eastern and northern Uganda. For three days in 
mid-December 1987, there was firing across the border, and it ap- 
peared that the two countries might go to war. The two high com- 
missioners were harassed and expelled. The two presidents met 
in the border town of Malaba two weeks later. They reopened the 
border, pulled their troops back from it, and agreed to ship coffee 
to Mombasa on Kenya Railways, but similar hostile threats and 
actions occurred intermittendy over the next several years. In March 
1989, the Kenyan government claimed that a sizeable contingent 
of NRA troops had invaded northwest Kenya and that a Ugan- 
dan aircraft had bombed a small town in the same area. Uganda 
denied both allegations, pointing out it had no aircraft capable of 
carrying out such a raid and that the " soldiers" were probably 
cattle rusders who had carried out raids across the border for years. 
For its part, the Ugandan government claimed that the Kenyans 
were continuing secredy to assist rebels infiltrating eastern Uganda, 
and tensions remained high through mid- 1990. Both leaders ex- 
pressed their willingness to improve relations, however, and in mid- 
August 1990, Museveni and Moi met and agreed to cooperate in 
ending their longstanding animosity. 

Relations between the NRM government and Tanzania were 
quieter and more correct, if not especially warm. The two govern- 
ments were suspicious of each other when the NRM took power. 
On the one hand, NRM leaders believed the Tanzanians had sup- 
ported Obote's efforts to gain power during the interim period 
before the 1980 elections and had helped him in his efforts to sup- 
press the NRA during the guerrilla struggle. On the other hand, 
Museveni had admired Tanzania's progressive policies since his 
university days in Dar es Salaam. When the Ugandan government 
had asked a team of British military advisers to leave in Novem- 
ber 1986, it replaced them with Tanzanian army trainers. More- 
over, both governments strongly supported regional cooperation. 
Despite all of Uganda's public statements about developing an 
alternative route for its exports through Tanzania in the late 1980s, 
there was little it could send by that route until Tanzanian roads 
were rebuilt and the port of Dar es Salaam functioned more effec- 
tively. 

Uganda's Other Neighbors- Sudan, Rwanda, and Zaire 

Uganda's relations with its other neighbors were dominated by 
responses to serious domestic political conflicts within Uganda or 



184 



Government and Politics 



a neighboring state that spilled over their common borders. After 
the NRM took power, the threat that it would support like-minded 
radical guerrilla movements near the border in each of Uganda's 
neighbors except Tanzania tinged interstate relations with deep sus- 
picion. 

Relations with Sudan had been primarily concerned with the 
consequences of the Sudanese civil war for the first decade after 
Uganda's independence. The Ugandan government regarded the 
war as pitting Africans against Arabs and thus tended to be sym- 
pathetic to the southern desire for secession. Thousands of southern 
Sudanese refugees fled to Uganda. Following the assumption of 
power by a left-wing Sudanese regime in 1969, Obote tilted his 
loyalties toward the Sudanese government in order to strengthen 
his own radical credentials. After this war was settled in 1972, 
Uganda's relations with Sudan became quieter. Many southern 
Sudanese took advantage of Amin's ethnic ties to southern Sudan 
to join the Ugandan army and take part in its indiscriminate at- 
tacks on Ugandan civilians. When Amin was overthrown, the 
Sudanese soldiers, along with many Ugandan supporters of Amin, 
fled to southern Sudan. There they were joined by 200,000 Ugan- 
dan refugees, mostly from northwest Uganda, during Obote's sec- 
ond presidency, when the new Ugandan army took revenge on 
them. 

In 1983 a new phase began with the second Sudanese civil war, 
which was complicated in 1 986 by an outbreak of fighting in north- 
ern Uganda between remnants of Obote's former Ugandan army 
and the NRA. Each government accused the other of assisting anti- 
government rebels. After 1987 President Museveni became a medi- 
ator in an effort to arrange meetings in Kampala between the leaders 
of the warring Sudanese factions. In support of this policy, the 
NRM government announced that it would not export revolution 
and thus would not help the Sudanese rebels or give them sanctu- 
ary in Uganda. By 1990 the border had become considerably less 
significant in disrupting relations between the two countries be- 
cause Sudanese rebels controlled most of it, because the northern 
Ugandan rebels who had used Sudan as a sanctuary were largely 
defeated, and because most of the Ugandan refugees in Sudan had 
returned home. In early April 1990, Sudanese ruler Lieutenant 
General Umar Hasan Ahmad al Bashir visited Kampala and signed 
a nonaggression pact with Museveni. 

Rwandans had started to migrate from their overpopulated coun- 
try to Uganda in search of jobs early in the colonial period. Four 
years before Uganda became independent, a revolution in Rwanda 
in which Hutu agriculturalists took power from their Tutsi (Watutsi) 



185 



Uganda: A Country Study 

overlords resulted in a mass exodus of Tutsi refugees into Uganda. 
Many remained in camps, hoping eventually to return home, but 
the Rwandan government refused to accept them, claiming the 
country was too overcrowded. During Obote's second presidency 
in the 1980s, the Ugandan government regarded them as supporters 
of the NRM. A crisis erupted in 1982 when local officials in south- 
western Uganda forced 80,000 people of Rwandan descent, includ- 
ing many with Ugandan citizenship, to leave their homes and 
possessions. Refused entry into Rwanda, they were forced to live 
in refugee camps on the Ugandan side of the border, where they 
remained through 1990. Relations with Rwanda were again strained 
in October 1990, when Rwandans in the NR A joined a rebel in- 
vasion of northern Rwanda. President Juvenal Habyarimana ac- 
cused Museveni of supporting the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and 
relations worsened throughout the rest of 1990. 

Uganda's involvement in rebel activity in Zaire almost brought 
down the Obote government in 1966, although the Ruwenzururu 
rebellion on the Ugandan side of the border during the 1960s at- 
tracted little support from Zaire. During the late 1980s, however, 
when a radical Zairian group dedicated to the overthrow of Presi- 
dent Mobutu Sese Seko, the Congolese Liberation Party (Parti de 
Liberation Congolaise — PLC), became active in the same moun- 
tains, Mobutu accused the NRM of supporting it. Remnants of 
the Ruwenzururu movement established a working relationship with 
the PLC in 1987, and the NRM became the enemy of both rebel 
movements. As the PLC increased its attacks in Zaire from its sanc- 
tuary in the Ugandan Ruwenzori Mountains, Mobutu responded 
by helping former UPC politicians with close links to Ruwenzururu 
leaders establish an exile group in Zaire for the purpose of over- 
throwing the NRM government. Meanwhile, farther north there 
were intermittent clashes between Ugandan and Zairian soldiers, 
both as a result of the NRM's campaign to eliminate cross-border 
smuggling and over fishing rights in the lakes along the border. 
Large numbers of Ugandans, who had fled into Zaire as refugees 
during the Amin and second Obote governments, had begun to 
return to Uganda. But in June 1987, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) program assisting them was 
closed. And in a bizarre incident that further soured interstate re- 
lations, Amin attempted to return to northern Uganda through 
Zaire in January 1989 but was recognized and held in the airport 
at Kinshasa. In the absence of an extradition treaty with Uganda, 
Zaire allowed Amin to return to his home in exile in Saudi Arabia, 
despite NRM demands for his return to stand trial. In September 
1990, Museveni and Mobutu agreed to cooperate in resolving 



186 



Government and Politics 



border security problems, but despite this pledge the border area 
remained unsettled for the rest of the year. 

Britain 

By virtue of its former imperial relationship with Uganda, Brit- 
ain had special economic and political links with its former terri- 
tory, although these connections eroded over the quarter century 
of upheaval after Uganda's independence. As British officials strug- 
gled to maintain ties, they chose to support the Amin and second 
Obote regimes long after most Ugandans and most other foreign 
governments had rejected them. Relations with Britain also de- 
pended on the attitude of different Ugandan governments, which 
balanced their need for loans and technical assistance against their 
desire to project an image of a nonaligned foreign policy. At in- 
dependence Britain had been Uganda's chief trading partner and 
the queen its head of state. Irritated by President Obote 's "move 
to the left" in the 1960s and by his vocal criticism of British arms 
sales to South Africa, the British government was delighted when 
Amin overthrew Obote in January 1971 . Britain was the first coun- 
try to recognize the new Ugandan regime and within a few months 
provided Amin with military assistance. However, relations were 
strained to the breaking point in 1972 when, without consultation 
or warning, Amin expelled Uganda's Indian population (about half 
of whom held British passports), forcing Britain to accept a large 
number of refugees despite its own restrictive immigration legisla- 
tion. Britain responded by halting all aid to Uganda and impos- 
ing an economic embargo. In January 1973, Amin recalled his high 
commissioner from London, nationalized British tea estates and 
other firms (but not British banks), and threatened to expel the 
7,000 British residents of Uganda. By March the following year, 
6,000 British citizens had left Uganda, and Britain broke diplomatic 
relations in July 1976 when Amin's soldiers killed a woman hostage 
holding British and Israeli citizenship in revenge for the Israeli res- 
cue of the other hostages captured by the Palestinians and held at 
the airport at Entebbe (see Military Rule under Amin, ch. 1). 
Nevertheless, despite the revelations of atrocities carried out by state 
officials, the British government allowed private firms to supply Amin 
with luxury goods paid for with Ugandan coffee until 1979. 

Immediately after the Amin regime was overthrown, Britain 
recognized the interim government and promised aid and techni- 
cal assistance. Later in the interim period, the British government 
sent a team to train the police, a controversial initiative that it has 
continued ever since. British authorities responded cautiously to 
Obote 's claimed success in the 1980 elections, but once he 



187 



Uganda: A Country Study 

convinced them of his pro-Western economic policies, they sup- 
ported him to the bitter end. Despite Western governments' criti- 
cism of the Obote regime, as the behavior of the army throughout 
the country — particularly in the Luwero Triangle — became known, 
British authorities at first either disputed the allegations or kept 
silent, as they had during the latter years of the Amin regime. Then 
in 1986, despite their former support for Obote, the British im- 
mediately established close relations with the NRM. In Novem- 
ber 1987, Museveni visited London, where he held talks with the 
queen and the prime minister, but at the same time, he continued 
to criticize their government for its failure to impose trade sanc- 
tions on South Africa. 

The United States 

The United States has had no significant geopolitical, business, 
or trading interests in Uganda, although a number of United States 
firms did a profitable business with Uganda, particularly during 
the Amin period. For the most part, the United States government 
has maintained a low profile, avoiding involvement in domestic 
Ugandan political issues, while administering a relatively small eco- 
nomic assistance program and seeking Uganda's support on several 
issues before the UN. For their part, the Ugandan authorities at- 
tempted to adhere to a policy of nonalignment that allowed them 
to criticize such United States policies as its intervention in Vietnam, 
while persuading the United States to expand its development as- 
sistance and to support an increase in Uganda's international coffee 
quota. After Uganda's break with Britain in 1973, the United States 
became Uganda's chief trading partner for a short time, but rela- 
tions were nonetheless becoming strained. The United States 
Embassy was closed in November 1973 (although the Ugandan Em- 
bassy in Washington remained open), while United States firms 
supplied the government with security equipment used by the army 
and the notorious Ugandan intelligence service. In October 1978, 
the United States Congress ended all trade with Uganda. With 
Amin's overthrow in 1979, the United States Embassy reopened 
and provided emergency relief, particularly food, medical supplies, 
and small farm implements. When the second Obote regime indi- 
cated its pro- Western stance in 1980, the United States govern- 
ment responded with additional agricultural assistance. 

The guerrilla struggle soon created new strains between the 
United States and Uganda, however, as the United States Embassy 
forthrightly reported to its Congress the pattern of growing human 
rights violations by government and army officials (see Human 
Rights, ch. 5). This issue came to a head in July 1984, when the 



188 



President Museveni meets with President Ronald Reagan 
at the White House, October 1987. 
Courtesy Office of Presidential Libraries, National Archives 

United States assistant secretary of state for human rights and hu- 
manitarian affairs testified that between 100,000 and 200,000 Ugan- 
dans had been killed in the Luwero Triangle and that Obote's forces 
behaved much like Amin's army. The United States ambassador 
publicly added that under the Obote regime, human rights were 
ignored with greater impunity than under Amin. The Ugandan 
government denied the accusation and withdrew its military officers 
who had been training in the United States. When the NRM came 
to power, friendly relations were quickly restored. The United States 
aid program was reoriented to focus on immediate rehabilitation 
priorities identified by the Ugandan government, particularly the 
war-damaged areas in the Luwero Triangle and in the matter of 
the resettlement of refugees returning from Sudan and Zaire. 
Museveni visited Washington in October 1987 and February 1989 
for consultations with the president and members of Congress. 

Israel 

Uganda had friendly relations with Israel until the late 1960s, 
when Obote strengthened ties with Sudan and tried to prevent the 
Israelis from continuing to use Ugandan territory to supply the 
southern Sudanese liberation movement. However, Amin, then 



189 



Uganda: A Country Study 

head of the army and increasingly at odds with Obote, helped keep 
these supply routes open. Amin, who may have received some help 
from the Israeli military mission in Uganda in his 1971 coup, im- 
mediately restored friendly relations with Israel after he seized 
power. But in March 1972, after peace was restored in Sudan and 
Amin's request for military equipment was rebuffed, he expelled 
resident Israelis from Uganda, broke diplomatic relations, and es- 
tablished ties with Libya and other Arab nations. Israel promptly 
imposed a trade embargo on Uganda, and in July 1976, the Israeli 
government mounted a surprise rescue operation of air passen- 
gers hijacked to the airport at Entebbe by the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Following Amin's overthrow, 
Ugandan governments, including Museveni, continued to support 
the African boycott of Israel. 

The Soviet Union 

As part of its proclaimed policy of nonalignment, Uganda es- 
tablished friendly relations with the Soviet Union in 1965. But with 
the exception of a few years in the mid-1970s when the Soviet Union 
became Amin's main source of military supplies, its involvement 
with Uganda was relatively minor. During the 1960s, its major 
aid project in Uganda was a large textile mill located in the town 
of Lira. The Soviet Union also provided limited military assistance 
to Uganda, and Amin's 1971 coup was immediately denounced 
by Pravda as reactionary. Soon after taking power, Amin expelled 
most of the Soviet military team, and relations between the two 
countries remained correct but mutually suspicious. After 1973 — 
following Amin's break with Israel, the United States, and Britain — 
the Ugandan- Soviet relationship became far more visible. Hundreds 
of Ugandan army and air force recruits went to the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe for training. Soviet fighter aircraft, missiles, 
and armored personnel carriers were delivered to Amin. But the 
Soviet Union refused Amin's request for assistance to meet the Tan- 
zanian invasion of 1979. The NRM government established cor- 
dial relations with Moscow in 1986, and the following year, the 
Soviet Union agreed to rehabilitate the Lira textile mill and do- 
nated US$50,000 worth of medical supplies to Mulago Hospital 
in Kampala. 

Through its first five years in power, the NRM government's 
foreign policy was a blend of nonaligned diplomacy and a prag- 
matic search for economic and military assistance from donors 
across the military spectrum. But domestic problems, more than 
foreign policy concerns, dominated the political agenda. Establish- 
ing democratic structures at the grass-roots level and defining and 



190 



Government and Politics 



implementing RC operations had not yet been accomplished by 
late 1990. Establishing peace nationwide and furthering the eco- 
nomic recovery also promised to challenge the NRM government 
throughout most of the 1990s. 

* * * 

The literature on Uganda, particularly on the past two decades, 
is relatively small but informative. There is no published guide to 
Ugandan political and administrative institutions, perhaps because 
the government has been in a state of flux for many years. However, 
Ugandan government publications are frequendy useful in explain- 
ing both policy and the purposes of public institutions. The most 
useful sources of background material are J. Jorgensen's Uganda: 
A Modern History; G. Ibingira's The Forging of an African Nation; N. 
Kasfir's The Shrinking Political Arena; and M. Mamdani's Imperial- 
ism and Fascism in Uganda. O. Furley's "Britain and Uganda from 
Amin to Museveni" in K. Rupesinghe's Conflict Resolution in Uganda 
is helpful in setting out the changes in Uganda's foreign relations 
with Britain and the United States during the Amin and second 
Obote regimes. M. Mamdani's "Uganda in Transition" provides 
a useful interpretation of politics under the NRM government. Ex- 
cellent sources for contemporary reportage include the newspapers 
The New Vision and Weekly Topic, both published in Kampala; the 
quarterly Country Report: Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit; and Keesing's Record of World Events. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



191 



Chapter 5. National Security 



Traditional shield and spear 



SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1962, Uganda has been plagued 
by recurring cycles of political upheaval, lawlessness, and civil war. 
The armed forces have played a significant role in political and 
social development throughout much of the twentieth century. In 
the years leading up to independence and for several years after 
that, military and civilian leaders competed for control. Civilian 
political institutions were unable to end the regional strife that 
plagued Uganda, and because they were also unable to address 
the basic economic and social needs of their citizens, popular sup- 
port for the idea of military rule increased. 

Under Idi Amin Dada's military regime (1971-79), several 
hundred thousand Ugandans died, many of them as a result of hu- 
man rights violations by security forces. The violence, together with 
the practice of using the military to protect presidential wealth and 
power, destroyed Ugandan society. Amin's aggressive foreign policy 
also heightened tensions with neighboring states, and in 1979, Tan- 
zanian president Julius Nyerere ordered his troops to invade Ugan- 
da. The ensuing conflict led to Amin's downfall. 

Milton Obote's second term as president, from 1980 to 1985, 
followed a period of transition and nationwide elections that renewed 
hopes for democratic rule. Obote nonetheless failed to restore peace 
or stability, and as insurgent groups proliferated, the government 
unleashed another reign of terror against the civilian population. 
After a succession of short-lived regimes, Yoweri Kaguta Museve- 
ni's National Resistance Army (NRA) seized power in 1986 and 
pledged to end the political upheaval. But the military had changed 
from a standing force to a loose coalition of former rebel armies, 
and these groups continued to engage in military and political rival- 
ries. By 1990 it was clear that economic and social reconstruction 
would be slowed by ethnic-based rivalries and rebel opposition well 
into the decade. 

National Security Environment 

Establishing peace and security in Uganda has eluded every 
government since independence, as each one struggled to create 
a unified state out of a collection of ethnic groups (see Internal Secu- 
rity Services, this ch.). In 1990 insurgents remained active in north- 
ern, eastern, and western Uganda. The government's dual policy 
of military pacification and offers of unconditional amnesty to recal- 
citrant rebels failed to end the fighting. Most of the south achieved 



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Uganda: A Country Study 



peace during Museveni's first three years in power, but the govern- 
ment still had to divert scarce national resources to end regional 
conflicts that kept Uganda weak and divided. 

Except for its ties to Tanzania, Uganda's relations with other East 
African states have deteriorated since Museveni came to power (see 
External Security Concerns, this ch.). Ugandan and Zairian troops 
clashed on their common border several times during the 1980s. 
Relations between the NRA and Sudan, which was experiencing 
its own civil war, also have been strained, primarily because of 
Sudanese accusations that Museveni allowed weapons to transit 
Uganda en route to Sudanese rebels and because each country har- 
bored the other's insurgents and refugees. The Rwandan govern- 
ment has claimed that Uganda allowed Rwandan refugees living 
in Uganda to form an insurgent group and, with Kampala's help, 
to launch military operations in Rwanda to overthrow the govern- 
ment of Juvenal Habyarimana. Kenya's President Daniel T. arap 
Moi protested several times that Uganda was sabotaging the rela- 
tionship between the two countries by launching attacks on border 
villages and providing assistance to Kenyan dissidents. These regional 
strains contributed to instability and drained the nation's resources 
and energy, but they were overshadowed by the domestic turbu- 
lence that plagued Uganda in the post-Amin years. 

Military History 
Early Development 

Uganda has a rich and varied military history. Many of the coun- 
try's precolonial societies possessed complex military organizations. 
One of the most powerful traditional leaders, Kabarega, king 
(pmukamd) of Bunyoro from 1870 to 1899, transformed his personal 
guard into a standing army (see Early Political Systems, ch. 1). 
This force used a variety of modern weapons, including Reming- 
ton rifles, percussion muskets, and breech and muzzle loaders. 
Mutesa I, king (kabakd) of Buganda from 1852 to 1884, also raised 
a standing army, led by a general and several captains. At the height 
of its power, Mutesa' s army of several thousand warriors had more 
than 1,500 rifles. 

After Britain became interested in Uganda's economic poten- 
tial in the nineteenth century, a group of British merchants creat- 
ed a small military force to protect their interests. In 1890 the 
Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA), which administered 
the territory that would become Uganda, established an army to 
defend British investments there. This force of 300 included 
Sudanese soldiers (most of whom were recruited in Egypt) who were 



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organized into a Zanzibar Levy. The following year, Selim Bey, 
who commanded a military unit for the German explorer Emin 
Pasha, agreed to allow about 100 of his Sudanese troops to join 
the British force in East Africa. 

After Britain declared a provisional protectorate over Uganda 
in 1894, the colonial authorities formed a military unit of 600 regu- 
lars and 300 reservists, most of whom were Sudanese. Four Arabic- 
speaking British officers assumed responsibility for their training. 
In December 1893, Colonel Henry Colvile led a force of several 
thousand Baganda (people of Buganda; sing., Muganda) fighters 
and 420 Sudanese in a campaign against Bunyoro, Buganda' s arch- 
rival. This "pacification" succeeded in subduing Bunyoro and se- 
cured for Buganda a politically dominant role in the protectorate. 

Sudanese soldiers provided the mainstay of the Ugandan army, 
whose task was to preserve British interests and to launch punitive 
expeditions against those who rebelled against the crown. In 1895 
the colonial authorities organized these soldiers into rifle compa-° 
nies, which became known as the Uganda Rifles. Despite the good 
reputation they achieved at riflery, many Sudanese became dis- 
illusioned with the rigors of military service in a foreign country 
under British command. Their grievances included loneliness, low 
pay, poor food, bad officers, and frequent reassignments, often to 
remote areas. 

When the colonial government failed to resolve these problems, 
the Uganda Rifles mutinied in 1897, killing the commander of the 
force and five other European officers. Discontent spread rapidly 
through Uganda's Muslim community, which was sympathetic to 
the Sudanese soldiers, and violence erupted in several regions. Fi- 
nally, Britain dispatched troops from India to suppress the mutiny. 

To prevent another revolt, the colonial government diversified 
the composition of the military. It reduced the number of Sudanese 
recruits, increased recruiting among the Indians and Ugandan Afri- 
cans, and increased the overall ratio of European officers to sol- 
diers. The government also granted a 400 percent military pay raise. 
But by December 1900, military expenses were eroding the profita- 
bility of the colonial enterprise, so Special Commissioner Sir Har- 
ry H. Johnston organized a lower-paid constabulary of 1,450 armed 
Ugandans. The following year, to further reduce costs, British offi- 
cials consolidated all military forces in East Africa and British 
Somaliland into the King's African Rifles (KAR). In 1903 the 
Uganda Armed Constabulary Ordinance and the Uganda Prisons 
Ordinance separated the police and prisons from the KAR. 

The colonial authorities maintained racial separation in the mili- 
tary by assigning Africans to the Fourth Battalion and Indians to 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

the Fifth Battalion. In 1913 the authorities disbanded the Fifth Bat- 
talion and supplemented the Ugandan unit with the Uganda Volun- 
teer Reserve and Uganda Rifles Corps, both auxiliary forces that 
could be used to quell domestic disturbances. 

The Fourth Battalion took part in several punitive expeditions 
and armed patrols in Uganda and neighboring territory. The best 
documented among these were against the Lumbwa and other peo- 
ples of western Kenya between 1902 and 1906; a mission to Lac 
Kivu, southwest of Uganda, in 1909; the campaign against Shaykh 
Muhammad Abdullah Hassan (dubbed the "Mad Mullah" by 
foreigners) in British Somaliland in 1909 and 1910; and patrols 
against catde raiders in northeastern Uganda and northwestern 
Kenya each year from 1910 to 1915. 

World War I 

World War I transformed Uganda's military establishment. 
Its personnel grew from 1,058 to 8,190. Emergency legislation 
upgraded the Fourth Battalion to a regiment. Former Fourth Bat- 
talion personnel became part of the new Uganda Regiment, which 
eventually comprised six battalions. By the end of World War I, 
16,000 Africans had served in the KAR and 178,000 had worked 
as laborers in the carrier corps, primarily in East Africa. The British 
government awarded decorations to 155 soldiers and mentioned 
the valor of many others in dispatches to the crown. Casualties in 
the Uganda Regiment included 225 deaths in battle or as the result 
of injuries; in addition, 1,164 died from disease and at least 760 
were wounded. 

Ugandan soldiers saw little action during the interwar years but 
provided garrison duty on Uganda's northern frontier and at Meru 
and Lokitaung (both in Kenya). The colonial authorities reor- 
ganized the Uganda Regiment several times, however, and reduced 
its size to about 400. It included two rifle companies, a machine- 
gun platoon, a marching band, and a battalion headquarters staff 
at Bombo. In addition, 169 soldiers made up a reserve force. 

In 1930 British officials on the Committee of Imperial Defence 
combined the remnants of the Uganda Regiment with the Third 
Battalion in Kenya to form the Northern Brigade, headquartered 
in Nairobi. In the late 1930s, as World War II approached, Ugan- 
da's governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, established the Seventh Ter- 
ritorial Battalion to bolster security in Uganda while other troops 
conducted operations in Kenya. Northern Ugandans dominated 
the army, although all major ethnic groups were eventually rep- 
resented in the fighting forces. 



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National Security 



World War II 

World War II again revolutionized the military. The colonial 
administration recruited 77,131 Ugandans to serve in nine infan- 
try units, two field artillery batteries, and several auxiliary battal- 
ions. Ugandans served outside Africa for the first time, seeing action 
in the occupation of Madagascar in opposition to the Vichy govern- 
ment in France and the reconquest of Burma from the Japanese. 
In addition, Ugandans helped defeat the Italians in Ethiopia (then 
part of Italian East Africa) and worked as part of a military labor 
force in Egypt and the Middle East. They also garrisoned on 
Mauritius and at Diego-Suarez on Madagascar and helped build 
defenses in Mombasa, Kenya. As in World War I, Ugandan sol- 
diers made important contributions to the war effort and received 
many awards, including the Distinguished Conduct Medal, the 
Military Medal, and the Member of the British Empire Medal. 

Following the allied victory in 1945, protectorate officials again 
reduced the army's size, demobilizing 55,595 of the Ugandan troops 
by March 1948. The remainder belonged to the Fourth Battalion. 
During the late 1940s, Ugandan troops deployed to British Soma- 
liland and Kenya to contain local uprisings. In the 1950s Mau Mau 
rebellion in Kenya, Ugandans served in the Kenyan towns of 
Nakuru, Kinangop, Fort Hall, and Nyeri. As independence ap- 
proached in both nations in the 1960s, Ugandans participated in 
joint police- army sweeps against catde rustlers in northwest Kenya. 

In 1948 Britain established the East Africa High Commission 
to administer its possessions there — Uganda, Kenya, and Tangan- 
yika (which merged with Zanzibar to form Tanzania in 1964) — as 
one territory. The military arm of the High Commission, the East 
African Defence Committee, coordinated military policies, but the 
War Office in London retained ultimate responsibility for military 
affairs. In 1957 the High Commission assumed all responsibility 
for administering East Africa's military organizations and changed 
the name of the King's African Rifles to the East African Land 
Forces. This unification scheme was shortlived, however, and in 
1958 Uganda's Legislative Council created the Military Council 
to help Uganda's governor administer the army's finances and 
returned responsibility for the military to London. 

As Uganda moved toward independence, the army stepped up 
recruitment, and the government increased the use of the army 
to quell domestic unrest. The army was becoming more closely 
involved in politics, setting a pattern that continued after indepen- 
dence. In January 1960, for example, army troops deployed to 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

Bugisu and Bukedi districts in the east to quell political violence. 
In the process, the soldiers killed twelve people, injured several 
hundred, and arrested more than 1,000. A series of similar clash- 
es occurred between troops and demonstrators, and in March 1962 
the government recognized the army's growing domestic impor- 
tance by transferring control of the military to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. 

After Uganda achieved independence in October 1962, British 
officers retained most high-level military commands. Ugandans in 
the rank and file claimed this policy blocked promotions and kept 
their salaries disproportionately low. These complaints eventually 
destabilized the armed forces, already weakened by ethnic divi- 
sions. Each postindependence regime expanded the size of the army, 
usually by recruiting from among people of one region or ethnic 
group, and each government employed military force to subdue 
political unrest. These trends often alienated local populations where 
nationalist sentiment was already low. 

National Security since Independence 

Despite a relatively peaceful transition to independence in 1962, 
Uganda became one of the least stable countries in Africa. Inter- 
nal dissent overshadowed external threats, as seven governments 
were empowered in just over two decades of independent rule 
and opposition organized against each regime. The government 
response to its critics and opponents was often repressive: uncounted 
instances of officially sanctioned torture, imprisonment, and execu- 
tion detracted from governmental legitimacy. The violence per- 
sisted, and abuses continued to occur in 1990. 

The First Obote Regime: The Growth of the Military 

In the first year of independence, the KAR was again known 
as the Uganda Rifles. The armed forces more than doubled, from 
700 to 1,500, and the government created a second battalion, sta- 
tioned at the northeastern town of Moroto. The traditional leader 
of the Baganda, Edward Mutesa, became president of Uganda and 
commander in chief of the army. Milton Obote, a northerner and 
longtime opponent of autonomy for the southern kingdoms includ- 
ing Buganda, was prime minister. Mutesa recognized the serious- 
ness of the rank-and-file demands for Africanizing the officer corps, 
but he was more concerned about potential northern domination 
of the military, a concern that reflected the power struggle between 
Mutesa and Obote. Mutesa used his political power to protect the 
interests of his Baganda constituency, and he refused to support 
demands for Africanization of the officer ranks. 



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National Security 



In January 1964, following a mutiny by Tanzanian (then Tan- 
ganyikan) soldiers in protest over their own Africanization crisis, 
unrest spread throughout the Ugandan armed forces. On Janu- 
ary 22, 1964, soldiers in Jinja mutinied to press their demands for 
a pay raise and a Ugandan officer corps. They also detained their 
British officers, several noncommissioned officers, and the minister 
of interior, Felix Onama, who had arrived in Jinja to represent 
government views to the rank and file. 

Obote appealed for British military support, hoping to prevent 
the mutiny from spreading to other parts of the country. About 
450 British soldiers from the Scots Guards and Staffordshire Regi- 
ment responded, surrounded the military barracks at Jinja, seized 
the armory, and quelled the mutiny. The government responded 
two days later by dismissing several hundred soldiers from the army, 
several of whom were subsequently detained. 

Although the authorities later released many of the detained sol- 
diers and reinstated some in the army, the mutiny marked a turn- 
ing point in civil-military relations. The mutiny reinforced the army's 
political strength. Within weeks of the mutiny, the president's 
cabinet also approved a military pay raise retroactive to January 
1, 1964, more than doubling the salaries of those in private to staff- 
sergeant ranks. Additionally, the government raised defense allo- 
cations by 400 percent. The number of Ugandan officers increased 
from eighteen to fifty-five. Two northerners, Shaban Opolot and 
Idi Amin Dada, assumed command positions in the Uganda Ri- 
fles and later received promotions to commander in chief and army 
chief of staff, respectively. 

Following the 1964 mutiny, the government remained fearful 
of internal opposition. Obote moved the army headquarters from 
Jinja to Kampala and created a secret police force, the General 
Service Unit (GSU), to bolster security. Most GSU employees 
guarded government offices in and around Kampala, but some also 
served in overseas embassies and other locations throughout Ugan- 
da. When British training programs ended, Israel started training 
Uganda's army, air force, and GSU personnel. Several other coun- 
tries also provided military assistance to Uganda (see Foreign Mili- 
tary Assistance, this ch.). 

When Zairian (then Congolese) aircraft bombed the West Nile 
villages of Paidha and Goli on February 13, 1965, President Obote 
again increased military recruitment and doubled the army's size 
to more than 4,500. Further reorganizations included the creation 
of a third battalion at Mubende, a signals squadron at Jinja, brigade 
reconnaissance units, an antiaircraft detachment, an army ordnance 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

depot, a brigade signals squadron training wing, a records office, 
a pay and pensions office, and a Uganda army workshop. 

Tensions rose in the power struggle over control of the govern- 
ment and the army and over the relationship between the army 
and the Baganda people. On May 24, 1966, Obote ousted Mute- 
sa, assumed his offices of president and commander in chief, sus- 
pended the 1962 constitution, and consolidated his control over 
the military by eliminating several rivals. After Mutesa fled to Brit- 
ain, Obote dismissed twenty-five Baganda officers for disloyalty 
and again increased recruiting in the north. In July 1967, to fur- 
ther consolidate support within the army, Obote created the Mili- 
tary Police Force under Major General Idi Amin Dada's command. 
Amin, in turn, recruited forces from his home region of West Nile 
among Lugbara, Madi, Kakwa, and people of Sudanese descent, 
who were known by the ethnic label "Nubian." Obote 's rivalry 
with Amin toward the end of the 1960s replaced his earlier power 
struggle with Mutesa. These tensions helped polarize the rank and 
file in the military. 

Throughout most of the 1960s, military expeditions often con- 
tributed to regional antipathy toward centralized control. Army 
patrols in northeastern Uganda often responded to accusations of 
cattle rustling and other problems, which, in earlier decades, would 
have been dealt with locally. Then when the government allowed 
Sudanese rebels of the Anya Nya movement to operate from bases 
in the northwest, army detachments deployed to that region to pre- 
vent an incursion by Sudanese government troops. Many Ugan- 
dans in the area who were of Sudanese descent remained skeptical 
about Ugandan nationhood and viewed the army presence as a 
military occupation rather than a security measure. 

Idi Amin and Military Rule 

On January 25, 1971, Idi Amin Dada took advantage of the 
turmoil in the military, the weakened popular support for the 
government, and Obote' s absence while attending the Common- 
wealth Conference of Heads of Government at Singapore to seize 
control of the government. Claiming to be a professional soldier, 
not a politician, Amin promoted many of his staunchest support- 
ers, both enlisted personnel and officers, to command positions. 
His favoritism received widespread publicity, as a number of 
laborers, drivers, and bodyguards became high-ranking officers, 
although they had little or no military training. Army recruiters 
suspended educational requirements for military service, sometimes 
forcing groups of urban unemployed to volunteer. After the army 
had established control over the civilian population, Amin unleashed 



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National Security 



a reign of terror against Ugandans that lasted almost until the end 
of the decade. 

The army changed composition under Amin's rule. By 1977 it 
had grown to 21,000 personnel, almost twice the 1971 level. Amin 
killed many of its more experienced officers and imprisoned others 
for plotting to weaken or overthrow his regime. A few fled the coun- 
try rather than face the mounting danger. Amin also increased the 
number of military recruits from other countries, especially Sudan, 
Zaire, and Rwanda. By 1979 foreigners accounted for nearly 75 
percent of the army, exacerbating problems of communication, 
training, and discipline. The government barely controlled some 
army units. A few became quasi-independent occupation garrisons, 
headed by violence-prone warlords who lived off the land by 
brutalizing the local population. 

Amin established several powerful internal security forces, in- 
cluding the State Research Bureau (SRB) and Public Safety Unit 
(PSU). Both terrorized local populations. By 1979 they had ex- 
panded to include about 15,000 people, many of whom acted as 
informers on fellow citizens. The SRB and PSU were responsible 
for as many as 250,000 deaths. Their victims included people from 
all segments of society and were accused of speaking or acting 
against the regime. One official observer estimated that two-thirds 
of Uganda's technocrats died or fled into exile during the 1970s. 
Amin also ordered the expulsion of the country's Asian communi- 
ty, which numbered approximately 70,000. These and other ex- 
cesses drained the nation's human and financial resources; cash 
crop cultivation dwindled, most manufacturing ceased, and the 
economy collapsed. Social services, local government, and public 
works activities were almost non-existent. 

By late 1978, Amin had laid the groundwork for his downfall 
by eliminating many moderate political and military leaders. His 
actions intensified rivalries within the army, which destroyed the 
alliance among factions from the northwest who had remained loyal 
to Amin. Sudanese and Kakwa soldiers then sought to weaken each 
other's influence, leading to violent disputes and mutinies within 
commands. To defuse these tensions, Amin deployed the rebel- 
lious Suicide Battalion from Masaka and the Simba Battalion from 
Mbarara to annex an 1 ,800-square-kilometer strip of Tanzanian 
territory north of the Kagera River, known as the Kagera Salient. 
Tanzania's president, Julius Nyerere, responded with force, and 
within two months the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) 
had expelled the Ugandans from the salient. 

On November 14, 1978, Nyerere ordered the TPDF to invade 
Uganda and oust Amin. About 1,000 Ugandans who had been in 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

exile in Tanzania and had organized themselves into the Uganda 
National Liberation Army (UNLA) accompanied the TPDF in- 
vasion force. The TPDF-UNLA force numbered about 45,000. 
They launched a two-pronged attack supported by long-range ar- 
tillery. One group captured the southern town of Masaka near Lake 
Victoria; the other advanced to the west of Masaka, moving north- 
ward through Mbarara and then east to Kampala. 

By mid-March 1979, about 2,000 Libyan troops and several 
hundred Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters had 
joined in the fight to save Amin's regime; however, this interven- 
tion failed to stop the TPDF-UNLA force. Entire garrisons of 
government troops mutinied or deserted when they realized that 
Amin would lose his hold on the government. Finally, on April 
10, 1979, Kampala fell. Amin went into exile in Tripoli, Libya, 
and approximately 8,000 of his soldiers retreated into Sudan and 
Zaire. The TPDF eventually withdrew from Uganda, and the vic- 
torious UNLA established an unstable government to restore peace 
and stability. 

The Second Obote Regime: Repression Continues 

Yusuf Lule, chair of the UNLA's political arm, formed the new 
government. He called for law and order and outlined a strategy 
to rehabilitate Uganda. To improve the military's reputation, he 
set new standards of literacy and political education for army and 
police recruits. To reduce the army's political role and build a truly 
national force, he proclaimed his intention to draw military recruits 
from all ethnic groups in proportion to their population. In achiev- 
ing this goal, Lule hoped to authorize increased military recruit- 
ment among the Baganda, Uganda's largest ethnic group. 
Non-Baganda government officials opposed this policy. The Na- 
tional Consultative Council (NCC), which became the new legis- 
lature, and the Military Commission, which oversaw the army's 
operation, refused to support Lule's policies, and they voted him 
out of office after only sixty-eight days as president. 

In late 1979, the NCC elected Godfrey Binaisa, who had served 
as attorney general under Obote and Amin, to form a new govern- 
ment. Binaisa, an ineffective president, failed to consolidate sup- 
port within the military. His failure to do so allowed senior army 
officers to operate almost independently of the government. Rather 
than authorizing military recruiting among all ethnic groups, Binaisa 
allowed then Minister of Defence Yoweri Kaguta Museveni to enlist 
a disproportionate number of volunteers from his home region in 
the southwest. The use of regional and ethnic affiliation as a polit- 
ical lever prompted a power struggle with Chief of Staff David Oyite 



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National Security 



Ojok, a northerner. Binaisa tried to resolve this dispute by dis- 
missing Ojok. The Military Commission rejected this action, ousted 
Binaisa and the NCC, assumed control of the government, and 
called for national elections in December 1980. Milton Obote, who 
had been ousted by Amin's 1971 military coup, returned to the 
presidency. Obote called on the army to restore peace, but instead 
several ethnic-based military forces emerged to challenge his 
authority. 

Among the groups opposing Obote were Museveni's National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) and its military wing, the National 
Resistance Army (NRA), both of which attracted members from 
western Uganda. Also working to oust Obote were the Former 
Uganda National Army (FUNA), most of whose members had 
served in the army under Amin, and the Uganda National Res- 
cue Front (UNRF), which drew members from Amin's home 
territory in the northwest. In addition, the Uganda Freedom 
Movement (UFM) and the Federal Democratic Movement of 
Uganda (FEDEMU), both based primarily in Buganda, opposed 
Obote. To suppress these groups, the Ministry of Defence spent 
one-fourth of the government's recurrent expenditures in 1983 and 
1984; nevertheless, these groups remained active against the 
government. 

The UNLA mounted counterinsurgency operations in numer- 
ous areas, including Arua and Moyo in the northwest, Karamoja 
in the northeast, and Luwero north of Kampala. The army, whose 
ranks were filled with poorly trained, poorly clothed, poorly fed, 
and irregularly paid foot soldiers, had almost no ability to sustain 
counterinsurgency operations. The government's inability to main- 
tain discipline over the armed forces allowed many units to degener- 
ate into unruly gangs. The military perpetrated numerous human 
rights violations and engaged in several illegal activities, includ- 
ing theft, looting, assault, and holding civilians for ransom. 

In pursuit of remnants of Amin's army in the northwest, UNLA 
troops entered the area and killed thousands of civilians, many of 
whom were women, children, and old people. According to a 1983 
United Nations (UN) report, this reign of terror forced an esti- 
mated 260,000 refugees to flee to Sudan and Zaire. In the north- 
east, cattle rustlers acquired an army arsenal of automatic weapons 
and ammunition, which they used on raids in neighboring districts 
as well as southern Sudan and Kenya. In response to these raids, 
the UNLA and Kenyan authorities mounted a pacification cam- 
paign, which resulted in the eradication or displacement of most 
of southern Karamoja's population by mid- 1984. 



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Uganda: A Country Study 



Despite its many illegal activities, the UNLA's atrocities in the 
Luwero Triangle attracted the most international attention. In 1980 
the inhabitants of this region had rejected Obote's rule and wel- 
comed opposition guerrillas, including Museveni's NRA. Until the 
end of the Obote regime in 1985, the UNLA waged war against 
rebels and civilians in the area, and the Luwero Triangle became 
known for its devastation. Several local officials estimated that the 
UNLA killed between 100,000 and 200,000 civilians and that it 
detained, tortured, and assaulted several thousand others. The In- 
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that 
150,000 people displaced from Luwero had taken refuge in its 
camps. 

By mid- 1985 the demoralized UNLA began to disintegrate. 
Obote's promotion of Opon Acak, a junior officer from Obote's 
home region of Lango, to army chief of staff alienated much of 
the Acholi-dominated officer corps. The UNLA's failure to defeat 
the NRA, which had emerged as the strongest antigovernment guer- 
rilla group, widened the gulf between the army and the Obote re- 
gime. On July 27, 1985, Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Basilio 
Olara Okello and a small group of UNLA soldiers overthrew the 
Obote regime. According to Okello, he launched the coup ' 'to stop 
the bloodshed; to create conditions for viable peace, unity, develop- 
ment, and the promotion of human rights." 

Under the new government, which ruled through a Military 
Council, General Tito Lutwa Okello became head of state, and 
Brigadier Basilio Olara Okello served as the chief of defense forces. 
To establish a coalition government, Tito Okello invited all politi- 
cal parties and guerrilla organizations to cooperate with the new 
regime. In August 1985, members of FEDEMU, FUNA, UFM, 
and UNRF agreed to this proposal, thereby gaining representa- 
tion on the Military Council. However, this alliance of former ene- 
mies proved unable to govern Uganda. The NRA took advantage 
of the weak coalition government, established control over rural 
areas of southwestern Uganda, and overran several military gar- 
risons west of Kampala. The NRA also established an indepen- 
dent administration in former president Amin's home territory in 
the northwest. 

The Rise of the National Resistance Army 

On December 17, 1985, after more than four months of negoti- 
ations, the NRA and the Military Council signed a peace accord 
in Nairobi. But then, on January 26, 1986, using Swedish and Lib- 
yan military assistance, the NRA abandoned the accord and seized 
control of the government. The new regime won some popular 



206 



A Ugandan army Czech-made armored personnel carrier on parade 

A Ugandan army military convoy 
Courtesy Thomas Ofcansky 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

support by pledging it would end human rights violations, improve 
military discipline, and restore stability. Many UNLA personnel 
retreated into Sudan, regrouped, and reentered Uganda in Au- 
gust 1986, and Uganda was once again gripped by civil war. 

From 1986 to 1990, the Museveni regime tried to end various 
insurgencies and to establish control over the army. Despite repeated 
government claims that the NRA had defeated the UNLA and other 
rebel groups, insurgent activity continued, especially in the north- 
ern, eastern, and western regions. In April 1988, 3,000 former 
Uganda People's Army (UP A) fighters and members of several 
other small rebel groups accepted a government amnesty by sur- 
rendering and declaring their support for Museveni's regime. In 
June 1988, the president concluded a peace agreement with Uganda 
People's Democratic Army (UPDA) commander Lieutenant 
Colonel John Angelo Okello. Although the NRA subsequently in- 
tegrated many UP A and UPDA personnel into its ranks, thousands 
of others rejected the peace accord and continued to fight against 
the NRA. 

Throughout most of the late 1980s, Museveni pursued a dual 
policy of offering rebels unconditional amnesties and intensifying 
military operations. In 1988 the government promised to pardon 
rebels who lacked criminal records if they surrendered; those who 
refused would be tried as ' 'bandits" before special courts desig- 
nated to deal with insurgents. 

In February 1989, Museveni declared a three-month moratori- 
um on military operations against rebels near Gulu. Army officers 
sought to improve political communication with the regime's op- 
ponents; as a result, a few rebels relinquished their arms. Once 
the moratorium expired, however, the NRA intensified assaults 
on rebel bases, and in mid- 1989 the NRA implemented a "scorched 
earth" policy in the area. Troops moved several thousand civilians 
to government-run camps, and they burned houses, crops, and gra- 
naries in these depopulated areas. In early February 1990, the NRA 
tried to isolate rebel forces by rounding up some 200,000 civilians 
and placing them in guarded camps in eastern and western Ugan- 
da. This counterinsurgency strategy enabled the NRA to estab- 
lish control over some areas, but it also eroded the government's 
domestic and international support, largely because of the high 
number of deaths resulting from inadequate food, water, shelter, 
and medical care in the camps. By late 1990, despite these harsh 
measures, a large number of rebels remained committed to the war 
against the NRM regime. 

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, one of the most active an- 
tigovernment rebel groups was the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) 



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in north-central Uganda. Alice Lakwena, a self-proclaimed mys- 
tic who persuaded her followers that she could turn bullets into 
water, led the HSM from its formation in April 1987 until mid- 
1988, when she fled to Kenya. Her successor was Joseph Kony, 
also a mystic, who claimed to be in communication with a num- 
ber of spiritual forces. The government-owned newspaper, The New 
Vision, reported that three HSM brigades operated around the 
northern town of Kitgum and that a mobile brigade of 700 soldi- 
ers operated southwest of Kitgum, near Gulu. In mid- 1989, govern- 
ment sources reported that an NRA preemptive strike against the 
HSM-UPA alliance near Soroti resulted in one of the largest con- 
frontations the NRA had encountered since 1985. More than 400 
people died, about 180 were captured, and more than 500 HSM- 
UPA fighters surrendered; the government did not report NRA 
losses. HSM tactics then switched from battlefield confrontations 
to kidnapping citizens, attacking hospitals, and ambushing vehi- 
cles to erode popular support for Museveni. By January 1990, 
however, the HSM, which then called itself the United Democratic 
Christian Movement (UDCM), had reverted to traditional insur- 
gent tactics by launching a series of attacks in Kitgum, Lira, and 
Apac districts. Later in the year, the HSM mounted operations 
in Gulu and Soroti districts. Although it enjoyed some local batt- 
lefield successes, the NRA failed to destroy the HSM. 

An NRA counterinsurgency campaign in eastern Uganda had 
similarly mixed results. Shortly after coming to power, Museveni 
disarmed and disbanded local militias that had been organized to 
protect the region against cattle rustlers. The NRA also absorbed 
militia units, such as the FUN A and former members of the UNLA, 
into its ranks. Museveni deployed some of these fighters in the east, 
and although this tactic succeeded in extending government con- 
trol into some unsettied areas, in many cases it also left these groups 
outside government control and weakened discipline within NRA 
ranks. As a result of the presence of these loosely affiliated NRA 
troops and other groups that remained outside government con- 
trol, crimes against the civilian population increased. Much of the 
subsequent "insurgent" activity in eastern Uganda was little more 
than organized banditry as many former members of the militia — 
nearly all of whom lacked a credible political agenda — had decid- 
ed that life in the bush was preferable to joining the NRA. Con- 
tinued rebel activity, largely by the UP A, and well-established 
patterns of cattle raiding prevented the NRA from pacifying eastern 
Uganda in its first five years in power. 

Museveni established good relations with Buganda by offering 
to reinstitute the office of the kabaka. Instead of taking this step, 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

however, he referred the question to a constitutional commission, 
which, by the end of 1990, had failed to rule on the matter. Mean- 
while, a number of Baganda reportedly took up arms to press the 
regime on this issue. By mid- 1989, most rebel operations in Bugan- 
da supposedly had been confined to Mpigi, the district that sur- 
rounds Kampala, and Entebbe, the site of the nation's largest 
airport. The government deployed only small numbers of troops 
to confront the Baganda rebels, confirming the view held by many 
Western observers that the opposition in Buganda was more polit- 
ical than military. 

Museveni tried to consolidate support within the army by filling 
key NRA positions with his supporters and by punishing sol- 
diers found guilty of committing crimes against the civilian popu- 
lation (see Human Rights, this ch.). Nevertheless, there have been 
several coup attempts against Museveni. The government has sup- 
pressed information about these incidents; however, on February 
17, 1989, The Guide published reports of five coup attempts since 
1986. Among these was an incident in April 1988, when the NRA 
detained a senior army officer and more than seventy of his per- 
sonnel for conspiring against the government. Other reports indi- 
cated that in September 1988 the NRA arrested and charged 
twenty-four people suspected of subversion and inciting soldiers 
to mutiny. Reports of factional opposition to Museveni within the 
NRA continued into the early 1990s. 

The Armed Forces in Society 

The armed forces have played a significant role in Uganda's po- 
litical and social development throughout much of the twentieth 
century. In the years leading up to independence, however, and 
for the first few years after independence, the army and civilian 
leaders competed for control of state decision making. In the 1970s, 
this power struggle culminated in a military government, and Presi- 
dent Amin used the increasingly ill-disciplined army and other secu- 
rity forces to secure his own power and wealth. Then in the early 
1980s, the army changed from a standing force to a coalition of 
rebel armies. As these groups engaged in their own military and 
political rivalries, military discipline declined even further. Some 
Ugandans described the military as little more than a rabble prey- 
ing on the civilian population. 

In part because of the army's reputation for poor discipline, many 
Ugandans viewed Museveni's 1986 accession to power with skep- 
ticism. Although he promised to restore stability, end human rights 
violations, and use the armed forces to implement social, politi- 
cal, and economic reforms, opposition to the regime persisted. 



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The NRA nonetheless ushered in several important political 
changes, the most significant of which was the introduction of grass- 
roots political organizations, or resistance councils (RCs; see Lo- 
cal Administration, ch. 4). RC members, elected at the village level 
and several administrative levels above the village, were ultimate- 
ly responsible to the National Resistance Council (NRC). Officials 
claimed this move marked the beginning of an effort to build 
democratic institutions and the end of state terrorism. 

For many people, the most optimistic development under NRA 
rule was the promise to end the military's abuse of civilians. 
Museveni implemented the Code of Military Conduct, which re- 
quired soldiers to respect civilians' personal and property rights, 
and directed army units to assist farmers in civic-action programs. 
Museveni also directed NRA officers to reduce the army's depen- 
dence on the civilian economy and to increase NRA self-sufficiency 
by raising cattle and cultivating cotton and corn on farmland set 
aside for army use at Kasese and Kiryandongo. These directives 
have increased popular support for the government, but have not 
restored the army's tarnished image in most areas of Uganda. 

Constitutional Authority 

Portions of Uganda's 1967 constitution remained in effect in 
1990, especially those providing for a centralized government that 
vests strong executive powers in the office of the president. The 
president retains responsibility for maintaining national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity and overseeing military affairs. Article 78 
designates the president as commander in chief of the armed forces 
and grants him the power to declare war in consultation with the 
legislature. Article 21 empowers the president to declare a nation- 
al state of emergency after consultation with his appointed ministers. 

Defense Spending 

From 1975 to 1985, Uganda's reported military expenditures 
averaged less than 3 percent of gross national product (GNP— see 
Glossary) and ranged between 14 and 30 percent of government 
spending. Arms imports multiplied eightfold between 1977 and 
1982, however, from about US$8 million to US$65 million, mea- 
sured in constant United States dollars. Expenditures then declined 
to an annual average of US$11 million between 1983 and 1986 
and increased slightly in 1987. In 1988-89, the government allo- 
cated US$40.7 million to the military. This figure represented a 
larger portion of government spending than in other East African 
countries but substantially less in absolute terms than defense spend- 
ing by those governments (see Budgets, ch. 3). 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

Military Strength 

By 1990 information regarding military organization and com- 
position had not been published. As president, Museveni held the 
defense portfolio and controlled all military decision making. Western 
reports of military strength estimated 70,000 men and women. 
Budgetary problems apparently had prevented Museveni from 
achieving his promise of increasing the NRA's size to 100,000. No 
information was available on military organization; Western sources 
cited only six brigades, several battalions, and a Police Air Wing. 

Military Service 

Recruitment and Training 

Both before and after independence, Uganda relied on volun- 
tary recruitment to the military, although the government forced 
some people to enlist during the 1970s. Minimum age for recruits 
was seventeen, and the maximum age, twenty-five. Military ser- 
vice required the equivalent of a seventh- grade education, although 
this requirement, too, was suspended at times during the 1970s 
and 1980s. There was no fixed tour of duty. Army regulations re- 
quiring either five-year or nine-year contracts for recruits were 
largely ignored. Soldiers who sought to leave military service ap- 
plied to their commanding officer, who could reject or grant the 
request. In 1990 military officials claimed that women served in 
the military in the same capacity as men, but the number of wom- 
en in the NRA and their contribution to combat were unknown. 

Northerners dominated the military well before independence. 
Their dominance was in part the result of British economic poli- 
cies that treated the northern region as a vast labor pool for cash- 
crop agriculture in the south. Many northerners joined the army 
as an alternative to agricultural wage labor. Protectorate officials 
also recruited more intensely in the north. They posted most mili- 
tary recruits away from their home areas and among people of 
different ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. This prac- 
tice was intended to ensure loyalty to military commanders and 
reduce military sympathies for local citizens. 

Before independence professional standards for military train- 
ing were high. During World War I and World War II, the pro- 
tectorate fielded an impressive force, and Ugandan soldiers earned 
international admiration. Then during the 1960s, training stan- 
dards declined amid the nation's political and economic crises, and 
military service attracted fewer educated recruits. Morale plummeted 
when British officers retained most commands, despite the fact that 



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National Security 



the government had tried to increase the number of Ugandan 
officers by granting some commissions after the officers had been 
given a crash course in military affairs. An increasing number of 
Ugandans found jobs more easily in the civilian economy. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, most training facilities were located across 
the south. Many recruits also trained in other countries (see For- 
eign Military Assistance, this ch.). In 1986 Museveni pledged to 
upgrade educational requirements for military recruits, improve 
training standards and discipline, and override regional and eth- 
nic loyalties that slowed the pace of military development. By late 
1990, he had made only limited progress toward these goals. 

Conditions of Service 

After independence, several national leaders relied on ethnic quo- 
tas or preferences to fill the security services with those they be- 
lieved could be trusted. Thus, during the 1960s, President Obote 
recruited many Langi soldiers from his home area in the north. 
During the 1970s, recruits from Idi Amin Dada's home region of 
the northwest dominated the rank and file at the expense of Acho- 
li and Langi soldiers, many of whom were purged. In 1980 Presi- 
dent Yusuf Lule, a Muganda, adopted a quota system to increase 
recruits from the south and allowed soldiers from Amin's home 
area to be harassed or expelled from the army. In the late 1980s, 
President Museveni attempted to halt this cycle of ethnic-based 
recruitment. He sought to recruit personnel from all regions, reduce 
the army's political role, and strengthen its image as a national 
security force. However, even this program of eliminating prefer- 
ences created a backlash against attempts to achieve equitable 
regional and ethnic representation in the military. 

Military pay, living conditions, and benefits varied widely un- 
der Uganda's diverse regimes. Under the British, military pay 
usually paralleled private- sector wages. After independence, 
however, life for the common soldier became desperate, and in- 
creasingly so in the 1970s and 1980s. Soldiers sometimes mutinied 
because of nondelivery of food and pay. Officers and enlisted per- 
sonnel sometimes survived by relying on theft, extortion, or bribery. 

In 1 986 the government vowed to improve living conditions for 
military personnel. Museveni instituted pay reforms and punished 
soldiers found guilty of theft or bribery, but in the late 1980s, the 
common soldier's life remained difficult. Despite claims of high 
professional standards among government officials and military 
officers, many soldiers were not being paid regularly, and discon- 
tent in the military was growing. 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

Uganda's military justice system deteriorated during the 1970s. 
The Code of Service Discipline, which was incorporated into the 
Armed Services Act of 1964, had denned offenses and punishments 
and upheld military standards. It also laid down regulations govern- 
ing trial and court-martial procedures in military courts. During 
the 1970s, however, military justice became subject to the whims 
of the authorities. Military personnel were often imprisoned or ex- 
ecuted for poor performance or disloyalty, but in perhaps as many 
cases, military misconduct went unpunished. Conditions failed to 
improve during the Lule and Binaisa regimes of 1979 and 1980, 
respectively, nor did they improve during the second Obote re- 
gime from 1980 to 1985. In the late 1980s, Museveni tried to re- 
store confidence in the military justice system among soldiers and 
civilians. Military tribunals tried members of the armed forces for 
crimes against civilians, and the government arrested and tried sol- 
diers for thefts and assaults on civilians. In a few cases, soldiers 
were executed for these crimes. 

Veterans 

Before 1962 Uganda had a history of helping veterans reenter 
civilian society, but postindependence governments discontinued 
these programs. Following World War II, the government had paid 
veterans pensions and granted them a one-year exemption from 
poll taxes. It also had created a committee to help veterans re- 
adjust to civilian life. The Civil Reabsorption and Rehabilitation 
Committee provided teacher training programs and instruction in 
a variety of trades. The government also helped veterans start small 
businesses by providing subsidies for initial purchases of merchan- 
dise. In addition, volunteer members of the Uganda War Memorial 
Committee and the British Legion helped pay school fees for chil- 
dren of veterans. Old soldiers' homes provided nursing facilities 
for some aged and disabled veterans. 

Veterans did not play an organized role in Uganda's indepen- 
dence movement or in the country's social and political life after 
independence, and veterans lost most of their former privileges. 
Economic development needs, political instability, and continu- 
ing insurgencies in northern and eastern Uganda prevented the 
organization of veterans groups in the late 1980s, but President 
Museveni promised to improve veterans' benefits once stability had 
been restored. 

Kadogos 

During the late 1980s, Uganda's most tragic military-related 
problem was the large number of children, mostly orphans, who 



214 



Uganda: A Country Study 

had attached themselves to the army. The government estimated 
that there were several thousand kadogos (child soldiers), most of 
whom were under the age of sixteen (see Social Welfare, ch. 2). 
Within days of Museveni's seizing control of the government, his 
press office announced that kadogos would be disarmed and enrolled 
in schools designated for that purpose. The first of these, the 
Mbarara Kadogo School, opened in February 1988, enrolling about 
800 pupils between ages five and eighteen, according to the school's 
commander. An important government aim was to deter these 
pupils from joining anti-NRA rebel groups still fighting against 
government control. By 1990 kadogos were no longer evident in regu- 
lar army units. 

Foreign Military Assistance 

Foreign Assistance in the 1960s and 1970s 

During the years immediately after independence, Ugandan ties 
with Britain remained strong. Uganda was a member of the Com- 
monwealth of Nations and maintained civil service, judiciary, and 
educational systems organized according to British institutions. A 
number of British military personnel remained in Uganda, includ- 
ing the commander of the Ugandan army, and each year two Ugan- 
dan students were admitted to the Royal Military Academy at 
Sandhurst. In 1964 Uganda called on British troops to help sup- 
press a mutiny staged primarily by Baganda soldiers, but Ugan- 
dans soon objected to the continued British military presence, and 
the troops were withdrawn later that year. 

Although relations with Britain remained important, Uganda 
broadened its foreign military relations during the 1960s. Israel, 
China, and the Soviet Union substantially increased military as- 
sistance. Israel and Uganda established diplomatic ties in 1962, 
and the two nations soon concluded agreements to train Ugandan 
intelligence, police, military, and paramilitary personnel. In Au- 
gust 1963, four Ugandans qualified as pilots on a Piper Super Cub 
in Israel. By 1965 Israel was equipping Uganda's security ser- 
vices, supplying small arms, light artillery pieces, and other equip- 
ment, and providing Israeli military instructors in Uganda. Israel 
also helped establish the Ugandan air force and equipped it with 
Piper Super Cub and Piaggio aircraft. After Congolese (Zairian) 
aircraft bombed western Ugandan villages in 1965, Israel furnished 
Uganda with six armed Fouga Magister jet trainers and three DC-3 
Dakota transport aircraft. Tel Aviv also established training schools 
for Ugandan pilots, artillery officers, and paratroopers. By early 
1967, Israel had seconded approximately fifty instructors to support 



216 



National Security 



this training effort, supplementing nonmilitary assistance for agri- 
cultural development and a variety of construction projects. 

The government of China hoped to block Israel's efforts to gain 
a foothold in Africa because of Israel's pro- Western orientation. 
To neutralize Israeli influence, Beijing supplied a range of eco- 
nomic and military assistance to Kampala, but this effort was short- 
lived. In 1965 the Chinese granted Uganda US$1 million and 
provided a US$4 million interest-free loan. Beijing also sent some 
small arms and a military aid mission to Uganda. In late 1967, 
after Ugandan officers complained that the Chinese mission was 
"engaging in revolutionary activity" and distributing lapel but- 
tons displaying the picture of Mao Zedong, President Obote asked 
the mission to leave the country. 

In contrast to China's relatively minor role in Uganda, the Soviet 
Union eventually became one of Kampala's closest allies. Soviet 
weapons deliveries to Uganda began after the two countries signed 
a military agreement in July 1965. Under the terms of this agree- 
ment, Moscow trained more than 250 Ugandan army personnel, 
20 pilots, and 50 air force technicians and mechanics. In addition, 
the Soviet Union supplied a squadron of two MiG-15 and four 
MiG-17F fighter-interceptors, airport ground support and mili- 
tary maintenance facilities, ground-to-ground and ground-to-air 
radio communication equipment, artillery pieces, and military 
trucks. All this materiel was free of charge, but Uganda had to 
pay for spare parts and ammunition purchased after that. By the 
end of 1967, twenty-five Soviet advisers were in Uganda helping 
to integrate this equipment into the Ugandan security services. 

During the 1970s, the Soviet Union expanded its influence by 
increasing military assistance. In July 1972, a Ugandan military 
delegation visited Moscow and arranged to take delivery of a vari- 
ety of weapon systems, including tanks, armored personnel carri- 
ers, missiles, transport aircraft, helicopters, marine patrol boats, 
field engineering equipment, MiG-21s, and radar. The next major 
Soviet arms deliveries were in 1974 and 1975, when Uganda ob- 
tained more than US$500 million in equipment. Significant items 
included 12 MiG-21s, 8 MiG-17s, 60 T/34/T/54 tanks, 100 ar- 
mored personnel carriers, 50 antiaircraft guns, 200 antitank mis- 
siles, 850 bombs and rockets, 9 radar units, 2 Mi-8 helicopters, 
250 surface-to-air missiles, 6 patrol boats, 6 mobile bridges, an 
unknown number of trucks and jeeps, and quantities of ammuni- 
tion, spare parts, and test equipment. In addition, between 1973 
and 1975, more than 700 Ugandan military personnel received 
training in the Soviet Union, while more than 100 Soviet instruc- 
tors managed a variety of training programs in Uganda. 



217 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Ugandan- Soviet relations cooled in 1975, when Amin expelled 
the Soviet ambassador because of a disagreement over Moscow's 
intervention in Angola. In July 1976, Israel launched a raid on 
the airport at Entebbe that freed passengers who had been taken 
hostage by Palestinian terrorists. Embarrassed and threatened, 
Amin improved relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow resumed 
arms shipments and signed a series of technical and cultural pro- 
tocols with Kampala, but ties became strained once again as the 
Amin regime began to deteriorate in the late 1970s. 

When Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979, a decline in Soviet 
military assistance forced Amin to look to Libya and, to a lesser 
extent, the PLO for support. Tripoli responded by sending large 
quantities of arms to Uganda, including three BM-21 "Stalin or- 
gan" rocket launchers and a Soviet-built Tu-22 bomber, which 
were used to bomb Tanzanian positions throughout southern Ugan- 
da. In addition, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi sent approxi- 
mately 2,000 poorly trained members of the Libyan militia to 
Uganda. Several hundred PLO guerrillas also took part in the un- 
successful fight to save the Amin regime, which fell in April 1979. 

Foreign Assistance in the 1980s 

Tanzanian influence increased after Amin's departure. The 
TPDF maintained about 20,000 troops in Uganda to help restore 
peace. In addition, Tanzanian soldiers managed a large-scale army 
training program at Mbarara. By mid- 1980, however, tension be- 
tween TPDF personnel and southern Ugandans, especially Bagan- 
da, prompted Dar es Salaam to withdraw about one-half of its 
troops. Despite this decision and continuing clashes between Tan- 
zanian troops and Ugandan citizens, President Nyerere then agreed 
to deploy a 1,000-man police unit to Uganda. By mid-1982, Nye- 
rere had further reduced Tanzania's military presence, citing the 
high cost of maintaining troops in Uganda. When the training mis- 
sions of the remaining 800 troops were hampered by misunder- 
standings and delays, they, too, were withdrawn. 

Relations with Britain gradually improved after 1980, when Mil- 
ton Obote began his second term as president, this time emphasizing 
private-sector development in Uganda's shattered economy. From 
1982 until 1984, British soldiers in the Commonwealth Military 
Training Mission trained approximately 4,000 Ugandan army 
recruits. On August 19, 1984, Kampala and London signed a mili- 
tary training agreement that increased the British presence from 
thirteen to twenty men. 

After a goodwill visit to the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (North Korea) in 1981, Obote signed a cooperation agreement 



218 



National Security 



covering a variety of technical, economic, and cultural areas. Pyong- 
yang agreed to deploy a military team of thirty officers to Uganda, 
primarily to manage maintenance projects and infantry training 
in Gulu. During the 1980s, the North Korean officers often led 
UNLA combat units in the field against antigovernment guerril- 
las; such operations reportedly claimed the lives of at least three 
North Koreans. The North Korean contingent left Uganda in Sep- 
tember 1985, a few months after the military coup that deposed 
Obote. 

Ugandan-Tanzanian relations improved after Museveni came 
to power in 1986, and Tanzanian military assistance resumed. In 
late 1986, about thirty military advisers replaced a British Mili- 
tary Advisory Training Team that had left Uganda. In January 

1987, a British representative returned to Uganda with a small, 
nonresident training team, and a substantial, although unknown, 
number of Tanzanians remained to serve as advisers and train- 
ers. Between 1988 and 1990, Tanzanian instructors managed por- 
tions of Uganda's basic training program. In addition, many NRA 
troops studied at Tanzania's National Military Leadership Acade- 
my in Monduli and the School of Infantry in Nachingwea. 

Libya, which provided weapons to the NRA before it seized pow- 
er, maintained cordial relations with Kampala after 1986 by fur- 
nishing a variety of assistance. In 1986 and 1987, Tripoli was 
Uganda's main arms supplier, and by early 1988, Libya had de- 
livered an impressive array of weapons, including aircraft, anti- 
aircraft artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and small arms and 
ammunition. Libyan security assistance declined in late 1988 and 
1989, when the extent of Libyan military aid to Uganda was 
unknown. Estimates of the number of Libyan advisers serving in 
Uganda in 1989 ranged from several dozen to 3,000; by 1990, 
however, most Western observers believed that the Libyan mili- 
tary presence in Uganda was minimal. Unconfirmed reports ac- 
cused some Libyans of racism against Ugandans in the NRA, but 
some military assistance continued, nonetheless. 

After 1986 Moscow's relations with Kampala shifted in empha- 
sis. Between 1986 and 1988, the Soviet Union provided more than 
US$20 million in weapons to the Museveni regime. In November 

1988, the Ugandan Ministry of Defence began talks with a Soviet 
manufacturer to purchase an An-32 transport aircraft, but a year 
later, the aircraft had not been delivered. By mid- 1989, Moscow 
had halted military aid to Uganda as part of its commitment to 
reduce its military role in sub-Saharan Africa. Thereafter, 
Ugandan- Soviet relations concentrated on economic and cultural 
cooperation. 



219 



Uganda: A Country Study 



In the late 1980s, Museveni asked North Korea to return to 
Uganda to train NRA fighters in the use of North Korean equip- 
ment. North Korean advisers helped train Ugandan military, police, 
and security personnel. P'yongyang also supplied a variety of mili- 
tary assistance. For example, a North Korean consignment of 
weapons offloaded at Dar es Salaam for transshipment to Uganda 
in late 1987 included Soviet-built SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, sixty 
antiaircraft guns, eight truck-mounted rocket launchers, ten ar- 
mored personnel carriers, and an unknown amount of ammuni- 
tion. Similar deliveries of military equipment continued into the 
early 1990s. 

United States relations with Uganda lacked any military empha- 
sis, but several private corporations sold military equipment to 
Uganda in the late 1980s. Museveni sought to improve ties that 
had been strained for more than a decade, and in response to these 
efforts, Washington increased economic assistance to Uganda. In 
1990 United States officials implemented an International Mili- 
tary Education and Training (IMET) program that brought Ugan- 
dans to the United States for command and staff training, infantry 
officer courses, medical training, and courses in vehicle main- 
tenance. 

External Security Concerns 

Uganda's relations with neighboring states except Tanzania have 
been strained since Museveni seized power in 1986. Although over- 
shadowed by internal divisions, clashes have occurred with Zaire, 
Sudan, Kenya, and Rwanda. Accusations of cross-border smug- 
gling were the most frequent cause of these problems, but in some 
cases, strains already existed because Uganda and its neighbors 
harbored each other's antigovernment rebel groups. Museveni 
generally tried to negotiate settlements to these conflicts. 

Zaire 

Historically, Ugandan-Zairian relations have been complicated 
by border problems. Border incidents caused by Zairian rebel 
groups operating from bases in Uganda have increased the strain 
between the two countries. Long-standing border tensions appeared 
to diminish in early 1988, largely because of diplomatic efforts 
by both nations. In April 1988, Ugandan and Zairian security 
officials met in Goma, Zaire, to resolve problems caused by the 
Congolese Liberation Party (Parti de Liberation Congo-laise — 
PLC). PLC rebels, opponents of Zairian president Mobutu Sese 
Seko, were active in the Ruwenzori Mountains, which stretch from 
southwestern Uganda into eastern Zaire. Ugandans in the area 



220 



National Security 



accused PLC members of stealing vehicles for resale in Zaire. The 
talks produced an agreement to retrieve stolen property peacefully, 
when possible, and to deal with PLC rebels through official means. 

In June 1988, Ugandan-Zairian relations again deteriorated when 
PLC forces mounted a series of attacks in northeastern Zaire. The 
PLC claimed to have killed 120 Zairian Armed Forces (Forces Ar- 
mees Zairoises — FAZ) troops and wounded many others. When 
the FAZ launched a counteroffensive, a PLC commander mistaken- 
ly led his forces into Ugandan territory. Ugandan troops arrested 
nineteen members of the PLC at Kasese, incarcerated them at the 
local military barracks, and registered a complaint that Zaire was 
failing to control its own political dissidents. 

Tensions escalated in November 1988, when FAZ troops raid- 
ed territory in northwestern Uganda, setting fire to several dozen 
houses and destroying property. Museveni's protest prompted Zaire 
to close the border between the two countries. Another confronta- 
tion followed when Zairian soldiers again razed several homes in 
western Uganda, this time in pursuit of fleeing rebels. A third border 
incident occurred in December 1988, when a FAZ platoon raided 
military outposts in northwestern Uganda, killing three Ugandan 
soldiers. 

Relations between the two countries were further strained when 
former Ugandan president Idi Amin Dada appeared in Zaire in 
January 1989. Holding a false Zairian passport, Amin arrived in 
Kinshasa on an Air Zaire flight from Libreville, Gabon. He ap- 
parentiy intended to return to Uganda with an estimated 500 armed 
supporters who were to meet him in northeastern Zaire. Museveni 
requested the former president's extradition, intending to try Amin 
for atrocities committed during his eight-year reign. Kinshasa re- 
jected this request because there was no extradition treaty between 
Uganda and Zaire. Instead, the Mobutu regime detained Amin 
in Kinshasa and expelled him from the country nine days later. 
Thereafter, relations between Uganda and Zaire were cool, lead- 
ing to the mutual expulsion of ambassadors; on September 8, 1989, 
the two countries restored full diplomatic ties. 

Throughout 1990 Ugandan and Zairian officials worked to stabi- 
lize their common border. In April the two countries agreed to deal 
peacefully with judicial, security, and defense matters and to appre- 
hend and repatriate runaway criminals. Talks in July dealt with 
a variety of security, trade, poaching, and smuggling problems, 
but the failure of these meetings to achieve any progress prompted 
FAZ units to seal off the Zaire-Uganda border in October 1990. 
In late 1990, the border between the two countries appeared likely 
to remain unstable for the foreseeable future. 



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Uganda: A Country Study 
Sudan 

Uganda's relations with Sudan have been strained, primarily 
because of long-standing problems with refugees. According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an 
estimated 500,000 Ugandans fled to Sudan between 1978 and 1988. 
After Sudan's civil war began to intensify in 1983, several thousand 
Sudanese — perhaps tens of thousands — fled to northern Uganda. 
Resolving even basic logistical problems caused by the movement 
of so many people proved difficult, especially for two governments 
beset by economic crises. To help ease the situation, Khartoum 
and Kampala in April 1988 signed a memorandum in which they 
agreed to repatriate approximately 60,000 Ugandan refugees from 
Sudan. Those who refused repatriation were to be moved to camps 
well inside Sudan to prevent them from participating in cross-border 
raids into Uganda. 

In June 1988, Uganda claimed that the Sudanese People's Liber- 
ation Army (SPLA), which opposed the government in Khar- 
toum, had intruded into Arua and Moyo districts in the northwest. 
According to Ugandan officials, SPLA troops assaulted, kidnapped, 
and murdered civilians. They also burned and looted several vil- 
lages, apparently in search of food and supplies. To lessen the result- 
ing tensions, the Ugandan-Sudanese Joint Ministerial Commission 
in September 1988 issued a statement addressing problems of secu- 
rity, trade, customs, health, transport, telecommunications, and 
wildlife conservation, and the two governments pledged to work 
toward cooperation. 

In November 1988, the UNHCR announced that the UN had 
repatriated 1 1 ,000 Ugandans, and the UNHCR reiterated the un- 
derstanding that Ugandan refugees still in Sudan would be located 
well inside the border but could return home in small groups 
whenever they wished. The UN also carried out a two-month emer- 
gency foodlift from Entebbe to Juba in southern Sudan and deliv- 
ered 5,000 tons of supplies to famine victims. UN aircraft also fer- 
ried emergency humanitarian supplies provided by Catholic Relief 
Services and Norwegian Church Aid. 

Despite the substantial efforts of Ugandan and Sudanese govern- 
ments and international relief agencies, the refugee problem con- 
tinued to overshadow relations between Uganda and Sudan. In 
February 1989, the UNHCR determined that about 15,000 Ugan- 
dan refugees still in Sudan were waiting to return to Uganda. 
Almost 18,000 Sudanese refugees remained in northwest Uganda, 
and that number was increasing rapidly in response to Sudan's con- 
tinuing civil war. Providing food, shelter, water, medical assistance, 



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and transportation for this growing number of refugees threatened 
to drain both resources and energy from the Ugandan and Sudanese 
governments for several more years. 

Despite Uganda's attempts to contribute to a peaceful solution 
to the Sudanese civil war and the conclusion of a barter trade agree- 
ment with Sudan in September 1989, tension between the two coun- 
tries continued to mount. Sudan accused Uganda of aiding the 
antigovernment SPLA, and in November 1989 Sudanese aircraft 
bombed the town of Moyo in apparent retaliation. 

Relations improved somewhat after Sudanese president Lieu- 
tenant General Umar Hasan Ahmad al Bashir visited Kampala 
in December 1989. The two leaders signed a nonaggression pact 
that committed each country to refrain from using force against 
the other and to prevent its territory from being used to launch 
hostile actions against the other. To enforce this pact, Sudan 
deployed a military team of nine officials to Uganda to monitor 
security along the common border. President Museveni also 
renewed efforts to facilitate the peace process in Sudan. Despite 
these steps, however, many Western observers remained skeptical 
about the long-term prospects for good relations between the two 
countries. 

Kenya 

Relations between Kenya and Uganda have been strained since 
Museveni seized power, although for much of 1988 and early 1989 
Uganda and Kenya vacillated between cooperation and confron- 
tation. In 1987 Kenya's President Daniel T. arap Moi had accused 
Museveni of allowing Libya to launch destabilizing attacks on 
Kenya from bases in Uganda, a charge Museveni steadfastly de- 
nied. Kenya nonetheless expelled the Ugandan high commission- 
er and closed the Libyan People's Bureau in Nairobi, and Uganda 
retaliated by arresting six Kenyan diplomats, including the acting 
high commissioner. A flurry of high-level communications succeed- 
ed in ending this incident, but each nation's fears of cross-border 
insurgency were heightened. 

The year 1988 had begun on a positive note when the two gov- 
ernments agreed to establish a buffer zone along their common 
border near Busia. At about the same time, however, the NRM 
government alarmed Kenyan officials by announcing it was con- 
sidering shipping imports and exports through Dar es Salaam, Tan- 
zania, rather than Mombasa, Kenya. This plan would have cost 
Kenya transit fees and several hundred jobs in its transport indus- 
try, and suspicions of economic sabotage began to sour relations 
between the two countries. 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

A more serious problem occurred in July 1988, when several 
Ugandan soldiers attacked fishers at Sumba Island in Kenyan ter- 
ritory on Lake Victoria. Kenyan security forces responded and in- 
flicted several casualties. Charges and countercharges were aired 
throughout the rest of 1988. There were also sporadic outbreaks 
of violence along the border and accusations that Ugandan vehi- 
cles were being detained or delayed at the Kenyan border points 
near Nakuru and Eldoret. 

Despite some progress toward peaceful negotiations, the hope- 
ful atmosphere was disturbed on March 2, 1989, when some 300 
armed forces, believed to be Ugandans intent on stealing cattle, 
killed a Kenyan army officer in Kenya's West Pokot District. 
Kenyan security forces responded, killing seventy-two of the al- 
leged cattle rustlers, by their count. Five days later, the Kenyan 
government claimed that a military aircraft from Uganda had 
dropped two bombs near a police post near Oropoi. According to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the bombs 
killed five people and injured seven others. The Ugandan govern- 
ment denied complicity in the attack and suggested that the air- 
craft had originated in Sudan, a report that appeared to be 
confirmed by independent observers. Ugandan minister of foreign 
affairs Tarsis Kabwegyere sought mediation. 

In 1990 the acrimony between Uganda and Kenya continued, 
especially after Ugandan police officials accused President Moi of 
helping Ugandan dissidents plan to overthrow Museveni. Rela- 
tions improved after the two leaders met in August and agreed to 
restore full diplomatic ties and to strengthen border security. 
However, by year's end, the two countries again were at logger- 
heads, in part because of Kenyan press allegations that Uganda 
intended "to establish a Pax Uganda over central and eastern 
Africa." 

Rwanda 

The increasing number of Rwandan refugees in Uganda height- 
ened tensions between Kampala and Kigali throughout the 1980s. 
The fact that many of these refugees had supported Idi Amin while 
he was in power provoked official displeasure and retribution dur- 
ing Obote's second presidency. In 1982 Obote, hoping to resolve 
the refugee problem and prevent challenges to his administration, 
expelled 60,000 ethnic Rwandans, accusing them of "antigovern- 
ment activities." Many of those evicted claimed to be Ugandan 
citizens whose families had lived in Uganda since the late 1800s. 

Museveni, who was of Ankole descent but had relatives in Rwan- 
da, had recruited approximately 1,000 Rwandans into the NRA 



224 




Ugandan refugee camps in Rwanda in the mid-1980s 
Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (Frangoise Wolff) 



225 



Uganda: A Country Study 

during the early and mid-1980s. Several journalists had reported 
that the Rwandans formed the core of the original NRA, and 
government critics complained about "foreign influence" over the 
national army. Rumors of Rwandans serving in the Ugandan mili- 
tary forming the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the late 1980s 
alarmed officials in Kigali who believed that the RPF posed a threat 
to Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana. A few officials in 
Kigali alleged that Museveni had promised assistance to Rwan- 
dan insurgents in exchange for their military support in the early 
1980s, when he was leading a guerrilla army in western Uganda. 

In 1989 Uganda and Rwanda agreed to resolve their differences. 
In February, for example, Uganda agreed to naturalize a few Rwan- 
dans already living in Uganda, while Rwanda pledged to consider 
repatriating others on a case-by-case basis. In early May, Museveni 
and Habyarimana affirmed their commitment to resolve the refu- 
gee problem with assistance from the UNHGR. 

Despite both governments' optimism that these discussions 
marked the beginning of improved relations, hostilities between 
the two countries soon resumed. On October 1, 1990, the RPF 
invaded Rwanda from bases in Uganda. The initial force, num- 
bering a few thousand, grew to approximately 7,000, including 
roughly 4,000 deserters from the NRA and a number of Rwan- 
dan refugees. The RPF issued its Eight-Point Program calling for 
economic and political reforms in Rwanda, similar to those espoused 
by Museveni in Uganda. 

As the war spread throughout northern Rwanda in late 1990, 
relations between the two countries became more strained. Presi- 
dent Habyarimana repeatedly accused Uganda of providing mili- 
tary assistance to the RPF and preparing to invade Rwanda, charges 
that Kampala consistently denied. President Museveni, in turn, 
accused Rwandan government troops of conducting "hot pursuit" 
operations into Uganda. Repeated efforts to negotiate an end to 
the fighting in Rwanda failed. 

Internal Security Services 
Early Development 

Ugandan police history began in 1900 when Special Commis- 
sioner Sir Harry Johnston established the Armed Constabulary with 
1,450 Africans under the command of British district officers. In 
1906 the Protectorate Police replaced the constabulary, and the 
colonial government appointed an inspector general as the com- 
manding officer of all police detachments. 



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National Security 



Although created as a civilian force, the police frequently car- 
ried out military duties. In 1907, for example, police detachments 
participated in internal security operations in the western kingdom 
of Toro and the eastern district of Bugisu. To support this expanded 
role, colonial authorities enlarged the Protectorate Police, and in 
1908 they opened a fingerprinting bureau in Kampala. By 1912 
the police operated fifteen stations and possessed a small criminal 
investigation division, a countrywide heliograph signal system, and 
a small bicycle pool for transport. The police continued their para- 
military functions, patrolling border areas between Uganda and 
German East Africa (later Tanzania) during World War I and 
patrolling Karamoja District to suppress cattle raiding and border 
skirmishes. 

After 1918 the police became a more traditional internal security 
force. Most of their work involved homicide investigations; traffic 
control; and supervision of vehicle, bicycle, and trade licenses. 
Worldwide economic depression caused the colonial government 
to reduce the size of the police force from its 1926 level of 33 officers 
and inspectors with 1,368 in the rank and file to 37 officers and 
inspectors with 1,087 rank and file. 

At the outbreak of World War II, the police again undertook 
military duties. In 1939 the Protectorate Police dispatched a gar- 
rison to Lokitaung, Kenya; arrested German nationals in Ugan- 
da; and provided security at key installations. In addition, the police 
assumed responsibility for operating and guarding camps for de- 
tained aliens. Many members of the police force also served in Brit- 
ish army units in East Africa and in overseas operations. After 
World War II, the colonial authorities expanded the police force, 
and in July 1954, the Legislative Council established new police 
stations and posts throughout Uganda. The government also formed 
a specially recruited Internal Security Unit that subsequently be- 
came the Special Force Units. By the mid-1960s, there were eighteen 
Special Force Units, each comprising fifty police trained in com- 
mando tactics, normally assigned to crowd-control duties and border 
patrols. 

Post independence Security Services 

Uganda's independence constitution in 1962 reaffirmed the Brit- 
ish policy of allowing the kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, 
and Ankole to maintain local police forces, which were nominally 
accountable to Uganda's inspector general of police. When the 1967 
constitution abolished the federal states and Buganda' s special sta- 
tus, the local police forces merged into the Uganda Police Force 



227 



Uganda: A Country Study 

or became local constabularies responsible to the district commis- 
sioner under the inspector general's authority. 

During the 1960s, the Uganda Police Force comprised the Uni- 
form Branch, which was assigned mainly to urban duties; Special 
Branch and Criminal Investigation Department (CID); Special 
Constabulary; Special Force Units; Signals Branch; Railway Police; 
Police Air Wing; Police Tracker Force; Police Band; and Canine 
Section. Four regional commanders directed police operations and 
assisted the inspector general. The Police Council — composed of 
the inspector general, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, and four other members appointed by the 
minister — recommended policies regarding recruitment and con- 
ditions of service. The Public Service Commission, in consulta- 
tion with the inspector general, appointed senior police officers. 
The Police Training School in Kampala conducted initial train- 
ing for new recruits. In-service training for noncommissioned 
officers and constables took place at the Uganda Police College at 
Naguru, and many officers studied in Australia, Britain, Israel, 
and the United States. 

By 1968 the Uganda Police Force was a multiethnic, nonpoliti- 
cal, armed constabulary of between 7,000 and 8,000 officers and 
constables. In addition to regular urban police activities, it under- 
took extensive paramilitary duties, provided honor guard detach- 
ments for visiting dignitaries, and performed most of the public 
prosecution in the criminal courts. 

During the late 1960s, the government increased its use of the 
police, and, in particular, the CID, to eliminate political dissent. 
Some politicians complained that this emphasis allowed street crime 
to flourish. President Obote also created the General Service Depart- 
ment (GSD) outside the police organization to monitor the politi- 
cal climate and report disloyalty. Some GSD agents infiltrated other 
organizations to observe policies and record discussions. They 
reported directly to the president on political threats arising from 
other government agencies and the public. Ugandans both ridiculed 
and feared GSD agents, whom they described as spies in their midst. 

During the 1970s, the police force was practically moribund, but 
President Amin, like his predecessor, used a number of agencies 
to root out political dissent. More arrests were made for political 
crimes than for street crimes or corruption. Amin's government 
relied on the Military Police, the Public Safety Unit (PSU), and 
the State Research Bureau (SRB) to detect and eliminate political 
disloyalty. In 1971 Amin created the SRB as a military intelligence 
unit directly under the president's control. Its agents, who num- 
bered about 3,000, reportedly kidnapped, tortured, and murdered 



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National Security 



suspects in their headquarters in Nakasero. Many SRB personnel 
were non-Ugandans; most had studied in police and military acade- 
mies in Britain and the United States. Most served one-year tours 
of duty with the SRB and were then assigned to military duty, 
government service, or overseas embassy guard duty. 

During the early years of the Amin regime, the PSU and the 
Military Police also acquired reputations as terrorist squads oper- 
ating against their compatriots. In 1972 the PSU, which was created 
as an armed robbery investigative unit within the civil police or- 
ganization, was equipped with submachine guns. Amin ordered 
PSU agents to shoot robbers on sight, but in practice, he exerted 
almost no control over them, and PSU agents became known among 
many Ugandans as roving death squads. 

In the early 1980s, the strength of the police force was only about 
2,500, many of whom were trained in Britain or North Korea. The 
heads of the four police departments — administration, criminal in- 
vestigation, operations, and training — reported to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. The Special Branch of the CID assumed the 
responsibilities of the SRB. The Police Special Force, a paramili- 
tary riot control unit, engaged in widespread atrocities against peo- 
ple who opposed the regime, especially in Buganda. 

Another internal security agency, the National Security Agency 
(NSA), was formed in 1979. Many of its first recruits were former 
GSD members. NSA agents testified before human rights investi- 
gators later in the 1980s that although they did not wear uniforms, 
they carried arms, and many believed themselves to be above the 
law. Their testimony also related instances of torture and murder, 
as well as frequent robbery and looting. Detainees were sometimes 
held in military barracks, in keeping with the NSA policy of avoid- 
ing police or prison system controls. In the notorious Luwero Tri- 
angle in Buganda, NSA agents became known as "computer men," 
because they often carried computer printouts in their search for 
reported subversives. 

When the NRA seized power in 1986, Museveni inherited a force 
of 8,000. A screening exercise revealed that out of the 8,000 per- 
sonnel, only 3,000 qualified to be retained as police officers. The 
government augmented this force by contracting 2,000 retired police 
officers. However, at 5,000 this force was too small to maintain 
law and order. Museveni therefore ordered the NRA to assume 
responsibility for internal security. He also announced plans to up- 
grade police training and equipment, increase the force to 30,000 
personnel, revive a defunct marine unit to combat smuggling on 
Uganda's lakes, improve the Police Air Wing's reconnaissance 



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Uganda: A Country Study 



capability by acquiring more aircraft, and form a new paramili- 
tary unit to bolster internal security. 

In December 1988, Uganda's inspector general initiated inves- 
tigations into charges of police abuse, in the hope of improving 
the force's reputation. In July 1989, he also announced the crea- 
tion of new departments of political education, legal affairs and 
loans, and local government, but their authority had not been fully 
defined. 

In December 1989, President Museveni announced that the 
police, then numbering almost 30,000, and other internal security 
organs eventually would assume responsibility for law and order 
in all districts except Lira, Apac, Gulu, Kitgum, Moroto, Koti- 
do, Soroti, and Kumi — where antigovernment rebels remained ac- 
tive. He also announced plans to end the army's internal security 
mission as the police assumed greater responsibility for law and 
order. These changes would enable the army to pursue new train- 
ing programs and, he hoped, improve morale. Museveni also direct- 
ed the minister of internal affairs to augment police salaries by 
providing basic rations, such as food, soap, and blankets, and to 
investigate ways of supplementing educational costs for the police. 

During the 1980s, Britain, France, North Korea, and Egypt 
provided assistance to the Uganda Police Force. British instruc- 
tors taught courses on criminal investigations and police adminis- 
tration, and they trained future police instructors. British assistance 
also included equipment, such as high-frequency radio sets and 
Land Rovers, and Britain had agreed to furnish bicycles, office 
equipment and supplies, and crime detection kits. 

In 1989 French police officials provided three-month training 
courses in riot control and suppression techniques. The first thirty 
Ugandans to complete this training became instructors for subse- 
quent courses. In December 1990, another French team of five 
police officials trained 100 Ugandan police officers in antiriot tech- 
niques. Museveni also accepted North Korean offers of equipment 
and training assistance. By July 1989, P'yongyang had trained and 
equipped Uganda's newly established Mobile Police Patrol Unit 
(MPPU) of 167 officers. Despite British, French, and North Korean 
training, the government admitted that the police still needed 
specialized training programs to improve its investigative capa- 
bilities. 

Criminal Justice System 

When Britain assumed control of Uganda, the judicial system con- 
sisted of a number of local authorities, tribal chiefs, and kin group 



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elders, who worked primarily to enforce local customary law. Is- 
lamic law was also practiced in areas of northern Uganda. During 
the twentieth century, British jurisprudence was gradually imposed, 
spreading more quickly across the south than the north. At indepen- 
dence the resulting legal system consisted of the High Court, which 
heard cases involving murder, rape, treason, and other crimes 
punishable by death or life imprisonment; and subordinate magis- 
trates' courts, which tried cases for crimes punishable by shorter 
terms of imprisonment, fines, or whipping. Magistrates' court de- 
cisions could be appealed to the High Court. All courts had the 
privilege of rendering "competent verdicts," whereby a person ac- 
cused of one offense could also be convicted of a minor, related 
offense. 

After independence the director of public prosecutions (DPP), 
appointed by the president, prosecuted criminal cases. Under the 
attorney general's direction, the DPP initiated and conducted crimi- 
nal proceedings other than courts-martial. The DPP also could ap- 
point a public prosecutor for a specific case. In some cases, a police 
official was the prosecutor, and the DPP reviewed and comment- 
ed on the trial proceedings. 

The legal system virtually broke down during the 1970s, in part 
because Amin undermined the judicial system when it attempted 
to oppose him. In March 1971, for example, when Amin granted 
the security forces the right to "search and arrest," they implement- 
ed the decree to harass political opponents. The courts were then 
blocked from rendering verdicts against security agents through 
a second decree granting government officials immunity from prose- 
cution. By absolving soldiers and police of any legal accountability, 
Amin unleashed a reign of terror on the civilian population that 
lasted eight years. 

The end of Amin's regime brought no significant improvement 
in the criminal justice system. In an effort to reassert the rule of 
law, in June 1984 the government prohibited the army from ar- 
resting civilians suspected of opposition to the government, and 
it allowed prisoners, for the first time in over a decade, to appeal 
to the government for their release from prison. The army ignored 
the 1984 law, however, and continued to perpetrate crimes against 
the civilian population. 

When Museveni became president in 1986, he pledged to end 
the army's tyranny and reform the country's criminal justice sys- 
tem (see Judicial System, ch. 4). He succeeded in granting great- 
er autonomy to the courts, but the NRA also arrested several 
thousand suspected opponents during counterinsurgency operations 
in northern and eastern Uganda. In late 1988, the NRC passed 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

a constitutional amendment giving the president the power to 
declare any region of the country to be in a "state of insurgency. ' ' 
Subsequent legislation allowed the government to establish separate 
courts in these areas, authorized the military to arrest insurgents, 
permitted magistrates to suspend the rules of evidence to allow hear- 
say and uncorroborated evidence in the courtroom, and shifted the 
burden of proof from the accuser to the accused. 

Prison System 

During colonial times, the principal penal facility was Luzira 
Prison near Kampala, although jails were common in larger towns. 
Prisoners in Luzira were separated according to categories such 
as long-term convicts, "recidivists," women, children, Asians, and 
Europeans. Cells for specific punishments and death row were also 
separate from the regular prison population, and the facility had 
several workshops and a hospital. The government also maintained 
smaller prisons for local convicts in Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, and 
Ankole. Terms of less than six months were generally served in 
smaller jails located in each district. 

In 1964 the Prison Service operated thirty prisons, many of which 
were actually industrial or agricultural facilities, intended to re- 
habilitate prisoners. By mid- 1968, the Prison Service had a force 
of about 3,000 under the command of the commissioner of prisons. 

During the 1970s, civilian and military prison conditions deteri- 
orated, and prisoner abuse became common. At Makindye and 
Mutukula military prisons outside Kampala, for example, Langi 
and Acholi soldiers suspected of disloyalty to the regime were mur- 
dered. The PSU killed several thousand political opponents at the 
Uganda Police College at Naguru. At the SRB's Nakasero head- 
quarters, some prisoners claimed they had survived through can- 
nibalism. 

Prison conditions in the early 1980s were also dismal. Accord- 
ing to Amnesty International, the Obote regime imprisoned civilians 
without charge or for political crimes. Many were held in police 
stations, military barracks, and NSA detention centers. Almost all 
penal facilities were overcrowded, sometimes housing ten times the 
number of inmates intended. Other reports, however, indicated 
that members of the Uganda Prison Service sometimes treated in- 
mates relatively humanely, allowing them to read, exercise, and 
attend religious services. 

When Museveni seized power, he promised to improve the coun- 
try 's prison system, but this proved to be a difficult task, in part 
because so many people were arrested. In late 1986, the Uganda 
Human Rights Activists (UHRA) charged that the authorities had 



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imprisoned as many as 10,000 people at the Murchison Bay Prison 
in western Uganda, a facility with an 800-inmate capacity. More- 
over, the UHRA and Amnesty International claimed that prisoners 
lived in abominable conditions, which caused a number of deaths 
from disease. 

In 1987 Museveni allowed the ICRC to survey conditions in 
Uganda's civil prisons. Although some reports suggested that pri- 
son conditions improved as a result, there had in fact been little 
change. In late 1990, for example, Chief Justice Samuel Wako 
Wambuzi condemned overcrowding in Masaka Central Prison. Ac- 
cording to his investigation, the prison contained 456 inmates rather 
than the authorized 120 people. Similar conditions existed in most 
of Uganda's other prisons. 

Patterns of Crime and the Government's Response 

Patterns in criminal behavior and arrests have often reflected 
Uganda's economic and political setting. During the colonial period, 
most arrests were for murder, rape, robbery, and, on occasion, 
treason. People were also imprisoned for failing to pay taxes. Af- 
ter Uganda gained independence, however, crime patterns slowly 
shifted to involve more violent crimes. Attacks by bands of armed 
robbers (kondos) became common in urban areas. Then in the 1970s, 
this pattern shifted to emphasize political crimes. Many arrests and 
executions were not recorded, and statistics were unavailable. 

Uganda's parliament tried to stop the rise of organized violent 
crime in 1968, amending the 1930 Penal Code to mandate the death 
penalty for those convicted of armed robbery. Parliament also 
amended the criminal procedure code to require ex-convicts to carry 
identity cards and to present these cards at police stations at regu- 
lar intervals. A few months later, the government passed the Pub- 
lic Order and Security Act, authorizing the president, or a delegated 
minister, to detain indefinitely anyone whose actions were judged 
prejudicial to national defense or security. After 1970 the govern- 
ment increased its reliance on this act to detain political opponents. 

Following the overthrow of the second Obote regime in 1985, 
the government freed about 1 ,200 prisoners held under the Public 
Order and Security Act. Some abuses still continued to be report- 
ed in 1990, despite government promises to end abuse by police 
and prison officials and to respect individual rights before the law. 

Human Rights 

Uganda's human rights record deteriorated after Idi Amin seized 
power in 1971. By the end of the 1970s, it was one of the worst 
in the world. Several hundred thousand civilians died at the hands 



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Uganda: A Country Study 

of local security forces. In 1986 Museveni pledged to improve Ugan- 
da's reputation for human rights. To achieve this goal, the NRM 
arrested and tried soldiers and civilians for such crimes, and the 
government worked to improve its reputation for respecting hu- 
man rights. 

In May 1986, NRM officials created the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Violation of Human Rights to investigate these crimes un- 
der all governments since independence until the day before the 
NRM seized power. The commission examined judicial and other 
records regarding arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and ex- 
ecutions. Its hearings began in December 1986, when an investi- 
gation team and the commission's chief counsel, Edward Ssekandi, 
began selecting witnesses who would testify in public session. One 
of the most controversial witnesses, a former NRA political instruc- 
tor, testified that political opponents were considered traitors. 

A lack of resources hampered the commission's performance. 
Financial and transportation problems initially confined its activi- 
ties to Kampala; later, these difficulties temporarily brought pub- 
lic hearings to an end. Although a February 1988 Ford Foundation 
grant enabled the public hearings to resume, the commission's fi- 
nal report was unavailable in late 1990. 

In 1987 the president also established the post of inspector general 
of government (IGG) to investigate individual complaints about 
human rights abuses committed since the NRM came to power. 
The inspector general answered only to the president and had the 
authority to seize documents, subpoena witnesses, and question 
civil servants as high ranking as cabinet ministers, with presiden- 
tial approval. Government officials had to cooperate with the IGG 
or face three-year prison terms or fines. Budgetary problems and 
staff shortages reduced the inspector general's effectiveness, and 
there were complaints during the 1988-90 period that his investi- 
gations were too slow and produced no results, despite lengthy tes- 
timony and evidence by international human rights groups and 
individual witnesses. 

Several nongovernmental human rights organizations also 
worked to improve conditions in Uganda. The UHRA, for exam- 
ple, has monitored developments in Uganda since the early 1980s 
through its quarterly publication, The Activist. Initially, UHRA's 
relations with the government were tense after the 1989 arrest of 
UHRA Secretary General Paulo Muwanga for comparing the 
NRM's human rights record to that of the Amin government. 
Muwanga was subsequently released, and a UHRA report in 1990 
generally approved of Museveni's human rights record. 



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National Security 



The Uganda Law Society is one of the most vocal advocates for 
protection of human rights in Uganda. In 1990 a quarter of the 
country's 800 lawyers belonged to the Uganda Law Society. Apart 
from speaking out against human rights violations in northern and 
eastern Uganda, the Uganda Law Society has called for an indepen- 
dent judiciary, an end to illegal arrests and detentions, legal re- 
form, and constitutionalism. A lack of funds and resources has 
hampered Uganda Law Society activities. 

The Uganda Association of Women Lawyers works to inform 
rural populations of their legal rights, promote family stability 
through legal advice and counseling, ensure equal protection un- 
der the law for women and children, and promote Ugandan citizens' 
welfare by emphasizing laws that promote economic development. 
In March 1988, the association opened a legal clinic to help indi- 
gent Ugandans, especially women and children. By August 1990, 
the clinic had handled more than 1 ,000 cases dealing with property 
rights, inheritance, and a variety of family and business concerns. 

To counter accusations of human rights abuse, particularly in 
northern and eastern Uganda, the government has punished mem- 
bers of the NRA convicted of assault or robbery against civilians. 
Several soldiers have been executed for murder or rape. Military 
officers even carried out some of these executions in the area where 
the crimes were committed, inviting local residents to witness the 
executions. Despite protests by several international organizations, 
these executions continued in 1990. Uganda's attorney general, 
George Kanyeihamba, justified the practice, insisting that strict 
discipline was necessary to maintain order in the military. 

Despite these harsh measures, human rights violations continued 
in parts of northern, eastern, and western Uganda in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. In October 1987, for example, witnesses report- 
ed that soldiers killed 600 people in Tororo District during an NRA 
counterinsurgency operation. People in the southwest claimed that 
the security services killed a number of school children in anti- 
government protests and that as many as 200 villagers were shot 
for refusing to attend a political rally. Murders of people suspect- 
ed of being rebel sympathizers were also reported. 

In early 1989, Dr. H. Benjamin Obonyo, secretary general of 
the antigovernment Uganda People's Democratic Movement 
(UPDM), corroborated evidence of atrocities acquired by Amnesty 
International and other human rights organizations. He also 
charged that the NRA had ' 'burned or buried civilians alive" in 
regions of the north and east. 

Throughout 1990, according to Amnesty International, the NRA 
killed a number of unarmed civilians in the districts of Gulu, 



235 



Uganda: A Country Study 

Tororo, Kumi, and Soroti. Despite several government inquiries, 
Amnesty International claimed that no NRA personnel were ever 
charged with these human rights violations or brought to trial. 
Moreover, more than 1,300 people remained in detention without 
charge at the end of 1990. Government officials labeled most of 
these allegations "exaggerated," but it was clear that they were 
unable to eliminate abuses by the military forces and that Uganda 
would face mounting international protests engendered by such 
abuse. 

* * * 

Several comprehensive studies deal with the evolution of secu- 
rity issues in Uganda. The colonial era is covered in H. Moyse- 
Bartlett's The King's African Rifles and Uganda, by H. Thomas and 
R. Scott. A. Omara-Otunnu's Politics and the Military in Uganda, 
1890-1985 also assesses the development of the security services. 
A. Mazrui's Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda provides insight into 
the military's role in society. Conflict Resolution in Uganda, edited 
by K. Rupesinghe, is a compilation of papers by Ugandan schol- 
ars presented at a 1987 conference in Kampala concerning Ugan- 
da's quest for peace and stability. 

Uganda's tradition of an open and lively press was being revived 
in the late 1980s. The New Vision, The Guide, and numerous other 
local newspapers report and comment on current developments. 
Numerous government publications also provide valuable infor- 
mation on the history of the security forces, conditions of service, 
and the effects of political and cultural change on them. Uganda 
Journal is useful for information about the historical development 
of the security services. For more recent information on the Ugan- 
dan military, see African Defence Journal or the National Resistance 
Army's journal, The 6th of February. Preindependence information 
on crime and the criminal justice system is available in the Annual 
Reports of the Uganda Police Force and the Prison Service. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



236 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Estimated Population and Urban Distribution, Selected Years, 

1978-90 

3 Enrollment in Government-Aided Educational Institutions, 

Selected Years, 1965-89 

4 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1984-89 

5 Development Allocations by Sector, Fiscal Years 1988-91 

6 Agricultural Production, 1984-89 

7 Foreign Trade, 1984-89 

8 Official Development Assistance (Grants and Loans), 1984-88 



237 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Estimated Population and Urban Distribution, 
Selected Years, 1978-90 



1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 * 

Total population 

(in millions) 12.3 13.2 14.1 15.2 16.2 15.9 16.9 

Percentage urban 8.5 8.7 9.0 9.3 9.7 n.a. 10.0 

n.a. — not available. 
* Official estimate. 



239 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Table 3. Enrollment in Government-Aided Educational Institutions, 
Selected Years, 1965-89 
(in thousands) 



Institutions 


1965 


1970 


1975 


1980 


1985 


1989 1 




580 


727 


918 


1,292 


2,117 


2,532 


Secondary schools 


16 


37 


46 2 


75 2 


160 2 


265 


Makerere University . . 


0.9 


2.6 


3.4 


4.0 


5.3 


6.3 


Other higher 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1.7 4 


2.6 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Provisional. 

2 O-level and A-level only. 

3 Institute of Teachers' Education, National College of Business Studies, and Uganda Polytechnic. 

4 1986 figure. 



240 



Appendix 



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oencf)*mNOOrtonic 
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m 


CO 





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o 


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o 


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o 




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241 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Table 5. Development Allocations by Sector, Fiscal Years 1988-91 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

Funding as 



Sector 


Planned 
Spending 


Percentage 
of Total 


of March 
1988 


Balance 


Transportation and 










communications . . . 


o /o. / 


90 A. 


171 n 
1 / 1 ,u 


9fl7 7 




314.5 


24.4 


186.8 


127.7 


Industry and 












271.9 


21.1 


93.7 


178.2 


Social 












221.0 


17.2 


90.8 


130.2 


Mining and 












89.2 


6.9 


53.4 


35.8 


Public 










administration .... 


13.2 


1.0 


1.2 


12.0 


TOTAL 


1,288.5 


100.0 


596.9 


691.6 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Uganda, 
1989-90, London, 1989, 10. 



242 



Appendix 



Table 6. Agricultural Production, 1984-89 
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated) 

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 



Export crops 

Cocoa 

Coffee 

Cotton 

Sugar (raw) .... 

Tea 

Tobacco 

Food crops 

Cereals 

Oilseeds 

Plantains 

Pulses 

Root crops .... 

Fish catch 

Livestock 2 

Cattle 

Goats 

Pigs 

Poultry 

Sheep 



0.3 0.2 

138.7 155.0 

12.2 16.3 

2.4 0.8 

5.2 5.6 

2.0 1.5 



944 1,171 
149 134 

6,250 6,468 
372 338 

4,731 4,532 

212.3 160.8 



4,993 5,000 

3,091 3,246 

227 238 

1,200 3,000 

1,602 1,674 



0.1 


0.1 


143.3 


159.4 


4.4 


2.9 


n.a. 


n.a. 


3.3 


3.5 


0.9 


1.3 


1,058 


1,220 


163 


163 


6,565 


7,039 


346 


374 


4,863 


4,960 


200.9 


149. 


5,200 


3,905 


3,300 


2,503 


250 


470 


5,000 


8,330 


1,680 


683 



0.2 0.5 

153.6 174.0 

1.8 2.6 

7.5 15.9 

3.5 4.6 

2.5 3.8 



1,398 1,619 1 

184 206 1 

7,293 7,469 1 

430 485 1 

5,177 5,474 1 

214.3 213.5 



4,260 4,184 

2,110 2,280 

452 553 

n.a. n.a. 

690 3 644 3 



n.a. — not available 

1 Estimate. 

2 In thousands. 

3 As reported. 

Source: Based on information from Uganda, Ministry of Planning and Economic Develop- 
ment, Background to the Budget, 1990-1991, Kampala, 1990, 194, 195, 197, 198. 



243 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Table 7. Foreign Trade, 1984-89 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 



Exports 

Coffee 359.6 348.5 394.2 311.1 264.3 263.6 

Cotton 12.1 13.4 4.9 4.1 3.1 4.0 

Corn 8.9 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 

Tea 3.3 1.0 3.1 1.9 1.2 3.1 

Tobacco L5 OA 0.0 0J) 0J5 1.5 

Total exports, 

including other ... 407.9 379.0 406.7 333.7 272.9 251.5 

Imports 342.2 264.1 476.0 634.5 627.4 659.1 

Trade balance 65.7 114.9 -69.3 -300.8 -354.5 -407.6 



Source: Based on information from Uganda, Ministry of Planning and Economic Develop- 
ment, Background to the Budget, 1990-1991, Kampala, 1990, 162-63; and Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Uganda, 1989-90, London, 1989, 26. 



Table 8. Official Development Assistance (OD A), 1984-88 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 


Bilateral 


50.1 


45.5 


88.0 


92.7 


195.4 




119.3 


143.0 


120.3 


193.0 


180.9 


TOTAL (ODA) 


169.4 


188.5 


208.3 


285.7 


376.3 




98.5 


84.0 


131.5 


153.5 


257.8 



Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel- 
opment, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Paris, 1990, 
285. 



244 



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263 



Uganda: A Country Study 



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265 



Uganda: A Country Study 

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269 



Uganda: A Country Study 



[Kampala]; Indian Ocean Newsletter [Paris]; International Institute 
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Washington Post; and Weekly Review [Nairobi].) 



270 



Glossary 



age- set — A group of persons of the same sex and approximately 
the same age who have been initiated together or who have 
passed through other social experiences together. 

clan — A group whose members are descended in the male line from 
a putative common male ancestor (patrician) or in the female 
line from a putative common female ancestor (matriclan — not 
reported in Uganda). Clans may be divided into subclans or- 
ganized on the same principle or into lineages (q. v. ) believed 
to be linked by descent from a remote common ancestor. 

fiscal year (FY) — Uganda's fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30. 
Fiscal year dates of reference correspond to the year in which 
the period ends. For example, fiscal year 1990 began July 1, 
1989, and ended June 30, 1990. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A measure of the total value of 
goods and services produced by a domestic national economy 
during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding 
the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form 
of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation (con- 
sumption of capital). Only domestic production is included, 
not income arising from investments and possessions owned 
abroad, hence the use of the word "domestic" to distinguish 
GDP from gross national product (q. v.). Real GDP is the value 
of GDP when inflation has been taken into account. In this 
book, subsistence production is included and consists of the im- 
puted value of production by the farm family for its own use 
and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings. In 
countries lacking sophisticated data- gathering techniques, such 
as Uganda, the total value of GDP is often estimated. 

gross national product (GNP) — The total market value of all final 
goods and services produced by an economy during a year. 
Obtained by adding the gross domestic product (q.v.) and the 
income received from abroad by residents and then subtract- 
ing payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. Real GNP is 
the value of GNP when inflation has been taken into account. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations; it is responsible for stabilizing 
international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- 
ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (in- 
cluding industrialized and developing countries) when they 



271 



Uganda Country Study 



experience balance-of-payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

lineage — A group whose members are descended through males 
from a common male ancestor (patrilineage) or through females 
from a common female ancestor (matrilineage — not reported 
in Uganda). Such descent can in principle be traced. Lineages 
vary in genealogical depth from the ancestor to living genera- 
tions; the more extensive ones often are internally segmented. 

Paris Club — The informal name for a consortium of Western cred- 
itor countries that have made loans or have guaranteed export 
credits to developing nations and that meet in Paris to discuss 
borrowers' ability to repay debts. The organization has no for- 
mal or institutional existence and no fixed membership. Its 
secretariat is run by the French treasury, and it has a close rela- 
tionship with the World Bank (q.v.), the International Mone- 
tary Fund (q. v.), and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). 

patrilineage — A group of male and female descendants of a male 
ancestor, each of whom is related to the common ancestor 
through male forebears. 

special drawing right(s) (SDRs) — Monetary unit(s) of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF — q. v. ) based on a basket of in- 
ternational currencies consisting of the United States dollar, 
the German deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, the British pound 
sterling, and the French franc. 

Uganda shilling — USh; basic unit of currency divided into 100 
cents. The Uganda shilling was introduced in 1966 and was 
tied to the United States dollar until 1975, when its value was 
tied to the special drawing right (SDR; q. v. ) of the IMF (q. v.). 
In 1986 the Uganda shilling was officially valued at 
US$1 = USh 1450. A new Uganda shilling was introduced in 
May 1987. It involved an effective devaluation of 76 percent, 
was given an official value equal to 100 old shillings, and had 
an international exchange rate of US$1 = USh60. Successive 
devaluations in 1988, 1989, and 1990 reduced the official dol- 
lar value to US$1 =USh510 by late 1990. 

World Bank — International name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its 
primary purpose the provision of loans to developing countries 



272 



Glossary 



for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less- 
developed countries. The president and certain senior officers 
of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three 
institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that 
subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the IMF (q.v.). 



273 



Index 



Acak, Opon, 206 

Acholi people, 9, 66; agriculture of, 67; 
cattle of, 67; discrimination against, 35; 
ivory trade by, 10; killed under Amin, 
26-27, 232; languages of, 50, 66; lin- 
eages of, 67; marriage among, 67; ori- 
gins of, 67; as percentage of population, 
67; social structure of, 77-78; soldiers, 
26, 36, 213 

Acholi region, 65; conquered by British, 
12; religion in, 77 

Achwa River, 46 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), xxvii, 41, 89-90, 93; deaths 
from, 47, 89; distribution of, 89; effect 
of, on population growth, 90; effect of, 
on society, 90; infection rate of, 89; 
prevention programs for, 89; and 
religion, 41, 76; treatments for, 90; and 
women, 83 

Action for Development, 83 

Activist, The, 234 

Adoko, Akena, 24 

Adrisi, Mustafa, 30 

African Development Bank, 136 

African Socialism, 24 

Agency for International Development. 
See United States Agency for Interna- 
tional Development 

agricultural cooperatives, 55, 78-80; 
credit by, 111, 135; marketing by, xxvi, 
104, 110 

agricultural development, 144 

Agricultural Enterprises Limited, 114 

agriculturalists, 4, 7, 59; ancient, 6; 
migration of, 6; political system of, 6; 
trade of, with pastoralists, 6 

agricultural production (see also under in- 
dividual crops), 97; ancient, 98; under 
British, 14; decline in, 110; during the 
Great Depression, xxii; growth in, xxvi; 
methods of, 110; by smallholders, 16, 
110; during World War I, xxii 

agricultural products, 110-16; bananas, 
6, 52, 54, 56, 136; beans, 65; cassava, 
54, 56, 66, 67, 68, 110; corn, 54, 51, 
65, 66, 67, 68, 110, 136, 211; eleusine, 
65, 67; exports of, 137; fruit, 110; 



government supports for, xxvi; le- 
gumes, 56, 68, 110; marketing of, xxvi, 
xxvii, 103; millet, 54, 56, 61, 65, 66, 
67, 68, 110; peanuts, 54, 61, 65, 67, 
110, 127; potatoes, 66; prices for, 99; 
rice, 58; sesame seeds, 67, 110, 127; 
sorghum, 65, 68, 110; sunflowers, 127; 
sweet potatoes, 54, 56, 65, 67, 110; 
trade in, xxii 

agricultural sector, 97; growth in, 100, 
101; problems in, 125; regional cooper- 
ation in, 143, 144 

agriculture, 108-23, 181; in Buganda, 52; 
in Bunyoro, 55-56; diversification of, 
97; in Karamojong culture, 61; loans 
for, 142; in the north, 110; promotion 
of, 131; regional cooperation in, xxv, 
144; in the south, 42, 110; wage earn- 
ers in, 110 

agriculture, commercial: diversification 
in, 111; as percentage of gross domes- 
tic product, 100; wage earners in, 110 

agriculture, subsistence (see also under in- 
dividual crops), xxii, 54, 80, 97; growth 
of, 100; for survival, 101, 107 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air cargo service: government control of, 
xxvii 

air force: equipment, 216; established, 

216; training, 216 
Air France: hijacking, 29, 187, 190, 218 
airlines: energy consumption by, 125; 

government control of, xxvii, 104 
Air Tanzania, 133 
Akaramojong language, 60 
al Bashir, Umar Hasan Ahmad, 185, 223 
Albert Nile, 46 
Algeria: trade with, 139 
Ali, Moses, 157 

Alur people, 66, 67-68; influences on, 68; 

languages of, 50; marriage among, 68; 

political system of, 67-68 
Amin Dada, Idi, 3, 24, 25, 224; aid to 

Anyanya rebels by, 25; ancestry of, 66, 

185; arms smuggling by, 23, 186, 



275 



Uganda: A Country Study 



189-90; attempt of, to return from ex- 
ile, 186, 221; coup d'etat by, 25-26, 
167, 190, 202; exile of, 30-31, 99, 195, 
204; fear of counterattack from Obote, 
28; hatred of, 81; illiteracy of, 29; as 
protege of Obote, 22, 201 

Amin administration: Air France hijack- 
ing under, 29, 187, 190, 218; army un- 
der, 210,213; army mutiny under, 30; 
Asians expelled under, 28, 70, 73, 80, 
98, 187, 203; courts under, 166; 
defense spending under, 27-28; disap- 
pearances under, 3; dissipation under, 
xxii, 3, 28, 187; districts under, 161; 
economic damage by, xxii, 98, 
100-101, 141, 147; foreign policy un- 
der, 27-28, 195; human rights abuses 
under, 233-34; illiteracy in, 29; inter- 
national recognition of, 26, 187; inter- 
national opposition to, 26, 180-81; 
invasion of Tanzania by, 30, 203; mas- 
sacres under, 3, 195; military under, 
203; military recruitment under, 80, 
203; Muslim heritage of, 73; organiza- 
tion of, 26; overthrown, 99; rivalries in, 
26; terror under, xxii, 97, 203, 231 

Amnesty International, 35, 232, 233, 
235-36 

ancestors: religious significance of, 74, 75 

Anglican Cathedral, 72 

Anglican Church. See Church of England 

Ankole kingdom, 12, 21, 34, 59-60, 69, 
152; British treaty with, 13; landown- 
ing classes in, 78; military service in, 
59; police in, 227; prison in, 232 

Anyanya rebels, 25, 27, 202 

Apac, xxiv, 209, 230 

Arab Bank for Economic Development in 
Africa, 120 

Arabic, 51, 69 

archaeology, 7 

Armed Constabulary, 226 

armed forces (see also army; air force; mili- 
tary): Africanization of officer corps in, 
200, 212-13; cost of maintaining, xxiii, 
197, 201; crimes by, 213; human rights 
violations by, 195; mutinies by, 213; 
number of troops in, 31-32; racial sepa- 
ration in, 197; role of, in political de- 
velopment, 195, 210; role of, in social 
development, 195, 210; women in, 212 

Armed Services Act (1964), 214 

army, 25; under Amin, 202, 210; Brit- 



ish officers in, 200, 212-13; Bugandan, 
8; cattle rustling fought by, 202; child 
soldiers in, 214-16; as coalition of reb- 
el armies, 210; conditions in, 205; coup 
d'etat by, 24; crimes by, 205, 209, 
231; demobilized, 199; ethnic favor- 
itism in, 25, 35; expansion of, under 
Amin, 27; under first Obote adminis- 
tration, xxii; foreign training of, 25, 
213; human rights abuses by, xxiii, 
xxiv, 205; internal security by, 230; in- 
volvement in politics, 199-200; looting 
by, 30, 36; luxury items for, under 
Amin, 28, 187; under Museveni, 154; 
mutiny in, 22, 30, 197; northerners in, 
171; political education for, 148; purges 
of, 27; rebels in, xxiii; recruitment, 
xxiii, 27, 199, 201, 202; reduction of, 
xxiii; reorganization of, 201-2; rival- 
ries in, 203; Rwandans in, xxv; ter- 
rorism by, 30 

Arua, 92, 125, 133, 205, 222 

Asians, 5, 70, 78, 80; in army, 197; coffee 
processing by, 70; cotton ginning by, 
16, 70; deprived of citizenship, 154; ex- 
pelled by Amin, 28, 70, 73, 80, 98, 114, 
187, 203; sugar plantations of, 16, 70; 
tea production by, 114; as traders, 70 

Astles, Bob, 28 

Aswa River, 46 

Ateso language, 60 

austerity measures, 34 

Australia, 116, 228 

Austria, 93 

Azidothymidine (AZT), 90 
AZT. See Azidothymidine 



Baamba people, 58 

Baganda people, 14; British admiration 
of, 11; dominance by, 41 , 52; languages 
of, 50, 51-54; literacy rate of, 51; mai- 
lo estates of, 14, 78; as percentage of 
population, 51; prosperity of, under 
British, 14-15; riots by, 16; as tax col- 
lectors, 8, 13, 14, 51 

Bagisu people, 54-55; as percentage of 
population, 54 

Bagwere people, 55 

Bahai, 72 

Bahima. See Hima people 
Bairu. See Iru people 



276 



Index 



Bakedi people, 55 
Baker, Samuel, 10 
Bakonjo people, 58 

balance of payments, 137, 140-41; con- 
trol of, 139-40; under Obote, 142 

balance of trade, 137; control of, 139-40; 
deficit in, xxvi, 138, 140, 141; surplus, 
140 

banking, 134; under Museveni, 103 
banking, commercial, 134; government 

control of, xxvii, 103, 104; lending by, 

135 

banking, development: government con- 
trol of, xxvii, 103, 104 

Bank of Baroda, 134 

Bank of Uganda, 103, 128, 134 

Bantu- speaking people, 51-60; classifica- 
tion of, 50; ethnic groups in, 55; inter- 
action of, with Nilotic- speaking people, 
6-7; languages of, 50; origins of, 6, 49; 
as percentage of population, 50; polit- 
ical system of, 6 

Banyankole people, 55, 59-60; languages 
of, 50 

Banyoro people, 55-58; agriculture 
among, 55-56; cattle-raising among, 
55-56; languages of, 50; as percentage 
of population, 55; political organization 
of, 56-58; similarities of, to Banyoro, 
58; social organization of, 56 

Baptists, 72 

barter agreements, 138-39, 179; countries 
bartered with, 130, 139; products bar- 
tered for, 138, 139; products bartered 
with, 127, 139 

Basoga people: agriculture of, 54; connec- 
tion of, to Banyoro, 54; kings of, 50, 
54; languages of, 50; as percentage of 
population, 54; society of, 54 

Batoro people, 55, 58; languages of, 50, 
58; as percentage of population, 50, 55, 
58; similarities of, to Banyoro, 58 

BCU. See Bugisu Cooperative Union 

beer, 58, 68, 126-27 

Belgian Congo {see also Zaire): army in- 
tervention in, 23, 186; bombing of 
West Nile by, 201; civil war in, 5, 186 

Bey, Selim, 197 

Bigo, 7 

Binaisa, Godfrey, 31, 32, 204, 205, 214 
Bito (see also Bunyoro), 7; political system 

of, 7-8; royal clan of, 7, 56 
black market, 80-81, 107; exchange rate 



of shilling in, 136; importance of, 81; 

percentage of population engaged in, 

81; vocabulary of, 80 
Block, Dora, 29, 187 
borders, 42, 45; of Buganda, 51 
Bowa, 107 

breweries: government control of, xxvii 
Britain: agricultural assistance from, 120, 
122-23; Amin administration support- 
ed by, 26, 187; debt to, rescheduled, 
142; economic embargo by, 187; flights 
to, 131-32; housing assistance from, 
93; luxury goods supplied to Amin by, 
187; military training by, 187, 201, 
216, 218; Museveni's visit to, 188; 
Obote administrations supported by, 
187-88; police training by, 228, 229, 
230; refugees in, 187; relations with, 
179, 218; trade with, 137, 187 
British American Tobacco Company, 
116, 127 

British Broadcasting Corporation, 33 

British colonial government, 13-20; 
agriculture under, 14, 16; Bunyoro un- 
der, 56, 58; cultural chauvinism under, 
13; economy under, xxii, 13, 98; edu- 
cation under, 14-15; established, 12; 
ethnic favoritism under, xxii; foreign 
affairs under, 178; hostility by, toward 
Banyoro, 10; kabaka under, 53; 
Karamojong culture under, 61; muti- 
ny under (1897), 13, 197; preparation 
by, for independence, 17; role of chiefs 
in, 13; subsidies of, 14; taxes under, 13; 
treaties of, 13; withdrawal of, 4 

British Cotton Growing Association, 14 

British Legion, 214 

British Military Advisory Training Team, 
219 

British Somaliland, 197, 198, 199 
budgets, 104-6; deficit, 104; develop- 
ment, 106; National Resistance Move- 
ment, 158; 1981, 134; 1992, xxvi 
Buganda {see also Baganda people), 5, 34, 
157; army of, 8, 196; borders of, 51; 
British treaty with, 13; Bunyoro trans- 
ferred to, by British, 12; civil war in, 
11-12; under colonial rule, xxii, 12; 
communication in, 9; division of, 11, 
24, 153; divorce in, 54; dominance by, 
147, 152, 171; economy of, xxii; edu- 
cation in, 14-15; elections in, 167; ex- 
pansion of, 8; family in, 53; foreign 



277 



Uganda: A Country Study 



trade by, 10; government control over, 
172, 178; guns in, 196; kabaka (king) of, 
8, 172-75; marriage in, 52, 54; modern- 
ization in, 41; under Museveni, 
209-10; navy of, 8; palace compound 
of, 8-9; police in, 227, 229; political 
system of, 7-8, 152; population of, 5, 
19; prison in, 232; schools in, xxii; sup- 
port of, for Amin, 26 
Buganda Agreement (1900), 13, 16, 70 
Buganda-Bunyoro rivalry, 10; arms race 
in, 10; under British, 14, 53; econom- 
ic, xxii 
Bugisu, 200, 227 

Bugisu Cooperative Union (BCU), 55 
Bukedi, 200 
Bundibugyo, 125 

Bunyoro {see also Banyoro people), 5, 12, 
13, 14, 34, 69, 152, 196; army in, 196; 
British hostility toward, 10; British oc- 
cupation of, 12, 53, 57, 58, 197; Brit- 
ish treaty with, 13; connection of, with 
Busoga, 54; foreign trade by, 10; 
government of, 56; guns in, 196; inva- 
sions of, 53; landowning classes in, 78; 
location of, 55; "lost counties" of, 5, 
10, 12, 14; migration in, 56; police in, 
227; political representation of, 21; po- 
litical system in, 7-8, 56-58; prison in, 
232; religion in, 74; royal clan of, 7, 
8; transferred to Buganda by British, 12 

Burma, 199 

Burundi: ancient peoples of, 7; im- 
migrants from, 49; in Kagera Basin Or- 
ganization, 144, 181 

Bushenyi, 92 

Busoga, 12, 152; autonomy of, xxii; cot- 
ton production in, 14; under first Obote 
administration, 21 



capital account balance, 141 

CARE. See Cooperative for American 
Relief Everywhere 

cash crops (see also under individual crops), 
xxii, 5, 28, 54, 56, 65, 68, 82, 97, 125; 
prices for, 111; encouraged under Brit- 
ish, 14; under Obote, 35; under Re- 
habilitation and Development Plan, 
110; regulated by British, 16 

cash economy, 55, 98 

Catholicism, Roman, 4; conversion to, 



11; introduction of, 11 

Catholic Relief Services, 222 

Catholics, Roman, 147; Democratic 
Party formed by, 19; as percentage of 
population, 70, 72; Rwandans as, 69 

cattle, 65, 66, 67, 68, 211; artificial in- 
semination of, 117; as brideprice, 64; 
in Bunyoro, 55-56, 58; diseases, 117, 
120; Hima control of, 59; importance 
of, 64; in Karamojong culture, 61, 62; 
ownership of, 117; population, 117; 
purchase of, from Tanzania, 117; 
ranching, 117; rinderpest epidemic, 61; 
as sign of superiority, 59, 61; as trib- 
ute, 58, 59 

cattle rustlers, 205, 209, 224 

cattle rustling, 117, 198; in Kenya, 205; 
in Sudan, 205; sweeps against, 199, 
202, 227 

cement industry: attempts to rehabilitate, 
126; government control of, xxvii, 104; 
neglect of, under Amin, 28 

census: of 1959, 47; of 1969, 49; of 1980, 
47, 49 

Central Bank, 134, 138, 140 
Central Sudanic- speaking people, 51 
chickens, 68 

chiefs, 161, 162, 165; in Ganda culture, 

52; in Nyoro culture, 56, 58 
children: with AIDS, 89; orphaned, 93, 

214; as soldiers, 214-16 
China, 121; materiel from, 217; military 

assistance from, 217; military relations 

with, 216 

Christianity (see also missions; see also un- 
der individual sects): attempts to convert 
kabaka to, 11; conversions to, 11, 13 

Christians: as martyrs, 72; as percentage 
of population, 70; rivalry of, with Mus- 
lims, 5, 30, 72 

Church Missionary Society (CMS) (see 
also Church of England): missionaries 
sent to Buganda by, 11, 72 

Church of England (see also Church Mis- 
sionary Society): adherents as percen- 
tage of population, 72; conversions to, 
11; membership in, required of kaba- 
ka, 72 

Church of Uganda, 30 

Chwezi, 7, 74 

citizenship, 153-54 

Civil Reabsorption and Rehabilitation 
Committee, 214 



278 



Index 



civil servants: census of, 108; distribution 
of, 108; "ghost," xxvii; under Museve- 
ni, 81; payroll of, 108 

civil service: corruption in, 108; inefficien- 
cy of, 108; reform of, xxvii; salaries in, 
105, 108 

civil war (1888-92), 11, 195-96 

civil wars, 3, 35, 97, 147, 148, 149, 150, 
155, 172, 208; effect of, on economy, 
100; effect of, on infrastructure, 130 

clans, 52, 53, 62, 65; royal, 53 

climate, 5, 46, 110 

CMS. See Church Missionary Society 

cocoa, 58, 113 

Code of Military Conduct, 211 
Code of Service Discipline, 214 
coffee, 97, 111-13, 188; for barter, 127, 
138; as cash crop, xxii, 16, 54, 55, 65, 
97; earnings, xxvi, 98, 112-13, 140, 
143; exports, 137, 140, 179, 183, 184; 
export taxes on, 105; growers, 3; mar- 
keting of, xxvi, xxvii; payment for, 104, 
136; price controls on, 17; prices, 81, 
97, 100, 104, 112, 140; production, 
xxvi, 58, 70, 100, 101, 111, 112, 113, 
125; under Rehabilitation and Develop- 
ment Plan, 110; rehabilitation pro- 
gram, 111-12; smuggling, 28, 111, 
112, 182 

Coffee Marketing Board, xxvi, 112, 140; 

financial problems of, 112 
Cohen, Sir Andrew, 17; East African fed- 
eration proposed by, 18, 180; reforms 
under, 18 
College of Commerce, 87 
Commission for Law Reform, 166 
Commission for Law Revision, 166-67 
Commission of Inquiry into the Violation 

of Human Rights, 167, 234 
Committee of Imperial Defence, 198 
"Common Man's Charter," 24 
Commonwealth Conference of Heads of 

Government, 25, 202 
Commonwealth Military Training Mis- 
sion, 218 

Commonwealth Observer Group, 33, 168 
Commonwealth of Nations, 216 
communications (see also telecommunica- 
tions), 130, 133; in Buganda, 9; infra- 
structure, disrepair of, 130 
Congolese Liberation Party (PLC), 186, 
220 

Congo River system, 46 



Conservative Party, 157, 174 
Constituent Assembly, 155 
Constitutional Assembly, 174 
constitutional commission, xxiii, 178; 

guidelines for, 155 
Constitutional Commission Act (1988), 

155 

constitution of 1962, 152; distribution of 
power under, 152; kingdoms under, 
152, 227; suspended by Obote, 3, 24, 
152 

constitution of 1966, 24, 153 

constitution of 1967: elections under, 162; 
judicial system under, 165; kings 
abolished under, 174; under Museve- 
ni government, 154, 211; provisions of, 
153; restored, 159 

Constitution (Amendment) Bill (1987), 
165 

consumer goods: imports of, 178; manu- 
facture of, 126-28; shortages of, 
137 

Cooperative for American Relief Every- 
where (CARE) Apiary Development 
Project, 120 

corruption, 15, 23, 103, 108; attempts to 
eliminate, 99, 149, 151; in civil ser- 
vice, 108 

cost of living, 107 

cotton, 113, 211; for barter, 127, 138; as 
cash crop, xxii, 14, 16, 54, 56, 65, 97, 
98, 171; emergency production pro- 
gram, 113; export of, 16, 98, 113, 137, 
140; export value of, 14; growers, 3; 
marketing of, xxvii; payment for, 104; 
prices, 104, 113, 140; production, xxvi, 
58, 66, 69, 110, 113, 125; under Re- 
habilitation and Development Plan, 
110 

cotton ginning: Africans allowed to par- 
ticipate in, 17; Asian monopoly over, 
16, 70 

coups d'etat: of 1971, xxii, 26, 167, 182, 
190, 202; of 1979, 30, 149; of 1980, 32; 
of 1985, 35, 150, 157, 206; of 1986, 36 

Court of Appeal, 165 

Court of Appeal for East Africa, 165 

credit, domestic, 134-36; for crop financ- 
ing, 135; government's share of, 135; 
growth rate of, 134-35 

criminal justice system, 230-33; attempts 
at rehabilitation, 231; attorney gener- 
al under, 231; British law under, 231; 



279 



Uganda: A Country Study 



customary law under, 231; deteriora- 
tion of, 231; director of public prose- 
cutions under, 231 ; Islamic law under, 
231; precolonial, 230-31 
crime, 233 

Cuba: barter agreements with, 139; re- 
lations with, 180; sugar imports from, 
127 

cultural chauvinism, 7, 13, 69 
currency (see also shilling), 134 
current accounts: balance, 140, 141; 
deficit, xxvi, 141 



dairy farming, 117-20; prices in, 117; 
production capacity of, 117-20; re- 
habilitation of, 117 

dairy industry: imports by, 120, 127; re- 
habilitation of, 117, 127 

Dar es Salaam, 131 

DAs. See district administrators 

Daudi Chwa (Kabaka), 15 

DC. See district commissioner 

Debasien Peak, 45 

debt, domestic, 98 

debt, external, 141-42; under Amin, 98; 
multilateral, xxvi; under Museveni, 
134; rescheduling of, xxvi, 134, 142; 
types of, 142 

debt, multilateral, 142 

debt service, xxvi, 134, 141 

defense spending, xxvii; under Amin, 
27-28, 98; under Museveni, 105, 211; 
under Obote, 32, 201 

Democratic Party (DP), 175; criticism by, 
of election process, 170, 176; formed, 
19, 72, 157; members of, in National 
Resistance Movement government, 
157, 175-76; obstacles to, 32-33 

Denmark, 117 

Department of Veterinary Services and 

Animal Industry, 117 
DES. See district executive secretary 
desertification, 181 

development projects, 4; brokering of, 4; 

budget for, 106 
Diego-Suarez, 199 

Directorate of Industrial Training, 107 
disappearances: under Amin, 29; under 

Obote, 35 
Distinguished Conduct Medal, 199 
district administrators (DAs), 152, 163 



district commissioner (DC), 161, 163 
district councils: elections to, 162; respon- 
sibilities of, 162 
District Education Office, 86 
district executive secretary (DES), 163 
divorce, 54, 83 
Djibouti, 144, 181 
Dodoth Hills, 45 

Dodoth people, 60; homesteads of, 61, 62; 

origins of, 61 
Dopeth-Okok River, 46 
DP. See Democratic Party 
drainage patterns, 45-46 
drought, xxiv, xxv, 61, 101, 112, 144, 181 



EAC. See East African Community 
East Africa High Commission, 199 
East African Community (EAC), 98, 134, 

143, 165, 180-81 
East African Community Compensation 

Fund, 141 
East African Defence Committee, 199 
East African Development Bank, 134 
East African federation, proposed, 18, 

180 

East African Land Forces, 199 
East African Steel Corporation, 126 
East Germany, 127 
Ebifa (News), 15 

economic development, xxii; under Ten- 
Point Program, 99 

economic disparities: between agricul- 
turalists and pastoralists, 4; among 
regions, 148 

economic: growth, xxv-xxvi, 100-101; 
independence, 148; recovery, 97, 
106-7; reform, xxiii, 105-6 

economy, 97; under Amin, xxii, 98; un- 
der colonial government, xxii; damage 
to, xxii; formal sector, 107; government 
involvement in, 101-7; monetary, 101; 
under Museveni government, 149; in 
1960s, 3; nonmonetary, 101; world, xxii 

EDF. See European Development Fund 

education (see also schools; teachers), 
83-88; under British, 14-15, 41; cur- 
riculum, 15; goals for, 84; government 
control of, 162; government spending 
on, xxvi; modernization through, 42; 
postsecondary, 86-87; primary, 85-86, 
162; secondary, 86; spending on, 84, 88 



280 



Index 



EEC. See European Economic Com- 
munity 

Egypt, 10, 199; barter with, 139; police 
training by, 230 

elections, 167-70; boycott of, 20, 167; 
campaigns, 176; criticism of, 170; 
method of, 169-70; National Re- 
sistance Council, 160, 168-70; of 1958, 
167; of 1961, 167; of 1962, 20, 167; of 
1967 (postponed), 167; of 1971 (can- 
celed), 167; of 1980, 32-33, 157, 168; 
of 1989, 168, 177; parliamentary, 167; 
preindependence, 18; resistance coun- 
cil, xxiii-xxiv, 168-69; voter turn- 
out for, 170; women in, 170 

electricity: consumption of, 124; supply 
of, to Kenya, 184 

electric utilities: generation facilities of, 
123, 124; government control of, xxvii, 
104 

elite, 78, 81; ancient, 7; flight of, from 
Amin regime, 80; military, 78 

energy, 123-25; electricity, 124; loans for, 
142; petroleum, 124-25; regional 
cooperation in, 144; wood, 123-24 

English, 51, 133 

Entebbe, 210; population of, 48 

Entebbe airport, 25, 28; destruction of, 
130; flights from, 131-33; Israeli raid 
on, 29, 187, 190, 218; Palestinian 
hijacking at, 29, 187, 190, 218; num- 
ber of passengers through, 131 

Ethiopia, 144, 181, 199 

ethnic groups (see also under individual 
groups), 49-70, 178; British favoritism 
toward, xxii; classification of, 49; 
among Karamojong people, 64; rival- 
ries among, xxii, 41, 195 

Europe: flights to, 131-32; trade with, 179 

European Development Fund (EDF), 91 

European Economic Community (EEC), 
117, 143; assistance of, to tea industry, 
114-16; coffee rehabilitation program, 
111-12 

exchange rate: of shilling, 136; two-tier, 
136 

executions, 200; under Amin, 26, 30; 

punishment for, 234 
exile: of Amin, 30-31, 99, 195, 204; of 

intelligentsia, xxii, 203; of kabaka, 18, 

24, 172; of Obote, 26 
export earnings, xxvi, 100; decline in, 

101 , 137; as percentage of gross domes- 



tic product, 110 

exports (see also cash crops), 97, 137; 
diversification of, xxiii, 137, 138; licens- 
ing for, 104, 139-40, 151; nontradition- 
al, xxvi, 111, 138; program to increase, 
112; taxes on, 105; traditional, xxvi 

Exxon, 125 



family, 53 
famine, 61, 222 

FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation of the United Nations 

farmers, 81; agricultural cooperatives of, 
xxvi, 55, 78-80; tenant, 78; women as, 
52, 51, 65, 67 

FAZ. See Zairian Armed Forces 

FEDEMU. See Federal Democratic 
Movement of Uganda 

Federal Democratic Movement of Ugan- 
da (FEDEMU), 205, 206 

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
18 

Finland, 93 

fishing, 120-22, 186; with dynamite, 

121- 22; production, 120, 121 

Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) of the United Nations, 92, 

122- 23 

food processing: beverages, 126-27; flour, 
127; oil, 127-28 

Forces Armees Zairoises. See Zairian 
Armed Forces 

Ford Foundation, 234 

foreign aid, xxvi, 34; amount, 143; at- 
tempts to attract, 103, 105, 136, 137; 
to finance imports, 141; to finance 
recovery, 142; military, 216-20; to 
Museveni administration, 97 

foreign: currency, 137; loans, xxvi 

foreign debt. See debt, external 

foreign exchange, 97; attempts to in- 
crease, 138; auction system for allocat- 
ing, xxvi; shortage of, 99, 136, 137, 
138; unofficial, 141 

foreign policy: under Amin, 27-28, 179, 
195; importance of trade routes in, 178; 
as public gesture, 180 

foreign relations, 178-91; with Britain, 
187-88; with Israel, 189-90; with 
Kenya, xxv, 125, 131, 178, 181-84, 
196, 200, 223; with Libya, xxv; under 



281 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Museveni, xxiv; with Rwanda, xxv 

185- 86; with the Soviet Union, 190-91; 
spending on, 106; with Sudan, 185; 
with Tanzania, 182, 184; with the 
United States, 188-89; with Zaire, xxv, 

186- 87 

foreign trade, 137-40; precolonial, 9-10 
forest, 122-23; area, 122; poaching, 123; 

production, 122; products, 122, 124; 

rehabilitation, 122-23; resources, 122 
Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), 

205, 206, 209 
Fort Portal, 28, 130 
France: debt to, rescheduled, 142; exports 

to, 128, 137; police training by, 230 
Frelimo. See Front for the Liberation of 

Mozambique 
French, 133 

Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique. See 
Front for the Liberation of Mozam- 
bique 

Freshwater Fisheries Research Organiza- 
tion, 121 

Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
(Frelimo): Museveni's training under, 
34, 150 

FUNA. See Former Uganda National 
Army 



Ganda culture (see also Baganda people; 
Buganda): agricultural economy of, 52; 
authoritarian control among, 51; cul- 
tural chauvinism of, 13; divorce in, 54; 
history, 8; home territory, 52; individu- 
al achievement among, 51; influence of, 

52- 53; lineages in, 52; marriage in, 52, 
54; religion in, 75; social diversity in, 

53- 54; social organization in, 52, 53; 
villages, 52 

gasoline subsidies, 106 
Gayaza, 15 
Gazette, 165 

GDP. See gross domestic product 
General Service Department (GSD), 228 
General Service Unit (GSU), 24, 201; dis- 
banded, 26 
generational conflict, 15 
geography, 42-45 
German East Africa, 227 
Germany, 12 
Ghana Airways, 132 



"ghost" employees, xxvii, 133 
GNP. See gross national product 
gourds, 65 

government (see also under individual ad- 
ministrations), 155-65; borrowing, 135; 
coalitions in, 4, 21, 22; under consti- 
tution of 1962, 152; under constitution 
of 1966, 153; control over Buganda, 
172; as employer, 108; hostility of, 
toward labor unions, 21; interim 
(1979-80), 31-33, 187; involvement of, 
in economy, 101-7; northerners in, 
171; revenues, xxvi, 78; single-party, 
35; subsidies, 106 

government, local, 161-65; under Brit- 
ish, 161; chiefs in, 161; divisions in, 161 

government spending, 99; attempts to 
cut, 105; under Museveni, 158, 211; in 
1990, 106 

grain, 58; milling, government control of, 
xxvii 

Great Depression: agriculture during, 
xxii, 16; police in, 227 

Great Lakes, 45, 50 

Great Rift Valley, 5, 45 

Grindlays Bank, 134 

gross domestic product (GDP), 100, 101; 
agriculture as percentage of, 100; ex- 
port earnings as percentage of, 110 

gross national product (GNP), 211 

GSD. See General Service Department 

GSU. See General Service Unit 

guerrilla movements: fears of Ugandan 
support for, 185, 196; Popular Re- 
sistance Army, 150 

Guide, The, 210 

Guweddeko, Smuts, 27 

Gulu, xxiv, 169, 170, 208, 209, 219, 230, 
236 

guns, 10, 196; tax on, 13 



Habyarimana, Juvenal, xxv, 186, 196, 
226 

Hall, Sir John, 16 

Hassan, Shaykh Muhammad Abdullah, 

198 
Harare, 143 

health, public (see also acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome; population): birth 
rate, 47; cancer, 88; causes of death, 
88; death rate, 47, 88; fertility rate, 47; 



282 



Index 



infant mortality, 47, 88; life expectan- 
cy, 88; malnutrition, 88, 117-20; 
spending on, 106 
health care, 90-92; government spending 
on, xxvi, 90; under Ten-Point Pro- 
gram, 99 

health care facilities, 90; brokering of 
projects in, 4; government control of, 
151; hospitals, 90; rehabilitation of, 
90-91 



High Court, 166, 231; structure of, 
165-66 

Hilton Young Commission, 18 

Hima-Iru relations, 59 

Hima people (see also Tutsi), 55, 58, 69; 
ancestors of, 7, 55, 56; caste system of, 
7,8; cattle raising by, 56, 59; cultural 
chauvinism of, 7; dominance of, 59; 
marriage of, with Iru, 59, 60; political 
system of, 7 

Hitler, Adolf, 3 

Hoima, 150; cement production in, 126; 
oil exploration in, 125 

Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) (see also 
United Democratic Christian Move- 
ment), 41, 77, 208-9 

hotels, 123, 130, 138 

housing: government control of, xxvii; 
projects, 92-93; as social symbol, 
92-93; under Ten-Point Program, 99 

HSM. See Holy Spirit Movement 

human rights, 179, 233-36; under Na- 
tional Resistance Movement, 234; or- 
ganizations, 234-35 

human rights abuses, xxiii, xxiv, 229; by 
armed forces, xxiii, xxiv, 195, 205; un- 
der Amin, 195, 233-34; international 
protest against, 142, 189; by National 
Resistance Army, 235-36; by police, 
229; punishment for, xxiii, xxiv, 210, 
231, 234, 235 

hunting, 9 

Hutu, 7, 69, 185 



IBEA. See Imperial British East Africa 

Company 
Ibingira, Grace S.K., 21, 23 
Ibrahim, Ahmad bin, 10 



ICO. See International Coffee Organi- 
zation 

ICRC. See International Committee of the 
Red Cross 

IDA. See International Development As- 
sociation 

identity cards, 233 

IGADD. See Inter-Governmental Author- 
ity on Drought and Development 

IGG. See inspector general of government 

ILO. See International Labour Office 

Imatong Mountains, 45 

IMET. See International Military Educa- 
tion and Training 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

immigrants: from Burundi, 49; as percent- 
age of population, 49; from Rwanda, 
49; from Sudan, 49 

Imperial British East Africa Company 
(IBEA): army of, 196-97 

imports, 97, 138; of consumer goods, 178; 
dependence on, 178; licensing for, 104, 
139-40, 151; of petroleum products, 
178; of powdered milk, 117, 120, 127; 
value of, 137, 141 

independence, 3, 147, 200; movement, 4; 
preparation for, 17, 200 

India, 197 

Indian Ocean, 131, 178 
Indians. See Asians 

industrial: equipment, 97; growth, 100, 
123; infrastructure, deterioration of, 
123; production, decline in, 107 

industrial sector, 123-28; energy con- 
sumption by, 125; government control 
of, 151; loans for, 142; output of, 100, 
101; problems in, 123; regional cooper- 
ation in, xxv, 143; training in, 107; 
workers in, 107; working conditions in, 
107 

infant mortality, 47 

inflation, xxvi, 134, 158; attempts to con- 
trol, 136-37; rate, 136-37 

infrastructure: disrepair of, 110, 123, 130; 
economic, 97, 142; precolonial, 8 

inspector general of government (IGG), 
234 

Institute of Public Administration, 107 
Institute of Public Health, 91 
Institute of Teachers' Education, 85, 87 
Institute of Tropical Medicine, 89 
insurance: government control of, xxvii 
insurgencies: during National Resistance 



283 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Movement government, xxiii, xxvii, 
231-32, 235 
Integrated Fisheries Development Proj- 
ect, 120 

intelligentsia: exile of, xxii, 203 
Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 
Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Drought and Development (IGADD), 

143, 181; established, 144; members of, 

144, 141 

internal security {see also police), 162, 
226-30; by National Resistance Army, 
229 

Internal Security Unit, 227 
International Coffee Agreement, xxvi 
International Coffee Organization (ICO), 

112; collapse of, 112; export quotas, 

112 

International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), 34, 92, 206, 224, 233 

International Development Association 
(IDA), 91, 104 

International Development Bank, 120 

International Labour Office (ILO), 108 

International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), 220 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 34, 
106; special drawing right (SDR), 136, 
143; structural adjustment program of, 
158, 180; support from, 99, 143 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Corporation (Intelsat), 133 

investment, xxvii; foreign, xxvii, 100 

iron age, 6 

Iru people, 55, 69; dominated by Hima, 
59, 60; marriage of, with Hima, 59, 60; 
origins of, 55 

Islam {see also Muslims), 4, 73-74; con- 
versions to, 11, 13; introduction of, 10; 
theology of, 73 

Islamic University, 87 

Ismail (Khedive), 10 

Israel: aid from, 217; aid to Anyanya reb- 
els by, 25; Amin administration recog- 
nized by, 26; debt to, rescheduled, 142; 
materiel from, 216-17; military ad- 
visers from, 25, 28; military assistance 
from, 201, 216; military training by, 
25, 201, 216-17; moratorium on trade 
with, 140, 190; police training by, 228; 
raid on Entebbe by, 29, 187, 190, 218; 
relations with, 189-90 



Italian East Africa, 199 

Italy: barter with, 130, 138; debt to, 
rescheduled, 142; flights to, 131 

Iteso people, 65-66; age-sets of, 66; 
agricultural economy of, 65; clans of, 
65; under first Obote administration, 
21; homesteads of, 65; languages of, 50, 
60; lineages of, 65; marriage among, 
65; as percentage of population, 65; 
women in, 65 

ivory: hunters, 10; trade, xxii, 61, 98 



Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, 30-31 

Jie people, 60; clans of, 62-64; lineages 

of, 62; marriage among, 62; origins of, 

61 

Jinja, 120, 130, 131; deterioration of, 123; 
hydroelectric generation in, 4; mutiny 
in, 201; petroleum reserves at, 125; 
population of, 48 

Johnston, Sir Harry H., 13, 197, 226 

JSC. See Judicial Service Commission 

judges: 165, 166 

Judicature Act (Amendment) Bill (1987), 
165 

Judicial Service Commission (JSC), 165 
judicial system {see also under individual 
courts), 156, 165-67; prosecution in, for 
human rights abuses, xxiii; prosecution 
in, for treason by politicians, xxiv; 
structure of, 165 

kabaka, 172-75; clan of, 53; defense of in- 
stitution of, 172-74; investiture of, 19, 
72; membership of, in Church of En- 
gland, 19, 72; opposition to, 19; resto- 
ration of, 174-75, 209-10; role of, 52, 
75; selection of, 8 

Kabaka Daudi. See Daudi Chwa 

Kabaka Freddie. See Mutesa II, Freder- 
ick Walugembe 

Kabaka Yekka (KY), 157; coalition of, 
with Uganda People's Congress, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 167; formed, 20, 72, 167 

Kabale: electricity generation at, 124; 
population of, 48; telecommunications 
in, 133 

Kabarega (King), 12, 196 

Kabarole: petroleum exploration in, 156; 
population of, 48 



284 



Index 



Kabwegyere, Tarsis, 224 
Kadam Peak, 45 
kadogos (child soldiers), 214-16 
Kafu River, 46 

Kagera Basin Organization, 143, 144, 
181 

Kagera River, 30 

Kagera River Basin, 144, 181 

Kagera Salient, 182, 203 

Kagwa, Sir Apolo, 15; accused of corrup- 
tion, 15 

Kakira sugar estates, 116, 127 

Kakonge, John, 21, 23 

Kakwa people, 26, 66; as percentage of 
population, 66; political system of, 66; 
religion of, 76; as victims of anti-Amin 
revenge, 74 

Kakwenzire, Joan, 83 

Kalangala (Sese Islands), 161 

Kampala, 25, 121, 150, 201, 204; cap- 
ture of, by National Resistance Army, 
147; city council of, 161; hospitals in, 
90; population of, 48; telecommunica- 
tions system in, 133 

Kampala Hill (see also Kibule Hill): 
mosque on, 28 

Kampala-Kasese rail line, 131 

Kampola, 92 

Kanyeihamba, George, 235 

KAR. See King's African Rifles 

Karamoja, 65, 205, 227 

Karamojong peoples (see also Dodoth peo- 
ple; Jie people), 60-65, 151; age-sets of, 
64; agriculture of, 61-62; cattle of, 61, 
62, 63; diet of, 60, 62; ethnic groups 
among, 64; family structure of, 61; 
government discrimination against, 61; 
languages of, 50, 60; lineage of, 62; 
marriage among, 64; origins of, 61; 
pastoralist economy of, 60; social struc- 
ture of, 77 

Kasese, 133, 211; electricity generation 
at, 124 

Katonga River, 46 

Kaunda, Kenneth, 26 

Kayiira, Andrew, 157 

Kazinga Channel, 46 

Kenya, 3, 18, 21, 22, 23, 36, 42, 60, 180; 
Amin administration opposed by, 26, 
180-81; Amin administration recog- 
nized by, 182; annexation of, 182; 
border skirmishes with, xxv, 179, 184, 
196, 223, 224; under British, 199; cat- 



tle rustlers in, 205; in East African 
Community, 98, 143; in East African 
Development Bank, 134; in IGADD, 
144, 181; relations with, xxv, 125, 131, 
178, 181-84, 196, 220, 223; shipping 
through, 130, 131, 178, 183, 184, 223; 
smuggling to, 28; trade with, 182, 183; 
Ugandans in, 49, 182 

Kenya Colony: agriculture in, 14; portion 
of Uganda transferred to, 14; subsidies 
to, 14 

Kenya Railways, 184 

Kenyatta, Jomo, 26 

Kibule Hill (see also Kampala Hill): 
mosque on, 28 

Kidepo National Park, 64, 130 

Kigezi, 13, 125 

Kigongo, Haji Moses, 160 

Kilembe copper mine, 128 

Kimera (Prince), 8 

kingdoms, 161; abolished, 24 

kings: abolished, 174; in Bunyoro culture, 
56 

King's African Rifles (KAR), 32, 197, 
198 

King's College Budo, 15 
King's Enemies, 19 
King's Friends, 19; election boycott by, 
20 

Kinyala Sugar Works, 116 
Kiryandongo, 211 
Kisekka, Samson, 157, 174 
Kisumu, 14, 131 
Kitgum, xxiv, 209, 230 
Kiwanuka, Benedicto, 19, 20; disap- 
peared, 29 
Kony, Joseph, 77, 209 
Kotido, 230 
Kumam people, 66 
Kumi, 230, 235 
KY. See Kabaka Yekka 



labor: actions, 80; force, 107-8; survey, 
107-8 

labor unions: government hostility 

toward, 21; leadership of, 21 
Labwor Hills, 45 

Labwor people, 60, 65; homesteads of, 65 
Labwor region, 65 
Lac Livu, 50 
lakes, 45-46, 121 



285 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Lake Albert, 45, 46, 50 
Lake Bugondo, 45 
Lake Edward, 45, 46, 50 
Lake George, 46 
Lake Kwania, 45 

Lake Kyoga, 45, 46, 50, 51, 65; fishing 

in, 120, 121 
Lake Kyoga Basin, 45 
Lake Naivasha, 182 
Lake Opeta, 45 
Lake Tanganyika, 50 
Lake Victoria, 6, 7, 8, 42, 45, 46, 50, 51, 

131, 223; fishing in, 120 
Lake Victoria Basin, 42; rainfall in, 6 
Lake Victoria Bottling Company, 127 
Lakwena, Alice, 77, 209 
landowners, 78, 80 
land tenure, 16 

land use, 42; in Ganda culture, 52 
Langi people, 21, 35, 66; agriculture of, 
67; cattle of, 67; clans of, 67; killed un- 
der Amin, 26-27, 232; languages of, 
50, 66; lineages of, 67; marriage 
among, 67; recruited into army, 26, 
213; social structure of, 77-78 
Lango, 19, 206; cotton production in, 14 
language groups (see also under individual 
languages), 49-70; Arabic, 51; Bantu, 4; 
Central Sudanic, 51, 68-69; differences 
among, 4; Eastern Lacustrine Bantu, 
50, 51-55; Eastern Nilotic, 50, 60-66; 
English, 51; Nilotic, 4; Swahili, 51; 
Western Lacustrine Bantu, 50, 55-60; 
Western Nilotic, 50, 66-68 
Latek, Odong, 77 

Legislative Council, 199, 227; reor- 
ganized, 17-18 

Libya: attempt to gain aid from, 28, 29; 
military support from, 204, 206, 218, 
219; relations with, xxv, 180, 190; trade 
with, 139 

Libyan People's Bureau, 223 

life expectancy, 47 

lineages, 52, 54, 56, 62, 65 

Lira, xxiv, 190, 209, 230 

literacy: under British, 14-15; among 
Baganda, 51; under Museveni govern- 
ment, 84; under Ten-Point Program, 
99 

livestock (see also cattle), 1 17-20; beekeep- 
ing, 120; goats, 65, 68, 117, 120; 
poultry, 120; sheep, 117 

Local Administrations Act (1967), 162 



Local Government Ordinance (1949), 161 
location, 42 

Lokitaung, Kenya, 198 
Lome Convention, 143-44 
"lost counties," 5, 10, 12, 14, 22; resto- 
ration of, 22 
lower class, 80 

Luganda: broadcasts in, 133; publications 

in, 15 
Lugard, Frederick, 12 
Lugazi sugar estates, 116, 127 
Lugbara people, 26, 66; languages of, 51 ; 
as percentage of population, 68; 
religion of, 74-75, 76; social organiza- 
tion of, 68 
Lukiiko, 167 

Lule, Yusuf: background of, 31, 74; 
government of, 31, 204; military un- 
der, 213, 214; Museveni's merger with, 
150, 157 

Lumbwa, 198 

Lumumba, Patrice, 23 

Lunyoro language, 58 

Luo people (Kenya), 66 

Lutherans, 72 

Lutoro language, 58 

Luwero District, 149, 205; housing in, 93; 
refugees from, 34 

Luwero Triangle, 150, 188; atrocities in, 
206, 229; genocide in, 3, 34, 189; loot- 
ing in, 34 

Luwum, Janan, 30 

Luzira Prison, 232 

Lwanga, David, 157 

Lwo languages, 66 



Madagascar, 199 

Madhvani family, 116 

Madi people: languages of, 51; as percent- 
age of population, 68; social organiza- 
tion of, 68 

Magezi, George, 21, 23 

mailo estates, 14, 78 

Makerere University, 4, 31, 85, 86, 91, 
107 

Makindye military prison, 232 
Malaba, 184 
malaria, 47 
Malawi, 18 

Malire Mechanical Regiment, 28; muti- 
ny of, 30 



286 



Index 



malnutrition, 88, 117-20 

Malyamungu, Major, 27 

manufacturing, 125-28; of construction 
materials, 126; of consumer goods, 
126-28; output, 4; rehabilitation of, 
126 

marketing boards, 103, 104; complaints 
about, 104 

marriage: among Acholi, 67; among 
Alur, 68; among Banyankole, 59; in 
Basoga culture, 54; in Ganda culture, 
52, 54; among Iteso, 65; among Jie, 62; 
among Langi, 67; polygynous, 68, 82 

Masaka, 28, 203, 204; hotels in, 130; 
housing in, 92; population of, 48 

Masaka Central Prison, 233 

Masindi, 125, 150 

materiel: imports of, 211, 218, 219 

Mau Mau rebellion, 3, 18, 199 

Mauritius, 199 

Mayanga-Nkangi, Joshua, 157 
Maziba Hydroelectric Power Station, 124 
Mbale, 13, 87; hotels in, 130; population 

of, 48 
Mbandwa religion, 74 
Mbarara, 27, 87, 149, 203, 204, 218; 

housing in, 92 
Mbarara Kadogo School, 216 
Mehta family, 114, 116 
Member of the British Empire Medal, 

199 

Mengo High School, 15 
Meru, Kenya, 198 
Methodists, 72 

middle class, 3; restoration of, 81 

Middle East, 199; flights to, 132 

migration (see also exile), 55; in Bunyoro, 
56; to Kenya, 49; rural-to-urban, 48 

military (see also armed forces): abuses, 
xxvii, 211; benefits, 213; conditions of 
service, 213-14; elite, 78; growth of, 
200; history, 196-200; justice system, 
214; morale, 213; northern dominance 
of, 212; pay, 201, 213; rule, 41; train- 
ing, 213; veterans, xxiii, 214 

Military Commission, 32, 204, 205 

Military Council, 199, 206 

military government: popular support for, 
195 

Military Medal, 199 
Military Police Force, 202, 228, 229 
military recruiting, 213; under Amin, 80, 
202, 213; ethnic-based, 213; under 



Lule, 213; under Obote, 202 
military recruits: age of, 212; education 

required for, 212; tour of duty of, 212 
minerals, 42, 128 
mines, 123 

mining, 128; copper, 128; gold, 128; 
government control of, xxvii; promo- 
tion of, 131; regional cooperation in, 
144; rehabilitation of, 128 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husband- 
ry, and Fisheries, 87, 127 
Ministry of Community Development, 87 
Ministry of Defence, 103, 219; spending 

by, 105, 106, 205 
Ministry of Education, 86, 103; spend- 
ing by, 105, 106 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
122 

Ministry of Finance, 105 
Ministry of Health, 89, 91; spending by, 
106 

Ministry of Home Affairs, 200 

Ministry of Housing, 106 

Ministry of Internal Affairs, 228, 229 

Ministry of Justice, 166 

Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, 87 

Ministry of Local Government, 165 

Ministry of Planning and Economic De- 
velopment, 47 

Ministry of Trade, 140 

Minority Rights Group Report Number 
66, 33 

mission schools, 5 

Mitchell Cotts, 114 

Mitchell, Sir Philip, 198 

Mobile Police Patrol Unit (MPPU), 230 

Mobutu Sese Seko, 186, 220 

modernization, 41; through education, 
42; and National Resistance Move- 
ment, 41; role of women in, 41-42 

Moi, Daniel T. arap, xxiv, 182, 183, 196, 
223; meetings of, with Museveni, 183, 
184 

Mombasa, 14, 199 
monetary policy, 151 
money supply, 136 
Moroto, 200, 230 
Moshi Declaration, 158 
mountains, 45, 54 

Mountains of the Moon. See Ruwenzori 

Mountains 
Moyo, 205, 222, 223 
Mpanga, Joyce, 83 



287 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Mpigi district, 210; hospitals in, 90 
Mpologoma River, 46 
Mpoma: telecommunications system in, 
133 

MPPU. See Mobile Police Patrol Unit 
Mubende, 7 

Mubuku Power Scheme, 124 
Muhammad, 73 

Mukono district: hospitals in, 90 

Mukwano Industries, 128 

Mulago Hospital, 91, 190 

Munno (Your Friend), 15, 19 

Murchison Bay Prison, 233 

Murchison (Kabalega) Falls, 46; hydro- 
electric power station, 124 

Murchison (Kabalega) National Game 
Park, 68, 124, 130 

Musazi, I.K., 17 

Museveni, Yoweri Kaguta, xxii, 32, 35, 
175, 195; background of, 150; coup at- 
tempts against, 210; coup d'etat by, 36, 
81, 210; foreign policy of, 179; inter- 
national reaction to, 180; mediation of, 
in Sudanese civil war, 185; meetings of, 
with Moi, 183, 184; Muslims under, 
74; private army of, 32, 204; revolu- 
tionary training of, 150; roles of, 155; 
Uganda People's Movement formed 
by, 149; visit of, to Britain, 188; vow 
of, to overthrow Obote, 33-34 

Museveni administration (see also National 
Resistance Movement government; 
Ten-Point Program), 147; accused of 
corruption, 103; army under, 231; 
cabinet under, 158; debt under, 134; 
foreign aid to, 97, 142; foreign relations 
under, xxiv, 190, 219; goals of, xxii; 
improvements in military by, 213, 214; 
police under, 229-30; policy making 
under, 158; privatization under, 103; 
women under, 83 

Muslims (see also Islam): under Amin, 
29-30; under British colonial govern- 
ment, 197; under Museveni, 74; num- 
ber of, 73; as percentage of population, 
70, 73; rivalry of, with Christians, 5, 
11, 30, 72, 147; as victims of anti-Amin 
revenge, 74 

Mutebi, Ronald, 174, 175 

Mutesa I (Kabaka), 11, 51, 196; conver- 
sion of, to Islam, 73 

Mutesa II, Frederick Walugembe (Kaba- 
ka Freddie), 16; exiled, 18, 24, 172; as 



head of state, 20; power of, 18-19; rein- 
stated, 18 

Mutesa, Edward, 200, 202 

Mutukula military prison, 232 

Muwanga, Paulo, 32, 234 

Mwanza, 131 

Mwinyi, Ali Hassan, xxiv 

Naguru, 228 

Nairobi: flights to, 132; telecommunica- 
tions system in, 133 
Nakasongola, 125 
Nakawa, 127 

Nalukolongo Diesel Workshop, 131 
Namilyango, 15 
Namirembe Hill, 72 
Namuwongo, 92 
National Assembly, 153 
National College of Business Studies, 85, 
87 

National Consultative Council (NCC), 
31, 204, 205; quarrels in, 31 

National Executive Committee (NEC), 
160-61 

national income, 4 

national integration: obstacles to, 4-5 
nationalism: absence of, 4, 5; local, 5 
National Military Leadership Academy 

(Tanzania), 219 
National Mining Commission, 128 
National Resistance Army (NRA), xxii, 
33-34, 36, 205; background of, 148, 
149-50; capture of Kampala by, 147, 
183; counterinsurgency campaign, 209; 
foreign training for, 219; formation of, 
150; government overthrown by, 195, 
206; human rights violations by, 
235-36; internal security by, 229; or- 
ganization of, 212; peace accord signed 
with Military Council, 206; rebel ac- 
tivities of, 206; Rwandans in, 224-26; 
self-sufficiency of, 211; size of, 212; 
women in, 83 
National Resistance Army Council 
(NRAC), 154; interim period extend- 
ed by, 154-55, 177-78 
National Resistance Council (NRC), 83, 
158-61, 178; authority of, 154, 159, 
160; candidates for, 168-69; elections, 
160, 168; expanded, 160; hierarchy of, 
156, 211; members of, 154; women in, 
83, 160, 163, 168, 169 



288 



Index 



National Resistance Movement govern- 
ment (NRM) (see also Museveni ad- 
ministration; National Resistance 
Army; resistance councils; Ten-Point 
Program), 77, 147, 189, 205; agricul- 
tural diversification under, 97; amnesty 
to rebels, 208; background of, 148, 
149-50; banking under, 103; budget, 
158; Buganda under, 174, 178; cabi- 
net, 83, 159-60; constitution of 1967 
under, 154, 211; control of exports by, 
103; control of imports by, 103; coun- 
terinsurgency strategy, 208; discipline 
of soldiers by, xxiv, 211; economic poli- 
cies of, 149; economic reform under, 
xxiii, 99-100; education under, 85; ex- 
ecutive under, 156-58; foreign policy 
under, 179, 190-91; goals of, xxii-xxiii, 
147, 208, 210, 232; housing under, 
92-93; human rights under, 234; indus- 
try under, 123; interim period extend- 
ed by, 154-55, 177-78; legislature 
under, 158-61; local government un- 
der, 162; marketing boards under, 103; 
ministries under, 156; modernization 
under, 41; organization of, 149; para- 
statals under, 103; peace treaty of, with 
Okello government, 182-83, 206; peace 
treaty of, with Uganda People's 
Democratic Army, 182-83; policies of, 
148-49; political issues under, 170-71, 
185; political parties restricted under, 
175-76, 178; political tactics of, 177- 
78; principle of broad-based govern- 
ment, 148, 156-58, 159, 175, 178; 
regional cooperation under, 181; 
resistance to, 148; wage laborers under, 
107; women in, 41-42, 83 

National Security Agency (NSA), 229, 
232 

National Teachers' College, 85, 87 
National Tobacco Corporation, 116 
Native Authority Ordinance (1919), 161 
natural resources, 3 

NCC. See National Consultative Council 
Nebbi, 92, 125 

NEC. See National Executive Committee 

Netherlands, 93; assistance of, to tea in- 
dustry, 114-16 

newspapers: government control of, xxvii; 
languages published in, 51 

New Vision, The, 209 

Nile River (see also Albert Nile; Victoria 



Nile): search for source of, 11; Upper, 
10 

Nile Mansions, 35 

Nilotic-speaking people: interaction of, 
with Bantu-speaking people, 6-7; ori- 
gins of, 50; as percentage of population, 
60; political systems of, 6 

Nixon, Richard, 3 

Nkole. See Ankole kingdom 

Nnalubale. See Lake Victoria 

nonalignment, 179, 180, 190 

north (see also north-south conflict): 
agriculture in, 110; in army, 198, 212; 
dominance of, 171; fertility rate in, 47; 
government control of, xxii; insurgen- 
cies in, xxiii; land use in, 42; language 
groups in, 49; Nubians in, 69; occupa- 
tions in, 80; pacified, xxiv; pastoralism 
in, 110; political control by, 148; rain- 
fall in, 46, 110; temperatures in, 46 

Northern Brigade, 198 

North Korea, 128; barter with, 139; 
materiel from, 220; military advisers 
from, 35, 219, 220; police training in, 
229, 230; relations with, 180, 218-19, 
220 

north-south conflict, 5, 171, 178; in the 

army, 26-27; violence in, 171-72 
Norwegian Church Aid, 222 
NRA. See National Resistance Army 
NRAC. See National Resistance Army 
Council 

NRC. See National Resistance Council 
NRM. See National Resistance Movement 
NSA. See National Security Agency 
Nuba Mountains, 69 
Nubian mercenaries (see also Sudan), 69, 
196-97; under Amin, 27, 203; coloni- 
al, 5, 12; grievances of, 197; power of, 
80; precolonial, 196-97; task of, 197 
Nubians, 69; cotton production by, 69; 
education of, 69; languages of, 69; ori- 
gins of, 69; population of, 69; as vic- 
tims of anti-Amin revenge, 74 
Numayri, Jafaar, 25 
Nyerere, Julius, 24, 26, 30, 195, 203, 218 
Nyoro culture (see also Banyoro people; 
Bunyoro), 56-58; political organization 
of, 56-58; social organization of, 56; 
women in, 56 

OAU. See Organization of African Unity 



289 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Obonyo, Banjamin, 235 

Obote, Milton, 3, 28; Amin as protege 
of, 22; Asians under, 70; attempted 
assassination of, 25; attempt to coun- 
terattack, 28; brokering by, 4, 21; con- 
stituency of, 21; corruption charges 
against, 23; "coup d'etat" by, 24, 202; 
exiled to Tanzania, 26; massacres un- 
der, 34, 35; opposition to, 205; over- 
thrown, 202; plan to arrest Amin, 25; 
as prime minister, 20, 200; return of, 
from exile, 32, 182, 205; Uganda Peo- 
ple's Congress formed by, 19; vote of 
"no confidence" against, 23 

Obote administration, first, 20, 200-202; 
army under, xxii; army mutiny under, 
22; brokering under, 4; coalition un- 
der, 20, 21, 22, 23, 167; constitution 
suspended under, 3, 152, 202; foreign 
relations under, 182, 185; northerners 
under, 80; opposition support for, 
22-23; southerners under, 80 

Obote administration, second, 3, 33-35, 
204-6; balance of payments under, 
142; British support for, 187-88, 218; 
economy under, 99; election to, 149, 
168; foreign relations under, 182, 189; 
killings under, 34, 189; military under, 
213; overthrown, 150; recovery pro- 
gram, 141, 142; revenge under, xxii, 
68, 224; Rwandans deported by, 186, 
224; terror under, 195 

Obwangor, Cuthbert, 21 

Occupational Health and Hygiene De- 
partment, 107 

Oder, Arthur, 167 

Office of the President, 103; spending by, 
105 

OIC. See Organization of the Islamic 
Conference 

Ojok, David Oyite, 32, 204-5; death of, 
35; private army of, 32 

Okello, Basilio Olara, 35, 206 

Okello, John Angelo, 208 

Okello, Tito Lutwa, 150, 206; economy 
under, 99, 142; government of, 35-36, 
142, 182 

Okoya, Acap, 25 

Olenga, "General," 23 

Onama, Felix, 21, 22, 201 

OPEC . See Organization of the Petrole- 
um Exporting Countries 

Opolot, Shaban, 201 



Opu, Matthew, 166 

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 

xxv ; Amin administration opposed by, 

26; Museveni as chair of, 180 
Organization of the Islamic Conference 

(OIC), 87 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 

countries (OPEC), 120 
Oropom people, 61 
Owen Falls, 46 

Owen Falls hydroelectric project, 4, 124 
Oxfam. See Oxford Committee for Fam- 
ine Relief 

Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
(Oxfam), 92 

Pager River, 46 

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
204, 218 

Pakistanis. See Asians 

parastatals, 103-4; corruption in, 108; 
elimination of, xxvii; formation of, 103; 
wages in, 108 

Paris Club: debt rescheduled with, 142; 
support from, 143 

parliament {see also National Assembly): 
composition of, 22-23; elections for, 
167; power of, 158-59; supremacy of, 
158-59, 160 

Parti de Liberation Congolaise. See Con- 
golese Liberation Party 

Pasha, Emin, 197 

pastoral economy, 42 

pastoralists, 4, 50, 59; Chwezi, 7; 
Karamojong, 60; as ancient elite, 7; 
trade of, with agriculturalists, 6 

patronage: among ethnic groups, 41; in 
government, 4 

patron-client relations, 15, 78, 178; an- 
cient, 7; in Ankole, 59, 60; in Bugan- 
da, 53; in Busoga, 54; in Toro, 58 

Penal Code (1930), 233 

Peters, Karl, 12 

Petrofina, 125 

petroleum: barter for, 139; consumption 
of, 124-25; exploration for, 125, 131; 
import of, 124, 178; reserves of, 125 

physicians, 90 

plantains. See bananas 

PLC. See Congolese Liberation Party 

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation 



290 



Index 



police (see also internal security; Special 
Force Units), 32; abductions by, 35; 
under British, 197; under constitution 
of 1962, 227; crimes by, 229, 230; 
Criminal Investigation Department, 
228, 229; duties of, 227, 228; foreign 
training of, 187, 230; history of, 226- 
27; human rights violations by, 229; 
military duties of, 227; under Muse- 
veni, 229-30; number of, 229, 230; 
organization of, 228, 230; political 
education for, 148; salaries, 230; secret, 
201; training, 228, 229, 230; units 
of, 228; used to quell dissent, 228 

Police Air Wing, 212, 229-30 

Police Council, 228 

Police Special Force, 229 

Police Training School, 228 

political development: role of armed 
forces in, 195, 210 

political education, 150, 151-52, 163; of 
army, 148; of Baganda, 174; impor- 
tance of, 163; of police, 148, 230 

political parties, 175-77; candidates nomi- 
nated by, 153; formation of, 4, xxii, 18; 
under National Resistance Movement 
government, 155, 175-76, 178 

political systems (see also under individual 
peoples): divisions among, 5; precoloni- 
al, 6-9 

political violence, xxiv, 179, 228 
politics: and religion, 41, 70-72, 75 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- 
tine: Air France hijacking by, 29, 187, 
190, 218 

Popular Resistance Army (PRA): guer- 
rilla war of, 150; merger of, with Lule, 
150; organized, 150 

population (see also health, public), 47-49; 
Acholi as percentage of, 67; Asian, 70; 
Baganda as percentage of, 51; Bagiru 
as percentage of, 54; Bantu-speakers as 
percentage of, 50; Banyoro as percent- 
age of, 55; Basoga as percentage of, 54; 
Batoro as percentage of, 58; birth rate, 
47; of Buganda, 5, 19; Central Sudanic- 
speakers as percentage of, 68; Chris- 
tians as percentage of, 70; composition 
of, 47; death rate, 47, 88; density, 
47-48, 55; dependency ratio, 47; distri- 
bution of, 47-49; growth rate, 47, 100; 
growth rate, and AIDS, 90; immigrants 
as percentage of, 49; Iteso as percentage 



of, 65; Langi as percentage of, 67; loss- 
es under British, 16; Lugwara as perent- 
age of, 68; Madi as percentage of, 68; 
Muslims as percentage of, 70; Nilotic- 
speakers as percentage of, 60, 66; in 
1959, 19; in 1969, 47; in 1980, 47; in 
1990, 47; Nubian, 69; sex ratio, 47; size, 
47; in urban areas, 48 

poverty, 80 

Pravda, 190 

Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern 

and Southern Africa, 140, 143, 181 
Presbyterians, 72 

president: under constitution of 1966, 153; 

under constitution of 1967, 153, 211; 

judges appointed by, 165, 166; powers 

of, 156; under proclamation of 1986, 

156; term of, 156 
press, 33 

prime minister: under constitution of 1966, 
153; under proclamation of 1986, 156; 
role of, 4 
prisoners: abuse of, 232; freed, 233 
prisons, 197, 232-33; attempt to rehabili- 
tate, 232; conditions, 232-33; facilities, 
232 

Prison Service, 232 

privatization: under Museveni, 103, 
125-26; of public enterprises, xxvii 

proclamation of 1986, 156, 159; amend- 
ments to, 156 

Produce Marketing Board, 140 

property, expropriated: restitution of, 
xxvi-xxvii 

Property Custodian Board, 114 

Protectorate Police, 226, 227 

Protestants (see also under individual denomi- 
nations), 4, 12, 19; armies of, 72; as per- 
centage of population, 70, 72; resented, 
147 

Psiair, 133 

PSU. See Public Safety Unit 
PTA. See Preferential Trade Area for East- 
ern and Southern Africa 
Public Enterprise Project, 104 
Public Order and Security Act (1968), 233 
Public Safety Unit (PSU), 228; disappear- 
ances by, 29; killing by, 203, 232; ter- 
ror by, 203, 229 
Public Service Commission, 228 
Public Service Improvement Project, 107 
public works: sewage systems, 92; water 
supplies, 92, 99 



291 



Uganda: A Country Study 



Qadhafi, Muammar, xxv, 28; military 
aid from, 30, 218 



radio: broadcasts, languages of, 51, 133; 

stations, 133 
Radio Uganda, 33 

railroads, 130-31, 178; completion of, 14; 
condition of, 130; extent of, 130; 
government control of, xxvii, 104; 
transport, 5 

rainfall, 6, 46, 108-10, 136 

rainforest, 6 

Radai, 92 

Rakai district, 90 

RC. See resistance councils 

RDP. See Rehabilitation and Develop- 
ment Plan 

refugee camps, 70, 206 

refugees: in Kenya, 182; returning, 189, 
222-23; Rwandan, xxv, 49, 69-70, 
224-26; in Sudan, 49, 205, 222; Ugan- 
dan, 49, 186; in Zaire, 49, 186, 205; 
Zairian, xxv 

regional: cooperation, xxv, 143-44, 151, 
184; organizations, 180-81; rivalries, 
xxii 

regions: economic disparity of, 147; fear 
of domination by, 171-72 

Rehabilitation and Development Plan 
(RDP), 99-100, 106-7; agriculture un- 
der, 110; goals of, 106, 143; initiated, 
103; tourism under, 130; transportation 
under, 130 

religion {see also under individual religions), 
70-77; and acquired immune deficien- 
cy syndrome, 41; conversions in, 11, 
41; economic implications of, 70-72; lo- 
cal {see also under individual sects), 70, 
74-75; millenarian, 76-77; and poli- 
tics, 41, 70-72, 75, 178; rivalries 
among, xxiv, 5, 11, 29, 30 

Rembe, 76 

resistance commmittees, 162, 166, 168, 
169, 170 

resistance councils (RCs), xxiii, 77, 105, 
149, 191; creation of, 162, 211; duties 
of, 163-65; efficiency of, xxiii; elections 
for, xxiii-xxiv, 156, 168-70; hierarchy 
of, 162-63; purpose of, 163-65; term 
of, 163 

rivers, 45-46 

road system: brokering of projects in, 4; 



condition of, 123, 130; construction of, 
162; rehabilitation of, 130-31, 138 
Royal Military Academy (Sandhurst), 
216 

RPF. See Rwandan Patriotic Front 
Rubaga Hill, 72 

Rural Entrepreneurial/V ocational Train- 
ing Center, 107 
rural farmers scheme, 135-36 
Ruwenzori Mountains, 45, 186, 220 
Ruwenzururu political movement, 58, 
186 

Rwanda, 42; ancient peoples of, 7; bar- 
ter with, 139; fighting along border 
with, xxv; immigrants from, 49, 185; 
in Kagera Basin Organization, 144, 
181; refugees from, xxv, 49, 185-86, 
196, 224-26; relations with, xxv, 183, 
185-86, 220, 224-26; revolution in, 
185-86 

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), xxv, 
186, 226 

Rwandans, 69-70; deportation of, 69-70, 
224; ethnic groups of, 69; as mercenar- 
ies, 203, 224-26; as percentage of popu- 
lation, 69; as refugees, 69-70; religion 
of, 69 



St. Mary's Kisubi, 15, 19 
Saudi Arabia; attempt to gain aid from, 
28, 29 

Save the Children Fund, 91 

schools {see also education), 4; in Bugan- 
da, xxii; brokering of projects in, 4; 
curriculum of, 84; effect of political in- 
stability on, 84; enrollment, 84; exami- 
nations, 84; farms run by, 120; 
government control of, 151; levels sys- 
tem in, 84; mission, 83; Quranic, 69 

School of Infantry (Tanzania), 219 

Scots Guards, 201 

Schwermaschinen Kimbinat Ernst Thael- 

mann, 127 
SDR. See special drawing right 
Sebei people, 55 

security; regional cooperation in, xxv 
Semliki River, 46 
Sese Islands (Kalangala), 161 
Shell, 125 

shilling {see also currency): depreciated, 
105; devaluation of, 34-35, 99, 107, 



292 



Index 



112, 134, 136, 158; exchange rate of, 
136; floated, 99, 104, 135, 136; linked 
to special drawing right, 136 

Siedle, Robert, 27 

Simba Battalion, 27, 203 

Singapore, 25, 202 

Sino-Uganda Fisheries Joint Venture 

Company, 121 
slaves, 59; slave trade, xxii, 10, 77 
sleeping sickness epidemics, 16, 76 
smuggling, 111, 186; under Amin, 28, 
80, 182; arms, 23, 186, 189-90; coffee, 
28, 111, 112, 182; to Kenya, 28; per- 
centage of population engaged in, 81; 
steps to eliminate, 28, 111, 229 
social change, 77-81 ; role of armed forces 

in, 195, 210 
social services: under Ten-Point Program, 
99 

social welfare, 92-93 

Societe Generate de Surveillance, 140 

Society of Missionaries of Africa (White 

Fathers), 11, 12, 72 
Somalia, 144, 181 
Sor, 75 

Soroti District, 170, 209, 230, 236 
south (see also north- south conflict): 
agriculture in, 110; autonomy of, xxii; 
dominance of, xxii, 171; fertility rate 
in, 47; land use in, 42; language groups 
in, 49; under Museveni, 195-96; occu- 
pations in, 80; political control by, 148; 
rainfall in, 46, 110; temperatures in, 
46, 110 

South Africa: moratorium on trade with, 
140, 188 

Soviet Union: Amin's coup denounced 
by, 190; materiel from, 190, 217, 218, 
219; military assistance from, 190, 
217-18; military relations with, 216; 
military training by, 190, 217; relations 
with, 180, 190-91, 219 

special drawing right, 136, 143 

Special Force Units, 24, 25, 35, 227 

Speke, J.H., 10-11 

SPLA. See Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army 

SRB. See State Research Bureau 
Ssekandi, Edward, 234 
Ssemogerere, Paul Kawanga, 32, 157 
Staffordshire Regiment, 201 
Standard Bank, 134 
standard of living; of Baganda, 51 



Stanley, Henry M., 8, 11 

State Research Bureau (SRB), 26, 
228-29; disappearances by, 29, 228-29; 
killing by, 203, 228-29; mercenaries in, 
229; prisoners of, 232; terror by, 203, 
228-29; torture by, 35, 228-29 

steel industry: attempts to rehabilitate, 
126; government control of, xxvii, 104 

Stroh, Nicholas, 27 

structural adjustment program, xxiii, 142, 
158, 180 

Sudan (see also Nubians), 5, 42, 60, 204; 
cattle rustlers in, 205; civil war in, xxv, 
5, 25, 185, 189-90, 196; drought in, 
xxv; in IGADD, 144, 181; immigrants 
from, 49; influence of, on Alur people, 
68; nonaggression pact with, 185, 223; 
refugee camps in, 36; refugees in, 49, 
185, 189, 205, 222; relations with, 185, 
189, 220, 222-23; religion in, 76; sup- 
port for Amin in, 185 

Sudanese People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA), 222, 223 

sugar, 116; as cash crop, 97; imports of, 
116, 127; plantations, 16, 70, 98; 
production, 58, 116, 125, 127; subsi- 
dies, 106 

sugar industry: government control of, 
xxvii; neglect of, under Amin, 28; re- 
habilitation of, 127 

Suicide Battalion, 203 

Sumba Island, 224 

Supreme Court of Uganda, 165-66 

Swahili, 51, 69, 133 

Sweden, 206 



Tabasiat Peak, 45 

Tamteco. See Toro and Mityana Tea 
Company 

Tanganyika (see also Tanzania), 10, 16, 
18, 22, 199; army mutiny in, 201 

Tanzania (see also Tanganyika; Zanzibar), 
3, 7, 10, 23, 28, 30, 32, 42, 70, 180; 
Amin administration opposed by, 26, 
180-81; cattle purchased from, 117; in 
East African Community, 98, 143; in 
East African Development Bank, 134; 
fighting along border with, xxv; invad- 
ed by Amin, 30, 182, 203; in Kagera 
Basin Organization, 144, 181; military 
assistance from, 219; military training 



293 



Uganda: A Country Study 



by, 184, 219; Obote exiled to, 26, 182; 
relations with, 181-84, 184, 196, 219, 
220; shipping through, 130, 131, 183 
Tanzanian People's Defence Force 
(TPDF), 31, 32, 203; Amin overthrown 
by, 99, 182, 195, 203-4, 218; training 
by, 218 

taxes, 68; government control of, 162; un- 
der kabakas, 52; reform of, 105 

tea, 113-16; barter for, 139; as cash crop, 
97; expansion of, 114-16; exports, 137; 
payment for, 104; prices, 104, 114, 
140; producers, 114; production, xxvi, 
98, 110, 113-14; under Rehabilitation 
and Development Plan, 110 

teachers, 84, 85; shortage of, 87 

telecommunications, 133; contribution of, 
to economy, 100; government control 
of, xxvii; regional cooperation in, 143 

telephones, 133 

television: broadcasts, 133; programs, 
languages of, 51, 133; stations, 133 

temperature, 46, 110 

Ten-Point Program, xxiii, 147-48, 
149-52, 161, 174, 180; broad-based 
government under, 158; courts under, 
166; democracy under, 150, 163; 
economic development under, 99; 
economic goals of, 99, 151, 155; elimi- 
nation of corruption under, 151; na- 
tional unity under, 150-51; political 
parties under, 175; regional coopera- 
tion under, 151, 180-81; rehabilitation 
under, 151; resistance councils under, 
162; ten points of, 150-51; written, 150 

Tepeth people, 60, 64-65; religion of, 75 

terrorism: under Amin, 81, 229, 231; by 
army, 30; under Obote, 34; state, 29, 
211, 229 

Teso District, 21, 60; area of, 65; cotton 
production in, 14 

Teuso people, 60, 64 

textile production, 125; government con- 
trol of, xxvii; rehabilitation of, 126; 
Soviet aid for, 190 

tobacco, 116; barter for, 139; as cash 
crop, 56, 68; exports, 137; industry, re- 
habilitation of, 127; prices, 140; 
production, xxvi, 61, 110, 116, 125; 
under Rehabilitation and Development 
Plan, 110 

topography, 42-45; altitude, 42 

Toro and Mityana Tea Company 



(Tamteco), 114, 116 
Toro kingdom, 58, 69, 152, 227; agricul- 
ture in, 58; British treaty with, 13; land- 
owning classes in, 78; police in, 227; 
political organization of, 58; prison in, 
232 

Tororo, 28, 235, 236; cement production 
in : 126; oil mill in, 127 

torture, 147, 200; under Amin, 26; by 
army, 206; under Obote, 35; by police, 
229; punishment for, 234; by State 
Research Bureau, 35, 228-29 

Total, 125 

tourist agencies: government control of, 
xxvii 

tourist industry, 97, 124, 128-30; contri- 
bution of, to economy, 100; destroyed, 
130; foreign exchange from, 130; loans 
for, 142; number of tourists in, 128, 
130; rehabilitation of, 130; revenue 
from, 128, 130 

trade (see also balance of trade): in agricul- 
tural products, xxii; barter for, 130, 
138-39, 179; between agriculturalists 
and pastoralists, 6, 65; contribution of, 
to economy, 100; ivory, xxii; regional 
cooperation in, xxv; routes, 178; slave, 
xxii, 10 

tradition, 41 

transportation, 130-33, 137; air, 130, 
131-33; contribution of, to economy, 
100; energy consumption by, 124-25; 
freight, 131, 183; infrastructure, dis- 
repair of, 130; network, 4; regional 
cooperation in, xxv, 143, 144 
tribalism. See nationalism, local 
Tutsi people (see also Hima), 69, 185-86; 
as refugees, 186 



UDCM. See United Democratic Chris- 
tian Movement 

UEB. See Uganda Electricity Board 

UFM. See Uganda Freedom Movement 

Uganda: etymology of, 51 

Uganda African Farmers Union, 17 

Uganda Airlines, 131-33 

Uganda Armed Constabulary Ordinance 
(1903), 197 

Uganda Association of Women Lawyers, 
235 

Uganda Bata Shoe Company, 128 



294 



Index 



Uganda Cement Industry, 126 
Uganda Company, 14 
Uganda Commercial Bank, 83, 103, 134, 
135 

Uganda Cooperative Bank, 134 
Uganda Council of Women, 82 
Uganda Dairy Corporation, 127 
Uganda Development Bank, 116, 134 
Uganda Development Corporation, 17 
Uganda Electricity Board (UEB), 124; 

problems in, 124 
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), 

205, 206 

Uganda Human Rights Activists 

(UHRA), 232, 233, 234 
Uganda Law Society, 235 
Uganda Leather and Tanning Industry, 

128 

Uganda Millers, 127 

Uganda National Congress, 17 

Uganda National Liberation Army 
(UNLA), 30, 36, 172, 209; atrocities 
of, 206; counterinsurgency operations 
of, 205; coup by, 30, 204; killings by, 
205; North Korean advisers to, 219; 
ousted, 148; rebel activities of, 208 

Uganda National Liberation Front 
(UNLF), 31, 158, 168, 182 

Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), 
157, 205, 206 

Ugandan Red Cross, 91 

Ugandan-Sudanese Joint Ministerial 
Commissions, 222 

Uganda People's Army (UP A), 208 

Uganda People's Congress (UPC), 32, 
175; advantages of, 33; coalition of, 
with Kabaka Yekka, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
167; constitution under, 159; corrup- 
tion in, 149; criticism by, of election 
process, 170; factions in, 21; formed, 
19; in National Resistance Movement 
government, 176 

Uganda People's Congress Youth 
League, 21 

Uganda People's Democratic Army 
(UPDA), 176, 206 

Uganda People's Democratic Movement 
(UPDM), 235 

Uganda People's Movement (UPM), 
175; formed, 149 

Uganda Police College, 228, 232 

Uganda Police Force. See police 

Uganda Prisons Ordinance (1903), 197 



Uganda Protectorate; established, 12, 
197; portion transferred to Kenya Colo- 
ny, 14 

Uganda Railways Corporation, 131 
Uganda Regiment, 198; reorganized, 198 
Uganda Rifles, 197, 198, 201; mutiny of, 

197; size of, 200 
Uganda Tea Corporation, 114, 116 
Uganda Tea Growers' Corporation 

(UTGC), 114 
Uganda Technical College, 85 
Uganda Volunteer Reserve, 198 
Uganda War Memorial Committee, 214 
UNDP. See United Nations Development 

Programme 
unemployment: of veterans, xxiii, 214 
UNHCR. See United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees 
UHRA. See Uganda Human Rights Ac- 
tivists 

UNICEF. See United Nations Children's 
Fund 

United Democratic Christian Movement 
(UDCM) (see also Holy Spirit Move- 
ment), 209 

United Garment Industries, 126 

United Nations, 188; foodlifts by, 222; 
Museveni's address to, 181; report on 
UNLA, 205 

United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), 91, 122-23 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), 49, 70, 186, 222, 
226 

United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), 91, 117 

United States: Amin administration 
recognized by, 26; business with, 188; 
debt to, rescheduled, 142; economic as- 
sistance from, 188, 220; emergency 
relief to, 188, 189; police training by, 
228, 229; relations with, 188-89, 220; 
trade with, 10, 117, 137, 179, 188; 
Ugandan criticism of, 188 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 138 

Unity Conference, 31 

UNLA. Uganda National Liberation 
Army 

UNLF. See Uganda National Liberation 
Front 

UNRF. See Uganda National Rescue 
Front 



295 



Uganda: A Country Study 



UP A. See Uganda People's Army 
UPC. See Uganda People's Congress 
UPDA. See Uganda People's Democrat- 
ic Army 

UPDM. See Uganda People's Democrat- 
ic Movement 
UPM. See Uganda People's Movement 
Urban Authorities Act, (1964), 162 
Usuk County, 170 

UTGC. See Uganda Tea Growers' Cor- 
poration 



Victoria Nile, 45, 46, 51 

Viginter, 130 

Virunga Mountains, 45 

Voice of America, 33 

voters: under National Resistance Move- 
ment government, 168; requirements, 
154 

voting, 169-70 



wage laborers: in agriculture, 110; under 

Museveni, 107; public, 108 
wages, 107 

water: government spending on, xxvi; im- 
provements in supplies of, 92; systems, 
92 

West Germany, 122-23; flights to, 131 
West Nile District, 21, 25, 34 
West Nile region, 46, 67, 201, 202, 213 
WFP. See World Food Programme 
White Fathers. See Society of Missionaries 
of Africa 

WHO. See World Health Organization 
women, 81-83; and AIDS, 83, 89; 
citizenship of, 153; in civil war, 82; and 
divorce, 83; employed in commerce, 
83; as farmers, 52, 51, 65, 67, 82; fer- 
tility rates of, 47; laws regarding, 166; 
life expectancy of, 47; in National 
Resistance Army, 83; in National 
Resistance Council, 83, 160, 163, 168, 
169; in Nyoro culture, 56; in political 



positions, 83, 160, 170; in postsecond- 
ary education, 87; pressure by, for le- 
gal reforms, 82; as religious leaders, 82; 
subordination of, to men, 81 
workers: skilled, 80; subsistence farming 

by, 81; unskilled, 80, 81 
World Bank, 105-6; aid from, 153; as- 
sistance by, for oil exploration, 125; as- 
sistance by, to tea industry, 114-16 
World Food Programme (WFP), 117 
World Health Organization (WHO), 89 
World War I: agriculture during, xxii, 16; 
casualties in, 198; military in, 198, 212; 
police in, 227 
World War II, 199-200, 212; medals won 
in, 199; police in, 227; theaters fought 
in, 199 



Yakan religion, 76-77; outlawed, 76; po- 
litical authority in, 76-77 

Young Baganda Association, 15-16 

Young Women's Christian Association 
(YWCA), 87 

Yugoslavia: barter with, 139 

YWCA. See Young Women's Christian 
Association 



Zaire {see also Belgian Congo), 3-4, 42, 
183, 204; fighting along border with, 
xxv, 186-87, 196, 220, 221; influence 
of, on Alur people, 68; refugees from, 
xxv; refugees in, 49, 186, 189, 205; re- 
lations with, 186-87, 220-21; talks 
with, 221 

Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), 221 

Zambia, 18, 35; agricultural assistance 
from, 120; Amin administration op- 
posed by, 26 

Zambian Airways, 131, 133 

Zanzibar {see also Tanzania), 10, 70 

Zanzibar Levy, 197 

Zimbabwe, 18 

Zoka River, 46 



296 



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550-167 


Finland 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-46 


Panama 



297 



550-156 


Paraguay 


550-53 


Thailand 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-89 


Tunisia 


550-42 


Peru 


550-80 


Turkey 


550-72 


Philippines 


550-74 


Uganda 


550-162 


Poland 


550-97 


Uruguay 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-160 


Romania 


550-32 


Vietnam 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


550-51 


Saudi Arabia 


550-99 


Yugoslavia 


550-70 


Senegal 


550-67 


Zaire 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-184 


Singapore 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


550-86 


Somalia 






550-93 


South Africa 






550-95 


Soviet Union 






550-179 


Spain 






550-96 


Sri Lanka 






550-27 


Sudan 






550-47 


Syria 






550-62 


Tanzania 







ti-U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1992 311-824/60010 



298 



PIN: 004247-000 



